INTRODUCTION

Periods of disunity in Chinese history do not usually receive the attention they deserve, yet it is just in those years of apparent disorder and even chaos that important developments, social, cultural, artistic, and even institutional, often find their earliest expression. The Six Dynasties period (220–589 CE) was just such a time of momentous changes in many aspects of the society. But it is precisely the confusing tumult and disorder of the political events of those four centuries that create the strongest impression. We find this perception mirrored in the reaction of the put-upon Gao Laoshi, the middle-school schoolmaster described by Lu Xun in one of his stories, who was so dejected when he had been assigned to teach a course on the Six Dynasties. All he remembered about the subject was how very confusing it was, a time of much warfare and turmoil; no doubt what would have come to his mind was the common saying *wu Hu luan Hua* “the Five Barbarians brought disorder to China.” He felt that he could do a creditable job with the great Han and Three Kingdoms that came before or the glorious Tang after it, but what could he say about those miserable years in between?¹ The very nomenclature reflects its apparent disjointed nature. Yet it was that very disorder, a collapse of central authority, that provided the conditions enabling such important advances which make the Six Dynasties period such a significant one in Chinese history.

The period covered in this volume suffers from what might be called an identity problem; that is, one of definition. In historical terms, identity defines the qualities and characteristics associated with it, and what role, so to speak, that period played in the course of events that made up the history under consideration. The name applied to the period encapsulated that identity and thus deserves some attention. In Chinese terminology this poses no problem,

since the usual list is a factual one. It is generally called most expansively “Sanguo liang Jin Nanbeichao” 三國兩晉南北朝; that is, the Three Kingdoms, two Jin, and Southern and Northern courts, or, a bit shorter, “Wei Jin Nanbeichao” 魏晉南北朝, with the Wei state standing for the Three Kingdoms; similarly Japanese scholars call it “Gi-Shin Nambokuchō.” Another term is “Liuchao” 六朝 (Japanese “Rikuchū”), the Six Kingdoms, since Jiankang (modern Nanjing) in this period served as the capital of six dynasties (Wu 柏, Eastern Jin 東晉, Song 宋, Qi 齊, Liang 梁 and Chen 陳); thus while the reference is to the southern states, the sense of the term generally covers the whole of China, north and south. However, “Liuchao” may be ambiguous, as some modern writers (usually southerners) use it to refer only to the area of the Southern Dynasties that made Jiankang their capital. A more descriptive label sometimes used is the “Period of Disunity,” but while it has the virtue of underlining a salient political characteristic of the period, it has the drawback of being applicable also to that of the Five Dynasties (907–960).

The Han and Sui–Tang dynasties are usually recognized as among the high points of early Chinese power and cultural achievement; as a consequence, the period between them, the years 220 to 589, is often held in low esteem—the Dark Age of Chinese history—and at most viewed simply as a transitional span of time. Calling it China’s Middle Age, and its derivation “medieval” on the model of European history, for many scholars carries with it a pejorative import. Arnold Toynbee, in his Study of history, found a striking parallel between the European and Chinese cases, seeing that in both there was a period of state decline followed by a time of trouble; that is, external/barbarians and internal/proletariat, resolving itself into a new stage of the “universal state,” which is to say, in China, the Sui–Tang. No doubt Toynbee’s paradigm of historical analysis of challenge and response deservedly no longer is felt to have any explanatory usefulness. However, the term “medieval” can still be viewed

2 The term “Six Dynasties” was applied to this period as early as the Song by Zhang Shou (1084–1145) and Zhang Dunyi (active twelfth century), the latter the author of the Liuchao shiji bianlei, ed. Zhang Chenshi (Beijing, 2012), a work primarily focused on the history and landmarks of Jiankang when it served as capital during the Six Dynasties period. The Yuan dynasty Songshi 宋史 (compiled in 1345) provides an example (56.3933) where the term “Six Dynasties” is used to designate both the northern and southern dynasties.


5 Charles Holcombe rightly observes that the term “medieval,” if only defined in terms of European-style feudalism, is not applicable to China from the third to the eighth centuries. See his “Was medieval China medieval?” (Post-Han to mid-Tang), in A companion to Chinese history, ed. Michael Szonyi (Chichester, 2017), p. 114.
as a useful descriptor if broadly defined, which is why many Western scholars refer to this period as early medieval China. Scholars of global history have become more cognizant that to understand the historical commonalities of civilizations across the world there is a need for general descriptive labels, such as “medieval,” that can be applied cross-culturally. The similarities between Europe from the sixth through tenth centuries, the early Arab empires (Umayyad, 661–749, and Abbasid, 750–1258), and China from the third through the sixth centuries are striking: we see a decentralized polity, a hybrid ruling elite, the appearance of a manorial type of economy, the emergence of organized religion, and a heavy reliance on close patron–client ties between upper-class men. Hence, applying the word “medieval” to China from the third to sixth centuries still has hermeneutic value.6

All of the other volumes in the Cambridge history of China series are named after political dynasties, but the term “Wei–Jin–Northern and Southern Dynasties” is much too cumbersome, true perhaps even for the more simplified “Northern and Southern Dynasties.” Alternatives such the “Han–Tang Interim,” or, perhaps more meaningfully, the “Transition between the Han and Tang,” may be useful as chapter headings, but not as tags within written narratives, and in most contexts do not give the period its due importance. The fallback solution used in this volume, and more generally elsewhere, is to simply use as its title the term “Six Dynasties,” referring broadly to this interim between the Han and Sui–Tang. The number is not fully accurate since it encompasses the short-lived regimes in the North succeeding the fall of the Western Jin and leading up to the Northern Wei, what is called the “Shiliuguo” 十六國, or in English, the “Sixteen States.” Nevertheless, keeping all these restraints in mind, Six Dynasties serves quite well.

The terminology related to this period clearly points to the enduring fragmentation of the previously united Han realm. As Helena Motoh has described it, in the post-Han period there emerged “a series of different constellations of power (parallel rule of three states, or two states, etc.),” roughly divided in a north–south formation, one north of the Yellow River and the other south of the Yangzi, with the area between the scene of continuing competition.7 As Motoh further notes,

6 Keith N. Knapp, “Did the Middle Kingdom have a middle period? The problem of ‘medieval’ in China’s history,” Education about Asia 12.2 (2007), pp. 8–13.
The division is also ethnic, since the North was mostly ruled by the dynastic families of non-Han origin, while the South was ruled by Han Chinese dynasties, first by the Eastern Jin and then by the so-called Southern Dynasties. Political disunity is thus also seen in cultural terms, as a loss of parts of the territory to the rule of the non-Han peoples.

A salient feature of the Six Dynasties period is the dominant role taken by the non-Han peoples who entered northern China, some by slowly permeating into the borderlands or by storming the frontier. The historical records list a number of tribal names: Xiongnu, Xianbei, Tuoba, Jie, Murong, and so forth, but there was little discussion at the time of the actual composition of these entities, nor has modern research made much analytical headway. In his chapter on the Northern Wei, Scott Pearce draws on the opening of the *Wei shu* (*History of the Northern Wei*) to trace the origins of the Tuoba, the founders of that dynasty. Their traditional account of the various encounters as these people made their way from their distant northern habitat to the Chinese frontier, telling of a hybrid, horse-like animal that served as guide for a time, and the “heavenly maiden” who presented one of the leaders with an heir, may well have been the stuff of myths. But as Pearce suggests, these legends of the difficult journey, no doubt recounted with some license, may still reflect some reality. What this account calls to mind is the similar origin accounts associated with the various “barbarian” peoples who appeared on the Roman frontier in medieval Europe.

There is a rich literature on the nature of the “barbarian migrations” in Europe at roughly the same period as that in China, which to a certain extent may suggest parallel developments, but the Western historians still struggle with how to frame the material. The current favored term, “ethnogenesis,” emphasizes that the various barbarian groups under discussion were not biological or ethnic communities as such but, as Michael Kulikowski has it, were unstable and fissiparous groups, and that the earlier racial conceptions of barbarian ethnicity must give way to constructed ethnicities, however that is perceived by the modern scholarly factions now debating the issue—a highly contentious subject. 8 In ethnogenesis’s early model, Reinhard Wenskus proposed that there was a nucleus tradition, a complex, that was able to confer an identity on a population. This involved a process of *Stammesbildung* or account of a particular struggle to suggest that there were significant internal social and political ends served by such contending campaigns.

8 Michael Kulikowski, “Nation versus army: A necessary contrast?”, in *On barbarian identity: Critical approaches to ethnicity in the Early Middle Ages*, ed. Andrew Gillett (Turnhout, 2002), pp. 71–72. Kulikowski, p. 70, n. 2: “One of the great virtues of recent studies of ethnogenesis has been to show the malleability of early medieval ethnicity and, consequently, to force us to regard with skepticism all claims to natural ethnic community while looking for the strategies by which such communities are socially constructed.”
ethnogenesis, that drew together disparate people into a community that on
the basis of ancient and orally transmitted traditions came to believe they
shared a common origin. While the belief in such ancient origins can be said to be ideological, such elements cannot be entirely discounted, and amid such memories, myths, and traditions there is still the strong possibility that they were not entirely invented.9

Walter Pohl, in defense of the term “ethnogenesis,” suggested that ethnic formation processes were complex, long-term developments, and that the term suggests an origin of the ethnos in a limited initial stage. The ethnic formation of a group could fail, and the group disappear. Success or failure are just descriptive terms; the methodology is to attempt a reconstruction of the ethnic processes, political contexts, and perception in the sources. The analysis of origin legends and ethnic discourse is just a tool in what is a bricolage, trying to bring together a variety of elements.10

For example, Charles R. Bowlus, in his article on “ethnogenesis” also in Gillett’s volume, reviews recent studies and speaks of “misleading concepts.”11 Such terms as “Goths” or “Franks” referred to peoples, or tribes, of diverse origins, languages, and cultures, who had coalesced into larger confederations. According to Bowlus, the ethnogenetic theory is best seen as probes into the makeup of these confederations, and he holds that such a core was basically a confederation of groups of warriors each with its own leaders, and that they are best seen as an army, not a people on the move. At the center was an elite military band whose language, culture, and traditions came to be adopted by the confederation as a whole, leading to acceptance of an identity of common descent. He also points out that ethnogenesis models share a common sequence of events, including a primordial deed, such as crossing a sea or mighty river or victory over odds, and throughout the process there must be an ancestral enemy whose existence holds the Grossstamm or confederation together. Bowlus concludes that the ethnogenesis construct is a paradigm that may be suited only to handling data in modern research but of little utility in dealing with the scant sources of the past. As Walter Pohl says, “Whether invented or only partly invented, such traditions could play an analogous role: the world in which the barbarians had settled on Roman soil

presented high risks, challenges, and problems of adaptation; narratives could give a meaning to this difficult situation.”

Despite some uncertainty, and even misgivings concerning how the ethno-genesis construct may be utilized for historical research in the European case, it does seem to offer insight into that of the East Asian area. The similarity with the Tuoba legend is striking. In the case of the Tuoba, as Pearce points out in his chapter on the Northern Wei, the *Weishu* records the reaction of Emperor Taiwu, not that long after the fact, when he was presented with the opportunity to lay claim to evidence of that arduous trek, as tenuous as that evidence might have been, and to send envoys to authenticate it, thus using the opportunity to strengthen the ties that held his compatriots together.

Wang Junjie has written an important article which bears on this very question: how the Xianbei, originally the name of a small tribe, came to be that of a powerful confederation and, indeed, joined to the identity of those who dwelled in the Northern Wei state. He traces the earliest mention of the Xianbei to some tribesmen located on the far northeastern Liaodong borders in the pre-Han and Han periods. They moved into the area abandoned by the flight of the Xiongnu after these latter were defeated by Han forces in 89 ce. Various other groups who had been subordinate to the Xiongnu but who had remained in the area then took on the Xianbei name, which from that time came to be a potent umbrella designation for those joining the confederation while retaining their original identity. Among the various other components were the Murong in Liaodong, the Duan in Liaoxi, the Yuwen to the north, the Tuoba even further north, the Qifu at Longxi, and the Toufa at Hexi, each dominant in their separate areas. The Tuoba emerged as the victorious aggregate among others and established their state. They then began, perhaps driven by a sense of necessity, to create an ancestry that legitimated their primary claim to the Xianbei name, one which continued to be the traditional mantle incorporating all the conquered groups, diverse as they were in customs, language, and so forth. Thus, as the *Weishu* recounted, the Tuoba claimed to be descended from the Yellow Emperor and had been allotted the northern regions, where they took their name from the Xianbei mountain there. As Wang Junjie points out, that legend is recorded in the *Weishu*, which itself was compiled after the fall of the dynasty, but there is contemporary evidence of the acceptance earlier by the Northern Wei subjects of their being Xianbei and the self-referential use of the term “Xianbei.” In 450,
a campaign by the Northern Wei against the southern Liu-Song state, representatives of the two forces faced each other to negotiate a settlement. When the southern envoy asked his adversary, the distinguished Han Chinese literatus Li Xiaobo, for his name, the answer was, “I am a Xianbei and have no surname.” Asked about his rank, he replied, “The Xianbei official ranks are different [from yours] and cannot be briefly explained; still it is adequate to match yours, Sir.” We may well doubt that Li really saw himself as a Xianbei tribesman, but he could identify himself as such in his role as an agent of that state.

Turning now to the field of Six Dynasties studies, the traditional approach by those writing on China’s past, and that includes the Six Dynasties period, was textually oriented, based on a wide knowledge of the literary tradition and a rigorous methodology, an adherence to what in Japan was called jisōshugi, or “historical positivism.” In that long tradition, it was rare to find someone like Zhang Xuecheng (1738–1801) who combined that strict adherence to the principles of historical accuracy with a theoretical discussion of the significance of research. These views are also reflected in the important historical research of his contemporary Zhao Yi (1727–1814), who held that while the classics contained the principles of government, the histories recorded the government’s activities, and thus, according to Robert J. Smith, were seen as a guide for “proper conduct for the present and future.” The rigor with which the research was conducted by these men and others was of the highest degree, but the purposes to be served by their efforts came to undergo a conceptual transformation.

It may be argued that the modern study of the Six Dynasties period began with Japanese sinologists, and in particular with Naitō Torajiro, more commonly known as Naitō Konan (1866–1934), a journalist and later professor at Kyoto University, whose work had an important and lasting influence not just on Japanese scholarship, but internationally as well. He is primarily known for his delineation of a broad-stroked periodization in Chinese history. In general, these stages consisted of rule by great clans in the Zhou and Han, then succeeded by a medieval period, defined as the Six Dynasties and the Tang, marked by the dominance of an aristocracy, before giving way in the Song to what he termed China’s modern age, characterized by a strong autocracy served by a bureaucracy staffed by those chosen on the basis of civil service.
It is a measure of Naitō’s influence that such standard Western works as John K. Fairbank et al., *East Asia: Tradition and transformation* (Boston, 1973), and Jacques Gernet, *La Chine ancienne, des origines à l’empire* (Paris, 1964), adopted Naitō’s periodization.18

In Naitō’s analysis, the Six Dynasties era was characterized by powerful clans that emerged from scholarly lineages of the end of the Later Han. These locally powerful clans, or lineages as they are sometimes called, became the basis of an aristocracy defined by a system of categories called the *liupin* 輝品, or “Six Grades.” Members of the top echelons (*shidaiju* 士大夫) were appointed as officials who virtually controlled the state, beyond any threat from the imperial court. The status of these aristocratic entities (termed *kizoku* 貴族 in Japanese) was strengthened by intermarriage and matches made with the imperial family. Naitō’s schema met with much criticism but was taken up and developed by many followers, such as Kawakatsu Yoshio (1922–1984) and Tanigawa Michio (1925–2013), and is generally known as the Kyoto school.19 Kawakatsu, in an article published in French, persuasively traces the history and decline of the southern “aristocracy” in the latter part of the Southern Dynasties.20 Tanigawa, on the other hand, focused on the interrelationship of the elite with their community, what he termed *kyōto shi* 共同体 (from the German *Gemeinde*). This relationship, an idealistic one, was based on Confucian morality, supplying an ethical–moral basis to the help extended to the community in troubled times by its cultured and intellectual elite. Needless to say, Tanigawa’s met with much criticism, especially from the Marxists because he made no mention of any class struggle.21

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19 For a discussion of these developments and their debates with the Marxist-oriented Tokyo school, see Fogel’s review in *HJAS* 44.1 (1984), pp. 228–247, of Tanigawa Michio, *Chōgoku shitsugyō kokyū to chikai to no horikō ni tatsu no shōkōki kenkyū* (Kyoto, 1985). Miyakawa, “An outline of the Naitō hypothesis,” is also an important study of the process of Naitō’s development of his ideas and a review of the range of support, or not, which his proposal elicited.


Naitō’s analysis has served to stimulate an enormous richness of scholarly research. After the great debates over periodization subsided in the 1980s, Japanese scholarship on early medieval China shifted its focus to smaller but more tangible issues. In a 1999 essay, Tanigawa Michio noted that one of the largest challenges facing Japanese scholars of early medieval China was determining the nature of the ruling class: to what degree were the “aristocratic” families autonomous? The study of the nature of government and its relationship with elite families has continued to draw the attention of many scholars. Kawamoto Yoshiaki notes that a major question for many historians studying the period is to what extent regimes were established in northern China by non-Han people non-Han in nature. More specifically, were Northern Dynasties’ institutional innovations, such as the equal-field system (jun-tian zhi), the division of subjects into free and subordinated people (liangjian zhi 良賤制), and the garrison militia system (jubing zhi), inspired by Chinese or non-Han traditions? A number of Japanese scholars have explored the nature of northern polities often with insights gained from the use of newly discovered entombed tomb inscriptions (muzhiming). A new area of research has been the study of cities and regions; these studies are deeply informed by archaeological discoveries. Another emerging avenue of study of the nature of the ruling class: to what degree were the “aristocratic” families autonomous?
inquiry has been how early medieval Chinese used ritual to give order to the court and social relations. Studies of Buddhism and Daoism continue to be numerous as well.

In China, scholarly interest in the Six Dynasties period can be traced back through the ages but Zhao Yi, cited above, ranks among the foremost of those who took an interest in that history. In his *Gaiyu congkan*, 1790, and *Nian’ershi zhaji*, 1795, Zhao Yi’s careful notes and learned observations set a high standard in textual studies. His attention was for the most part focused on the texts themselves, and how well they reflected the objectivity and accuracy expected of the historiographical ideal. Zhao Yi, of course, was a man of his time. It may be noted, for example, that one of the items in his *Gaiyu congkan* is a discussion of the emphasis placed on lineage and the compilation of genealogies during the Six Dynasties, but there was no evidence offered, unlike in the case of Naitō Konan, that this played a central role in the structure of the state’s political organization.

Turning to the emergence of a modern historiography in China, Axel Schneider, in an illuminating article, has described how the traditional role of the historian was to trace the historical facts that exemplified the dao道; that is, the presence of the uniform and normative order that was the basis of the legitimacy of the current regime. As Schneider says, there is a dispute whether it was the development of the kaozheng考證 methods of textual criticism in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that led to the secularization of historiography, but certainly by the early twentieth century, that this played a central role in the structure of the state’s political organization.