1

Introduction

THE PUZZLE

Why were the Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire accommodated until 1875, but targeted with exclusionary policies thereafter, including mass killings? This empirical puzzle from the last decades of the Ottoman Empire remains unresolved. For most of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Ottomans still occupied significant parts of Southeastern Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. During the early nineteenth century, the Tanzimat reform institutionalized the pre-existing accommodation of religious difference within the context of the Empire through the *millet* (religious community) system. However, external involvement by the Great Powers and the diffusion of nationalist ideas put pressure on the Ottoman way of managing diversity, undermining its multiethnic character and pushing it toward homogenization.

Armenians and Turks had lived in relative harmony in the Ottoman Empire for centuries. The Ottoman administrators treated the Armenians as the "most loyal *millet*" in the Empire. This was justified, since many different peoples in the Empire had already rebelled during the nineteenth century (e.g., the Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians), while the Armenians had not. By the 1890s, however, the Ottoman ruling elite's views had changed significantly, and systematic persecution of the Armenians began. Two decades later, during World War I, the Young Turks[1] – then ruling over the Ottoman Empire – perceived the Armenians as being used as a fifth column[2] and thus threatening their country's security and

[1] Hanioğlu 2001.

[2] According to Encyclopædia Britannica, a fifth column is a "clandestine group or faction of subversive agents who attempt to undermine a nation's solidarity by any means at their disposal.. . . A cardinal technique of the fifth column is the infiltration of sympathizers into the entire fabric of the nation under attack and, particularly, into positions of policy decision and national defense. From such key posts, fifth-column activists exploit the fears of a people by spreading rumours and misinformation, as well as by employing the more standard techniques of espionage

targeted them with mass killings and deportations. The result was the Armenian genocide.[3]

This puzzle gives rise to a broader question: What explains variation in state policies to manage social diversity and attain order? Despite the voluminous literature on more or less successful national integration histories,[4] as well as theories explaining a state's choice to exclude or include non-core groups,[5] there is no theory that accounts for the conditions under which a state is likely to assimilate, accommodate, or exclude a non-core group. Different paths to national integration have been proposed,[6] but no systematic theory that accounts for variation in nation-building policies.

Since World War II, modernization theorists have discussed national integration as a by-product of industrialization, urbanization, and political development.[7] According to these scholars, national sentiments were the result of people's residence/location as well as increased social mobilization, which linked peripheries to metropolitan centers.[8] Over time, it is argued, the initial passive identification turns into a more conscious and active one.[9]

Early modernization theorists have devoted little attention to direct state involvement in the process of nation-building. For example, according to the "melting pot" theory, members of the non-core group choose assimilation for material reasons. Thus, assimilation is a byproduct of economic development and does not require much state intervention.[10]

These theories do not specify who pursues nation-building policies and in what fashion. As Smith puts it, in this set of theories "the role of the state is simply to act as a handmaid of history, whose goal is a world of large-scale nation-states or regions."[11] Another problem with this set of theories is that they cannot account for the cases of non-core groups that are targeted with assimilation campaigns in states that are not undergoing modernization, or for cases of non-core groups that are kept segregated or are deported instead of assimilated in modernizing states. Moreover, these theories – developed primarily with the U.S. context in mind – were focused on the factors that may determine the success or failure of

and sabotage." Accessed on 06 Apr. 2009: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/206477/fifth-column.

[3] For more, see Akcam 2006; Dündar 2010; Hovannisian 1986; Melson 1986; Suny et al. 2011.

[4] Deutsch and Foltz 1966; Eisenstadt and Rokkan 1973; Snyder 2003; Weber 1976.

[5] Bulutgil 2009; Downes 2008; Mann 2005; Naimark 2001; Rae 2002; Snyder 2010, Straus 2006, Valentino 2004, Wimmer 2002.

[6] Greenfeld 1993.

[7] Anderson 1983; Bendix 1969; Huntington 1968; Anderson et al. 1967.

[8] Deutsch 1965.

[9] The diffusionist theory of social integration makes similar predictions with the other modernization theories with respect to state preferences toward non-core groups. This theory was proposed by Parsons, Eisenstadt, and Smelser. According to them the culture of the core group trickles down to the people at the periphery. Part of Deutsch's argument captures this process with social communication doing the work (1965).

[10] Alba and Nee 2003; Glazer and Moynihan 1970; Gordon 1964.

[11] 1986: 232.

state policies. My argument, presented below, focuses instead on explaining the initial selection of policies, not their successes or failures.

Later generations of social scientists provided microfoundations for the various modernization theories.[12] These studies also embraced the unplanned character of national integration strategies posited by the modernization theorists. Their work, inspired by methodological individualism, provided microfoundations focusing on the calculations individuals make with respect to identity choices.[13] But individual level decisions are always structured within the context of state policies. Without a theory that accounts for variation in state-planned policies toward non-core groups, we cannot have a complete theory of nation-building; the "supply side" of the phenomenon is undertheorized. This book provides such a theory.

Most arguments by contemporary comparative politics scholars focus on domestic dynamics to explain state policies toward non-core groups. Group size, territorial concentration, and especially rootedness have been suggested as crucial characteristics on which governments focus when they plan their nation-building policies.[14] The logic is that large, territorially concentrated, and indigenous groups are more likely to demand autonomy or even fight for self-determination than small, dispersed, and recently settled groups. Moreover, countries with more such groups are less likely to accommodate them than countries with fewer such groups.[15]

Primordialist arguments hold that a state's treatment of non-core groups is based on cultural differences. The larger the perceived difference between the culture or race of the non-core group and the core group, the more likely it is that the non-core group will be excluded.[16] Conversely, if the groups are similar, then the non-core group will be targeted for assimilation. Scholars in this camp have also emphasized the importance of past relations between the core and the non-core group.[17] I incorporate some of these findings in my theory but with a twist, namely injecting external involvement by interested powers in the mix.

According to ethnic antipathy and status reversal theories, past relations between the dominant group and the non-core group condition state policies. Groups are constantly competing for status and self-esteem. A previously disadvantaged group is likely to target the previously advantaged group with exclusionary policies once the roles are reversed.[18] However, such arguments

[12] Gellner 1983; Hechter 1975; Laitin 1995 and 1998.
[13] Laitin 1998. According to this account, populations adapt to the hegemonic constitutive story in order to secure upward social mobility. Thus we should not observe any group-specific assimilation policies since people will gradually integrate. The basic incentive structure should suffice. Laitin's theory largely neglects the supply side. But often individuals are not even given the option to assimilate, while others are given incentives to do so. Laitin does address the supply side with respect to Jews and Roma in his article "Marginality: A Microperspective" (1995).
[14] Brubaker 1993; Toft 2003.
[15] Van Evera 1994; Walter 2009.
[16] Armstrong 1982; Isaacs 1975; Kaplan 1993.
[17] Horowitz 1985; Kaufman 2001; Van Evera 1994: 23–25.
[18] Horowitz 1985; Petersen 2001 and 2002.

cannot account for variation in the treatment of the same non-core group/state dyad over time.

An equally prominent theory in sociology focuses on a state's understandings of nationhood, civic versus ethnocultural.[19] According to this argument, elites in states with a civic understanding of nationhood are more likely to target all non-core groups with assimilationist policies. In contrast, elites in states with an ethnic understanding of nationhood will exclude any group that does not fit the ethnocultural criteria for nationhood.[20] However, while this argument may capture important country level differences, it cannot account for the important subnational variation that exists in most states.

Scholars studying genocide and ethnic cleansing have also advanced explanations underlining the importance of domestic political considerations, arguing that insecure regimes are likely to target certain non-core groups with exclusionary policies as a way to consolidate their power. In certain cases, this is an argument that emphasizes security threats coming from the non-core groups.[21] In other cases, the groups have not challenged their government but are just scapegoats.[22] Although such arguments illuminate certain cases they do not make any predictions with respect to assimilation or accommodation.

International dynamics have also been considered in the literature by sociologists and political scientists alike. Michael Mann and Jack Snyder, among others, have highlighted structural international factors such as the spread of democracy to account for variation in nation-building policies.[23] According to this logic, structural transformations at the international level produce societal frictions when they are introduced. Again, these country-level factors are important to understand broader trends, but they are not calibrated enough to account for subnational group-specific variation.

Finally, other scholars have drawn attention to the impact of the non-core group having a national homeland on nation-building.[24] They argue that elites in a national homeland make credible commitments to their co-ethnics abroad.[25] This commitment in turn makes the non-core group assertive toward the state they live in and can lead to a secessionist war.[26] The implicit prediction with respect to nation-building policies is that non-core groups with national homelands are likely to escalate their demands and thus are more likely to be targeted with exclusionary policies by the state whose sovereignty they challenge. The shortcomings of the various versions of the homeland argument have to do with the emphasis on the ethnic affinity between the external power and the

[19] Brubaker 1992.
[20] Brubaker's theory builds on the older distinction between 'ethnic' and 'civic' nationalism, see Kohn 1945.
[21] Gagnon 2004; Harff 1987; Straus 2006.
[22] Brass 1997; Martin 2001; Snyder 2000.
[23] Mann 2005; Snyder 2000.
[24] Brubaker 1996; Weiner 1971.
[25] Jenne 2007; Salehyan 2009; Van Houten 1998.
[26] Thyne 2009.

non-core group and the inability to account for the variation in the behavior of the "homeland" over time. Many external powers supporting non-core groups have no ethnic ties with the non-core group and, as King and Melvin have pointed out, many homelands do not act as homelands today but may do so tomorrow.[27]

THE ARGUMENT

My argument builds on existing explanations but focuses on the importance of international and geostrategic concerns for nation-building policies. It accounts for the variation in nation-building policies as a result of the interaction between host states and external powers rather than non-core groups and host states.[28]

In the stylized presentation of my argument there are three actors: a host state, a non-core group, and an external power. The ruling political elites of a host state want to reproduce their power and ensure the sovereignty of their national state. Non-core groups want to maximize their well-being and avoid state repression. Moreover, depending on how salient the non-core group's identity is the group members may also seek anything from recognition and basic minority rights all the way to autonomy or even independence. External powers often cultivate relations with non-core groups in other states to destablilize them, to increase their bargaining power, or because of ethnic ties. External powers usually – but not always – choose to support non-core groups that reside in geopolitically important areas, are large, territorially concentrated, and close to the borders.

I posit that this external involvement, whether clandestine, covert, or overt, drives not only the mobilization and politicization of the non-core group's identity, but also the host state's perception of the non-core group and the state's nation-building policies toward the group. Hence, the foreign policy goals of the host state and its interstate relations with external powers drive a host state's choices of nation-building policies toward non-core groups.

The interstate relations between the host state and the external power supporting the non-core group can take the form of rivalry or alliance.[29] These

[27] King and Melvin 1999/2000.

[28] The term "host state" in my framework is shorthand for the political elites ruling in the name of the core group. I use the term "host state" to distinguish it from the external power that supports the group that is more often than not also a state. The term "host" is used to signify the state where a non-core group resides and it does not imply anything about the legitimacy of the core group rights over the land versus the rights of a non-core group. In fact, often non-core groups are indigenous to the land they reside when core groups are not. For more on the definitions of the actors in my argument, see the relevant section in Chapter 2.

[29] I follow Walt's (1997: 157) definition of alliance: "An alliance is a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states. Although the precise arrangements embodied in different alliances vary enormously, the defining feature of any alliance is a commitment for mutual military support against some external actor(s) in some specified set of circumstances."

relations in turn are influenced by – but are independent from – international alliance blocs. The nature of these interstate relations ultimately structures the relationship between the non-core group and the host state.

Domestic factors matter as well. The foreign policy goals of the host state are of great importance. A host state may have revisionist or status quo foreign policy goals.[30] The elites of a state can come to adopt revisionist goals because the military and economic power of their state is rapidly increasing relative to their competitors, because of ideological convictions, or because they have lost territories in a recent war and want to regain them. Regardless of the causes of a state's revisionism, the foreign policy goals of the ruling political elites are focused on overturning the international status quo. Alternatively, state elites may favor the international status quo. This, again, might be because their power is declining relative to their competitors, because their ideological convictions have changed because of a defeat or exhaustion, or because they have recently expanded their territory and want to consolidate it.

There is a significant debate in the international relations literature over whether all states,[31] no states,[32] or some states are revisionist.[33] My argument falls in the third camp, recently baptized "neoclassical realism,"[34] but it comes with a twist. In contrast to neoclassical realism, where domestic incentives affect a state's foreign policy behavior,[35] I suggest a reversed-neoclassical realism, where foreign policy goals interact with the nature of interstate relations with the external patrons of non-core groups to condition nation-building policies. Revisionism in my framework refers to a state's *ex ante* stated foreign policy goals, not necessarily its behavior.[36]

Four configurations that lead to different policy choices flow from a set of assumptions I discuss in Chapter 2, and have so far been neglected in the literature. First, a policy of assimilation toward that non-core group is likely if a group has no external support. Second, a host state is likely to pursue assimilation through internal colonization if the state favors the status quo and an enemy is supporting the non-core group. Third, a host state is likely to accommodate a non-core group if an ally is supporting that group. Finally, a host state is likely to exclude a non-core group when the state has revisionist aims and an enemy is supporting that group.

[30] Wolfers 1962: 90, 92.
[31] Mearsheimer 2001.
[32] Waltz 1979.
[33] Schweller 2004 and 2006.
[34] See Lobell et al. 2009; Rathbun 2008; Rose 1998.
[35] Many studies of neoclassical realism focus on the importance of domestic variables in explaining foreign policy outcomes. Jack Snyder shows the role of compact interest groups on expansionist foreign policy (1991); Jason Davidson shows that fascist Italy's revisionism in the interwar years was driven by domestic political opportunities (in Davidson 2002). Taylor Fravel (2008) argues that internal threats can account for China's policy with respect to territorial disputes.
[36] Davidson 2002.

My argument is applicable to cases that satisfy the following conditions. First, the ruling political elites represent a core group that is well defined and there is a clear criterion of inclusion – a "national type" in the age of nationalism.[37] Second, part of the population has not yet been successfully assimilated and there is no "caste structure" in place.[38] Third, the state has the capacity to directly rule the population.[39] In other words, my argument would require modification to account for variation in states that do not have a well-defined core group – maybe because they are ruled by a multiethnic coalition or their organization is based on an organizing principle that defies such definition; states where there are no non-core groups; states where there is a hierarchical ethnic structure that is considered fixed or sacred; and/or states that do not have the capacity to directly rule their population – that is, failed states.

These scope conditions render the Balkans states following World War I an ideal set of cases to study. The area at the time was ethnically heterogeneous, with many unassimilated ethnic groups; the ruling elites of these states had a clear national type in their minds; and all of these states had the capacity to pursue nation-building policies.[40] Moreover, we can control for important factors. All states were primarily agricultural societies with low urbanization levels, they faced the same international system of minority rights protection, they had experienced similar forms of past rule – as parts of the Ottoman Empire – and they had a similar understanding of nationhood. Importantly, there is significant variation in nation-building policies across and within these states. Finally, studying cases from the interwar period is less difficult than studying recent cases where the historiography has not matured and archival materials have not been declassified.

One might argue that the interwar Balkans experience belongs to the distant past, that the era of nation-building and assimilation has reached its limits, and that the time when citizenship is no longer connected to ethnicity is – or ought to be – near.[41] Indeed, there might be a threshold of economic development beyond which the citizens of a state become immune to nationalist ideology. And yet political realities around the world challenge the euphoria of the early 1990s regarding the prospects of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. Issues of ethnicity, nationhood, and citizenship remain complexly bound up with one another throughout

[37] Within multiethnic empires, that by definition are not driven by a homogenizing imperative, accommodation rather than assimilation is the default option. In such situations, external support by an ally is definitely not required for a group to be accommodated. I borrow the expression "age of nationalism" from Hobsbawm's work (1990 and 1991).

[38] In such cases assimilation is by definition impossible, see Weber 1978. These systems involve an "ideology of inferiority for the subordinate groups" and thus an almost fixed ethnic structure that is perceived as natural. For more on hierarchical systems, see Horowitz 1985: 21–32.

[39] For the distinction between direct and indirect rule, see Hechter 2000.

[40] To be sure, there was plenty of instability in Albania and Turkey during the first years after World War I but calling them failed states would be wrong.

[41] Benhabib 2004; Joppke 2005; Kymlicka 1995; Young 1993.

the globe – even in developed countries, as evidenced by the recent policy debates in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Slovakia, and Switzerland.[42]

While it is true that exclusion seems inconceivable in contemporary consolidated democracies, even liberal states are likely to deviate from their multiculturalist arrangements under certain geopolitical and economic conditions. I argue that consolidated democracies can afford to accommodate non-core groups because of their participation in powerful alliances such as NATO or the EU, which significantly reduce threat perceptions and provide security protection. In other words, in the absence of these alliances or if faced with imminent security threats even consolidated democracies will pursue exclusionary policies when confronted with enemy-backed non-core groups, as the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II illustrates.[43]

Moreover, the increased security measures that states pursued following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the intensifying efforts to control illegal immigration have further strengthened border controls. Thus we are faced with a paradox: "people are at the same time both more closely united [because of globalization] and more carefully divided through increased physical and legal barriers."[44] All in all, the forces of globalization far from supersede the role of the nation-state both within and beyond its territorial limits.

In a world where territory is important and border changes are possible, we must consider external support for non-core groups. Despite the well-known arguments that territory is becoming increasingly less important in our globalized world, that border changes are – or will be – rare events in our international system, and that borders are increasingly obsolete,[45] territorial disputes, border changes, and strict border controls are with us and will be with us in the future.[46] For territorial disputes, one just needs to ask people in Cyprus, Mali, India, Israel, China, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, to name just a few countries with ongoing disputes. For border changes one needs to look in the former USSR, former Yugoslavia, Eritrea, East Timor, South Ossetia, Georgia, and Sudan, to name just a few recent cases. When we add to the list above the scores of "nations without a state"[47] or "stateless nations"[48] then we get a sense of the potential for territorial conflicts in the near future.

Returning to the initial puzzle, my theory suggests that in order to understand the shift of Ottoman policies toward Armenians from accommodation to exclusion, we need to pay attention to the patterns of external involvement and

[42] Akturk 2011; Caldwell 2009; Howard 2009.
[43] Harth 2001; Robinson 2009.
[44] Ganster and Lorey 2005: xi.
[45] Camilleri 1990; Friedman 2000 and 2007; Sassen 1996, 1998, and 2002; Schaeffer 2003; Strange 2000.
[46] Buchanan and Moore 2003; Doremus et al. 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2011; Vasquez and Henehan 2001; Wilson and Donnan 1998.
[47] Guibernau 1999.
[48] For example, Minahan (2002) documents 300 developed or emerging national groups without their own state worldwide. For Europe alone, see Bodlore-Penlaez 2010.

interstate relations. The Armenian genocide was neither destined to happen due to a long-standing ideological conviction by the Young Turks to eliminate the Armenians nor strategically provoked by Armenian armed groups in order to force the Great Powers of the time to intervene on their behalf.[49] It was the increasing Russian, and later French, military and diplomatic support of the Armenians – rather than merely the cultural or religious difference between Armenians and Turks per se – that transformed the perception of this group in the eyes of the Ottoman ruling elites and set the stage for the persecution of the Armenians. And this transformation was happening in parallel with the transformation of the Ottoman Empire itself from a multiethnic to a homogenizing empire.[50] Once the international conditions for exclusionary policies were there, and the Ottoman Empire under the Young Turks was no longer driven by the multiethnic precepts of the past, then ethnic differences and local conditions became operative. Variables such as cultural or religious differences take a long time to change, but nation-building policies can – and often do – shift at a faster pace. In order to account for the variation in nation-building policies across space and over time, we need a theory that incorporates variables that change at a pace similar to these policies. In this book I present such a theory.

WHY STUDY NATION-BUILDING POLICIES?

The primary reason to study and understand the logic of nation-building policies toward non-core groups is that inter- and intra-state wars often result from conflict over such policies.[51] For example, Imperial Russia used the pretense of protecting the rights of the Orthodox Christian *millet* to intervene in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The politics between the Kingdom of Serbia and Austria-Hungary surrounding the Serb minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina spurred World War I.[52] Similarly, Hitler referred to the political unification of the German *Volk* residing outside Germany's borders as the driving principle behind his military moves that led to World War II.[53] The Turkish government justified its 1974 military intervention in Cyprus based on the principle of the protection of its co-ethnics.[54] More

[49] Suny et al. 2011.
[50] Findley 2010; Reynolds 2011; Üngör 2011.
[51] There is an extensive empirical and theoretical literature establishing this connection. For more on this, see Ambrosio 2001; Brown 1996; Byman and Van Evera 1998; Carment et al. 2006; Connor 1972; Davis and Moore 1997; Goertz and Diehl 1997; Heraclides 1990 and 1991; Horowitz 1985; Lake and Rothchild 1998; Saideman 1997 and 2002; Saideman and Ayres 2000; Sambanis 2001; Snyder and Walter 1999; Taras and Ganguly 2002; Woodwell 2004.
[52] Another theory is that Franz Ferdinand's assassins wanted to prevent the reorganization of the Habsburg Empire on a trialist basis (a plan to include the Slavs in the Dual Monarchy in order to check the Hungarians), which would have severely undermined Serbian aspirations in Bosnia and Croatia (Sowards 1996).
[53] Weinberg 1995: 95–146.
[54] Stern 1975: 38, 78; Coufoudakis 1976: 469–471.

recently, Russia used similar justifications in its military intervention in Georgia in support of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.[55]

This trend is not unique to the Balkans or post-communist Europe. In the Middle East a potential Kurdistan threatens four sovereign states: Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran. In Kashmir, a nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan is a real possibility. In Asia, Tibetans and Uyghurs are becoming more assertive toward the Chinese government. In Africa, hundreds of ethnic groups straddle existing state borders. The fates of these peoples and many others with similar statuses depend very much on the international politics of nation-building. Ironically, so do the fates of their host states.

Beyond anecdotal evidence, scholars studying the onset of civil wars statistically have found that political competition among ethnic groups is central to our understanding of armed conflict. Cederman, Min, and Wimmer show that specific ethnic power configurations at the state's center are more likely to lead to conflict than others. In particular ethnic groups that are excluded from state power, have a mobilizational capacity and have experienced conflict in the past are much more likely to rebel.[56] Studying how the abovementioned configurations emerge in the first place is thus crucial.

Understanding the logic of state-planned nation-building policies can help decisionmakers at the United Nations (UN) or in regional organizations such as the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) anticipate political developments and devise incentives to prevent ethnic cleansing, encourage accommodation, or foster national integration. Granted, this understanding is not enough on its own; it has to be coupled with effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms by international organizations. But the latter can be better calibrated if based on a deeper understanding of the logic of nation-building policies.

At least three policy implications flow from my argument. First, one way to prevent exclusionary policies is by upholding the principle of state sovereignty. Second, ethnic cleansing and exclusionary policies may be prevented – along with a whole host of unintended consequences such as spill over of conflict, refugee flows, and humanitarian crises –[57] if governments are particularly judicious when they venture to assist non-core groups in enemy host states. In such cases they either need to commit as many resources as needed to help the non-core group or not interfere at all. Finally, for the probability of accommodation to increase, we need to increase interstate alliances through regional integration initiatives and international and regional institutions such as the EU and ASEAN.

BOOK PLAN

The book comprises eight chapters and a methodological appendix. In Chapter 2, I present the building block concepts and the basic logic of my theory. I also situate

[55] King 2008.
[56] Cederman et al. 2010.
[57] Kuperman 2008; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Weiner 1996.