

Index

- abstraction thesis, 46
- Addison, J., 128
- Adler, M., 97, 98, 99, 102
- Allais, M., 41
- altruism, 49, 53, 58, 59, 64, 68, 81, 96
- Alvard, M., 51
- Amir, O., 119
- Anderson, E., 59
- Aristotle, 78
- Arneson, R., 79, 82
- Arrow, K., 16, 25, 82, 91
- aspirin, 36, 44
- Austin, D., 102

- Bagozzi, R., 119
- Barry, B., 83
- Becker, G., 8, 45, 123
- beer, 16, 18, 82, 119
- belief-desire psychology, 112–14
- beliefs, 6
- Belk, R., 119
- Ben Ze'ev, A., 125
- Bentham, J., 39, 79
- Bicchieri, C., 69, 70
- Binmore, K., 24, 67
- Blount, S., 51
- Boardman, A., 23, 93
- Border, K., 33
- Bradley, R., xiii
- Brandt, R., 81
- Bratman, M., 5, 62, 71–73
- Brighouse, H., xiii
- Broadway, R., 93, 95
- Broome, J., 16, 17, 19, 35, 99
- Bruce, N., 93, 95

- Bunyan, J., 128
- Bykvist, K., 81

- Camerer, C., 101
- cardinal representation theorem, 38
- centipede game, 66
- Chapman, B., 45
- characteristics, 36, 43–47, 122, 124, 127, 134
- Charlemagne, 85, 91
- chimera, 85, 91
- choice determination, 15, 17, 20, 107, 114
- choice ranking, 2
- chooser dependence, 53
- Chu, R., 110
- Chu, Y., 110
- Churchland, P., 5
- coherence, 129–30
- commitment, 57–62, 71, 72
- compensating variations, 93
- complete information, 66
- completeness, 13–19, 41, 42, 48, 63, 71, 72, 107, 109, 114, 117, 131, 133
- comprehensive outcomes, 51, 67
- consequentialism, xiv, 34, 42–45, 49, 52–57, 118
- consumer choice theory, 43
- consumer research, 112, 119
- context independence, 16, 17, 20, 34, 107–110, 114, 129
- contingent valuation, 91, 97, 135
- continuity, 13
- Cook, P., 118
- coordination game, 70
- Corona beer, 119

- cost-benefit analysis, 75, 88, 93–103, 136
 ex ante approach, 99
 ex post approach, 99
 Cozic, M., xiii
 Crisp, R., 79
 culmination outcomes, 51, 67
- DALYs, 121
 Damasio, A., 122, 125
 Danto, A., 71
 Davidson, D., 7, 71
 Dawes, R., 125
 deafness, 120–24
 Debreu, G., 14
 default principle, 52–56
 desires, x, xi, 4–6, 61, 64, 71–3, 81, 84, 85,
 112–114, 118, 127–130. *See* preference
 vs. preference, x, xi, 77
 Dinan, T., 102
 disability, 121
 Dolan, P., xiii, 79
 dominant strategy, 31, 66–68
 Dretske, F., 71
 Dworkin, G., 80
 Dworkin, R., 82
- earthquake, 90
 Eells, E., 41
 efficiency, 94–96
 Egonsson, D., xiii, 122
 Ehrlich, P., xiii
 Elster, J., 82, 110, 122, 124, 125, 126
 emotions, 123–26
 empiricism, 24
 Enç, B., 71
 endangered species, 91, 97, 135
 endowment effect, 108
 enjoyment comparisons, 1–3, 133
 equity, 94, 96
 equivalent variations, 93
 equivocation, 80, 81, 90, 96
Euthyphro, 89
 evaluation
 overall, 1, 3, 4, 6, 35, 57, 65, 77, 94, 120, 122,
 123, 133, 134
 total. *See* preferences, total subjective
 evaluation.
 expected benefit, 21, 22, 34, 35, 58, 63,
 64, 68
 expected utility theory, 37–42, 44, 47–49, 55,
 56, 65, 118, 135
 expensive tastes, 82
- Fankhauser, S., 95
 favoring, 2
 Fehr, E., 53
 Fehige, C., xiii
 Feldman, F., 79
 Fishburn, P., 47
 Fisher, R., 41
 Fleurbaey, M., xiii
foie gras, 36
 Fournier, S., 119
 framing, 90, 108, 115, 116
 Frank, R., 103, 118
 Frankfurt, H., 82
- game theory, 30–32, 49–56, 65–70, 136
 game forms, 49, 50, 52, 55, 65, 66
 Gauthier, D., 79
 Gibbard, A., 41, 62, 81
 Glaister, S., 93
 Glimcher, P., 118
 Goodin, R., 79
 Grand Canyon, 99
 Gravelle, H., 25
 Green, E., 33
 greenhouse emissions, 91
 Grether, D., 110
 Griffin, J., 79, 83, 84, 86, 87
 grizzly bear, 120
 Grüne-Yanoff, T., xiii
 Gul, F., 23, 77
Gulliver's Travels, 47
- Haitian earthquake, 90
 Hammond, P., 44, 99
 Hansson, S., xiii
 Hausman, C., xiii
 Hausman, D., xiii
 Hausman, J., xiii
 Haveman, R., xiii
 Hare, R., 83
 Harris, R., 99
 Harsanyi, J., 38, 82
 Hastie, R., 125
 Heathwood, C., 83
 hedonic pricing, 45, 46, 47, 111, 115, 118, 131
 Henderson, J., 25
 Hicks, J., 94
 Hitchcock, C., 41
 Holt, D., 119
 Holyoak, K., 111
 hot chocolate, 16, 18
 Houtthakker, H., 25

- Hume, D., xi, 123, 126–128, 131
 Hunt, L., 126
- imagination, 122, 123, 126, 131, 136
 independence axiom, 16, 37, 41
 inequity aversion, 53
 Institute for Health Metrics and
 Evaluation, 121
 intention, 20, 62, 71–72
 iPod, 59
 Issacharoff, S., 101
 Itzhak, x, 1
- Jackson, M., 129
 Jeffrey, R., 33, 35
 Joyce, J., 41
- Kahneman, D., xiii, 21, 79, 107, 108, 109, 111,
 112, 123
 Kaldor, N., 94
 Kalish, C., xiii
 Kant, I., xi
 Kautsky, C., xiii
 Keeney, R., 45, 46
 Kenny, A., 125
 Kenya, 30
 Kraut, R., 85
 Krawczyk, D., 111
 Kremer, M., 30, 31
 Krueger, A., 79
- Lamalera whalers, 51
 Lancaster, K., 45
 Las Vegas, 110
 Layard, R., 79, 93
 Le Grand, J., 95
 Lehrer, J., 120
 Leino, J., 30
Les Liaisons Dangereuses, 90
 Levine, A., xiii
 Lewis, D., 41
 Lichtenstein, S., xiii, 107, 110, 111
 Litt, R., 118
 Little, I., 24, 27
 Loewenstein, G., 101
 loss aversion, 108, 115
 Lucci, C., xiii
- malevolence, 59
 Malpezzi, S., 45, 46
 Mas-Colell, A., 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 27
 McCain, J., 31
- McClennen, E., 15
 McKerlie, D., 81
 McPherson, M., xiii, xiv, 99
 Mele, A., 71
 menu dependence, 53
 metapreferences, 82
 Miguel, E., 30
 Mill, J.S., 79, 80
 Milton, J., 128
 minimum wage, 31, 42, 43
 miscegenation, 126, 130
 Mongin, P., xiii, 24
 morality, ix, xi
 Morgenbesser, S., 15, 16, 129
 mouse droppings, 5
 multi-attribute utility theory, 45–47, 118
 Muniz, A., 119
- Nagel, E., 117
 Nagel, T., 86
 Nash equilibrium, 32, 54
 Nelson, P., 45
 net benefit, 75, 93–103
 Newall, B., 122
 non-satiation, 19, 20, 118, 131
 non-use values, 91
 normative economics, x, xii, 7, 88–103, 134, 135
 Nozick, R., 79
 nudges, 101
 Nussbaum, M., 125
- O'Donoghue, T., 101
 O'Guinn, T., 119
 Oedipus, 41, 45, 46
 Ogilby, J., 128, 145
 Olewiler, N., 99
 ordinal representation theorem, 14
 ordinal utility, 11, 13, 14, 19, 20, 34, 37, 82, 107
 Osbard, K., 33
 Overvold, M., 84
 Oxfam, 19
- paraplegia, 120–24
 Parfit, D., 79, 81, 84, 85, 127
 Paris, D., 27
 passive-use values, 91
 paternalism, 80, 88, 100, 101
 Pearce, D., 93, 103
 Pesendorfer, W., 23, 77
 Peters, E., 124
 Pettit, P., xiii, 46, 47
 pickpocket, 61

- pie, 15, 16, 94, 95, 129
 Pietrofski, P., 71
Pilgrim's Progress, 47
 Plato, 89
 Plott, C., 110
 Pope, A., 128
 positive economics, x, xii, 34–48, 133
 positivism, 24
 Posner, E., 97, 98, 99, 102
 potential Pareto improvement, 94
 preference formation, ix, xii, 42–47, 53–56, 71, 105, 115, 117–120, 129–137
 preference reversals, 110, 111
 preferences
 anti-social, 82, 84
 basic vs. non-basic, 36
 completeness, 48
 vs. desire, x
 final, 27, 28, 34–37, 42–48, 62, 73, 112, 113, 128, 135, 136
 formation. *See* preference formation
 psychologists' view, 113
 revealed. *See* revealed preference
 and tastes, xii, 8, 18, 36, 117, 123, 128, 133
 as total subjective comparative evaluations, 7, 22, 24, 34, 57, 59, 64–71, 77
Pride and Prejudice, 29, 31
 prisoner's dilemma, 65–70
 prospect theory, 108, 112, 114, 115
 prudence, xi
 psychology, ix–xiii, 4, 8, 16, 37, 46, 62, 63, 69, 71, 79, 81, 100, 105, 107–119, 128, 137
 folk, 4, 5, 46, 113, 137

 QALYs, 121
 Quandt, R., 25
 Quinn, W., 5

 Rabin, M., 54, 101
 Raiffa, H., 45, 46, 117
 Railton, P., 83, 86
 rational choice, ix, xii, 7, 19, 20, 60, 62, 64, 65, 68, 83, 114, 120–125, 134
 rational fools, 58, 62, 63, 137
 rational requirement of indifference, 16
 rationality, 14
 Rawls, J., 83
 Raz, J., 83, 87
 reason, ix, 3–7, 19, 41, 46, 51, 53, 55, 67, 69, 85–87, 91, 96, 97, 127, 128, 130, 134
 reasons, x–xiii, 4–7, 19, 52, 55, 61, 64, 80, 83, 113–115, 120, 124

 Red Sox, 86
 Reiss, J., xiii
 Rees, R., 25
 reference points, 16, 108, 109, 112, 115, 134
 reflexivity, 13
 relational goods, 103
 retirement, 100–102
 revealed preferences, 8, 23–33, 135
 revelation theorem, 25, 26
 Reynolds, J., 27
 Richardson, H., xiii
 Richter, M., 25
 Robbins, L., 8
Romeo and Juliet, 27, 28, 31
 Rosen, S., 45
 Rothschild, M., xiii
 Rubinstein, A., 30

 Salant, Y., 30
 Samuelson, P., 24, 25, 27, 95
 Sartre, J., 124
 satisfaction
 equivocation on, 80
 Savage, L., 38, 41
 Scanlon, T., 5, 6, 86, 87, 88, 127
 Scarantino, A., 125
 Schabas, M., xiii
 Schafer-Landau, R., xiii
 Schapiro, T., 5, 6, 71
 Schelling, T., 82
 Schmidt, K., 53
 Schotter, A., xiii
 Schroeder, M., 5, 71, 114, 127
 Schulz, A., xiii
 Scitovsky, T., 95
 self-centered welfare, 59
 self-goal choice, 60
 self-interest, 8, 13, 20–22, 53, 57–60, 79, 80, 83–103, 134–136
 self-welfare goal, 60
 Sen, A., xii, xiii, 11, 20–27, 34, 35, 36, 51, 52, 53, 57–73, 82, 115, 137, 146
 share-croppers, 93
 Siberian tigers, 87, 92
 Sidgwick, H., 79
 Simon, D., 111
 Simon, H., 20
 Skyrms, B., 41
 Slovic, P., xiii, 107, 110, 111
 Sobel, D., 84, 91
 Sober, E., xiii, 89
 social norms, 63, 69, 126, 131, 136

- social science
 - philosophy of, x
- social welfare functions, 93, 95
- Socrates, 89
- Solomon, M., 119
- Solomon, R., 112, 125
- sour grapes, 82, 110
- Stampe, D., 6
- standard model of choice, xii, xiii, 36, 37, 40–44, 47, 56, 62, 71–73, 105, 107, 110–116, 134, 136
- Stich, S., 5
- Stigler, G., 8, 45, 123
- Sugden, R., 93
- Sumner, L., 83, 84
- Sunstein, C., 101
- sympathy, 57–59
- tastes, 3, 8, 18, 57, 64, 78, 113, 121, 135
- Temkin, L., 19
- Thagard, P., xiii, 129, 130
- Thaler, R., 79, 101, 108, 109, 110, 111
- Thatcher, M., 1
- Titelbaum, M., xiii
- tractors, 93
- transitivity, 13–19, 107, 114, 129
- trustworthiness, 53, 68
- Tuomela, R., 71
- Tversky, A., 19, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112
- ultimatum game, 51
- umpires, 110
- utility
 - equivocation, 80, 96
 - expected. *See* expected utility theory
 - as an index of preference, 14
 - ordinal. *See* ordinal utility
- Varian, H., 13, 14, 15, 23, 24
- Vining, A., 96
- Vioxx, 44
- Wakker, P., 115
- water vs. wine, 3
- weak axiom of revealed preference, 15, 26–28
- Weibull, J., 49
- Weimer, D., xiii, 96
- Welch, B., 101
- welfare, x, 8, 77–87
 - mental state theories, 79
 - objective-list theories, 79
 - preference-satisfaction theories, 79–87
- welfare economics, 88–103
- welfarism, 95, 96
- well-being. *See* welfare
 - mental state theories, 79
 - theories of, 77–87
- Wellman, H., 81, 112, 113
- Wessels, U., xiii
- wheat, 93
- whooping cranes, 98
- Wikler, D., xiii
- Williams, A., 93
- wine vs. water, 3
- Woodward, J., xiii
- Wright, E., xiii
- Zerbe, R., 96
- Zwane, A., 30