Introduction

Who were the Physiocrats?

The resurgence of interest in physiocratic ideas in the twenty-first century is nothing short of astonishing. New studies of pre-Revolutionary economic and political debates devote at least a section to them.¹ Young scholars, in particular, have been reexamining texts written by the major physiocrats, although in some instances before they became physiocrats, and linking them to Enlightenment debates on natural law, luxury, sentiment, sovereignty, or the national debt. At the same time, physiocracy increasingly features in more general surveys as shorthand for Old Regime reform projects or even for an interest in agriculture.²


² For example, in French scholarship, in the form of a “physiocratic current” [connant physiocratique] in several articles in Nadine Vivier, ed., Elites et progrès agricole, XVle–XXe siècle (Rennes, 2009). T. J. Hochstrasser in “Physiocracy and the Politics of Laissez-Faire,” in Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler, eds., The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 419–42, expands the group to include what he calls a “distinctive second wave of physiocratic thinkers” (p. 420). William Doyle uses
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Since the physiocrats’ practical suggestions for economic improvements overlapped with those of other reformers, especially within government circles, the temptation to disregard their important divergences has been greatest for scholars of French finances and ministerial projects.¹ There is a difference therefore between understanding the physiocratic movement as it developed internally and its strident and doctrinaire public face. The Economists, as physiocrats were then known, were useful for those high-ranking administrators who agreed with some of their ideas and could use them to test public response to liberalization of the economy. Opponents of such reforms were equally quick to focus on physiocratic writings whose “sectarian tone,” as the intendant of Limousin remarked, won them more enemies than friends and could be used to undermine royal policies. For its true followers, physiocracy involved a psychological conversion that was more visible to contemporaries than to later generations and that needs to be restored to understand physiocracy’s successes and failures.

Since it was more politic to subsume their peculiar beliefs within a broader program of economic reform, a conflation was consciously orchestrated by the movement’s major popularizer, Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, and the confusion was sustained in mid-nineteenth century by Alexis de Tocqueville in his analysis of the origins of the French Revolution. Since then, it has served to bolster reinterpretations of the Revolution focused on the political culture of the late eighteenth century, where “physiocrats” are granted a particularly important role that must be addressed and corrected. In this study, I will argue that physiocracy must be defined very narrowly indeed, given the epistemological as well as economic tenets that its espousers had to accept. Extending membership to partial sympathisers masks the movement’s peculiarities, why it so frustrated contemporaries and proved opaque and burdensome even

¹ For example, Joël Félix in his study of L’Averdy’s ministry, Finances et politique au siècle des Lumières, Le ministère L’Averdy 1763–1768 (Paris, 1999).
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to its most devoted followers. Physiocracy was much more than an economic theory: It rested on a particular understanding of the human mind, of the role of reason and imagination so that, as well as expanding their doctrine into the social and political realms, physiocrats also tackled culture, attempting to define an aesthetic.

Such fine distinctions will no doubt surprise nonspecialists who, if they have heard of the movement at all, probably recall its central contention that only agriculture creates renewable wealth (renewable being the key term here). Some might even be familiar with its image of zigzagging exchanges known as the *Tableau économiq∗, or have tried – and commonly failed – to figure out how it works. The physiocracy I present here is more arcane, although it encompasses the standard description. Physiocrats believed that François Quesnay had pierced the mysteries of nature and understood the economic system that Providence had intended for mankind. He laid out a rule for the annual reproduction of a marketable surplus, based on nature’s capacity to multiply itself, although this “law” was only truly comprehensible to those who took the trouble to study it carefully and let the evidence penetrate their minds. Once they had done so, its truths would become self-evident and cohere into the same set of relations that Quesnay had so clearly perceived. His “vision” was embodied or summarized (depending on the exegesis) in the *Tableau*, a representation that was more than the sum of its parts. Time and again physiocrats contended that Quesnay’s sudden flash of insight could not be properly put into words. It had come to him through a chain of reasoning that culminated in an inner certainty. Evident truths were justified by God. Men had been created with the capacity for higher thought and granted occasional insights into his divine wisdom. In its less lofty embodiment, the doctrine explained why only agriculture could furnish the necessary surplus and assure societies of a steady income down the ages. But it came enveloped within a theory of knowledge that vacillated between Cartesian innateness and Lockean sensationalism, the role of the senses disappearing at times in a fog of divinely inspired intuition.

Once Quesnay had worked out his ideas, all he required from his collaborators was to find a way to disseminate them since he chose not to do this himself. He converted the marquis de Mirabeau, then at the height of his fame, to his system and the latter took on the role of chief exponent with alacrity. Yet Mirabeau was unable to explicate the mathematical arguments behind the *Tableau*, since he did not understand them himself, and Quesnay had no use, in any case, for anyone who questioned his conclusions. Physiocratic texts would lead the public to accept
unassailable principles by asserting their material and moral necessity. Since they believed the physical and moral laws of the universe were one and the same, accepting physiocracy and living according to its teachings would occur simultaneously. No invisible hand was at work here. In order for the system of reproduction of profits “that nature intended” to work, the entire population had to collaborate and understand that individual self-interest lay in adhering to this necessary order. They had to be taught, persuaded, and perhaps even stirred emotionally to accept physiocratic ideas. The means differed, Quesnay believing that his scientific system demanded intellectual concentration, Mirabeau meaning to arouse men’s better selves, and Du Pont invoking sentimental contagion. Disseminating the doctrine required particular agility in balancing “scientific” demonstration and moral persuasion, and hence relied greatly on the temperament and beliefs of the collaborators themselves. They shared a common faith in Quesnay but, based on their own appreciation of human motivation, veered in unexpected directions when publicizing his thought. This is the subject of this book.

Quesnay’s economic “law” fitted within natural religion in the same ways as Newton’s investigations (or as they were understood to have done), and he hoped that his theory would be similarly treated as a mathematically demonstrated phenomenon. Unlike gravity or light, however, Quesnay’s outcomes depended on human decisions, on the will controlling the passions. Social institutions and political authorities would reinforce the right choices and monitor them, but the Achilles heel of Quesnay’s system, as of all subsequent social theory, lay in its reductive human psychology. Quesnay’s system faced the additional difficulty of requiring total adherence to work properly (rather than just a significant majority), since one could not opt out of nature’s dictates. Calculating probabilities (which mathematicians such as Condorcet would endorse in this domain) was anathema to Quesnay because it introduced the element of chance which his entire system meant to overcome. Although Quesnay divided the population into large groups of landowners, farmers, and artisans and calculated aggregate exchanges, overall success nonetheless rested on millions of individuals making the right choices. Mirabeau would call this “fulfilling one’s duties” and develop the doctrine’s moral system around it.

As Pierre Samuel Du Pont, Quesnay’s young acolyte, would later explain, Quesnay “had seen that man had only to look inside himself to find the indisputable rules that governed these laws, and had only to study the physical realm assiduously in order to grasp its precepts, foundation,
and authority. He realized that this evidence and the authority of these sovereign laws would become irresistible once they became widely known and demonstrated.” To be a physiocrat was to share in these certainties. As a result, those who merely assented to the consequences of physiocratic principles (such as free trade in grain) were quickly ejected from the movement’s inner circle or broke with the group, as happened with the inspector of trade and manufactures Louis-Paul Abeille or the philosopher Condillac. The physiocrats arrived on the scene in the late 1750s in the midst of the Seven Years War. New projects to bolster the nation’s productivity had surfaced, been adopted, or rejected since Colbert’s time, and planning and calculating were not new to the Control General (the Old Regime combination of Ministry of Finance and Ministry of the Interior). To be sure, Colbert’s protectionist policies, his zeal in regulating artisanal production, and his subsidies to luxury industries would garner increasing criticisms. Still, one must not forget the extent to which Louis XIV’s minister had offered a positive vision. In a world subjected to ferocious international military and commercial rivalries, Colbert had told France that she would be able compete successfully

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4 Pierre Samuel Du Pont, La Physiocratie ou constitution essentielle du gouvernement le plus avantageux au genre humain (Paris, 1767).
5 See Letter from Abeille to Du Pont, 28 February 1769, Hagley Museum and Library, [henceforth Hagley] Winterthur Mss Group 2 Series A w2–17, complaining that he had been included in Du Pont’s list of proto-physiocrats. Walter Eltis, “Le rejet de Condillac par les physiocrates: une occasion manquée,” in B. Delmas, T. Demals, and Ph. Steiner, eds., La diffusion internationale de la physiocratie (XVIIIe–XIXe siècles) (Grenoble, 1999), pp. 177–93. Georges Weulersse, La physiocratie sous les ministères de Turgot et de Necker (Paris, 1950) pp. 22–3. For an alternate reading and a full list of collaborators, see Christine Théré and Loïc Charles, “The Writing Workshop of François Quesnay and the Making of Physiocracy,” History of Political Economy 40:1 (2008), 1–42. On the English side, David Hume abhorred the Economists and wondered what could possibly drive Turgot to support them. See his letter to the abbé Morellet, dated 10 July 1769, in John Hill Burton, Life and Correspondence of David Hume, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1846), vol. II, pp. 427–8. Adam Smith was more generous. While he criticized the physiocrats for denying industry and trade a role in the creation of surplus wealth and calling them “barren or unproductive” (the physiocrats’ actual term was sterile), “yet in representing the wealth of nations as consisting, not in the unconsumable riches of money, but in the consumable goods annually reproduced by the labour of the society; and in representing perfect liberty as the only effectual expedient for rendering this annual reproduction the greatest possible, its doctrine seems to be in every respect as just as it is generous and liberal.” Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter IX, in Kathryn Sutherland, ed. (Oxford, 1993), pp. 387, 388–9.
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and prosper (or, optimally, conquer all). Economic prophets were less lucky thereafter. The Regent Philippe d’Orléans’s advisor, John Law, might have exuded unbounded optimism, but his bank and his trading companies spiraled out-of-control in the early 1720s and ended in a massive collapse, convincing the French public to steer clear of visionary “systems.” As the government scrambled to raise funds in the midst of the Seven Years War, physiocrats offered their own remedies to France’s national debt and depleted resources. Their solutions resonated favorably, initially at least, because they tapped into the era’s romanticization of nature and celebrated France’s underrated agricultural potential. While everything was on the verge of collapse, physiocrats showed how everything could be fixed. Their ideas, far-fetched at times, nonetheless overlapped sufficiently with reforming currents within the royal administration, to create a superficial alliance that went a long way to secure physiocracy’s initial success.

Georges Weulersse’s masterly study of 1910 offers an excellent overview of the doctrine. Weulersse disentangled the various strands of physiocratic doctrine and described how, once the basic principles had been laid out, Quesnay and his collaborators set to propagating their ideas within reforming government circles. Weulersse’s story of the rise and fall of the doctrine thus followed the arc of its administrative favor. The movement began auspiciously in the late 1750s, reached its apex with the 1763 and 1764 edicts freeing the grain trade, and collapsed in 1770 when those measures were rescinded. Weulersse extended this study to the Revolution over several volumes (published posthumously), without discerning a true revival of physiocratic ideas. The temptation has been, however, to stretch physiocracy beyond these chronological and ideological boundaries. The aim of this study is to pull physiocracy out of the penumbra into which it has fallen, restore its peculiarities, and show how

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9 Weulersse, Le mouvement physiocratique en France.
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difficult it was, even for its most active supporters, to work out and disseminate Quesnay’s ideas.

Du Pont de Nemours

The longstanding blurring of the lines between physiocracy and promoters of laissez-faire can be traced back to 1768 when Pierre Samuel Du Pont published a selection of Quesnay’s writings. He called the collection *Physiocratie*, a term meaning the “reign of nature,” that became associated with the group initially known simply as the Economists. At the same juncture, he penned a separate pamphlet *De l’origine et des progrès d’une science nouvelle*. In the first, Du Pont praised Quesnay’s principal associates the marquis de Mirabeau and Le Mercier de la Rivière. In the second, Du Pont interjected: “Three men truly deserved the friendship of the inventor of the Science and the Tableau économique, M. de Gournay, M. le marquis de Mirabeau, and M. Le Mercier de la Rivière, who became his intimates in this period [the late 1750s].” Jean Claude Marie Vincent de Gournay, the Intendant of Commerce who turned the phrase *laissez-faire, laissez-passer* into a commonplace, died in 1759 and was hence unable to challenge Du Pont’s move to ally physiocrats with top government reformers. Nor could he challenge Du Pont’s other claim that he and Quesnay had reached the same conclusions, “although by different routes,” unless this was confined to economic deregulation. The high administrators, Du Pont added, “with whom the nation’s fate now rested,” had been tutored by Quesnay. But Du Pont was overstepping. The riposte came two years later, from one of those very figures and Gournay’s most prominent disciple, the future Controller General of Finances Jacques Turgot. He was incensed by Du Pont’s “corrections” of his text, *Réflexions sur la formation et distribution des richesses*, which he had allowed Du Pont to publish in the physiocratic monthly, *Les Éphémérides du citoyen*. Du Pont had amended the text to make

\[\text{10} \text{ The term had been invented by the abbé Baudeau, the editor of the *Éphémérides du citoyen* but Du Pont popularized it through his collection of essays.}]

\[\text{11} \text{ Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, *La Physiocratie*, op. cit.; De l’origine et des progrès d’une science nouvelle (London, 1768).}]

\[\text{12} \text{ The phrase has been traced to a merchant François Legendre in the seventeenth century responding to Colbert. Georges Weulersse, *La physiocratie à la fin du règne de Louis XV* (Paris, 1959), p. 73.}]


\[\text{14} \text{Turgot had written the piece in 1766 and it appeared in three parts, in volumes XI and XII (1769) and volume I (1770) of the *Éphémérides du citoyen*.} \]
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Turgot’s views conform more closely to Quesnay’s, and Turgot demanded “he disavow all the additions which give the impression that I am an Economist, something I do not wish to be, just like I do not wish to be an Encyclopedist.”\[15\] He had already reproached Du Pont, in 1765, of claiming he had approved of a report that he hadn’t even read.\[16\]

Du Pont published a retraction but did not end his eclectic search for physiocratic precursors or prominent supporters. Citing C. Cusano’s analysis of the Éphémérides du citoyen under Du Pont’s editorship (1768–1772), Bernard Delmas, Thierry Demals, and Philippe Steiner describe the process whereby physiocrats, seeking publicity and validation, projected a physiocratic outlook onto all of Europe by praising any “laudable act” by foreign rulers or individuals that promoted agriculture.\[17\] Their ecstasy knew no bounds when they discovered a monarch engaging in symbolic ploughing (Joseph II or the future Louis XVI) or chatting with harvesters (Marie Antoinette).\[18\]

This enthusiasm wasn’t matched on the ground. Historians have shown that those Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians, Germans, Austrians, or Swedes who showed any interest in physiocracy rarely did so because they believed in the doctrine (the Margrave of Baden being one notable exception). Rather, they drew from it a generic support for agricultural improvement, free trade in grains, or fiscal reform, while also rejecting the more arcane, rebarbative aspects of Quesnay’s thought.\[19\] In France as well, government converts to laissez-faire found it expedient at times to ally themselves with the économistes. This conflation would backfire dramatically when Turgot’s opponents used it to tar his ministry.\[20\] As their “prime representative,” he was accused of enacting the program of the “dangerous sect” of Economists.\[21\] If this was not entirely false in matters


\[16\] Letter from Turgot to Du Pont, Limoges, 10 May 1765, Hagley, W2–1522.


\[21\] Weulersse, La physiocratie sous les ministères de Turgot et de Necker, p. 29. Weulersse then states, on the following page, that relations between Turgot and the physiocrats were
of policy (or in the appraisal of the importance of agriculture), more perceptive contemporaries knew Turgot to be too independent of mind to be anyone’s devotee.  

One should not forget that eighteenth-century agronomists were not pleased to be considered physiocrats either. Historian André Bourde thus differentiated between the agricultural “philosophers” of the physiocratic school, and those who thought of themselves as “practitioners of the agricultural arts.” While seemingly joined by a common interest in agriculture, and often confused by outsiders who might refer to them interchangeably, most eighteenth-century agronomists had no wish to be associated with physiocracy, and historians should remember this.

There is a further reason for all this confusion. The close personal ties that bound friends and foes alike made it sometimes hard to know where individual members of the French intelligentsia stood on various issues. They frequented the same salons, had mutual friends, did not wish to attack one another in print and preferred to let their displeasure be known in other ways. This meant insiders knew what the general public could not, unless they kept up with gossip and those gazetteers who let the cat out of the bag. This is not to say that open breaks and disavowals did not occur from time to time, but rather that those who basically shared similar, but not identical, views often desisted from airing those differences in public. Correspondence and memoirs are therefore crucial to making finer distinctions between fellow-travelers and true believers. Turgot’s death in 1781 generated a string of testimonials, including a full-blown biography penned by Du Pont. He weaves an engaging narrative – his journalistic style serving him well here. Whereas Du Pont had once viewed Turgot as synthesizing Quesnay’s and Gournay’s


All those who challenged the status quo were furthermore accused of being “Encyclopedists,” even if, in the case of Turgot and Quesnay, they ceased submitting entries after 1757, when the enterprise fell into disfavor. Moreover, whereas D’Alembert and Voltaire continued to support physiocratic ideas, Diderot, after his initial enthusiasm, grew increasingly skeptical of the movement in the late 1760s. See on this Weulersse, _La physiocratie sous les ministères de Turgot et de Necker_, pp. 23–4, 31.


See Antoine Lilti, _Le monde des salons, sociabilité et mondanté à Paris au XVIIIe siècle_ (Paris, 2005), and for a more conflictual version of this world, see Jonathan Israel’s summary of his previous studies, _A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy_ (Princeton, 2009), and Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, _Comment peut-on être intellectuel au siècle des lumières?_ (Paris, 2011).
Insights, Du Pont now regarded Turgot as surpassing both. Still, Du Pont remained sufficiently faithful to Quesnay to lecture Jean-Baptiste Say, in response to the latter’s denunciation of physiocracy and his praise of Adam Smith, to acknowledge his debt to Quesnay and Turgot. “I note that we don’t merely have a pupil in you, but a strong emulator. . . . your fanciful attempt to disown us, which you do not hide sufficiently well, my dear Say, doesn’t stop you from being, by way of Smith, a grandson of Quesnay and a nephew of the great Turgot.” Quesnay had “laid the foundations of the temple to this noble goddess [liberty]; built its thick walls. You and I then added the cornices, finials, astragals, and capitals to the columns that were already standing.”

**Tocqueville, Marx, Foucault**

Although some critics, like Edmund Burke, had immediately linked the events of the Revolution to the Economists’ vile influence, interest in their ideas withered in the early decades of the nineteenth century. The trend reversed in the 1840s when Eugène Daire and his associates published collections of economic texts that privileged a homegrown political economy to rival Britain’s. Daire treated the physiocrats, Turgot and other French eighteenth-century economic reformers as the real progenitors of classical economics. In making available these “classic texts,” Daire moreover described Turgot as the most eminent physiocrat, thus becoming one of the main agents of the conflation that I have described.

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25 Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, *Mémoires sur la vie et les ouvrages de M. Turgot, Ministre d’Etat* (Philadelphia, 1782), pp. 51 and 110 (that all that is worthwhile in Adam Smith can be found in Turgot’s *Réflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses*). On the shifts in Du Pont’s allegiances see, Schelle, *Du Pont de Nemours*, p. 183, and by 1809–1811, in his notes to his edition of Turgot’s works, Du Pont restores the distinction between followers of Quesnay and those of Gournay, and Turgot and Smith are independent of either (pp. 375–6); Weulersse, *La physiocratie à l’aube de la Révolution*, pp. 20, 223–4.


