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Introduction

NATIONALISM, IDEOLOGY, AND MYTHOLOGY

The two most daring and heretical assaults on Israeli-Jewish identity, which are umbilically connected to Zionism, are the Canaanite and the crusader narratives. On the one hand, the mythological construction of Zionism as a modern crusade described Israel as a western colonial enterprise planted in the heart of the East, alien to the area, its logic, and its peoples, whose end must be degeneration and defeat. On the other hand, the nativist construction of Israel as neo-Canaanism, which defined the nation in purely geographical terms as an imagined native community, demands breaking away from the chain of historical continuity. Those are the two greatest anxieties that Zionism and Israel needed to encounter and answer forcefully.

The Origins of Israeli Mythology seeks to examine the intellectual archaeology of Israeli mythology as it reveals itself through the double axis of place and time. Most scholars encounter Israeli complex identity through researching ideology (Zionism), settlement (the first waves of immigration), political movements, the cataclysm of the Holocaust, Israel's wars, the place of "others" such as ultra-orthodox or oriental Jews, or sites that have gained a mythical status, such as Tel Hai or Massada. The perspective adopted here provides a different genealogy of Israeli self-perception, a mapping of the deep anxieties, states of mind, and metaphors of Israelis with regard to their spatial and temporal identity. In other words, I will try to recover a phenomenology of the Israeli-Zionist identity discourse and to expose its mythological roots.

The chapters in this book describe constitutive stages in the development of Israeli mythology: the Promethean passion and the messianic drive; the mythology's main mutations: the crusader anxiety and the Canaanite rebellion; and a possible alternative identity for the future: the Mediterranean option. To some extent they are what the philosopher Max Black calls "conceptual archetypes"[1]: continually shifting states of Israeli consciousness that can be

[1] Max Black, *The Labyrinth of Language*, London 1970.

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understood more clearly through historical investigation, conceptual ana-
lysis, and the study of analogies. To use the expression of the philosopher
Stephen Pepper, the narrative traces "root metaphors" in the metamorphoses
of Israeliness such as "Nimrod" or Kfar Etzion.[2] The great questions to be
considered are how the metaphor is integrated into the public discourse, the
political action, and the Israeli *habitus*; how a symbolization of historical
events becomes a fixed metaphorical image, and if and how a mythologiza-
tion of the symbol occurs. The answers to these questions can throw light on
the root causes of present-day cultural phenomena and contemporary political
manifestations in Israel.

In this study, there are five focal points that are both particular test cases
and stages in the development of the communal Israeli experience. I begin
with the birth of the "new Hebrew" in Europe at the turn of the nineteenth
and of the twentieth century, expressed in Friedrich Nietzsche's (1844–1900)
terms that were widespread in the culture of the Hebrew revival and through
different Zionist ideologies. Nietzsche was the major thinker who made his
mark on the Hebrew Prometheanism. From the turn of the twentieth century,
his ideas, whether veiled or overt, resounded throughout the worlds of Jewish
philosophy, political ideas, and cultural discourse in modern Hebrew litera-
ture and poetry.

The second case is dedicated to the Canaanite challenge, as expressed by
the lengthy political and literary discourse starting in the 1930s with the poet
Yonatan Ratosh (1908–1981), founder of the Young Hebrews movement. It will
examine how intellectual critics warned against Canaanism, both in its left-
wing and in its right-wing manifestations, claiming that it would eventually
turn into a national ideology resembling a fascist variant of certain European
national movements. The following chapter focuses on the rightist-religious
variant of neo-Canaanites as exemplified in a unique historical episode: the
return to Kfar Etzion, a religious settlement located near Jerusalem in the
southern West Bank, established in 1927 and abandoned in the 1948 war.
The return to Kfar Etzion by Jewish settlers after the 1967 War will be dis-
cussed as a microcosm of the right of return to the Greater Land of Israel.
From there I consider the analogy drawn between Zionism and the crusad-
ers in the Israeli discourse and the way in which it reflects fears of the vul-
nerability and temporary nature of the Zionist project. The Zionist-crusader
analogy accentuates the dichotomy between the Levant and the colonialist
West, which brings us to the concluding chapter. Finally, I examine Israel as a
Mediterranean society-in-the-making. Through the debate on Israeli identity
and the inspiring intellectual biography of Jacqueline Kahanoff (1917–1979),
I will explore the Mediterranean option for Israel.

As should be apparent from the test cases, the subject of this work is not the
Canaanite movement or the crusader history, but rather the construction of
Israeli identity and the making of its national consciousness through historical

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[2] Stephen Pepper, *Concept and Quality: A World Hypothesis*, La Salle 1967.

development and against alternative options. The myths discussed here constitute a dialogic structure through which the Israeli Jews have communicated with each other, generation after generation, beyond different cultural backgrounds, about their hopes, dreams, and fears. Paraphrasing Schelling's definition of mythology, these myths tackle the all-important questions at the heart of their "narrative philosophy": Where did the Israelis come from? Where are they going?[3]

The Zionist ideology was part of the modern enterprise. It represented the Promethean passion of western man, which meant being one's own master, rebelling against the fate decreed by one's history, being able to mold the future, to create a society independent of existing circumstances. At the heart of modernity – that is, behind the Promethean passion – there is the assumption that man is stronger than the place. The claim of Zionism as a modern movement was that the new Jew who had left Europe would conquer the place and would mold it to his measure. That was the reason why the crusader narrative and the Canaanite narrative were such great and fundamental threats to Zionism: Both claimed that place is stronger than man, and it can construct man contrary to his wishes. The crusader narrative claims that the place would expel would-be settlers, whereas the Canaanite narrative contends that the place would draw such people in. According to the crusader narrative, the Israelis did not come from this place; according the Canaanite, they could only have come from this place.

Zionism not only sought to change the Jew's relationship to place but also to change his relationship to time.[4] It boasted of restoring the Jew to history, and claimed that this was necessary in order that he would cease to relate to time in a deterministic way, passively waiting for the end of days. The task of the modern Jew was to approach time in an active manner. The traditional Messianic approach to time was exchanged for an active modern approach whose Messianism was Promethean and in which man, through his actions, achieved his own redemption in historical time. In contrast to this, the crusader and Canaanite narratives claimed the preeminence of time over man. The crusader narrative claimed that time would ultimately defeat the Israeli colonialist experiment, and the Canaanite narrative claimed that the mythological Canaanite time was more valid than the Jewish or Zionist time.

Underlying the Canaanite metaphor is the deterministic claim that the Hebrew national identity is native and owes nothing to human effort. It is not voluntary, modern, or western – that is to say, Promethean – but primitive and fundamentalistic. Thus, it undermines the Zionist pretension of effecting a transformation of the Jew: It holds that it is impossible that an

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[3] Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, *Philosophie der Mythologie*, Stuttgart 1856.
[4] Eyal Hovers, "Time in Zionism: The Life and Afterlife of a Temporal Revolution," *Political Theory*, 26, 5 (October 1998), pp. 652–685; Robert Paine, "Jewish Ontologies of Time and Political Legitimation in Israel," in Henry J. Rutz, ed., *The Politics of Time*, Washington D.C. 1992, pp. 150–170.

extraterritorial religious consciousness can become a native national identity. Conversely, the crusader metaphor also makes the deterministic claim that the Zionist project is a hopeless cause. However much the Zionist, Hebrew, or Israeli seeks to strike roots in the place, he will inevitably be an alien implantation. Underlying both metaphors, which are in contradiction to one another, is the common basic assumption that the Zionist passion is doomed to failure from the start.

The paradox of Zionism laid in a new self-consciousness of many Jews in Europe at the time of the Enlightenment and emancipation that, being by nature free individuals, they were still enslaved. From the time that the modern Jew began to think for himself and have his own values, he asked himself why he was enslaved to the national norms of his neighbors and colleagues. The inequality between himself and his associates in Europe was made evident by the revolutionary universalistic assumptions of the Enlightenment and led to a positive and liberating thought. Universalism postulated the right of all peoples to self-determination, and thus the principle of equality encouraged a demand for national specificity. It was a reflexive consciousness deriving from the emancipation, and at the same time paradoxically strengthened by anti-Semitism, that gave birth to modern Jewish nationalism. Zionism thus became the Promethean passion of Jews in the modern era.

The uniqueness of the Zionist project lay in its ability to combine the creation of a new space with the molding of a new historical individual. The Promethean will to the self-construction of the new Jew required first of all the annulment of the dichotomy inherent in the slogan of the Jewish Enlightenment: "Be a Jew in your home and a man outside." Two basic assumptions, which follow from one another, were implicit in this slogan: The Jew lived in a space that was not his, and as a result he was alienated from himself. In other words, the modern Jew was inauthentic because he lived in a hostile enclave and in a certain sense he was homeless, or a pariah: Exile is not only a physical situation, but a state of mind.[5] Zionism therefore sought to be a movement of self-liberation: Liberation from the enslaving space would automatically free the alienated individual. Zionism was not only a transference of the Jews to a new space, the abandonment of a temporary place and a return to the territory of birth, but the aspiration to radically change the kind of man that grew up in the unnatural space that its thinkers and founders called exile. It was felt that it was necessary to construct a new historical subject, and this would not only come about through education or through political developments such as the French or Russian revolutions or similar national ideologies, but through transference from one geographical and mental space to another. Place is space in the memory:[6] Zionism consequently

[5] Anita Shapira, "What Happened to the 'Denial of the Exile'?" *Alpayim*, 25 (2003), pp. 9–54 [Hebrew].

[6] Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, New York 1980. Concerning the Israeli Place, see especially: Zali Gurevitch, *On Israeli and Jewish Place*, Tel Aviv 2007 [Hebrew]; Eyal

sought to exchange a house that it considered empty for an old-new home full of modern Jewish meaning.

It was the place that would bring about the transformation of identity: From being a subject, the Jew in his homeland would become his own ruler, he would create his authentic personality; the Jew would become a Hebrew, the child of exile would become a native. Geography would change history, and parallel with this conceptual transformation, a new philosophy of history would arise.[7] The Zionist philosophy of history that emerged presented a synthetic retrospective picture of Jewish history in which it was deemed necessary to return and to reconnect with the initial, sovereign, Hebrew, heroic stage. Hence the emphasis placed on a whole series of symbols and myths rooted in Zion, the place of birth, and on the creation of a new human model, positive, heroic and tied to the land; and hence the obliteration of the concepts and memories that came into being between the end of Jewish independence in 132 CE and the Zionist national rebirth in 1948. Zionism was thus for many people a territorialization of Judaism, but in a deeper sense than merely restoring the Jews to their natural place.[8] It reflected a radical historical philosophy that sought to change the Jew into an old-new Hebrew. The meaning of the rebirth for the more radical thinkers was a return to Hebraism and not to Judaism, to the physical space and not to God. The paradox was this: Only in the ancient historical space could the new man come into being; only a return to ancient roots would restore the Jew to modern history.

HOMO MYTHICUS

Ideology and mythology are two interrelated concepts. Ideology involves a framework of beliefs, ideas, and values that aim at achieving a political, social, or national goal. Mythology is a framework that combines separate myths into a single, unitary meta-narrative that tells the story of a people, religion, or nation. Mythology is the plastic, dramatic, narrative face of ideology. It complements ideology by supplying images, stories, and personalities that bring the abstract theoretical concepts to life.

Some scholars have seen mythos and ideology as two contrasting structures of thought. This distinction is basically incorrect: Myth and ideology are "neutral" concepts, and they can be loaded with various contents. It may be that the error of those who see myth as something irrational is due to the fact that myth generally utilizes the aesthetic dimension and is expressed in figurative, symbolic and visual terms. It should be remembered, however, that this is

Ben-Ari and Yoram Bilu, eds., *Grasping Land: Space and Place in Contemporary Israeli Discourse and Experience*, Albany 1997; Ariel Hirschfeld, *Local Notes*, Tel Aviv 2000. [Hebrew]; Barbara Mann, *A Place in History: Modernism, Tel Aviv and the Creation of Jewish Urban Space*, Stanford 2006; Suzan Slymowicz, *The Object of Memory: Arabs and Jews Narrate the Palestinian Village*, Philadelphia 1998.

[7] Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge 1983.

[8] Boas Evron, *Jewish State or Israeli Nation?* Bloomington, 1995.

only the medium of myth, not its content, whether rational or irrational. Myth hints at the unity of man and his world, and its approach consequently links the subjective consciousness in a personal way with the mythical object.[9] In other words, if in the opinion of creators of myths or their followers, ideology is too abstract and theoretical, party-affiliated, or sectarian – and therefore alien – myth speaks in the language of human beings. In short, myth is more "human" than ideologies or utopias. This study regards myth as an immanent factor constructing modern life, and especially national movements such as Zionism.

The fabrication of a modern political mythology has inspired intellectuals, politicians, and leaders of national movements. It created a new terminology or political dictionary of modernism, based on such key concepts as the "new man," "political myth," "community of experience," and the "will to power." This new style signified a transition from the centrality of ideology to the centrality of myth.

European critical theoreticians recognized the importance and centrality of myth in the consciousness of modern man.[10] Some other prominent writers, philosophers, and cultural critics created a new political style of "anti-intellectual" intellectuals, giving myth precedence over reason.[11] Ideology, for them, was too abstract, general, and nonaffective to be instrumental in a political mobilization of the masses. According to this theory of social psychology, people are socialized not by means of ideology, but through a common experience of action: This is the pragmatic role of myth in society. Man as *homo mythicus* can create myths and can consume them. He constructs his world out of an array of images, an assortment of symbols, pictures of the past, visions of the future, and common dreams. *Homo mythicus* completely reorganizes the chaos of his private and public life and transforms its lack of significance into a meaningful structure.

Myths can simultaneously perform many functions. Not all of them are negative or merely justificatory rationalizations of a particular status quo. They may indeed provide legitimization for existing social and political practices, for a dominant elite, social group, or ideology. Myth may also be intended as a mobilizing agent to galvanize commitment or identification with a cause, as has often been the case all over the world in the past two centuries. Above all, most myths are, to some degree, narratives that seek to anchor the present in the past. Myths seen in this light, as a special kind of narrative, as

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[9] Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, New Haven 1953–1957; idem, *An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture*, New Haven 1979, pp. 233–241; Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Myth and Meaning*, New York 1979.

[10] Among them Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch, Ernst Cassirer, Albert Camus, and Hannah Arendt, see David Ohana, *Homo Mythicus*, Sussex 2009, pp. 95–134.

[11] Especially notable are Georges Sorel, Ludwig Klages, Ernst Jünger, and Oswald Spengler, see David Ohana, "The 'Anti-Intellectual' Intellectuals as Political Mythmakers," in *Homo Mythicus*, pp. 141–151.

symbolic statements or frames of reference that give meaning to the past, are not necessarily false or harmful examples of pseudo-history. The true significance of the myths more often lies in what they can tell us about the ways in which a particular nation or set of individuals seeks to organize its collective memory and to establish a distinctive identity.

The study of myths shows us that symbolization changes reality and reality changes with symbols. Symbolization is the perception of one thing by means of another: Language gives a name, myth gives a point of view, science creates laws, religion bestows significance, art creates form, and history organizes facts within a period of time. Every medium of this kind is a network of symbols that decodes an interpretive text of the world. Language codifies the world; mythical language explains the world in a different way from scientific language. The world as language, as symbol, as interpretation differs from man to man, but group images give common symbols of the world and construct collective myths.

These collective myths are based on a certain event among the events of the past that is chosen to serve the needs of the present. History is an impression of the past for the purpose of scientific knowledge, whereas myth is the creation of the past for the purpose of forming the present. The mythical event is taken as a precedent that recurs and reappears with the passage of time, and it forms it and gives it a shape. Behind the Zionist ideology and the idea of a Jewish democratic state in the Middle East, there is a deep-rooted mythology with tragic and heroic elements, telling the story of the people's return to its ancient land. The Promethean impulse typifies this national ideology that wished to resemble the European national movements, originated in the early nineteenth century. It wished to revitalize its ancient roots, reconstruct its sovereignty in a modern form, create a new type of man, and appeal to heroic and esthetic values.

Mythology is based on interpretations of the past, and the study of collective memory has proliferated in Israel in the last two decades. Scholars have paid attention to the commemoration of the Holocaust[12] and the fallen soldiers,[13] the national myths of Massada and Tel Hai,[14] the ethnic revival,[15]

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[12] For Holocaust and memory, see for example: Eliezer Don-Yehiya "Memory and Political Culture: Israeli Society and the Holocaust," *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, 9 (1993) pp. 139–162; James Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning*, New Haven and London 1995; Avner Ben-Amos, "Holocaust Day and Memorial Day in Israeli schools: Ceremonies, education and history," *Israel Studies*, 4, 1 (1999) pp. 258–284.

[13] Concerning fallen soldiers and memory, see for example Ilana Shamir, ed., *Gal-ed: Monuments for the Fallen in Israel Wars*, Tel Aviv 1989. [Hebrew]; Emmanuel Sivan, *The 1948 Generation: Myth, Profile and Memory*, Tel Aviv 1991. [Hebrew].

[14] Concerning Masada, see for example Nachman Ben-Yehuda, *The Masada Myth: Collective Memory and Mythmaking in Israel*, Madison 1995.

[15] Concerning ethnic revival, see especially Aziza Khazzoom, "The Great Chain of Orientalism: Jewish Identity, Stigma Management, and Ethnic Exclusion in Israel," *American Sociological Review*, 68 (2003), pp. 481–510.

the history and transformation of national rituals,[16] monuments,[17] the emergence of the "new historiography,"[18] and Israel's prime minister Yitzhak Rabin's assassination in 1995.[19] Mythology is never an arbitrary collection of myths. Underlying religious, national, or ideological mythology there is a hidden order, a phenomenological unity that organizes different narratives into a meta-narrative with a comprehensive significance.

The Zionist ideology and the dominant Israeli ethos have one central mythology that is founded on the Promethean passion and contains a strong messianic element. In today's public and especially academic discourse, the concept of multculturalism and the existence of multiple narratives are regarded as the norm and as undermining the unitary concepts of the past. Regarding Zionism and Israel, there have been many different ideological streams that were negated in the past, either because of the ideology of the negation of the exile, or because of the hegemony of the mainstream Zionist ideology. Thus, for example, the ultra-orthodox Jews have always offered a stubborn alternative to Zionism. For them, however, the physical place is secondary to the metaphysical place, and therefore they do not challenge the collective ethos, but remain a secluded cult centered on sacred texts. The traditional *Mizrahim* (an immigrant community from the Arab countries), those represented by the political movement *Shas*, embody reactionary modernism, and through modern political, social, and pedagogical means try to bring about a conservative revolution by restoring the primacy of past oriental traditions. Therefore, like the Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox, they do not possess hegemonic pretensions. As for the religious Zionists, they are divided in this respect: the more moderate among them accept the basic Zionist premises; the radical ones want to enlarge the Zionist project to the Greater Land of Israel. As neo-Zionists, the dual threats of a shallow Crusader colonialism and Canaanite nativism apply to religious Zionists as well.

The Promethean passion is the "genetic code" that moves Zionism forward and structures its basic characteristics. There are criticisms of Zionism from the right and left, from religious and secular groups, but the Crusaders

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[16] Concerning the history and transformation of national rituals, see especially Maoz Azaryahu, *State Cults: Celebrating Independence and Commemorating the Fallen in Israel, 1948–1956*, Sede Boker 1995. [Hebrew]; Don Handelman and Elihu Katz, "State Ceremonies of Israel: Remembrance Day and Independence Day," in Don Handelman, *Models and Mirrors: Towards an Anthropology of Public Events*, Cambridge 1990, pp. 191–233.

[17] Concerning monuments, see especially Ester Levinger, *Monuments for the Fallen in Israel*, Tel Aviv 1993. [Hebrew].

[18] Concerning new historiography, see especially Laurence J. Silberstein, *The Post-Zionism Debates: Knowledge and Power in Israeli Culture*, New York 1999; Anita Shapira and Derek J. Penslar, eds., *Israeli Historical Revisionism: From Left and Right*, London 2003; Assaf Likhovski, "Post-post-Zionist Historiography," *Israel Studies*, 15, 2 (2010), pp. 1–23.

[19] Vered Vinitzki-Saroussi, "Commemorating a Difficult Past: Yitzhak Rabin's Memorials" *American Sociological Review*, 67 (2002), pp. 30–51; Yoram Peri, ed., *The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin*, Stanford 2000.

and Canaanites are the main mutations that relate to the core argument of Zionism and attack its basic logic. By their presence, they threaten to eliminate the entire Zionist body. From the point of view of mainstream Zionism, they appear as a decadent disease that, if not checked in time, will destroy the very fabric of the ideological project. New forms of integral nationalism and religious fundamentalism related to the sanctity of the Land of Israel began to change the contours of Israeli identity. The balance between the constituent elements of Israeli collective identity were further affected by the erosion of the dominant Zionist-socialist pioneering ethos in the early 1970s; by the crisis of confidence in the Labor leadership and in the military elites after the Yom Kippur War in 1973; the gradual rise in influence of Israel's underprivileged Mizrahim, who helped bring Likud, the political-right party, to power in 1977; by the growing settlements across the Green Line and violent confrontation with Palestinians in the occupied territories; and by the sharpening divisions between the religious and secular segments of Israeli society.[20] The decline in the internal national consensus and the increasingly harsh criticism and condemnation of Israel policies abroad were two of the most obvious symptoms of malaise in the 1970s and 1980s. Inevitably, they too began to change the contours of Israeli identity, the focus of its collective consciousness and memory, and the perception of Israel's role in the world. This was the context in which Zionist ideology itself came to be called into question from within and the older nation-building myths, which had already lost much of their mobilizing power, were challenged.

Alongside these stresses and strains, Israeli society was becoming increasingly westernized in the 1980s – more materialistic, individualist, and consumer-oriented. In this de-ideologized environment, there was far greater scope for a plurality of identities, for recognizing the validity of the private realm and the needs of the individual. A flourishing indigenous Hebrew-language culture and literary experimentation encouraged a new freedom in addressing time-honored ideals and deflating established myths. The era of grand ideological syntheses appeared to be over and increasingly called for "normalization." The Palestinian question could no longer be swept under the carpet and increasingly impinged on the Israeli collective psyche as a problem that directly affected the identity of the Israeli people and its state. Israel's international isolation and the successive traumas of the two Lebanon Wars, the two Intifadas, the unaccustomed Israeli passivity during the Gulf War, and Operation "Cast Lead" (2008) in Gaza provided important external stimuli for the fundamental debate about the means and ends, the goals and purpose of the Zionist project.

Of all the Israelis who are in a state of existential fear of the Iranian bomb, the writer Aharon Applefeld best perceived the heart of the problem: "Our

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[20] For critical analysis of the Israeli Occupation, see: Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, *Lords of the Land*, New York 2007; Amos Oz, *In the Land of Israel*, New York 1983.

fate in Europe pursues us here. I came from a world that declared war on the Jews, and the whole neighbourhood accepted this. And now the president of Iran comes and proclaims the extermination of the Jewish people. What is this if not the Jewish destiny?"[21] The next day, an Israeli journalist also bound up the Iranian threat with the precedent of the Holocaust in his article "The State Is in Danger of Extermination," and gave as one of the reasons for the lack of condemnation of this threat by the Western peoples "the image of Israel as a foreign Jewish implant."[22] Shimon Peres, before becoming Israel's president, had compared an Iranian nuclear bomb to a flying concentration camp. The Israeli general Yossi Peled, who himself was a refugee from the Holocaust, stated: "Since the beginning of the return to Zion about a hundred years ago, the Iranian nuclear threat is the greatest, most real, most existential threat there has been, raising the possibility that the state of Israel is a passing episode. It is a frightening, frightening threat to our existence."[23] About a week later, a supplement in the *Haaretz* newspaper put a question on these lines to the formers of public opinion: "What will you do if in two months time Ahmadinejad drops a nuclear bomb here?"[24] Thus, the first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed the emergence of the Israeli Crusader anxiety, this time in the image of humanity's deadliest weapon.

ZARATHUSTRA AND NIMROD IN ZION

To successfully explain the Zionist undertaking, one must stop seeing it exclusively in the context of Jewish internal development. Instead, we shall place it among the background of the intellectual, ideological, and cultural influences that existed in Europe, where it sprang up. Two interconnected figures, the biblical scholar Julius Wellhausen (1844–1918) and the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, made their mark on two prominent aspects of the early modern Jewish national movement: the Canaanite-Hebrew thesis and the making of the "new Hebrew." The romantic narrative whose roots went back to Johann Gottfried von Herder and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, which differentiated between territorial nationalism and exilic Judaism, between nature and culture, was not solely the legacy of Wellhausen, and it was shared by many people at the end of the nineteenth century.[25] The Wellhausen-Canaanite thesis that Judaism originated in a tribal people and a native community of Hebrew warriors and not in a community of priests and scholars played an important

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[21] *Haaretz*, 2.9.2006. [Hebrew].
[22] Yair Sheleg, "A State under Extermination Danger," *Haaretz*, 3.9.2006. [Hebrew].
[23] Ari Shavit, "Prepare for an Islamic Tsunami," an interview with Yossi Peled, *Haaretz*, 20.10.2006 . [Hebrew].
[24] Naomi Darom, "What Will You Do If in Two Months' Time Ahmadinejad Drops a Nuclear Bomb Here?" *Haaretz*, 27.10.2006. [Hebrew].
[25] Lou H. Silberman, "Wellhausen and Judaism," *Semeia*, 25 (1982), pp. 75–82.