

Introduction: a year like no other

Prenez garde, prenez garde	Watch out, watch out
Les sabreurs les bourgeois, les gavés	You cavalymen, bourgeois, fat-cats
V'là la jeune garde	The youth Guard is here
V'là la jeune garde	The youth Guard is here
Qui descend sur le pavé . . .	We are taking to the streets . . .
C'est la lutte finale qui commence	It's the start of the final struggle
C'est la révolte de tous les meurt-de-faim	It's the revolt of the starved
C'est la Révolution qui s'avance	It's the Revolution on the march
C'est la bataille contre tous les coquins ¹	It's the battle against all the rogues

As a number of historians have recognized, for drama and significance the year 1919 has few parallels in the history of the modern world. William Klingaman called it “the year our world began,” while Margaret MacMillan has characterized Paris in 1919 as “six months that changed the world.”² Most recently, Anthony Read has portrayed it as “a world on fire.”³ Whereas other key dates in modern history, ranging from 1789 to 1914, 1917, 1933, 1945, and 1989 have generally marked either the beginning or the end of something, 1919 interests us precisely because of the character of those twelve months themselves, and the paths taken or not taken by historical actors during them. Like 1848 and 1968, 1919 was a year in which many things seemed up for grabs, one that seemed to offer a wide range of choices, yet at the same time underscored the limits of the possible.⁴

¹ René Michaud, *J'avais vingt ans: un jeune ouvrier au début du siècle* (Paris: Éditions syndicalistes, 1967), 105.
² William Klingaman, *1919: The Year Our World Began* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987); Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2002); David J. Mitchell, *1919: Red Mirage: Year of Desperate Rebellion* (London: Cape, 1970).
³ Anthony Read, *A World on Fire: 1919 and the Battle with Bolshevism* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2008).
⁴ Jonathan Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848–1851* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Barbara and John Ehrenreich, *Long March, Short Spring: The Student Uprising at Home and*

This study considers the transformation of working-class life in Paris as a result of World War I, taking as its central point political activism in 1919. The turbulence of Paris in 1919 resembled that produced by the confluence of two or more streams into the same watery basin. The resulting white water is a spectacular but evanescent display, as the disparate streams eventually blend and flow into a routinized channel. This book argues that working-class identity in the French capital shifted in important ways, and that these shifts were especially apparent during the year after the Armistice. In particular, I contend that the war brought questions of consumerism and the state to the fore, and that racial and gender difference were of vital importance in elaborating new visions of what it meant to be a worker in the era of World War I. Central to this study is the assertion that consumerism concerns necessities as well as luxuries (and in fact a rejection of hard-and-fast distinctions between the two). Following from this, I argue that consumerism can just as easily be a radicalizing force politically as a conservative one, that the desire for goods can move people to challenge capitalism and the status quo rather than integrating them into it. As this book will show, an insurgent vision of consumer culture played a key role in the revolutionary spirit of 1919.

The war years gave a new urgency to working-class consumerism, focused overwhelmingly on basic consumer goods like food and housing; during the immediate postwar era debates about the nature of peacetime conversion and deregulation of consumer goods underscored the political character of not just consumer life but working-class identity in general. At the same time, different processes of peacetime conversion both called into question and ultimately reaffirmed the diverse and splintered character of working-class identity in Paris. More generally, insurgent consumerism and issues of difference and transnationalism underlined transitions from nineteenth-century working-class life, which emphasized narrow corporatist struggles, to a more inclusive vision of working-class community that would set the tone for the twentieth century. In the end, the instability of working-class life in 1919 highlighted themes that would henceforth loom large in the world of labor as a whole.

Those who observed such changes at the end of World War I often framed them in terms of revolution. Not only did the threat (or promise) of insurrection seem omnipresent in 1919 but the war itself seemed to have destroyed the old world without making clear what was to replace it. This

Abroad (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969). Also like 1848 and 1968, as I shall argue, 1919 represented an era whose revolutionary hopes failed in the short term but to an important extent ultimately triumphed.

study takes as one of its central questions an exploration of why revolution seemed so imminent in the postwar era, even in a victorious nation like France. However, rather than attempt to explain why the revolutionary moment never achieved fruition, it seeks instead to illustrate how the prospect of revolution arose from and helped shape fundamental changes in working-class politics and identity. Ultimately it sees the turbulence of 1919 as a template for the uncertainties and anxieties germane to class and class society in the twentieth century.

1919 IN HISTORY

Several qualities made 1919 special. It was a year divided almost exactly between war and peace. Although students generally learn that World War I ended with the Armistice on November 11, 1918, in actual fact the belligerent nations remained in a state of war until the signing of the peace treaty at Versailles on June 28, 1919. Unlike 1945, when peace and unconditional surrender came at the same time, the first six months of 1919 in particular represented a liminal period caught between violence and diplomacy, victory and defeat. Moreover, although the guns of the Western Front had fallen silent, military struggles continued in the Balkans and most notably in the infant Soviet Union. The year 1919 thus presents an intriguing mixture of conflict and concord, a fitting beginning to a European century that would witness extremes of both.⁵

The year 1919 also represented contrasts of chronology and geography. Like World War I in general, it looked both back to the nineteenth century and forward to the twentieth. For Europeans the year underscored the collapse of empire and the widespread creation of liberal democratic nation-states.⁶ One of the great paradoxes of the Peace of Versailles was its effective abolition of empire within Europe at the same time as it reinforced and extended empire overseas, thus emphasizing the racialized nature of democracy on a global scale and justifying W. E. B. Dubois' remark about the centrality of the color line to the twentieth century. At the same time it showed how such changes had to adapt to the persistence of tradition or fail. Most Europeans, even in an industrialized nation like France, lived in the countryside or in small towns, areas whose daily rhythms had little to do

⁵ Arno Mayer, *The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking* (New York: Knopf, 1967); William Keylor, ed., *The Legacy of the Great War: Peacemaking, 1919* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998).

⁶ See on this point Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Vintage, 2000); Jay Winter, Geoffrey Parker, and Mary R. Habeck, eds., *The Great War and the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

with the pronouncements of diplomats and prime ministers.⁷ A movement such as Italian fascism, like German Nazism born in 1919, demonstrated both the attractions of new forms of politics and the persistence of the old. The year 1919 also represented the first major attempts in the twentieth century to conceptualize the world as a unified whole. The leaders who gathered in Paris to make peace not only addressed wartime conflicts but also other fault lines, issues that would henceforth dominate global relations. The exclusion of the Soviets did not prevent the rivalry between democratic capitalism and state communism from assuming center stage in world politics. Similarly, the refusal of the Paris diplomats seriously to acknowledge colonial demands for self-determination only stoked the fires of anti-colonial nationalism. East vs. West, North vs. South, the tensions that would divide the world in the new century first became apparent in 1919.⁸

Above all, 1919 was a year of revolution, both actual and potential. Even more than 1968, it was the year during the twentieth century in which the overthrow of the dominant order seemed possible on a global scale.⁹ Not only was the Bolshevik regime in Russia fighting for its life and calling for world revolution, but most of Europe east of the Rhine and south of the Alps seemed caught up in massive, indeed insurrectionary challenges to the political and social status quo. Even that most bourgeois of nations, Switzerland, did not seem immune from the revolutionary contagion.¹⁰ Moreover, the spirit of revolution surfaced far beyond the bounds of Europe, unleashing massive popular movements in China, Korea, India, Mexico, and Egypt. The United States, already the world's symbol of conservative democratic capitalism, experienced major labor unrest, including a general strike in Seattle.¹¹ The old line from *Solidarity Forever*, "We can

⁷ Arno Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime* (New York: Pantheon, 1981).

⁸ On the Paris peace conference see, among many studies, MacMillan, *Paris 1919*; Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy* and *The Persistence of the Old Regime*; Keylor, *The Legacy of the Great War*. Studies of colonial questions at the peace talks have received less attention than some other issues: some interesting texts include Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Avon Books, 1990).

⁹ In this respect it also resembles 1989, at least for the peoples of eastern Europe.

¹⁰ In fact, Paris was chosen as the site of the peace conference in part because Switzerland seemed too unstable politically. As David Mitchell put it, "if quaint, picture-postcard Switzerland went Red, where would the rot end?" Mitchell, *1919: Red Mirage*, 67.

¹¹ On revolutionary movements in postwar Europe, see Roger Magraw, "Paris, 1917–1920: labour protest and popular politics," in Chris Wrigley, ed., *Challenges of Labour: Central and Western Europe, 1917–1920* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993); Charles Bertrand, ed., *Revolutionary Situations in Europe, 1917–1922: Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary* (Montreal: Interuniversity Centre

bring to birth a new world from the ashes of the old,” seemed to some an apt description of the state of Europe and the world in 1919.¹²

In choosing to focus on a single year, I have largely departed from the historians’ traditional emphasis on chronology.¹³ Not only do I focus for the most part on a few months, but I organize this study around major themes rather than the succession of days, weeks, and months. For some this may appear problematic: after all, if the essence of history is the study of change over time, one cannot expect to see major shifts in a mere twelve months. I do not therefore claim that this study offers a thorough accounting of the rise and fall of a major historical epoch. Nor do I argue that 1919 was a central “turning point” in history, such as the beginning of the twentieth century. I regard such arguments with some suspicion, since the concept of the turning point tends to rely on teleological narratives of history and can obscure important continuities in both popular and official mentalities and practices. Instead, I consider 1919 important because of the insights it offers into important aspects of Parisian society, culture, and politics in the early twentieth century. Some looked forward, some back, and most had relevance far beyond the Ile de France. Moreover, the focus on a single year naturally enables the historian to engage in a level of detail far greater than studies of longer periods, helping us to see events through the eyes of those who lived them, who did not know how things would turn out nor their significance for the future. In shying away from teleological narratives of the passage of time, I thus respond to and take seriously the critiques frequently leveled against the writing of History by postcolonial critics.¹⁴ Additionally, such an approach best illustrates the often inchoate, unstable character of the times. My analysis of 1919 both focuses on the important events that happened in that year and also uses it to illustrate broader tensions in Parisian, French, and ultimately global society. Consider this study a portrait of a singular year, one full of paths taken and not taken, yet one whose scope and implications ultimately go well beyond 1919.¹⁵

for European Studies, 1977); James Cronin and Carmen Sirianni, eds., *Work, Community, and Power: The Experience of Labor in Europe and America, 1900–1925* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983).

¹² Stewart Bird et al., *Solidarity Forever: An Oral History of the IWW* (Chicago: Lake View Press, 1985).

¹³ Although this book is about 1919, not all sections focus exclusively on that year. The first chapter addresses the roots of the 1919 crisis in World War I, and those sections that rely on statistical evidence look more generally at the early postwar years, simply because of the absence of census data and other quantitative materials for that year alone. Nonetheless, this remains a study centered overwhelmingly around the year after the Armistice.

¹⁴ Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004).

¹⁵ Consider for example Charles C. Mann, 1491: *New Revelations of the Americas before Columbus* (New York: Vintage, 2006); Ray Huang, 1587: *A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). A huge historiography of 1968 now exists: see,

PARIS, FROM NINETEENTH TO TWENTIETH CENTURY

This study addresses the history of one city, Paris, during what was in many ways a uniquely tumultuous year. On the face of it, the French capital does not seem the most likely site for a study of revolution in 1919. A victorious nation, France did not face the same kind of political upheaval so evident elsewhere on the Continent. Russia and Germany, the two countries that would dominate the history of Europe in the twentieth century, were the battlegrounds where the fate of world revolution would be decided.¹⁶ Moreover, as the site of the peace conference Paris stood for the forces of the global establishment, those trying to contain or eliminate Bolshevism as a threat to the new world order they hoped to create.¹⁷ Paris, symbolic capital of revolution in the nineteenth century, seemed to have ceded this role to Petrograd and even Berlin at the start of the new era.

Yet precisely this contrast between revolutionary heritage and global powerbroker makes the French capital such an interesting place to study the revolutionary spirit of the age. Paris in 1919 represented in extreme form something common to many great cities: the close proximity of haves and have-nots, of privilege and protest.¹⁸ No other place in the world more completely encapsulated the tensions of a world divided. Chronologically, 1919 stood exactly between the Paris Commune of 1871 and the May movement of 1968, and as we shall see social and political movements in that year bore more than a passing resemblance to both events.

Moreover, the era of World War I was an important period of transition for the French capital. In a famous essay Walter Benjamin called Paris “the capital of the nineteenth century,” a symbol of urbane culture and modernity (and, he might well have added, of revolution). Yet the twentieth century would bring a new face to the city. The 1921 census would record the largest population in the city’s history, over 2.9 million people. The nineteenth century had been one of dynamic population growth, as the

among many others, David Caute, *The Year of the Barricades: A Journey through 1968* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988); Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York: Bantam, 1993); Mark Kurlansky, *1968: The Year That Rocked the World* (New York: Random House, 2005).

¹⁶ For contrasting views on the Russian Revolution see Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution, 1917–1932* (Oxford University Press, 1994); and Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime: Lenin and the Birth of the Bolshevik State* (New York: Vintage, 1994).

¹⁷ Arno Mayer, *Wilson vs. Lenin: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy* (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing Company, 1959).

¹⁸ My ideas about the structure and politics of Paris as a great city owe much to the work of David Harvey. See his *Social Justice and the City* (London: Arnold, 1973); *Consciousness and the Urban Experience: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); and *Paris, Capital of Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

number of Parisians quintupled thanks to massive immigration from the provinces and the annexation of the outer *arrondissements* in 1860. The year 1921 was a high-water mark for Paris, however: almost every succeeding census would record a population decline, both absolutely and relatively.¹⁹ Henceforth urban growth would come almost entirely in the suburbs, which since the end of the nineteenth century had been growing at a much faster rate than the city itself. Thanks to the failure of city officials to annex the new suburban areas, as they had done with *la petite banlieue* in 1860, by the late twentieth century the overwhelming majority of “Parisians” would call the suburbs home. Paris itself would remain in large part a nineteenth-century city, to the delight of tourists and city planners, but the dynamism and the future of France’s greatest urban area would lie increasingly *extra-muros*. The final destruction of the city’s walls in 1919 reflected this move toward the periphery.²⁰

The contrast between city and suburb was social and political as well as geographic. As a substantial body of historical literature has demonstrated, the new suburbia of the early twentieth century was overwhelmingly working class, whereas Paris itself was becoming increasingly bourgeois. In 1919 the French Socialists would score a wave of municipal victories in the suburbs of the Department of the Seine, laying the grounds for the Red Belt to come. Paris, in contrast, voted for the right and would continue to do so in most elections during the twentieth century. Whereas the city became increasingly world-famous for luxury consumption, its suburban ring displayed the nation’s greatest concentration of heavy industry. One should not overemphasize this contrast: in 1919, as this study will show, large parts of Paris remained *populaire*. This is especially true of the outer *arrondissements* (districts), former suburbs annexed in 1860. Nonetheless, the outlines of the dichotomy between white city and red suburbs were already evident in 1919. As I shall argue throughout this text, this dichotomy paralleled and reflected global splits between East and West, North and South.²¹

¹⁹ On the population of Paris and the Paris area see Louis Chevalier, *Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century*, translated by Frank Jellinek (Princeton University Press, 1973); Norma Evenson, *Paris: A Century of Change, 1878–1978* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979); Michel Huber, *La population de la France, son évolution et ses perspectives* (Paris: Hachette, 1937); Philippe Ariès, *Histoire des populations françaises et leurs attitudes devant la vie depuis le XVIII^e siècle* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1948).

²⁰ Jean Bastié, *La croissance de la banlieue parisienne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964); Norma Evenson, *Paris, A Century of Change, 1878–1978* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

²¹ Jean-Paul Brunet, *Saint-Denis la ville rouge: socialisme et communisme en banlieue ouvrière, 1890–1939* (Paris: Hachette, 1980); Tyler Stovall, *The Rise of the Paris Red Belt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Annie Fourcaut, *Bobigny, banlieue rouge* (Paris: Éditions ouvrières, 1986).

For these reasons, therefore, a study of Paris in 1919 has much to contribute to our understanding of what Italian historians have called the *biennio rosso*, the revolutionary upsurge in Europe at the end of World War I. In part, this contribution takes the form of challenges to some key themes of this historiography. Many historians writing about this period have concentrated above all on explaining the failure of revolution in Europe outside Russia. They have advanced a number of plausible explanations, including the strength of bourgeois society in western and central Europe, the absence of a mass aggrieved peasantry, the splits within international socialism, and the strength of repressive state forces. Perhaps most important, scholars have argued that the fires of revolution did not spread outward from Russia because the forces of the moderate left ultimately proved too powerful. Reform, not revolution, most clearly expressed the desires of European labor, and carried the day in 1919.²²

This study departs from such perspectives in two major respects. First, it focuses less on why France did not take the revolutionary path in 1919 and more on why the prospect of insurrection loomed so large in the first place. That is to say, it concentrates less on what did not happen, more on what actually did. The fact that a French version of the Bolshevik seizure of power was never a realistic possibility after World War I does not lessen the importance of the political and social turmoil that Paris experienced in that period, nor does it explain why so many in France hoped for such an outcome. Second, this study challenges the dichotomy between reform and revolution that has shaped so much of our understanding of the *biennio rosso*, and indeed of modern revolution in general.²³ Instead, it considers the ways in which grievances often considered reformist in fact contributed to the spirit of revolution. The sharp opposition between, say, Friedrich Ebert and Lenin did not necessarily reflect the views of many of their followers or the revolutionary potential of the era.

²² Albert S. Lindemann, *The "Red Years": European Socialism versus Bolshevism, 1919–1921* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Helmut Gruber, ed., *International Communism in the Era of Lenin: A Documentary History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967); Martin Clark, *Antonio Gramsci and the Revolution that Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

²³ On the *biennio rosso* see Paolo Spriano, *The Occupation of the Factories: Italy 1920* (London: Pluto, 1975, translated by Gwyn Williams); Gwyn Williams, *Proletarian Order: Antonio Gramsci, Factory Councils, and the Origins of Italian Communism* (London: Pluto Press, 1975); Richard Bellamy and Darrow Schechter, *Gramsci and the Italian State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). On questions of reform and revolution in general, see Janet L. Polasky, *The Democratic Socialism of Emile Vandervelde: Between Reform and Revolution* (Oxford and Providence RI: Berg, 1995); Willie Thompson, *The Left in History: Revolution and Reform in Twentieth Century Politics* (London: Pluto Press, 1997).

CLASS AND IDENTITY: CONSUMERISM,
DIFFERENCE, AND GLOBALIZATION

This book argues that Paris in 1919 experienced a series of crises that taken together seemed revolutionary in their potential and implications. Even if the prospect of an overthrow of the established order did not seriously exist, in contrast to much of the rest of Europe, that was not necessarily evident at the time. Many Parisians did believe that the winds of change blowing from the east could in fact reach their city and transform life there. In studying the reasons for the revolutionary climate in postwar Europe historians have generally pointed to the impact of the war and the example of the Bolshevik revolution as its main causes. This study recognizes the importance of those factors, but also argues for a more specific analysis of the reasons for revolutionary sentiment. In particular, I will consider three main themes as key to the study of political upheaval in Paris at the end of World War I: consumer politics, shifting and unstable conceptions of working-class identity, and intersections between local and global relations of power.

Consumerism, politics, and the politics of consumerism have long been recognized as major issues in the construction of modernity. In an important article Victoria de Grazia has noted that “Next to the extinction of communism, nothing has disconcerted labor historians as much as the proliferation of cultural studies about mass consumption.”²⁴ My broad aim in undertaking this study is to bring these two scholarly traditions together. Students of consumer culture have generally characterized it as the proliferation of mass consumer goods to the extent that society as a whole is increasingly shaped around consumption.²⁵ This shift away from production necessarily entails the weakening of workplace-based identities in favor of those centered around material goods. The study of consumerism as a cultural formation has drawn more attention to the symbolic subtexts of consumer goods and the ways in which the diffusion of mass-produced goods has structured both individual identities and social cleavages in modern societies. If class consciousness is created at the point of production, as the dominant tradition in labor history has claimed, then surely a shift

²⁴ Victoria de Grazia, “Beyond time and money,” *International Labor and Working Class History*, 43 (Spring, 1993), 24–30.

²⁵ The scholarly literature on the history of consumer culture is now vast. Some useful works include Neil McKendrick *et al.*, *The Birth of a Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Whitney Walton, *France at the Crystal Palace: Bourgeois Taste and Artisan Manufacture in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Leora Auslander, *Taste and Power: Furnishing Modern France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

from production to consumption as the source of social identity must weaken such consciousness. In particular, many historians of working people in America, home to the world's leading consumer culture, have pointed to the rise of consumerism as the main explanation for the weakness of labor movements there.²⁶

Questions of gender have played a key role in the challenge posed by studies of consumerism to labor history. The tradition that men produce and women consume has not only proved commonplace in modern popular culture but has also permeated much of the work on both labor history and consumerism. Many of the leading historical studies of consumerism focus on women as consumers, and explore how and why such practices have traditionally been gendered female. In particular, studies of working-class women have made the point that consumer activities are just as important to both gender and class consciousness, if not more so, than workplace concerns. Historians of consumption have also demonstrated how men's consumer patterns are central to masculine social identities. In general, histories of consumer behavior have made the point that social identities result from the interaction of a number of factors, including but by no means limited to those of class and gender.²⁷

The relations between consumerism, politics, and popular culture have prompted extensive research among historians and other scholars. For example, anthropologists have made important contributions to our understanding of the ways in which commodities become repositories of meaning. One important debate has engaged what John Clarke has labeled the "pessimistic" vs. "populist" schools of thought.²⁸ The pessimists, most notably historians of advertising like Stuart Ewen and T. J. Jackson Lears, draw upon the perspectives of the Frankfurt School to portray consumerism as a lynchpin in the creation of capitalist cultural hegemony.²⁹ The

²⁶ The classic analysis of this issue is Thorstein Veblen's *Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions* (New York: Macmillan, 1899); Doug Brown, ed., *Thorstein Veblen in the Twenty First Century: A Commemoration of "The Theory of the Leisure Class," 1899–1999* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998). See also Warren Susman, *Culture as History: The Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Pantheon, 1984).

²⁷ On this point see in particular the essays in Victoria de Grazia and Ellen Furlough, eds., *The Sex of Things: Gender and Consumption in Historical Perspective* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

²⁸ John Clarke, "Pessimism versus populism: the problematic politics of popular culture," in Richard Butsch, ed., *For Fun and Profit: The Transformation of Leisure into Consumption* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).

²⁹ Stuart and Elizabeth Ewen, *Channels of Desire: Mass Images and the Shaping of American Consciousness* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1982); T. J. Jackson Lears, ed., *The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880–1980* (New York: Pantheon, 1983).