Introduction

> History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.
>
> Justice Thurgood Marshall (1989)[1]

On September 6, 1977, the front page of every West German daily bore news of the latest attack by members of the Red Army Faction (RAF). Captured in stark black-and-white images were scenes from Cologne the night before: two Mercedes Benz stopped short by a third, their doors flung open; three bodies, hastily covered where they had fallen, with a fourth hidden inside one of the cars; a baby carriage, abandoned after serving its purpose as decoy and roadblock. Missing from the picture was the owner of the two ambushed vehicles, Hanns-Martin Schleyer, a prominent industrialist and president of the West German Employers' Federation. After initial confusion concerning the nature of the crime, Schleyer's kidnapping was confirmed by local authorities and dragnet operations were launched in a desperate attempt to apprehend the white Volkswagen bus seen fleeing the scene a half hour before. As the news hit the wire, police forces across the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) went on high alert and federal officials descended upon the Rhenish city to assess the situation. From his office in Bonn, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt released a nationally televised statement four hours after the attack to calm growing fears and to ask that all West Germans support the state in its ongoing struggle against terrorism. By the time Schmidt concluded his talk, the white Volkswagen had been found with nothing more than a ransom note – left by the RAF – to connect the vehicle to Schleyer and his kidnappers. Though police officers continued to comb the area, federal authorities resigned themselves to the fact that they could do little but wait for the RAF's demands and the next chapter in the burgeoning terrorist crisis.

[1] U.S. Supreme Court Justice Marshall, dissenting opinion in *Skinner versus Railway Labor Executives' Association*, 489 *United States Reports* 602, 635 (1989).

The kidnapping of Hanns-Martin Schleyer and the brutal murder of his chauffer and three police escorts launched a manhunt that lasted six weeks and initiated a chain of events that placed the FRG in an undeclared state of emergency. Rather than negotiate with the RAF, West German authorities used various stalling tactics in hopes of buying police the necessary time to gather clues and find Schleyer. As Bonn officials waited for security experts – or luck – to provide them with information on the industrialist's whereabouts, West Germans voiced growing fear and anger over the situation in the FRG. The successful attack on Schleyer, who weeks earlier had been identified as a possible target, made the limits of crime prevention and the fragility of personal protection painfully clear. As the fourth and most violent strike that year, it also heightened existing fears that law and order had been lost to the streets, with the events in Cologne alternately compared to the gangster violence of Al Capone's Chicago and the political terror that paralyzed Germany's first democracy, the Weimar Republic, shortly before the Nazis came to power in 1933.[2] How was it, a popular news magazine asked in astonishment, that a band of "violent anarchists" had grown strong enough to declare war on the West German state?[3] More pressing was the question of how to make it stop. Politicians and newspaper editors cried that Germans had had "enough!" and demanded an end to the "drama," "nightmare," and "mad joke" that had begun more than seven years earlier.[4]

Formed in 1970, the Red Army Faction understood itself as part of a larger liberation movement intent on furthering the goals of third world anti-imperialist fighters and the transnational student rebellion of the 1960s. In answer to Latin American revolutionary Che Guevara's call to make "two, three, many Vietnams," the RAF and other West German "urban guerrilla" groups such as the 2nd of June Movement and Red Cells (RZ) attacked the military and economic symbols of American imperialism. These groups also considered the FRG (and West German society more generally) a legitimate target, both as a direct client state of the United States and as a polity that had failed to purge itself of the remaining vestiges of German fascism. Above all, the groups' illegal acts aimed to communicate the vulnerability of the current state and thereby make West Germans conscious of the potential for radical change. Their repeated defiance of the law would, the RAF argued, undermine Germans' traditional "habit of obedience" and, at the same time, force the state to reveal openly

[2] See, e.g., "Schwarze Stunde," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 6, 1977, 1 (hereafter, *FAZ*); Hans-Herbert Gaebel, "Das kostbarste Geschenk," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, September 9, 1977, 3 (hereafter, *FR*); Harry Pross, "Fahndung in der Geschichte: Der politische Mord bedroht nicht den Staat, sondern die Republik," *Die Zeit*, October 14, 1977, 4. Also: "Im Wortlaut: Brandt erinnert an Weimar," *FR*, September 7, 1977, 4.

[3] "Killer-Krieg gegen den Staat," *Der Spiegel* 38 (September 12, 1977), cover; "Stark genug, den Krieg zu erklären?" ibid., 17–21.

[4] "Schwarze Stunde;" "Fall Schleyer: 'Die Dramatik muß raus,'" *Der Spiegel* 39 (September 19, 1977), 21.

its fascism.[5] Violence, in this context, was understood as a simultaneous act of self-emancipation and self-defense – the latter understood as progressive counterviolence (*Gegengewalt*) legitimated and even necessitated by the initial violence of the state. By attacking the FRG, the militant groups sought nothing less than to liberate West Germans from a state and society that did not live up to its professed democratic ideals.

Following an initial rash of bank robberies and deadly skirmishes with police, the RAF launched a "May Offensive" in 1972, bombing U.S. military bases in Frankfurt and Heidelberg, the Springer Press headquarters in Hamburg, the Munich and Augsburg police headquarters, and a federal judge's car in Karlsruhe. They killed four soldiers and injured dozens of bystanders and Springer employees. The arrest and imprisonment of founding members Ulrike Meinhof, Gudrun Ensslin, and Andreas Baader shortly thereafter moved the war to the prisons, where they and their allies launched repeated hunger strikes and an international campaign accusing the FRG of torturing political prisoners. On the outside, the RAF's original political aspirations fell by the wayside in remaining members' single-minded pursuit to free their imprisoned leaders. From 1974 onward, succeeding generations joined the 2nd of June Movement and the RZ in carrying out a string of actions designed to pressure the state. Aside from one spectacular victory in 1975, in which the West German government not only released several imprisoned militants but provided them with money and air transportation out of the FRG, the groups met with little success. Bungled kidnappings became assassinations and two large-scale hostage takings – of the West German embassy in Stockholm in 1975 and the 1976 Entebbe hijacking carried out with members of a militant Palestinian faction – caused the deaths of hostages, police officers, and terrorists alike. In 1977, the RAF initiated a new wave of violence in response to the death of Meinhof on May 9, 1976, and the sentencing of Baader, Ensslin, and Jan Carl Raspe – the remaining RAF leaders – to life in prison on April 28, 1977. The assassination of Attorney General Siegfried Buback in May and Dresdner Bank president Jürgen Ponto at the end of July ensured that, when news of Schleyer's kidnapping hit the newspapers in early September, West Germans' nerves were already stretched taut.

[5] For a primary source collection on the RAF, see *Rote Armee Fraktion: Texts und Materialien zur Geschichte der RAF* (Berlin: ID-Verlag, 1997). Among the growing literature on the RAF and left-wing terrorism in the FRG, see Tobias Wunschik, *Baader-Meinhofs Kinder: Die zweite Generation der RAF* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997); Jeremy Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Wolfgang Kraushaar, ed., *Die RAF und der linke Terrorismus*, 2 vols. (Hamburg: Hamburger Ed., 2006); Klaus Weinhauer, Jörg Requate, and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, eds., *Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik: Medien, Staat und Subkulturen in den 1970er Jahren* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2006); Willi Winkler and Bernd Klöckener, *Die Geschichte der RAF* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2007). The *Baader-Meinhof Komplex* remains a favorite since it was first published in 1985. The latest English-language edition: Stefan Aust, *Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the R.A.F.*, trans. Anthea Bell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

To be certain, the violence unleashed by the RAF was shocking to a society where murders were not common and which had systematically stigmatized radicalism of any sort since 1945. And average West German citizens like Sonja Siemsen, who lived in fear for her and her daughter's safety since coincidence placed her at the 1972 bombing of the IG-Farben building in Frankfurt, felt genuinely terrorized by the RAF.[6] But the FRG is a superlative example of how physical acts of violence are dramatically exacerbated in their effects by the doubts, fears, and hidden insecurities to which they give free rein. From the very beginning, terrorism was seen as a litmus test for German democracy, where the responses of the state and populace were taken as evidence of the lessons West Germans had or had not learned from the past. At best, this was a dubiously subjective exercise carried out by West Germans and a watchful international community. At worst, it encouraged the population to interpret the situation in zero-sum terms with the fate of the FRG hanging in the balance. To these already high stakes was added the question of the RAF's relationship to the student movement that preceded it. Those eager to roll back the developments of the 1960s claimed a direct connection between terrorism and activism, arguing that the former was the logical conclusion of the latter's amoral and destructive tendencies. This argument gained traction with the help of widespread anticommunism, which not only painted the world in terms of East and West but reified a left–right political framework that, as Belinda Davis rightly notes, can obscure as much as it explains about the content and practices of postwar popular politics.[7] In response, former activists and self-identifying leftists underscored the student movement's emancipatory and humane goals in contrast to the violent path pursued by the RAF and, more important, to the system of violence originating with the state. Proving they could give as good as they got, "'68ers" also argued that the systemic exploitation and repressive violence of capitalism were, in fact, at fault, having first victimized the RAF's members and then inspired them to rebellion. These opening shots guaranteed that the question of terrorism became a crucial battleground in the fight to define the legacy of the 1960s.

Rather than encourage consensus, then, each new attack furthered a debate over terrorism and counterterrorism to which even convicted or suspected terrorists contributed. Conservatives, still smarting from the 1969 electoral defeat that placed the postwar Social Democratic Party (SPD) at the head of government for the first time, accused the new government of downplaying the threat posed by left-wing extremism and inadequately defending the "free democratic order." The explanation they offered for this lack of action? The SPD's socialist sympathies and its traditional skepticism toward the German state. Presenting themselves as Germany's natural leaders, members of the Christian

[6] Letter from Sonja Siemsen to Helmut Schmidt, Frankfurt, September 22, 1977, Bundesarchiv (Koblenz) Bundesministerium des Innern: 83808.

[7] Belinda Davis, "What's Left? Popular Political Participation in Postwar Europe," *American Historical Review* 113 (April 2008): 363–90.

Democratic Union (CDU) proposed their own counterterrorism program predicated on swift and punitive state action. On the other end of the spectrum, West Germany's highly diverse extraparliamentary left perceived the SPD-led counterterrorism efforts as exceeding the bounds of acceptable state force and as exemplary of a larger assault on leftist politics. Citing illegal police raids, the flouting of civil liberties, and the alleged torture of convicted terrorists as evidence, members of the extraparliamentary left accused the government of slowly dismantling – rather than protecting – democracy in its attempts to combat terrorism. Not surprisingly, the governing Social Democrats – along with their junior coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats (FDP) – repudiated both assessments. They presented themselves as bastions of calm and reason in contrast to the "reactionary" and overwrought responses coming from their right and left. Behind closed doors, however, Social Democrats proved torn between the two poles – seeing danger in too light as well as too heavy a hand on the part of the state.

There can be little doubt that memories of the Third Reich weighed heavily on West German efforts to combat terrorism, working to escalate fears and raise the emotional register of debate. No matter who levied an accusation against whom, each carried barbed references to past failures and the moral responsibility of every German to avoid their repetition. Because fascism retained a powerful hold on political imaginations, West Germans struggled to distinguish real from imagined conditions in the FRG. On the one hand, the violence of the RAF evoked the specter of Weimar Germany and the dangers of a too permissive state. On the other, shrill calls for law and order awoke fears of Germany's inability to break free from its fascist past. These anxieties split unevenly along generational lines, with members of the older generation often moving with alarm to avert a repetition of Weimar while their children railed loudly against perceived continuities with National Socialism. The entwining dialogues revealed a population besieged as much by its own past as by terrorism and crystallized the extent to which the confrontation with terrorism in the 1970s was necessarily a confrontation with the Nazi past.

Because the battle cries of the 1960s and the ghosts of the Third Reich loomed large in the minds and rhetoric of West Germans confronting 1970s terrorism, the process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, or "coming to terms with the past," frames most historical discussions of the period.[8] But wrapped in the potent allusions to Weimar and the Third Reich was an older German debate, a debate over democracy and its ability to successfully confront a state

[8] Among them, e.g., Norbert Elias, *The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 229–97; Hans-Jürgen Wirth, ed., *Hitlers Enkel oder Kinder der Demokratie? Die 68er, die RAF und die Fischer-Debatte* (Giessen: Psychosozial, 2001); Gerd Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt: Unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution, 1967–1977* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2001); Varon, *Bringing the War Home*; Wolfgang Kraushaar, *Die Bombe im Jüdischen Gemeindehaus* (Hamburg: Hamburger Ed., 2005); idem, Karin Wieland, and Jan Philipp Reemtsma, *Rudi Dutschke, Andreas Baader und die RAF* (Hamburg: Hamburger Ed., 2005).

of emergency, to which West Germans' experience of terrorism contributed. If there was one image in the six weeks of the so-called German Autumn that competed for emotional resonance with the Cologne murder scene, it was that of a besieged state – government buildings walled in by sandbags and patrolled by SWAT teams.[9] For some, it illustrated the German state in crisis: battered down and seemingly helpless in the face of a handful of terrorists. For others, it revealed what they suspected had been there all along: the face of authoritarian or fascist power. Viewed alongside the heavily circulated mug shots of suspected terrorists, this image, with its two divergent interpretations, captures the competing fears that defined West Germans' experience of terrorism. The violent anarchy of a state too weak to defend itself or a police state at war with its own population – these, West Germans feared, were the high stakes in *Die Zeit*'s tagline, "State behind barbed wire?"[10]

In the postwar period, Weimar and National Socialism – as well as the besieged state – operated as reference points for the anarchy and authoritarianism Germans had long suspected was the inevitable result of a democratic state under siege. Since the early nineteenth century, the conviction that democracy was both inherently weak and particularly ill-suited for the German lands had promoted these fears and guaranteed that the issue of democracy's defense resurfaced time and again as Germans attempted to address the problem. Some did so – to powerful effect – by rejecting democracy altogether, while others planned less successfully for the extraordinary mobilization of the state or its citizens – or both – as a solution in times of crisis. Though the end of the Third Reich and Allied occupation certainly silenced those who might use democracy's need for defense as an argument against it, the supposed rupture of 1945 did not otherwise change the terms of the debate. The viability of German democracy remained the million-dollar question while the solutions – the rejection of political passivity in favor of militant (*wehrhafte*) democracy and a commitment to popular resistance (*Widerstand*) to antidemocratic forces – built off previous conclusions regarding the legitimate means for democracy's defense.

If the debate retained its basic contours, the stakes did not. The Reichstag's self-dissolution by way of the 1933 Enabling Act and the German people's complacency under the Third Reich confirmed fears regarding democracy's inherent weaknesses and, worse, fed suspicions that neither the state nor the population would act reliably as its safeguards. This conundrum assured that democratic stability would remain a topic of postwar discussion, with Weimar and Nazism serving as both a lesson and a threat. Before 1945, German imaginings of democracy's demise had, at worst, envisioned the return of monarchical

[9] See, e.g., "Der Staat geht in Stellung," *Der Spiegel* 39 (September 19, 1977), cover; Klaus Dreher, "Wenn das Schweigen regiert," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, September 28, 1977, 3 (hereafter, *SZ*); "Präsidentenaufstritt 1977," *SZ*, October 7, 1977, 1; "Bonn: Stadt in Angst," *Quick* 40 (September 22, 1977), 14–15.

[10] "Staat hinter Stacheldraht?" *Die Zeit*, September 30, 1977, 3.

rule or defeat by outside forces. As of 1945, democracy's collapse was associated with Germany's total moral and physical devastation. Desperate to avoid such a fate, Germans made militant democracy and popular resistance central pillars of postwar political culture. This encouraged avid policing – of the population by the government, of the population by the population, and of the government by the population – and an antifascist vigilance ill-suited to the compromise and political tolerance commonly associated with civil society.[11] This dynamic escalated dramatically in the 1970s, when terrorism – and the reactions to it – provoked a range of social actors to turn the very tools for democracy's defense on each other as German fought German out of a common desire to protect democracy.

The civil war atmosphere that gripped the FRG at the height of the terrorist crisis dominates Germans' collective memory of the events and regularly resurfaces in new debates and political scandals, to say nothing of films and art installations. Sabine von Dirke sees this – and what she describes as an identity-shaking uncertainty about whether the constitutional state was preserved or suspended during the German Autumn – as evidence that West German terrorism qualifies as a collective historical trauma.[12] Others emphasize the media's role in creating a sense of existential crisis, arguing that terrorism was more spectacular than it was traumatic.[13] To be sure, the importance of the media is difficult to exaggerate, for modern terrorism is nothing if not a media event. But whether such representations or traumatic recollections sufficiently illuminate the importance of the German Autumn and the experience of terrorism more generally in German history seems less certain. Moreover, unless one dismisses the substance of Germans' fears, still missing is a convincing explanation for how West Germans evolved from a population at war with itself to the relatively civil society of the 1980s.[14] This book suggests that the explanation for terrorism's significance and for the changed political climate of the 1980s can be found in the successful containment of terrorism at the end of

[11] On the concept, see Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). For exemplary scholarship that interrogates both the historically constructed nature of civil society and the ever-changing definitions of civility, see John Keane, *Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) as well as Sven Reichardt, "Civility, Violence and Civil Society," in *Civil Society: Berlin Perspectives*, ed. John Keane (Providence: Berghahn, 2006), 139–67.

[12] Sabine von Dirke, "The RAF as Trauma and Pop Icon in Literature since the 1980s," in *Baader-Meinhof Returns: History and Cultural Memory of German Left-Wing Terrorism*, eds. Gerrit-Jan Berendse and Ingo Cornils (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008), 105–23.

[13] E.g., Hanno Balz, "Gesellschaftsformierungen: Die öffentliche Debatte über die RAF in den 70er Jahren," in *Der "Deutsche Herbst" und die RAF in Politik, Medien und Kunst: Nationale und internationale Perspektiven*, ed. Nicole Colin (Bielefeld: transcript, 2008), 170–84.

[14] For examples of historical analyses that evoke the move from crisis to relative stability without any explanation, see A. D. Moses, "The State and the Student Movement in West Germany, 1967–1977," in *Student Protest: The Sixties and After*, ed. Gerard J. Degroot (London: Longman, 1998); Belinda Davis, "Activism from Starbuck to Starbucks, or Terror: What's in a Name?" *Radical History Review* 85 (Winter 2003): 37–57.

the 1970s and the different conclusions regarding the state of German democracy that this involved. At stake, then, are questions of political culture, defined here simply as the values, expectations, and implicit rules that express and shape collective political intentions and actions. "Resistance" and "militant democracy" were not inert legal concepts but rather political symbols expressive of the basic assumptions that guided West Germans' political activity after 1945. They served to limit and legitimate certain courses of action even as they remained conceptually promiscuous – open to multiple interpretations and affected by the various actors who laid claim to them through their own actions. This study reconstructs the German debate over democracy's viability and defense in order to reveal continuities and shifts in political culture that have otherwise been obscured.

Like many recent histories of postwar Germany, this one challenges traditional notions of 1945 as a sharp caesura separating postwar Germans from their prewar political imaginings. Unlike other works, it shows how, in this instance, the 1960s were also less a point of rupture and more a crucial moment in which key conceptions of resistance and militant democracy were reaffirmed. Most important, an approach that focuses on outcomes as well as the debates that precede them – practice as well as discourse – demonstrates how, at the height of the terrorist crisis, West Germans of widely varying stripes revised long-standing assumptions about the state of democracy in Germany and acted to combat terrorism (and counterterrorism) accordingly. The RAF self-destructed, but the challenge of the terror it perpetrated became the impetus for West Germans to draw new conclusions regarding the legitimate use of state and popular violence within the FRG.

Viewing the German Autumn as a transformative event will strike some as a surprising claim for two reasons. First, in the long term historians have moved away from a focus on the event in favor of histories that emphasize underlying structural processes. And second, of those moments that *do* stand out in popular and scholarly histories of postwar Germany, 1977 is not generally among them. To understand the German Autumn as I treat it here – as an historical juncture that transformed key elements of West German political culture – requires one to take seriously different actors' fears and anxieties, regardless if they seem unwarranted or if some fears seem more justified than others. For it is precisely this experience of widespread insecurity that generated an atmosphere in which resistance and militant democracy, the categories of legitimate violence, were opened up to creative interrogation and rearticulation for a specific period of time. As a transformative event, the German Autumn contributed to the breakdown and reconfiguration of commitments and social networks that had defined politics since 1945.[15] Though the consequences of this were many, one of the most direct was the successful integration

[15] For a conceptualization of "the event" along these lines, see William H. Sewell, Jr., "Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille," *Theory and Society* 25 (1996): 843–81.

of a large, disaffected activist population that had, since the end of the 1960s, been a source of social tension and civil strife. By forcing a reconsideration of the limits of legitimate state and civil action, West Germany's terrorist crisis helped to usher in the relatively stable civil society that still defines Germany today, whose conflicts, even when acrimonious, are fought on fundamentally changed ground.

A significant number of citizens experienced the German Autumn of 1977 as anything but a triumph of democracy; still, the events gave key actors unprecedented clarity concerning the nature of West Germany's actually existing liberal order and the avenues open to its defense – and its critique. Extraparliamentary leftists did not join the RAF in mass armed revolt, the Social Democrats did not crumble under pressure or suspend the constitution, and no coup was staged by the right. Confronting a state of emergency and plagued by the specters of their history, Germans managed to learn from the past and even to use those lessons to defuse the adversarial dynamic driving their postwar political culture. This negotiation of terror not only facilitated a resolution to the immediate crisis but also freed West Germans to accept the Federal Republic as defined neither by its weaknesses nor its totalitarian past and thus to view democracy's defense as a matter of normal, rather than extra-ordinary, politics.

This shift in Germans' political sensibilities did not occur overnight and was not the product of terrorism alone. West Germans' confrontation with terrorism was a culmination of years of public debate as well as broader developments in state and society. It is also true that neither terrorism nor the responses it provoked can be understood without their international context.[16] Indeed, the 1970s saw an explosion of violence not only in the FRG but around the globe, with nearly every Western industrialized nation feeling itself the potential target of terrorism and struggling to counter this threat. Though terrorism was anything but a new phenomenon, it took a turn in the late 1960s marked by transnational networks, well-educated perpetrators, and the effective use of technology and mass media. The 1972 Lod airport massacre in Tel Aviv is an oft-cited example.[17] During the massacre, carried out by members of the Japanese Red Army on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the militants used Czech assault rifles obtained over Italy and turned them on an internationally mixed group of civilians that included sixteen

[16] The literature on terrorism is immense. Among the long-term comparative studies, see Walter Lacquer, *A History of Terrorism*, 3rd ed. (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2001); Martha Crenshaw, *Terrorism in Context* (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995); Isaac Cronin, *Confronting Fear: A History of Terrorism* (New York: Thunder's Mouth, 2002); Randall D. Law, *Terrorism: A History* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009); and Michael Burleigh's polemical *Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism* (New York: HarperCollins, 2009).

[17] However frequently Lod finds its way into general English-language narratives of international terrorism, it is seldom examined in detail. For a rare account, see Yoshihiro Kuriyama, "Terrorism at Tel Aviv Airport and a 'New Left' Group in Japan," *Asian Survey* 13 (March 1973): 336–46.

Puerto Rican religious pilgrims. Though the RAF operated largely on West German soil, it too fit this new profile: Its members trained in Fatah camps, received weapons via an international network, and could disappear into the larger population thanks to their middle-class backgrounds and the ease with which they obtained fake identity papers and new license plates. And, just as television revolutionized the way the Western world experienced war – bringing scenes of death and destruction from Vietnam into American and European living rooms – it also provided self-styled revolutionaries with an international audience. To court that audience's political sympathy, terrorists insisted that their demands be televised, circumvented government control by releasing statements directly to newspapers eager to sell more copy, and, when interest in their cause waned, they made more headlines by striking again.[18] In this way, the "propaganda of the deed," a strategy first deployed by nineteenth-century anarchists, reached new heights in the 1970s as each terrorist attack became a ready-made media spectacle.[19]

The strategies Western democracies employed in response tell us as much about the late twentieth-century security state as about the unprecedented challenge presented by the new international terrorism. In particular, counterterrorism offers a keen lens onto two significant trends: the ascendancy of technocratic methods of control and growing international cooperation in matters of domestic security. While the majority of Western states defined terrorism as a violent crime to be pursued within existing legal frameworks, they did not employ the same old crime-fighting tactics.[20] The 1970s saw the rise of a more technologically and strategically savvy police force as terrorism and other "new" crimes gave governments an excuse to push through modernizing programs they had conceived a decade before. Computers, with the power to store and cross-reference limitless amounts of data, revolutionized intelligence gathering and drove forward dreams of the well-managed society. Meanwhile, terrorism joined crimes such as drug trafficking, gun proliferation, and computer hacking, as well as novel dangers such as environmental catastrophe, in making a mockery of state boundaries and security solutions tied exclusively

[18] For the argument that terrorism is "primarily a communicative strategy," see Peter Waldmann, *Terrorismus: Provokation der Macht* (Munich: Gerling, 1998). On the relationship between the media and international terrorism, see, among others: Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media* (London: Sage Publications, 1982); Steven Livingston, *The Terrorism Spectacle* (Boulder: Westview, 1993); Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, *The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism* (New York: Longman, 1994); and Brigette Lebens Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).

[19] For the nineteenth-century variant, see Claudia Verhoeven, *The Odd Man Karakozov: Imperial Russia, Modernity, and the Birth of Terrorism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). On hijacking as the fullest expression of this phenomenon: Annette Vowinckel, *Flugzeugentführungen: Eine Kulturgeschichte* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2011).

[20] Peter Chalk, *Western European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), 97.