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Jonathan Boff

Index

[More information](#)

Index

- aircraft
 Allied superiority in, 75
 German views on British use of, 163–4
 Third Army use of, 137–40
 use in counter-battery work, 151
- Amiens, Battle of, 24
 German view of importance of tanks to outcome, 174–5
- armies, British
 Third Army
 apparent youth of soldiers in, 54
 asks Haldane to push on, 8 October, 89
 assault formations, 134
 assault on Hindenburg Line, 27
 September, 30
 attacks database, 135, 141, 145, 150
 average rate of advance, 78
 close air support from III Brigade, RAF, 137
 command
 summary, 214
 command group cohesion, 215
 composition in mid-August and attack plans, 24–5
 construction of light railways, 88
 construction of railways and roads, 82–6
 decline in infantry strength of, 41
 delay, 20 October, 89
 effect of logistics on operations, November, 90
 gains and losses, 21 August–11 November, 36
 German opposition facing, 21 August, 26
 logistic challenges
 summary, 89
 logistic requirement, 80
 long-range artillery interdiction, 151
 manpower
 summary, 68
 manpower advantage of, 40–1, 49
- morale
 qualitative assessments of, 98–100
 quantitative assessments of, 100–5
 NYD(N) cases, 101
 operations, 21 August–7 September, 26–9
 operations preliminary to assault on Hindenburg Line, 29–30
 operations, 8–23 October, 31–2
 operations, 23 October–11 November, 32–5
 orders for open warfare, 206
 orders in improvised fighting, 206
 orders VI Corps to take over army front, 9 November, 91
 planning for attack on the Hindenburg Line, 195–8
 ration strength, 80
 role in Hundred Days and representativeness of, 15–16
 schools, 60, 62, 63
 senior ranks dominated by pre-war officers, 157
 set-piece barrages, 147
 shortage of road capacity, 88
 training, lack of time for, 63–5
- Fourth Army
 ages of German prisoners taken, August, 52
- armies, German
Second and *Seventeenth* armies, representativeness of, 16–17
Second Army, 26
 artillery ammunition expenditure, 76
 availability of labour, 227
 casualties, 45–6
 combat-worthiness of divisions, 33, 35
 complains of RAF interference, 163
 failure on 18 September, 163
 MIA as a percentage of total casualties, 109

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02428-1 - Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918

Jonathan Boff

Index

[More information](#)

278 Index

- armies, German (cont.)
 nervous cases, 106
 reduced British tank threat, 177
 view of British infantry, 161
Sixth Army, 169
Seventeenth Army, 25, 28
 anti-tank tactics, 175
 casualties, 29, 45–6
 combat-worthiness of divisions, 34
 composition in mid-August, 25–6
 decline in infantry strength, 46
 failure of 22 August counter-attack, 231
 manpower, 41, 48, 49
 MIA as a percentage of total casualties, 105, 109, 117
 officer casualties, 71
 ratio of MIA to KIA, 119
 supply situation of, 77
 army groups, German
Army Group Boehm, 232–3, 236
 casualties, 46
 complains of RAF interference, 163
 defence instructions, 236
 exhaustion of, 232
Army Group Rupprecht, 18, 19, 227, 229, 232
 casualties, 45–6
 defensive instructions, 168
 lessons of Hamel for anti-tank defence, 176
- artillery
 balance of strength in, 76
 decentralisation of command of, 193
 German views on British use of, 162–3
 Third Army use of, 145–52
 attrition, 249–50
Auftragstaktik, 234, 239–40
- Bapaume, 203
 captured by New Zealand Division, 29
 August, 28
- Beach, James, 11, 18–19, 23, 115, 156
- Beaulencourt
 21st Division attack on, 1 September, 123–4
- Below, *General der Infanterie* Otto von, 231, 233, 241
 commander of *Seventeenth Army*, 25
- Below, *Generalleutnant* Hans von, 241–2
 criticism of Ludendorff, 230, 235
 view of British tactics, 160
- Bidwell, Shelford and Graham,
 Dominick, 11
- Boehn, *Generaloberst* Max von, 229, 241
- Bourne, John, 8, 11
- British army
 age of soldiers, 53–5
 bottom-up innovation, 156
 decline in manpower available in 1918,
 and effects thereof, 41–5
 experience level of soldiers, 56–7
 innovation
 resistance to top-down change, 156–7
 officers' distrust of top-down
 standardisation, 66–7
 pre-war ethos
 regimental particularism, 156
 resistance to top-down change, 157–9
 quality of replacements, 55–6
 training at home, 58
- Brown, Ian Malcolm, 80
- Byng, General Sir Julian, 8, 222
 attack on Havrincourt, 12 September, 196–7
 command group cohesion, 215
 concerns about supply, 90
 destruction of private papers, 9
 disagreement with Haldane, 202
 needs Rawlinson's help, 30
 Order of the Day, 11 November 1918, 1
 orders in open warfare, 206
 orders pursuit, 3 September, 28
 plan for 23 August, 204
 planned pause on 22 August, 26
 planning 21 August attack, 202
 planning attack on Hindenburg Line, 197
 planning for 4 November attack, 211
 pushes for early attack on the Hindenburg
 Line, 29, 89, 197
 relationship with Haldane, 223
 responds to Haig's pressure to maintain
 momentum, 21–22 August, 26–7
 response to Maxse's pamphlets, 67
 takes foot off pedal, 8 November, 212
- Cambrai, Battle of (November 1917):
 tactical lessons of, 196
- Campbell, Major-General David, 224
 relationship with Shute, 159
- cavalry
 Third Army use of, 136–7
- Citino, Robert, 234
- command
 British
 decentralisation in Third Army
 summary, 214–15
 decentralisation of artillery control, 208
 decentralisation of, in open warfare,
 206–7
 summary, 210–11

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02428-1 - Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918

Jonathan Boff

Index

[More information](#)

Index

279

- impact of personality on, 219–25
- importance of informal relationships to, 218–19
- planning instructions in *SS 135*, 194–5
- planning set-piece attacks in practice
 - attack on the Hindenburg Line, 195–203
 - pre-war principles of, 193–4
 - use of initiative, 191–3
- ‘command culture’
 - definition, 215
- ‘command group’
 - definition, 215–16
- ‘command groups’ in Third Army
 - cohesion of, 215–18
- German
 - command groups, cohesion of, compared with British, 237–9
 - over-centralisation and rigidity of, 234–42
 - ‘mission’ or ‘directive’, 234, *See Auftragstaktik*
- Command and Communications
 - German defensive problems, 172–4
- Command, British
 - German view of, 226
- communications
 - alternatives to wire, 184–8
 - difficulty of maintaining in open warfare, 183–4
 - German problems, 191
 - in static warfare, 179–83
 - increased volume in open warfare, 183
 - runners, 185–6
 - speed of battlefield, 188
 - training for, British, 189–91
 - visual signalling and pigeon, 186
 - wireless, 186–8
- Connelly, Mark, 157
- Corps, American
 - II, 18, 40
- Corps, British
 - Australian, 9, 16
 - Canadian, 8, 9, 16, 31, 196
 - Cavalry, 135
 - schools, 59
 - Tank, 74, 135, 155
 - declining value of, 142–3
 - heavy casualties, 141–2
 - RAF support for, 138
 - schools, 59
- IV
 - infantry strength of, 41
 - no attacks without artillery support, 146
 - ‘Notes on Tactics and Training’, 131, 156
- RAF support for, 138
- signals office throughput, 183
- trouble with 63rd Division, 220–1
- usage of cable, 183
- V
 - infantry strength of, 41
 - liberates German cabbages, 87
 - planning the attack on the Hindenburg Line, 200
- VI
 - artillery usage, 147
 - attack on Havrincourt, 12 September, 196–7
 - expenditure of artillery ammunition, 76
 - heavy artillery, 151–2
 - infantry strength of, 41
 - MIA as a percentage of total casualties, 105
 - planning for attack on the Hindenburg Line, 198
 - planning the attack on the Hindenburg Line, 200
 - prisoners taken by, 117
 - shocked by German tank attack, 8 October, 150
- XVII
 - communications, 179
 - RAF support for, 139
 - use of wireless, 186
- Corps, German
 - divisions switched between, 237
 - I Bavarian*
 - artillery deployment, 177
 - I Bavarian Reserve*, 26
 - II Bavarian*, 26, 229
 - artillery deployment, 177
 - command of the defence, 174
 - counter attacks, 231
 - defence scheme, 170
 - morale, 111–12
 - problems of defence in depth, 174
 - problems with defence in depth, 172
 - view of British leadership, 226
 - view on tanks, 175
 - III Bavarian*, 26
 - IV Reserve*, 19, 26, 160, 229
 - RAF impact on, 163
- XI, 26
- XIV Reserve*, 26, 74, 161, 171, 228
 - failed attack on Riencourt, 31 August, 236–7
 - morale, 113–15
- XVIII, 26
 - morale, 74
 - recentralises command, 173

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02428-1 - *Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918*

Jonathan Boff

Index

[More information](#)

280 Index

- Corps, German (cont.)
 view on tanks, 164, 175
LI, 26, 160, 230, 235, 241
 importance of smoke, 164
LIV, 26, 170
 morale, 113
 RAF impact on, 163
- defensive fortifications, German
 poor state of, 228–9
 shortage of labour for construction of, 227–8
- defensive policy, German
 each line to be held to the last, 229–30
 failure of elastic defence, 230–2
- Deist, Wilhelm, 14, 92
- Deverell, Major-General Cyril, 67, 146, 223
 relationship with Haldane, 224
- Divisions, British
 Guards, 1, 24, 207
 attack on 4 November, 211
 bottom-up innovation, 156
 command groups, 217–18
 devolution of command, 210
 Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Gort's initiative, 219–20
 Matheson's quality control, 222
 micro-management, 209
 peaceful penetration, 213
 planning for attack on Hindenburg Line, 27 September, 198–201
 rifle strength in action, 43
 signals, 27 September, 184, 185–6
 situation reports, 189
 traffic control, 88
 training, 64, 66
- New Zealand, 1, 9, 16, 24
 command groups, 217–18
 field artillery, 208
 German view of, 160
 quality of manpower, 57
 signals, 184
 stragglers, 104
 takes Bapaume, 28
 takes Le Quesnoy, 34
 trouble with 63rd Division, 220–1
- 1st Cavalry, 25
 2nd, 1, 24, 207
 attack frontages, 131
 creeping barrage, 148, 198
 field artillery, 208
 initiative from below, 209
 morale, 99
 quick tempo, 204–5
 tank co-operation, 143, 144
 training, 64
- 2nd Cavalry, 25
 3rd, 1, 24, 207
 artillery, 147–8
 attack frontages, 131–2
 calls for more initiative, 209
 casualties, 29
 cavalry co-operation, 136
 command, 200
 creeping barrage, 198
 micro-management, 203
 ration strength, 57
 tank co-operation, 144–5
- 5th, 1, 24
 assault formations, 134
 combined arms, 130
 command groups, 216
 communications, 183, 191
 field artillery, 208
 German view of, 160
 micro-management and delegation, 201
 supply, 86
 tank co-operation, 144
 training, 64
 use of field artillery in mobile warfare, 150
- 17th, 1, 25
 battalion strengths, 43
 casualties, 29
 field artillery, 208
 German view of, 160
 manpower, 57
 outnumber opponents, 20 October, 50
 situation reports, 190
 traffic control, 88
 training, 64
- 19th, 149, 213–14
- 21st, 1, 25
 assault formations, 134
 attack on Beaulencourt, 123–4
 field artillery, 208
 traffic control, 88
- 24th, 88, 104
- 33rd
 assault formations, 162
 attack on 21 September, 177
 Pinney as GOC, 224–5
 signals, speed of transmission of, 188
- 37th, 1, 24
 communications, 183
 fire and movement, 129
 German view of, 160
 rifle strength in action, 43
 supply, 90
 training, 62–3

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02428-1 - Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918

Jonathan Boff

Index

[More information](#)

Index

281

- trench strength, 131
- 38th, 1, 25
 - court martial rate, 104
 - German view of, 160
 - lack of activity in early 1918, 64
 - training, 66
- 42nd, 1, 24
 - advanced guard composition, 136
 - assault formations, 134
 - attack frontages, 132
 - cavalry co-operation, 136
 - field artillery, 150, 208
 - initiative, 193–4
 - lack of time for training, 64
 - machine guns, 140
 - sickness rate, 100
 - signals, 185
 - tank co-operation, lack of, 141, 144
- 52nd, 149, 207
- 56th, 207, 217
- 57th, 129, 131, 186
 - communications network, 179–82
- 59th, 24
- 61st
 - engineers' activity, 85
 - manpower, 55
 - supply, 90
 - Thorne's impressions, 219
- 62nd, 1, 25, 30, 44, 62
 - attack on 4 November, 211
 - attack on Havrincourt, 12 September, 196–7
 - barrages, 147
 - creeping barrage, 198
 - initiative, 209
 - need for forward command, 209–10
 - stickiness in pursuit, 212–13
 - traffic control, 88
 - training, 64
 - trench-fighting, 127–8
- 63rd, 24, 66
 - command groups, 218
 - fire and movement, 130
 - Lawrie sacked, 155
 - problems at Thillooy, 220–1
 - war-weary prisoners, 100
- Divisions, German
 - Deutsche Jäger*
 - called 'scabs', 113
 - morale, 110
 - Guards Cavalry*
 - homecoming parade in Berlin, 3–4
 - 1st Guards Reserve*
 - morale, 110
 - rotation between corps, 237
 - training, 69
 - 2nd Guards Reserve*
 - morale, 109
 - retreats as ordered, 21 August, 26
 - 3rd Reserve*
 - morale, 112
 - 3rd Marine*
 - morale, 109, 114
 - sickness rate, 78
 - 4th Bavarian*
 - artillery deployment, 176
 - communications, 173
 - counter attacks, 231
 - defence scheme, 170
 - fails to retreat as ordered, 21 August, 26
 - failure of counter attack, 31 August, 232
 - failure of counter attacks, 172
 - morale, 109
 - protests against attack orders, 236–7
 - 5th Bavarian*
 - officer casualties, 71
 - training, 70
 - 6th*
 - manpower, 50
 - 6th Bavarian Reserve*
 - command group cohesion, 238
 - morale, 109
 - 11th Bavarian*, 116, 234
 - manpower, 54, 69
 - training, 69
 - 12th Reserve*
 - stragglers, 115
 - 14th*
 - arguments over commitment of, 236
 - 16th Bavarian*
 - command group cohesion, 238
 - counter attacks, 231–2
 - failure of counter attack, 31 August, 236–7
 - state of, early November, 113
 - view of British tactics, 160
 - weakness of, 171
 - 21st Reserve*
 - defence scheme, 170
 - morale, 111
 - 23rd*
 - overrun by fire and movement, 161
 - replacements, 51
 - 25th*
 - morale, 111, 113
 - 25th Reserve*
 - morale, 112
 - 30th*
 - morale, 113
 - 40th*

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02428-1 - Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918

Jonathan Boff

Index

[More information](#)

282 Index

Divisions, German (cont.)

morale, 109, 111

44th Reserve

command group cohesion, 238

morale, 114

pre-war regular officers in, 238

48th Reserve

morale, 114

49th Reserve

shortage of officers, 71

52nd

morale, 109

54th

manpower, 49

83rd

command group cohesion, 238

training, 69

111th

morale, 112

113th

command group cohesion, 238

man on the spot calls off attack, 13
September, 240

morale, 112

out-manoeuved, 97

replacements, 51

rotation between corps, 237

training, 69

119th

deserters, 115

exhaustion of, 50–1

shortage of officers, 71

*121st*failure to counter attack, 18 September,
233*183rd*

failure of counter attacks, 172

manpower, 49

view of British, 161

185th

officer casualties, 71

shortage of officers, 72

187th

manpower, 47

204th

manpower, 47

207th

manpower, 47

220th

morale, 112

234th

morale, 109, 111, 112

Ebert, Friedrich

Stab-in-the-back myth, 3

Edmonds, Sir James

influence on historiography, 10–11

Feilding, Major-General Geoffrey, 223

Fennell, Jonathan, 95–6

Fergusson, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles

response to Maxse's pamphlets, 67

view of 63rd Division, 221

Field Service Regulations I (1909), 7

Foch, Marshal Ferdinand, 5, 10, 13

and *bataille générale*, 23–4

appointed supreme allied commander, 22

goes on the offensive, 23–4

plans for late September co-ordinated

offensive, 29

plans for Lorraine offensive, 40

plans to follow up success at Battle of

Amiens, 24

pressure on Haig, 26

view of British contribution in Hundred

Days, 1

food supply

German, 78

French, David, 72, 155, 157

Fuller, J. F. C., 10

gas

Third Army use of, 137

German army

age of soldiers, 52–3

attrition of officers, 70–2

decline in manpower, 1918, 45–9

deterioration by early November, 33–4

further deterioration in early November,

34–5

morale

British intelligence estimates of, 109–11

mail censorship reports on, 111–15

quantitative assessments of, 106–9

'shirking', 115–16

surrender, 117–19

quality of replacements, 50–2

supposed tactical excellence of, 165

German defeat

summary of hypotheses for, 15

German sources

problems of, 18–19

Griffith, Paddy, 188

Haig, Field Marshal Sir Douglas, 5

concerns about manpower, 44

description of the Hundred Days campaign

in his official despatch, 38

discounts POW reports, 115

on logistics, 78–9

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02428-1 - Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918

Jonathan Boff

Index

[More information](#)

Index

283

- operational method, 23
- orders greater aggression, 214
- planning attack on the Hindenburg Line, 197
- presses Byng to push on, 21–22 August, 26–7
- reins Byng in, 29
- relationship with De Pree, 221
- view of importance of attrition to the outcome, 246
- Haldane, Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer, 24
 - attack on Havrincourt, 12 September, 196–7
 - command problems, 206
 - complains of cautious advance, 212
 - complains of stickiness, 44, 214, 223
 - delegation, 207
 - difficulty of training men, 44
 - dispute with Byng and Harper, 202
 - hesitates, 207
 - plan for 23 August, 204
 - plan for 4 November, 211
 - quality assurance, 201
 - relationship with Byng, 223
 - relationships with subordinates, 223–4
 - response to Maxse's pamphlets, 67
 - shortage of spares for lorries, 86
 - spurs on subordinates, 207
 - supply problems, 89, 90
 - view of cavalry, 136
 - view of tanks, 142
- Hall, Brian, 179
- Harper, Lieutenant-General Sir George Montague, 24
 - disagreement with Haldane, 196
 - dispute with Lawrie, 155
 - experience of Cambrai, 196
 - need for artillery support, 146
 - response to Maxse's pamphlets, 67
- Harris, J. P., 8, 12, 13, 125, 142, 192
- Havrincourt, attack on, 12 September, 196–7
- Heye, *Oberst* Wilhelm, 240
- Hindenburg, *Feldmarschall* Paul von, 2, 30–1, 98, 230
- Horne, General Sir Henry, 8, 24
- Hundred Days, 1
 - rolling attrition rather than manoeuvre warfare, 36–7
 - tempo of campaign and nature of operations, 37–8
- intelligence
 - Allied estimates of German manpower decline, 50
 - British
 - estimates of German morale, 109–11
 - for attack on the Hindenburg Line, 198
 - German
 - views of British tactical skill, 162
 - Ironside, Brigadier-General Edmund, 204–5, 219
 - Jahr, Christoph, 92–3, 94, 115
 - Kuhl, *Generalleutnant* Hermann von, 76
 - chief of staff to Crown Prince Rupprecht, 25
 - Lawrie, Major-General C. E., sacking of, 220–1
 - 'Learning curve', 11–12, 246–8
 - Liddell Hart, Basil, 10
 - logistics
 - British problems, 78–9
 - British traffic control, 88–9
 - impact on British advance, 89–91
 - light railways, British use of, 87–8
 - motor transport
 - British use of, 86–7
 - railways
 - British use of, 81–2
 - railways
 - British construction problems, 82–4
 - roads
 - British construction of, 84–6
 - summary of British supply system, 80–1
 - Lofßberg, *Generalmajor* Fritz von, 23, 227, 232
 - chief of staff, *Second Army*, 26
 - Ludendorff, *General der Infanterie* Erich, 2, 23
 - artillery deployment, 177
 - asserts *OHL* control of tactical doctrine, 168–9
 - defensive policy of, 227
 - encourages men, July, 162
 - fires Boehn, 233
 - further attempts to impose common doctrine, 169–70
 - gamble, spring 1918, 22
 - goes over to the defensive, 23
 - importance of artillery to the defence, 176
 - micro-management, 170
 - nervous strain, 233–4
 - orders changes to defence in depth, summer 1918, 167–9
 - reaction to Battle of Amiens, 24, 174

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02428-1 - Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918

Jonathan Boff

Index

[More information](#)

284 Index

- Ludendorff, *General der Infanterie* (cont.)
 response to Allied attacks on Hindenburg Line, 30–1
 spring offensives 1918, 22–3
 success in imposing common doctrine, 170–1
 view of British tactics, 160
 view of possible replacement pool, 45
- manpower
 age profile of British soldiers, 53–5
 age profile of German soldiers, 52–3
 Allied intelligence estimates of decline of German, 50
 balance in early November, 49–50
 balance in Third Army sector, 40–1
 decline in British, 41–5
 decline in German during 1918, 45–9
 effect of American build-up on balance of, 40
 experience level of British soldiers, 56–7
 lack of time to integrate German replacements, 50–1
 quality of British replacements, 55–6
 quality of German replacements, 50–2
- Marne, Second Battle of the, 22–3
- Marwitz, *General der Kavallerie* Georg von der, 74, 233, 241–2
 commander of *Second Army*, 26
 criticism of Ludendorff, 235
- matériel*
 British production of, 79
 German production of, 76–8
- Matheson, Major-General Torquil, 44, 156, 189, 222, 223
- Maxse, Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor, 62, 65, 66
 pamphlets issued as Inspector-General, Training, 62, 67
- modern war, 248–50
 definition, 5–7
- morale
 definition, 94–6
 surrender, 117–19
- Morgen, *Generalleutnant* Curt von, 74
 comments on Hindenburg Line, 228–9
- Mudra, *General der Infanterie* Bruno von, 233
- Oberste Heeresleitung*, 3, 76
 artillery, 176
 attempts to impose common defensive doctrine, 169–70
 central control of reserves, 236
 control of tactical doctrine, 167–9
 deceives men, 167
 defensive tactics, 165
 demand for artillery guns, 76
 goes over to the defensive, 23
 last formal intervention in tactical doctrine, 21 September, 169
 leaflets on tanks, 175
 maintains influence over tactical doctrine after 21 September, 170
 memos from Boehn, 233
 no longer able to provide reserves, 30 September, 31
 orders building of defensive lines, 227
 political atmosphere of not conducive to good decision-making, 240–1
 rejects reflex counter attacks, 172
 success in imposing common doctrine, 170–1
 warned by Rupprecht of need for immediate retreat, 34
 operational level of war, 4
- Palazzo, Albert, 125, 152
- Pereira, Major-General George, 44, 201, 223–4
- Philpott, William, 5, 94
- Pinney, Major-General Reginald
 relationship with Shute, 158, 207, 224
 relationships with subordinates, 224–5
- Ponsonby, Major-General John, 67, 216
- Prior, Robin and Wilson, Trevor, 9, 12, 13, 124–5, 192
- Rawlinson, General Sir Henry, 9, 24, 29, 30, 40, 124, 127
- Reichstag*, 230
- Ritter, Gerhard, 92
- Robbins, Simon, 13, 125
- Royal Air Force
 counter-battery role, 151
 German views on British use of, 163–4
 role in campaign, 137–40
 support on 21 August, 25
- Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria, 2, 227, 230, 232, 241
 army group commander, 25
 concerned about shortage of men, 171
 proposes new defensive scheme but is overruled by Ludendorff, 168–9
 warns of need for immediate retreat, 5 November, 34–5

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02428-1 - Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918

Jonathan Boff

Index

[More information](#)

Index

285

- Samuels, Martin, 192
 view of German command style, 234
Sanitätsbericht, 106–9
 Sheffield, Gary, 8, 11, 12, 94, 125
 Shute, Lieutenant-General Sir Cameron,
 24, 215
 fussing, 224
 quality assurance, 201
 relations with Pinney, 207
 response to Maxse's pamphlets, 67
 Simkins, Peter, 10, 11, 63, 125
 Simpson, Andy, 12, 192, 194
 Solly-Flood, Major-General Arthur,
 179, 207
 SS 135, 60, 123, 129, 131–2, 146, 192
 artillery, 208
 new edition, November, 156
 pursuit, 211
 quality assurance, 201
 SS 143, 129, 131–3
 SS 144, 132
 SS 152, 58–62, 155
 'Stab-in-the-back myth', 2–4
 Stachelbeck, Christian, 54, 116, 234,
 235–6
 Stephenson, Scott, 93
 Stevenson, David, 39
 stone
 shortage of, 84–6
 Strachan, Hew, 15
 surrender
 distinction between voluntary and
 involuntary, 96–8
 tactical level of war, 5
 tactics
 aircraft
 German views on British use of,
 163–4
 Third Army use of, 137–40, 151
 all-arms attacks, 136
 artillery
 Third Army use of, 145–52
 British assault formations, 132–4
 British assault troop densities, 131–2
 British trench-fighting, 127–8
 cavalry, Third Army use of, 136–7
 combined arms
 brigade groups, 135–6
 British understanding of importance of
 in 1918, 126–7
 definition, 126
 diversity and flexibility of British, 153
 external factors driving diversity of
 British use of, 153–4
 internal factors driving diversity of
 British use of, 154–9
 pre-1914 British understanding
 of, 126
 defence in depth
 November 1917 German scheme for,
 165–7
 summer 1918 alterations to the
 November 1917 scheme,
 167–9
 fire and movement
 British failure to use, 130–1
 British use of, 128–30
 gas
 Third Army use of, 137
 German anti-tank defences, 175
 German defensive doctrine
 flaws
 anti-tank defence, 174–7
 communications, 172–4
 shortage of manpower, 171–2
 German intelligence reports on British,
 160–2
 German views on British use of artillery,
 162–3
 medium machine guns
 Third Army use of, 140
 small-unit tactics
 flexibility and diversity of British,
 134–5
 tanks
 German views on British use of, 164
 Third Army use of, 140–5
 tanks
 British superiority in, 74–5
 distort German defence, 176–7
 German defensive measures
 against, 175
 German views on British use of, 164
 Third Army use of, 140–5
 tempo, 6–7, 203, 226
 Terraine, John, 7–8, 11, 124
 Thaer, *Oberst* Albrecht von, 240
 Thorne, Brigadier-General Andrew, 219
 Todman, Dan, 12, 125
 training, British
 at unit level, 61
 impact of individual commander's
 attitude, 68
 Maxse's pamphlets
 responses to, 67
 of recruits at home, 58
 schools, 59–60
 SS 152, *Instructions for the Training of the
 British Armies in France*

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978-1-107-02428-1 - Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918

Jonathan Boff

Index

[More information](#)

286 Index

training, British (cont.)

principles, 58–9

time constraints on, 63–5

variability of, 62–3

training, German

of recruits and replacement,
68–9

shortage of trainers, 70–2

time constraints on, 70

Travers, Tim, 8, 13–14, 39, 126, 142, 154,
192–3

Watson, Alexander, 15, 70, 93, 94, 106, 116

Whigham, Major-General Robert, 223

Wilhelm II, *Kaiser*, 230

Zabecki, David, 234

Ziemann, Benjamin, 92