

ANARCHY UNBOUND

Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

In *Anarchy Unbound*, Peter T. Leeson uses rational choice theory to explore the benefits of self-governance. Relying on experience from the past and present, Professor Leeson provides evidence of anarchy "working" where it is least expected to do so and explains how this is possible. Provocatively, Leeson argues that in some cases anarchy may even outperform government as a system of social organization, and demonstrates where this may occur. *Anarchy Unbound* challenges the conventional self-governance wisdom. It showcases the incredible ingenuity of private individuals to secure social cooperation without government and how their surprising means of doing so can be superior to reliance on the state.

Peter T. Leeson is Professor of Economics and the BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism at George Mason University. He is also the North American editor of *Public Choice*. Previously, he was a Visiting Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, the F.A. Hayek Fellow at the London School of Economics, and a Visiting Fellow in Political Economy and Government at Harvard University. Professor Leeson is the author of *The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates* (2009) and a recipient of the Fund for the Study of Spontaneous Order's Hayek Prize, which he received for his research on self-governance.





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Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

PETER T. LEESON

George Mason University





CAMBRIDGEUNIVERSITY PRESS

32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10013-2473, USA

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

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www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107629707

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First published 2014

Printed in the United States of America

A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Leeson, Peter T., 1979–

Anarchy unbound : why self-governance works better than you think / Peter T. Leeson, George Mason University, VA.

pages cm. – (Cambridge studies in economics, choice, and society)
Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-107-02580-6 (hardback) - ISBN 978-1-107-62970-7 (paperback)

1. Anarchism. 2. Autonomy. I. Title. HX833.L4135 2014

321'.07-dc23 2013024739

ISBN 978-1-107-02580-6 Hardback ISBN 978-1-107-62970-7 Paperback

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In loving memory of Douglas Bruce Rogers: student, collaborator, and friend





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Acknowledgments

The ideas presented in Chapters 5, 7, and 10 of this book were developed with coauthors to whom I'm greatly indebted: Alex Nowrasteh, David Skarbek, and Claudia Williamson. I also thank Scott Parris, my editor at Cambridge University Press, and Peter Boettke and Timur Kuran, the editors of Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society, the series in which this book appears, for their encouragement and for providing me the opportunity to share my thinking about self-governance with others. As usual, Chris Coyne provided excellent thoughts and suggestions, which improved my discussion considerably. My discussion also benefited from the comments of three anonymous reviewers. Finally, I thank the Earhart Foundation for generously supporting this book.