The Good Neighbour

Australian peace support operations in the Pacific Islands, 1980–2006


The Good Neighbour tells the story of the deployment of Australian diplomatic, military and policing resources at a time when neighbouring governments were under pressure from political violence and civil unrest. It begins with Australia’s participation in the first Pacific Islands peace enforcement operation to Vanuatu in 1980; and covers contingency operations to the waters off Fiji, and unarmed and armed interventions into Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) and the Solomon Islands; and concludes with a brief intervention in Tonga in 2006.

The main focus of this volume is Australian peacemaking and peacekeeping in response to the Bougainville Crisis, a secessionist rebellion that began in late 1988 with the sabotage of a major mining operation. Following a signed peace agreement in 2001, the crisis finally ended in December 2005, under the auspices of the United Nations. During this time Australia’s involvement shifted from behind-the-scenes peacemaking, to armed peacekeeping intervention, and finally to a longer-term unarmed regional peacekeeping operation.

Granted full access to all relevant government files, Bob Breen recounts the Australian story from decisions made in Canberra to the planning and conduct of operations. He captures the experiences of Australian commanders and peacekeepers on the ground, sometimes in dangerous circumstances amid difficult tropical climates and austere living conditions.

Bob Breen is Associate Professor of Strategic Studies, Director of Deakin University Post-Graduate Qualifications and Academic Adviser at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, Australian Defence College.
The Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post–Cold War Operations


Volume V Bob Breen, *The Good Neighbour: Australian peace support operations in the Pacific Islands, 1980–2006*
THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF AUSTRALIAN PEACEKEEPING, HUMANITARIAN AND POST–COLD WAR OPERATIONS VOLUME V

The Good Neighbour

Australian peace support operations in the Pacific Islands, 1980–2006

BOB BREEN
This volume is dedicated to thousands of Australians who served in the Pacific Islands on peace support operations during the period 1980–2006. In particular the author acknowledges the ultimate sacrifices of Captain Mark Bingley, Corporal Shawn Lewis, Lance Corporal Jamie Parker, Trooper Joshua Porter and Protective Service Officer Adam Dunning.
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Cambridge University Press
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Preface

This volume of the Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post–Cold War Operations describes the history of the Australian Government's efforts to support peace in the Pacific Islands from 1980 until 2006. It is the story of the application of Australian diplomatic, military and policing skills and resources at a time when neighbourhood governments were under pressure from political violence and civil unrest in Vanuatu, Fiji, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Solomon Islands (see Map 1).

The nature and circumstances of these 'good neighbour' operations varied. Most involved armed or unarmed military forces and police, accompanied by diplomats and government officials, working for peace in high-risk environments. Some were brief whereas others continued for several years. All operations were conducted in demanding tropical climes characterised by peacekeepers having to adjust to austere living conditions and manage the high risk of contracting tropical diseases, such as malaria and dengue fever. Although there were few fatalities or casualties, all peacekeepers suffered physical and mental stress and, for some, periods of extreme danger.

This volume covers the broad sweep of activities included under the oft-used term 'peacekeeping'. Technically, however, the Australian Department of Defence uses the overarching term 'peace operations' to cover the continuum of activities that begin with preventive diplomacy and move through conflict prevention to peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement and, finally, to post-conflict peace-building. All these activities are represented in the events described in this volume.

The volume does not adhere to rigid definitions related to peace operations because they change and there are unique aspects of these operations in the Pacific Islands. The broad heading of 'peacekeeping' includes and excludes certain types of operation. The term can be interpreted in many ways, and the understanding of it has changed considerably since 1991, when the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade described it as: 'The use of military and civilian personnel under UN command to keep hostile factions or countries from fighting while peacemaking efforts are pursued.' In 1994 the Department of Defence defined it as 'non-combat operations (exclusive of self-defence), that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an

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1 For the purposes of this volume, the term 'Pacific Islands' includes the sixteen members of the Pacific Islands Forum, formerly the South Pacific Forum: Commonwealth of Australia, Cook Islands, Republic of the Fiji Islands, Republic of Kiribati, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Republic of Palau, Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Independent State of Samoa, Solomon Islands, Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu and Republic of Vanuatu.


3 Quoted in Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, United Nations Peacekeeping and Australia, p. 9.
existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute’. 4

The Department of Defence, however, also used the terms ‘peace enforcement’, ‘peace-building’ and ‘peace support operations’. Peace enforcement operations were ‘a form of combat, armed intervention, or the threat of armed intervention to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions – the primary purpose of which is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly acceptable to the international community’. Peace-building included diplomatic or military action to rebuild institutions and infrastructure, while peace support operations was an umbrella term covering peacekeeping, peace enforcement and preventative deployment. 5 In its 1994 report, the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade used the term ‘peacekeeping’ to encompass ‘all activities involving military operations in support of peace – peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement – unless specifically indicated otherwise’. 6 This seems to be a sensible approach. More recently, the Defence Department updated these definitions, but they do not alter the essence of the earlier ones. 7

This volume concludes that Australia’s story of supporting peace in the Pacific Islands from 1980 to 2006 is neither a military history nor a traditional description of peacekeeping operations like the ones Australia undertook elsewhere for reasons, such as alliance politics and good international citizenship. The volume refers to Australia’s ‘engagement for peace’ in the Pacific Islands. This type of operation is characterised by community-level interaction by peacekeepers with civil society. According to the World Bank, ‘[T]he term “civil society” refers to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide array of organisations: community groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, and foundations.’ 8

Initially, through diplomacy and other activities, such as the provision of development and military aid, Australia attempted to avoid instability leading to conflict in the Pacific Islands. When conflict erupted, Australian diplomats attempted peacemaking in order to secure a political rapprochement, truce, ceasefire or peace agreement.

4 Quoted in Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia’s Participation in Peacekeeping, p. 151.
5 Ibid., pp. 151–2.
6 Ibid., p. 2.
7 Peacekeeping: ‘A non-coercive instrument of diplomacy, where a legitimate international civil and/or military coalition is employed with the consent of the belligerent parties, in an impartial, non-combattant manner, to implement conflict resolution arrangements or assist humanitarian aid operations’. Peace enforcement: ‘The coercive use of civil and military actions by legitimate, international intervention forces, to assist diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents, who may not consent to that intervention. These actions will take the form of a graduated response to the conflict resolution: from the imposition of civil sanctions, followed by military support of sanctions, military sanctions and finally collective security actions.’ Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 2004, Operations Series ADDP 3.8, Peace Operations, Glossary, pp. 1, 2.
Australia initiated or cooperated with neighbours in peacemaking, typically in close consultation with New Zealand, a valued partner for supporting peace in the Pacific Islands. Accordingly, this volume is as much a diplomatic and conflict resolution history as it is an account of individual peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations.

Typically, peacekeeping operations began only after peacemakers had achieved a truce or ceasefire. Australia and neighbouring Pacific Islands states then deployed either unarmed peace monitors or armed military and police forces to maintain the peace while diplomats and others attempted to resolve or ease the underlying causes of conflict to a point at which the peacekeepers could be withdrawn. Armed peacekeepers were governed by defensive rules of engagement or directives for the use of force; that is, they could use force only in self-defence or as a last resort to defend others.

Sometimes it was necessary to enforce peace at gunpoint. Such operations involved the use of military forces, and sometimes armed police, to maintain a ceasefire or peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance was uncertain and the threat of disruption by spoilers was high. Occasionally, peace-enforcers deployed when there was no agreement between antagonists or an outbreak of civil unrest threatened to overwhelm local security forces. Australia was involved in several such operations in the Pacific Islands. These operations were rarely undertaken unilaterally and generally required the invitation of the government of the country in which the unrest was taking place.

Finally, after a measure of peace was achieved, it was necessary to employ complementary diplomatic, civil and, occasionally, military means to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the populace. In the Pacific Islands, this usually meant a return to the provision of aid for human development and to assist governments to govern, and in Solomons Islands the provision of a regional garrison force. Although Australia has been involved in many such development aid activities in the Pacific Islands, they are not covered in this volume.

The demands of these various aspects of peace operations presented unique challenges for the Australian Government in the Pacific Islands region from 1980 until 2006. Australia, the region’s most capable neighbour, was for the first time the lead nation in peacemaking efforts. Also for the first time, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) had to lead, plan, deploy and sustain forces in the region and to assemble, deploy and sustain Pacific Islands peacekeeping contingents as part of multinational peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations.

This volume begins by setting the scene for ‘good neighbour’ operations in Bougainville, PNG’s eastern island province, and Solomon Islands in the 1990s and 2000s. Chapter 1 provides an Australian policy context for Australian peacemaking and eventual peacekeeping and peace-enforcement interventions. It covers the origins and centrality of the policy of strategic denial and Australia’s responses to decolonisation through the provision of military and development aid, as well as the establishment of regional arrangements for trade, development and security cooperation. This chapter also touches on the security nexus between Australia and PNG, as well as the post-colonial legacy of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) and the influence of that legacy on what became known as the Bougainville Crisis.

With the scene set, chapters 2 and 3 describe the first tests of Australia’s policies for supporting peace in the Pacific Islands in Vanuatu and Fiji. In 1980 Australia committed a low-profile, small-scale deployment of ADF personnel as members of a successful
Preface

PNG military intervention in newly independent Vanuatu to quell a secessionist rebellion. Eight years later, the Australian Government put ADF troops, naval vessels and aircraft on standby to evacuate Australian citizens from Port Vila, the capital of Vanuatu, and assist local police to restore law and order in anticipation of a second outbreak of politically motivated violence. Further rioting did not eventuate, and Australian forces were stood down.

In May 1987 the Australian Government responded to a military coup in Fiji by marshalling regional and international condemnation and diplomatic pressure while supporting the efforts of Fiji’s Governor-General to restore parliamentary democracy. Concerned about the possible dangers to Australian citizens in the aftermath of the coup, the government ordered the precautionary deployment of a maritime task force with embarked troops to the waters off Fiji as an emergency evacuation contingency. This was the first overseas deployment of an Australian joint force since the end of Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War in 1972. The Fijian army maintained control of the streets of the capital, Suva, and other towns, and the Australian task force returned home without landing in Fiji, but with many lessons to learn about projecting military forces into the near region.

Chapters 4 to 16 concern the Bougainville Crisis, which began with the sabotage of a large mining operation in Bougainville in late 1988. Beginning with considerations of emergency evacuation of expatriates, as well as military intervention, Australia began a 15-year journey to assist the PNG Government. The initial policy under the Hawke Labor Government was to increase military aid to the PNGDF and to emphasise the Bougainville Crisis as an internal matter for the PNG Government to solve. After several years, the Hawke Government, prompted in part by the Australian Council of Trade Unions, intervened by facilitating and leading an armed Pacific Islands peacekeeping force to Bougainville briefly to secure the site for a peace conference. At that same time there was an increasingly assertive effort to assist the PNG Government to come to a political settlement with Bougainvillean secessionists. Australia hosted a peace conference in Cairns in 1995. Thus Australia moved from behind-the-scenes peacemaking in the first five years of the Crisis to facilitating a brief regional armed peacekeeping intervention in October 1994 and a peace conference in 1995. After two more years of inconclusive military operations, the PNG Government engaged South African mercenaries to fight in Bougainville in early 1997. This controversial decision and its unsettling aftermath in PNG encouraged moderate PNG leaders to support a peaceful negotiated solution to the Crisis while also prompting the newly elected Howard Government in Australia and the New Zealand Government to intervene more assertively with peacemaking initiatives that spawned the deployment of unarmed regional peacekeepers to Bougainville in late 1997. This operation continued through several organisational changes and phases until December 2003, when a small contingent of Australian civilian peacekeepers, called the Bougainville Transition Team, left Bougainville after six months service.

Unarmed inter-agency peacekeeping in Bougainville presaged a regional and what was dubbed a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to restoring law and order and accountable governance in Solomon Islands. Chapters 17 to 22 describe peacemaking and an unarmed peacekeeping operation in Solomon Islands from 2000 to 2002, followed by a large-scale armed intervention in 2003 and an emergency armed intervention in April 2006. Chapter 17 describes Australia’s interest in the fate of Solomon Islands
after ethnic tensions erupted into violence in the late 1990s, threatening the viability of government and public order. In October 2000 Australia brokered the Townsville Peace Agreement, which authorised the deployment of a small group of unarmed regional peacekeepers.

Chapter 18 takes up the story of these peacekeepers, called the International Peace Monitoring Team (Peace Monitoring Team), whose mission was to monitor the implementation of the Townsville Peace Agreement. Following the refusal of ethnic militias to disarm and the withdrawal of the Peace Monitoring Team, Solomon Islands continued an inexorable decline towards anarchy. Chapters 19 and 20 describe events that led to a change in Australian policy towards Solomon Islands and, eventually, to a large-scale armed intervention. These chapters examine the planning and conduct of the largest Australia-sponsored peace-enforcement operation in the Pacific Islands region from July until October 2003, known as the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Chapters 21 and 22 cover RAMSI’s challenges in 2004–05 and the response to an outbreak of rioting and arson in Honiara, the capital of Solomon Islands, in April 2006.

This volume’s coverage of RAMSI is limited to describing the initial peace enforcement phase in 2003–04 and security challenges RAMSI and Australia met until the end of 2006. There is much more of the RAMSI story to tell, and it is important to do so. There is merit in the Australian Government commissioning a volume of official history on the efforts of AusAID and other agencies, such as the AFP, to build governance capacity in Solomon Islands that covered all aspects of the Solomon Islands Government. The same could be said for the efforts of AusAID and other agencies in Bougainville to alleviate the suffering of the Bougainvillean people. Ultimately all of these efforts by a good neighbour were intended to contribute to a peaceful and prosperous Pacific Islands neighbourhood.

Chapters 23 and 24 describe a year of turmoil in the Pacific Islands in 2006. The first of these two final chapters describes another evacuation contingency operation in the waters off Fiji in November 2006 in anticipation of a military coup in early December. The coup that occurred on 4–5 December did not result in civil unrest, so the task force returned to Australia, sadly with the loss of a Black Hawk helicopter and one of its pilots and a passenger in an accident. The last chapter of the volume covers Australia’s response to an outbreak of rioting and looting in Nuku’alofa, the capital of Tonga, on 16 November. Australia diverted ships from the Fiji task force to Tonga and flew in troops from Australia to support a New Zealand–led operation to secure the international airport for the evacuation of foreign nationals. Despite arriving too late to avert significant damage to Nuku’alofa’s central business district, Australian and regional police, supported by Australian troops, deterred further political protests that could have ignited more outbreaks of rioting and arson.

There are several distinctive features of this volume that differentiate it from the others in this Official History series. The other volumes tell the story of Australia’s participation in UN-led and UN-endorsed operations as well as humanitarian relief efforts—good international and regional citizenship. Australia’s national interests were not engaged directly for most of these missions. Australian participation was designed to support allies and the international community to maintain a rules-based world order and demonstrate the Australian people’s compassion and commitment to humanitarian values. By contrast, this volume describes Australia’s interventions into its strategically
important Pacific Islands neighbourhood. National interests were at stake, and Australia was responsible and accountable for outcomes: Australia led rather than being led.

The United Nations and Australia’s major allies, such as Britain and the United States, figure prominently in other volumes (with the exception of the humanitarian operations volume), but are not as prominent in this volume. Neither Australia nor New Zealand sought assistance from the United Nations or major Western allies to intervene when there was trouble in the Pacific Islands. Neither nation anticipated having allies ‘shown the way’ to assist Melanesian neighbours. Furthermore, the United Nations, as well as other major Western and Asia-Pacific allies, expected Australia and New Zealand to work with their Pacific Islands neighbours to resolve conflict, encourage prosperity and respond to emergencies.

However, the United Nations is not absent from the story. Two Solomon Islands prime ministers and several Bougainvillean secessionists sought UN intervention. The United Nations reported on human rights abuses in Bougainville and sent representatives to peace talks there in 1994 and in New Zealand in 1998. A small UN observer mission deployed to Bougainville in 1998 under the terms of a ceasefire agreement. This mission played a significant role in mediation and weapons disposal, the penultimate phase of the resolution of the Bougainville Crisis.

This volume contains more detail on Australian military proficiency than other volumes. Outside its regional neighbourhood, Australia usually made relatively minor contributions to larger operations that were planned, organised, led and sustained by allies. The ADF planned, organised, led and sustained most operations, and contributed most of the peacekeepers, in the Pacific Islands. The proficiency of the ADF and its adaptation to regional peacekeeping operations is therefore an essential part of the story and important. Arguably, any systemic military shortcomings in the conduct of uncontested operations in the Pacific Islands exposed weaknesses in Australia’s capacity and capability to project force in defence of its sovereignty.

In contrast to the other Official History volumes in this series, the operations described here are characterised by a higher level of involvement by diplomats, the AFP, a range of experts and other Australian government officials. This difference reflects the evolution of an inter-agency approach to Pacific Islands peacekeeping over time. In October 1994, a lone diplomat, James Batley, accompanied an ADF-led peacekeeping operation into Bougainville, largely to report back to his department. From 1997 until 2003, ADF commanders of peace-monitoring groups and senior diplomats were close partners in Bougainville. Contingents of Australian government officials, including AFP officers, served as front-line peacekeepers in Bougainville for the same period. Australia’s first intervention in Solomon Islands in 2000 was led by a diplomat, Simon Merrifield, and comprised a police contingent, an ADF adviser, Colonel Brian Dawson (who was accompanied by a few military staff), and a small team of civilian observers. A second and larger-scale armed intervention into Solomon Islands in 2003 was commanded by a diplomat, Nick Warner, who already had a significant role in the Bougainville peace process while serving as Australia’s High Commissioner in Port Moresby. Colonel Paul Symon, who had first-hand experience as a peacekeeper in East Timor in 1999, was Warner’s military adviser. An AFP officer, Assistant Commissioner Ben McDevitt, who had served as a peace monitor in Bougainville, directed the activities of a large AFP and regional police contingent. A sizeable ADF task force of more than a thousand RAN, Army and RAAF personnel, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Preface

John Frewen, underpinned policing operations with armed protection, communications, logistic support, medical facilities and maritime, road and air transport.

The role of the AFP in regional peacekeeping increased significantly in 2004 and thereafter. In the 1980s and 1990s, only the ADF was on standby to intervene to restore law and order in the Pacific Islands in an emergency. In 2004 the AFP established the International Deployment Group (IDG), which had the capacity to provide officers for Australian domestic as well as regional and international stability and security operations. Between 2006 and 2009, the IDG expanded to 900 of an approved 1200-strong staff that included an Operational Response Group incorporating riot police. This group became capable of rapid deployment and highly skilled tactical policing in response to breakdowns in law and order.

The volume is written at three levels. At the strategic level in Canberra, politicians and officials from specific departments and agencies, as well as senior military and police officers, developed policies and decided on responses to threats to peace in the Pacific Islands. At the operational level, the ADF, in conjunction with other departments and agencies, planned, deployed, commanded, employed and maintained forces in the Pacific Islands. At the tactical and personal level in the field, Australian men and women moved among traumatised communities showing compassion to those they were sent to protect and responding firmly to those who threatened security and public order.

The interactions of Australian politicians, policy-makers and peacekeepers with coalition partners and Pacific Islands protagonists and peoples are described and explained using Australian sources and through Australian eyes. This volume is focused on the way Australians looked at others rather than the way others looked at Australians. I hope it will stimulate others to tell the story of New Zealand’s significant contribution to keeping the peace in the Pacific Islands, as well as the efforts of other regional neighbours to maintain peace, and the courage and commitment of Pacific Islands peacemakers and the members of civil society, especially women and church groups, who supported them.

This volume has been written as a record of history, as well as for elucidation and analysis. Cabinet provided full access to all relevant Australian government records, and there has been no censorship, except that the government reserved the right to prevent publication of any material that might be damaging to Australian national security, such as intelligence sources and information received from allied countries. The exclusion of sensitive intelligence and operational material has in no way altered conclusions or compromised the integrity of the history. Some sources cited in the volume, however, might not necessarily be available for public access for some time.
Acknowledgements

Emeritus Professor David Horner AM, Professor of Australian Defence History at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Coral Bell School of Asia and Pacific Affairs, Australian National University, is the Cabinet-appointed Official Historian. He is without peer in both authorship of Official History volumes and in supervision and encouragement of the authorship of others. Without him, this series of post–Cold War Official History and other series, such as those for East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, would not have received government sponsorship. His encouragement, advice and editorial assistance for this volume typifies his commitment to the highest possible professional standards and was gratefully received.

Emeritus Professor Horner assembled a group of first-class historians, most of whom have been commissioned to write other volumes in this series. I am grateful for the editorial advice these colleagues provided for each chapter of this volume. Catherine McCullough and then Cathryn Game, an editorial consultant for Cambridge University Press, made significant contributions by copy-editing, refining and enhancing the text. Miesje de Vogel conducted research and collected and prepared the images, and Colin Garnett completed the index for this volume. Lisa Foley painted the image used on the front cover.

My involvement in Australian peacekeeping operations began in Somalia in 1993 as the ADF Land Commander’s newly appointed Colonel (Operations Analysis). Along the journey thereafter, I received the generous cooperation and trust of many Australian military commanders and staff as well as AFP personnel in Australia. While visiting operations, hundreds of military, police and civilian peace-makers, peacekeepers and peace enforcers contributed to my understanding of the challenges they met and generously gave their time, recollections and advice freely for the common purposes of education, commemoration and inspiration.

Assembling files, visual material and maps for this volume involved a number of dedicated and helpful people. The managers and staff at the Defence Department Archives at Queanbeyan, NSW, managed by Jenny Oldfield, and the registry at Victoria Barracks, Sydney, managed by Chris Knell, assembled the ADF files used to inform this volume. Managers and staff at the Access Examination and Coordination Section, Public Diplomacy and Communications Division, DFAT, such as Dr David Lee, Steve Robinson and Wanda Oram-Miles, marshalled the files for the diplomatic story. Staff at the AFP repository at Weston Creek, ACT, and at the International Deployment Group, at Majura, ACT, assembled the files for the AFP story. Staff at the Australian War Memorial were always helpful, especially in the Audio Visual Section, led by Stephanie Boyle; Lenny Preston provided sound recorders and studio facilities to record interviews and gave me access to many transcripts. Stuart Bennington and Craig Berelle archived the research material used for the volume. The CartoGIS section, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University, particularly Karina Pelling, created the maps. The staff at the Pacific Manuscripts Bureau, Australian National University, assisted with several photographs. Officials from Defence Policy
Acknowledgements

and Commemorations Defence Branch, National Security Division, PM&C, such as Mary Jeffries, offered information and advice.

A number of individuals gave considerable time to enhancing this Volume. Emeritus Professor David Horner was a consistent contributor over the years this volume took to research, write and receive departmental clearance. Anthony Regan, a colleague from ANU and one of Australia’s foremost experts on Melanesia in general and Bougainville in particular, examined the penultimate manuscript meticulously. James Batley, Matthew Anderson and Bruce Hunt, all of whom served on posts and with the peace missions in the Pacific Islands, provided editorial advice. To each of them I am most grateful.

Finally, may I thank His Excellency General the Honourable David Hurley AC DSC (Retd), Governor of New South Wales, and his wife Linda for hosting me at Government House while I edited the penultimate manuscript and completed the Conclusion.

Bob Breen
November 2015
Disclaimer

The Australian Government has provided access to all relevant government records to Associate Professor Breen for the purposes of writing this volume of the Official History of Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post–Cold War Operations. In keeping with the customary independence of Australian official histories, the author alone is responsible for the interpretations in this volume and for any errors that might be found.
**Chronology, 1949–2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>United Nations grants formal approval for Australia to exercise joint administration of Territories of Papua and New Guinea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>CRA Exploration granted authority to prospect over area including Panguna deposit in Bougainville.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Mining Warden rejects objections from local villagers and grants additional prospecting licences to CRA. Confrontations between villagers and geologists continue throughout the year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1966</strong></td>
<td><strong>January</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>July</strong></td>
<td>Villagers around Panguna force suspension of drilling operations, but drilling later continues under police protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1967</strong></td>
<td><strong>June</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1969</strong></td>
<td><strong>April</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June</strong></td>
<td>Surveyors move in to work on Arawa land; Bougainville villagers objections to Special Mining Lease taken up by the Public Solicitor in the Australian High Court without success (case dismissed in August).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>July</strong></td>
<td>The micro-nationalist Napidakoe Navitu movement is formed in Arawa, Bougainville, in response to land...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
acquisitions for the mine, and 1500 people attend first meeting.

1970

Napidakoe Navitu becomes more influential and supports calls from a number of Bougainvillean leaders for a referendum on secession. Nagriamel movement in New Hebrides (Vanuatu) petitions United Nations to prevent sale of indigenous land to expatriates.

1971

A construction worker labour force for Panguna Mine in Bougainville and associated works peaks to more than 10,000 persons.

1972

April

Commercial production begins at Panguna Mine. American environmentalist Richard West in his book *River of Tears* predicts that disputes over ownership of the mine could cause civil war.

1973

February

Bougainville Special Political Committee established and prepares a case for establishing a district government for Bougainville.

July

The Bougainville Special Political Committee submits demand for a District Government to the PNG Constitutional Planning Committee.

1974


1975

May

Bougainville Provincial Government votes to secede from PNG and adopts the name ‘North Solomons’.

August

Bougainville Provincial Government announces decision to declare independence of the Republic of North Solomons as from 1 September.

1 September

Secessionists raise the flag of the North Solomons Republic in Arawa market.

16 September

PNG attains independence.

October

PNG Parliament suspends Bougainville Provincial Government.

1976

January

Anti-national government protests in Bougainville.

February

PNG government revokes suspension of Bougainville Provincial Government after negotiations.

July

First election held for the Bougainville Provincial Government. Bougainville Agreement signed between
PNG Government and Bougainville leaders pave the way for the Organic Law on Provincial Government.

December
PNG Parliament passes constitutional amendments providing for more decentralisation and provincial government.

1978
Panguna Landowners Association organised to press Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) for increasing compensation payments.

1979
Father Walter Lini appointed Prime Minister elect of Vanuatu in anticipation of independence in 1980.

1980
28 May
Secessionists under Jimmy Stevens occupy Luganville on Espiritu Santo Island, Vanuatu.

June
Britain deploys company (120 troops) from 42 Royal Marine Commando to Vanuatu.

1 June
Jimmy Stevens declares provisional government of Independent State of Vemarana on Espiritu Santo Island.

11 June
France deploys paramilitary Garde Mobile unit to Vila, capital of Vanuatu.

20 June
France deploys a paratroop company in response to British deployment of Royal Marines and withdraws Garde Mobile unit.

July
Panguna Landowners Association representatives in Arawa, Bougainville, sign a land compensation agreement with BCL.

14 July
PNG Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan and PNGDF Commander Brig Gen Ted Diro meet Prime Minister Walter Lini secretly at a South Pacific Forum meeting and offer military assistance to quell Espiritu Santo rebellion.

30 July

7 August
PNG Parliament approves legislation permitting provision of military assistance to Vanuatu.

9 August
Prime Minister Lini signs Treaty of Friendship between Vanuatu and PNG in Port Moresby.

12 August
Australia announces low-key limited support for PNGDF intervention in Vanuatu.

17 August
Vanuatu Parliament ratifies Treaty of Friendship with PNG.

18 August
RAAF aircraft deploy a PNGDF expeditionary force (Kumul Force) to Vila, and PNGDF aircraft then deploy troops to Luganville where they relieve British and French forces.
Chronology, 1949–2006

30 August
PNGDF soldiers ambush vehicle and kill Eddie Stevens, a son of Jimmy Stevens.

31 August – 23 September
PNGDF operations in support of Vanuatu Mobile Force clear villages on Espiritu Santo and make more than a hundred arrests.

September
Landowner roadblocks halts BCL production at Panguna Mine for some days.

27 September
Kumul Force withdraws from Vanuatu.

4 October
Kumul Force victory parade in Port Moresby.

1987

14 May
Coup in Fiji.

18 May
Fijian patrol boat HMFS Kira challenges HMAS Stalwart, a supply ship, at sea.

19 May
Fiji coup leader Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka releases Prime Minister Bavadra and Cabinet from custody.

20 May
Groups of indigenous Fijian males attack Fiji Indians and their property in Fiji’s capital, Suva.

22–23 May
Australian infantry company flies to Norfolk Island and deploys by RAN vessels to waters off Fiji (Operation Morris Dance) as a contingency for evacuation operations.

7 June
Australian evacuation force deployed to the waters off Fiji back in Australia.

24 July
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) formed from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

1988

March
Landowners in Panguna area of central Bougainville demand that PNG Government cancel the Mining Agreement with BCL.

April
Landowners and demand K10 billion and compensation for past damage to land and environment, transfer of 50 per cent of BCL profits and/or national government tax revenues to the Bougainville Provincial Government and transfer of ownership of BCL itself to Bougainvillian control within five years.

May
ADF troops and ships on standby to react to violence in Vanuatu (Operation Sail Cloth).

17 May
Roadblock and sit-in stops closes Panguna Mine for six hours.

2 September
Senator Gareth Evans takes up appointment as Australian Foreign Minister.

22 November
Bougainvillian militants steal explosives from the Panguna Mine magazine following PNG police action to clear a landowner roadblock.

xxviii
25–27 November The Bougainville Crisis begins when militants use stolen explosives in a series of attacks on mining infrastructure at Panguna.

December Demolition of the power pylons with explosives close mining operations intermittently. National government deploys police riot squads to Bougainville from Lae and elsewhere.

1989

15–17 January More attacks on BCL property and other targets in Panguna Mine area.

18 January PNG National Executive Committee (NEC) decides to impose all-night curfew in the Panguna mine area, starting 23 January.

February PNG Government declares a ceasefire, but Francis Ona, representing landowners, demands closure of mine and receives support from local leaders.

March Attacks on government and plantation buildings in Bougainville increase. PNG Cabinet approves deployment of PNGDF units to Bougainville.

25 May Bougainville Provincial Government committee chaired by John Bika issues a report proposing autonomy for Bougainville. Mining operations at Panguna in Bougainville close indefinitely.

26 June Deputy Prime Minister Ted Diro issues statement outlawing the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). PNG government declares State of Emergency in Bougainville.

September Prime Minister Namaliu announces public ceremony to be held on 12 September to sign a Bougainville Peace Package.

11 September Assassins kill John Bika, a Bougainville Provincial Government Minister. Peace agreement signing abandoned.

3 November Dr Timoci Bavadra, Prime Minister of Fiji overthrown in 1987 military coup, dies of cancer aged 55.

6 December Foreign Affairs policy statement, Australia’s Regional Security, presented to Parliament.

1990

January Amnesty International report incidents of human rights abuses by PNG security forces in Bougainville.

12 January PNG government extends State of Emergency in Bougainville. Colonel Nuia, PNGDF commander in
Chronology, 1949–2006

Bougainville, launches Operation Footloose as ‘all-out war’ on the BRA.

1 March
After failure of Operation Footloose, Colonel Leo Nuia and General Sam Kauona, Commander of the BRA, sign ceasefire agreement that includes provision for withdrawal of PNGDF from Bougainville and disarmament of BRA.

13 March
International Observer Group arrives in Bougainville to monitor withdrawal of PNG security forces and surrender of weapons by Bougainvillean militants.

16 March
All PNG security forces withdrawn from Bougainville.

4 April
Senator Robert Ray succeeds Kim Beazley as Australian Defence Minister.

May
PNG Government offers greater autonomy to Bougainville.

10 May
Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke agrees to permit Sitiveni Rabuka, Fijian military coup leader in 1987, to visit Australia.

17 May
Bougainvillean militants issue a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in response to the PNG government imposing a blockade of Bougainville.

29 July
Talks between PNG Government and a Bougainville delegation begin aboard HMNZS *Endeavour*.

5 August
PNG Government and Bougainville delegations sign the Endeavour Accord agreeing on restoration of government services in Bougainville, but deferring negotiations on Bougainville’s future political status.

13 September
The PNG armed forces begin returning to Bougainville at the request of leaders in Buka, northern Bougainville, and supported by the Buka Liberation Front, mainly former BRA.

October
Buka leaders sign Kavieng Agreement, calling on the PNG Government to re-establish order and services in Buka.

29 November
UN Security Council adopts Resolution 678, authorising the use of force to eject Iraq from Kuwait.

16 December
Australian naval task group enters the Persian Gulf.

1991

17 January
Coalition air strikes begin against Iraq begin.

23 January
PNG Government and BRA delegations sign the Honiara Declaration for the restoration of government services in Bougainville, deployment of a Multinational Supervisory Team and the establishment of an interim legal authority to govern Bougainville.