

COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

This volume brings together essays by many of the leading scholars of comparative constitutional design from myriad disciplinary perspectives, including law, philosophy, political science, and economics. The authors collectively assess what we know – and do not know – about the design process as well as particular institutional choices concerning executive power, constitutional amendment processes, and many other issues. Bringing together positive and normative analysis, it provides the state of the art in a field of growing theoretical and practical importance.

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