

1 | The Sociable Muse

Introduction

When something seems ‘the most obvious thing in the world’ it means that any attempt to understand the world has been given up.

Bertolt Brecht¹

While sociability has long been a key term of reference for eighteenth-century studies as a whole, it has not developed an especially strong profile in music scholarship.² Allusions to a sociable art are scattered freely in musicological literature, certainly with regard to the instrumental music of the later eighteenth century, the subject of this book, yet this cultural strain has not been examined as directly and explicitly as it has been in other fields. Scholarly approaches sometimes seem to take their discursive or critical cues from the perceived character of the music being examined: sobriety for the North German Baroque, a headier brew for the romantic generation, and so on. If so, then the mantra for studies of the later eighteenth century might be good taste, meaning that certain fundamental precepts may be taken as read, or perhaps touched on only lightly and in passing: to do more would be to give the game away. In other words, the friendly face that our repertory typically presents is ‘the most obvious thing

¹ Bertolt Brecht, ‘Vergnügungstheater oder Lehrtheater?’ (Theatre for Pleasure or Theatre for Instruction?), from ‘Über eine nichtaristotelische Dramatik’, in *Bertolt Brecht: Schriften zum Theater*, seven volumes (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1963), volume 3: 1933–1947, 55; *Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic*, ed. and trans. John Willett (London: Methuen, 1964), 71. This established translation is quite a free rendering of the original, ‘Bei allem “Selbstverständlichen” wird auf das Verstehen einfach verzichtet.’

² Parts of this opening section are based on various passages found in my articles ‘Before the Joke: Texture and Sociability in the Largo of Haydn’s Op. 33 No. 2’, *Journal of Musicological Research* 28/2–3 (2009), 92–118, www.tandfonline.com/loi/gmur20, and in particular ‘The Shapes of Sociability in the Instrumental Music of the Later Eighteenth Century’, *Journal of the Royal Musical Association* 138/1 (2013), 1–45, copyright ©The Royal Musical Association, reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd, www.tandfonline.com, on behalf of The Royal Musical Association.

in the world', so why should one labour the point any more than did the musicians of that time? Matthew Riley has characterized what could be seen as a related tendency, a tradition of what he calls 'polite criticism' in regard to this music, 'in which the writer poses as a gentleman-connoisseur and assumes a similar pose from his readers'.³ What might seem to contradict such a thesis is a long-standing theoretical attachment to the nuts and bolts of the musical language of the time, recently revived in a formidable series of studies by William E. Caplin, Robert O. Gjerdingen, and James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy.⁴ Yet for all of the more or less systematic approaches they offer, they also suggest a permissive ethos: an appeal to individual circumstance and free choice amongst formal or schematic alternatives – in other words, taste. Here too there has been a certain reticence to engage too heavily with the social implications of what all acknowledge to be an especially listener-directed art.⁵

Indeed, it is the very directness of address to a listener that constitutes one of the great novelties of this instrumental repertory. In order for this to come about, an especially clear system of communication must have been established, and our one relies strongly on familiar signs, whether these be topics or formulas or schemata.⁶ From our perspective, systematic approaches such as those mentioned above are very much to the point: sociability too necessitates constant attention to form. While such form

³ Matthew Riley writes: 'In the twentieth century, the study of "classical style" in Anglophone scholarship seems to have become a haven for the otherwise embattled genre of polite criticism, in which the writer poses as a gentleman-connoisseur and assumes a similar pose from his readers. Its echoes are recognizable in the prose styles of Tovey, Rosen, Joseph Kerman, and perhaps even Cone.' Riley, 'Sonata Principles' (review of Hepokoski and Darcy, *Elements of Sonata Theory*), *Music & Letters* 89/4 (2008), 596.

⁴ William E. Caplin, *Classical Form: A Theory of Formal Functions for the Instrumental Music of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Robert O. Gjerdingen, *Music in the Galant Style* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy, *Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, Types, and Deformations in the Late-Eighteenth-Century Sonata* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

⁵ As will subsequently become clear, various scholars have indeed touched on these social concerns. Wye Jamison Allanbrook was one individual who did make sociable qualities a fundamental point of orientation for her work, as encapsulated in her posthumous *The Secular Commedia: Comic Mimesis in Late Eighteenth-Century Instrumental Music*, ed. Mary Ann Smart and Richard Taruskin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014). James R. Currie's 'Waiting for the Viennese Classics', *The Musical Quarterly* 90/1 (2007), 123–166, places particular emphasis on the ethics of a style that conducts a dialogue with the listener, based on recognition – and often distortion – of conventions, and will be discussed in Chapter 3.

⁶ It is not, of course, as if any preceding and following musical styles are exactly lacking in familiar signs that can be recognized by a listener. What may enhance the sensation of familiarity in later eighteenth-century instrumental music is the way in which such features are packaged. This will be a major concern throughout my study, and will be explored further in Chapter 2.

may not literally be of the music-theoretical type, it does imply the need to read the signs, to negotiate one's way through what may be largely a series of familiar gambits.

Of course, one could hardly claim that social interaction itself was a novelty to the eighteenth century. What does seem to be new, though, is the very conception of the social as an encompassing category: Daniel Gordon, in his *Citizens without Sovereignty: Equality and Sociability in French Thought, 1670–1789*, writes of 'the invention of the social as a distinctive field of human experience',⁷ and this goes beyond all those concrete manifestations like the coffee-house and the salon. It entails a belief that keeping company is the natural human state and that interaction with others generates what we would call collective wisdom, a better take on things as they are than anything an individual alone can achieve. In French the very term 'sociabilité' was coined early in the eighteenth century.⁸ Also being added to the lexicon around this time, or at least acquiring new resonance, are the cognate term 'society' and the related notion of 'the public'. In their newer senses both terms try to comprehend a sort of sum total of all human activities and views. 'Society' is no longer just a specific collection of people gathered in one place, but something more permanent and larger-scale, and 'public' no longer refers solely to the exercise of state authority.⁹ Both come to refer above all to a discursive culture that involves the expression of opinion. This need not mean that agreement or even consensus is reached, that everyone speaks with one voice, or indeed that conformity is achieved. But it does imply that the interaction happens through the free association of individuals, beyond the direct control of such entities as church, state or monarchy. It is the very fact of communication – the process rather than the result – that is pivotal.¹⁰ 'Society' and 'the public' have since become such naturalized

⁷ Daniel Gordon, *Citizens without Sovereignty: Equality and Sociability in French Thought, 1670–1789* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 5.

⁸ Gordon, *Citizens without Sovereignty*, 6.

⁹ The latter point is clarified in James van Horn Melton, *The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1: while the older sense of the term 'public' still exists in such phrases as 'public building' or 'public property', the newer meanings 'were unrelated to the exercise of state authority. They referred rather to publics whose members were private individuals rendering judgement on what they read, observed, or otherwise experienced.'

¹⁰ Compare T. C. W. Blanning, *The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe 1660–1789* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 8–9: 'What matters about [the public sphere] is not what it contains in terms of ideas or feelings or even its social composition, but the fact that those contents are actively communicated. It is the effort of communication which creates the "public".'

concepts that it is hard to think one's way back into a time when they were only just gaining these new implications. Gordon notes of 'society' that it has become 'indispensable' to any historiographical 'discussion of collective life',¹¹ and indeed it is only through the existence of such a frame of reference, for better or worse, that this present study can take place at all.

While claims for the intrinsically social nature of human beings may once have had the force of novelty, they soon became so common that many writers acknowledged the fact. Joseph Addison, for instance, stated in 1711 that 'Man is said to be a Sociable Animal', while Henry Fielding began his 1743 *Essay on Conversation* by noting that 'Man is generally represented as an Animal formed for and delighting in Society'.¹² The very framing of such statements in the passive voice ('is said', 'is represented') itself appeals to a wider authority than the individual writer. A variant was to regard sociability as a birthright. Thus the *Dictionnaire de Trévoux* of 1704 stated that 'Man is born to be *sociable* to such an extent that this quality is just as much attached to his essence as reason is',¹³ while in an issue of *The Lounger* of 1785 Henry Mackenzie (it is thought) wrote, 'Men were born to live in society, and from society only can happiness be derived'.¹⁴ Caroline Pichler, whose father's Viennese salon was attended by composers such as Haydn in the 1780s and who in turn became a celebrated cultural arbiter as well as writer, could still reiterate the point in an essay of 1819: 'Der Mensch ist zur Geselligkeit geboren' (man is born to society).¹⁵ This could also be expressed in reverse, offering a negative image of those who wanted to renounce their human inheritance. The Third Earl of Shaftesbury – like Addison, regarded as something of a founding father of eighteenth-century sociable culture – opined that 'whoever is unsociable, and voluntarily shuns Society, or Commerce with

¹¹ Gordon, *Citizens without Sovereignty*, 7. Blanning, *Culture of Power*, 2, writes: 'By exchanging information, ideas, and criticism, these individuals created a cultural actor – the public – which has dominated European culture ever since.' For a discussion of the development of the terms 'social' and 'société' in France see Keith Michael Baker, 'Enlightenment and the Institution of Society: Notes for a Conceptual History', in *Main Trends in Cultural History: Ten Essays*, ed. Willem Melching and Wyger Velema (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), 95–120.

¹² Joseph Addison, *The Spectator* (10 March 1711), 48, and Henry Fielding, 'An Essay on Conversation', in *Miscellanies*, volume 1 (London: A. Millar, 1743), 117.

¹³ *Dictionnaire universel françois et latin [Dictionnaire de Trévoux]* (Paris: Estienne Ganeau, 1704), 'Sociable', cited in translation in Gordon, *Citizens without Sovereignty*, 52.

¹⁴ Hortensius [Henry MacKenzie], *The Lounger* 9 (2 April 1785), 75.

¹⁵ Caroline Pichler, 'Überblick meines Lebens' (1819), in *Prosaische Aufsätze*, two volumes (Vienna: Anton Pichler, 1822), volume 2, 189. All translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.

the World, must of necessity be morose and ill-natur'd'.¹⁶ A specifically musical application of this sentiment comes from Gaspar de Molina y Saldívar, Marquis of Ureña, who in his *Reflexiones sobre la arquitectura, ornato, y musica del templo* of 1785 wrote: 'One must nourish oneself with ideas, since men are contrivers, not creators. To renounce imitation is a great mistake: among a thousand gifted musicians there will scarcely be one who can develop without hearing others perform and imitating them. Anyone who imagines that he can find within himself the museum that will make him wise is just deceiving himself.'¹⁷ Through the metaphor of a museum, a repository of knowledge made publicly available, the marquis strongly affirms our principle of collective wisdom, even as he makes clear that contrary views did exist.

Indeed, sociability does not deny the existence of private thoughts and feelings; rather, it implies respect for the thoughts and feelings of others in a group situation. Rather than being a monolithically collective phenomenon, it arises from the cooperation of individual sensibilities. In other words, sociability is not impersonal, it is interpersonal. It involves such concepts and qualities as reciprocity, politeness, decorum, exchange, friendliness, pleasantness, comfort, ease, goodwill, graciousness, wit and humour. But since it entails an emphasis on human deportment rather than direct self-expression, it departs from the expressive aesthetics to which we are still so loyal, with their connotations of personal integrity and individual self-sufficiency. This means that watchwords of sociable interaction like politeness, comfort and moderation of utterance don't seem like promising vehicles for memorable aesthetic experience. Indeed, resistance to such qualities has been stronger and more sustained in the musical sphere than elsewhere, and one does not have to dig far into the reception history of later eighteenth-century music to recognize the signs. The controlling image is of creativity and individuality blighted by convention, so that only exceptional talents were able to produce music that can still engage our interest today.

The operative term in this equation, and the real sticking-point when we consider the reception of the style, is expression. We need to consider,

¹⁶ Anthony Ashley Cooper Third Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, three volumes (London: John Darby, 1714), volume 2, 137.

¹⁷ Gaspar de Molina y Saldívar, Marqués de Ureña, *Reflexiones sobre la arquitectura, ornato, y musica del templo* (Madrid: Joaquín Ibarra, 1785), 388, cited in translation in Teresa Cascudo, 'Iberian Symphonism, 1779–1809: Some Observations', in *Music in Spain during the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Malcolm Boyd and Juan José Carreras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 156.

though, whether expression as commonly understood is not so much a universal truth as a widely held assumption. While many forms of artistic activity have been understood to involve making productive capital out of personal feeling, this has been nowhere more consistently asserted than in the case of music. Whether in the academic or the wider public imagination, for many the very *raison d'être* of music resides in the way it connects directly with emotion, as variously expressed and experienced by composer, performer and listener.¹⁸ Music's relatively weak referential capacities have no doubt encouraged the sense that it all 'comes from inside', most plainly in the case of wordless instrumental forms. However, the belief that personal emotion – more broadly, subjectivity – is being expressed is itself socially conditioned. As Sianne Ngai puts it on a larger scale, 'far from being merely private or idiosyncratic phenomena . . . feelings are as fundamentally "social" as the institutions and collective practices that have been the more traditional objects of historicist criticism'.¹⁹ Feelings, in other words, have to be learnt based on the practices of a particular culture. Within that framework, the notion of expression is built on the culturally specific idea of a 'centred subjectivity', the sense that each of us contains a stable core of identity and character that is not shared by any other individual.²⁰ Even if we were to accept the link between music and emotion as a given, there remains the question of just how that might operate. As Celia Applegate wonders, is music 'a sphere of emotional education or compensation or expression or action, or some combination of all these?'²¹

In fact, when it comes to music, expression tends to be understood in a specific way. While in theory available to all emotional modalities, including those mentioned above under the banner of sociability, expression most commonly connotes introspection, measured speeds and melancholy affects:

¹⁸ In conjunction with this, it is worth noting that 'music and the emotions' has become a hot topic in recent scholarship, though not necessarily taking the same line as I aim to develop here. A representative recent contribution is the Special Issue on Music and Emotion of *Music Analysis* 29/1–2–3 (2010), ed. Michael Spitzer. A sample of the wider, longer-standing interest in the subject is Ute Frevert and others, *Emotional Lexicons: Continuity and Change in the Vocabulary of Feeling 1700–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

¹⁹ Sianne Ngai, *Ugly Feelings* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 25.

²⁰ This is addressed on a musical plane by Susan McClary throughout *Conventional Wisdom: The Content of Musical Form* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), for instance when she writes of Alessandro Scarlatti's character Griselda 'displaying the centered subjectivity – the belief in the unshakability of that inner core – that is still one of our favorite myths, poststructuralism notwithstanding' (79).

²¹ Celia Applegate, 'Introduction: Music among the Historians', *German History* 30/3 (2012), 345.

slow and sad, in other words.²² In sum, while it commonly connotes a focus on inner feelings, free from social constraint, ‘expression’ may in fact be regarded as the master convention of them all. It is something that has been learnt and internalized. But since this study will be emphasizing the positive and productive aspects of (artistic) convention, and the socialization of feeling, it would be inconsistent to regard this in a negative light. We simply need to note the existence of this convention, and its continuing hold over us.

It would be easy to ally the idea that music expresses personal emotion with developments that occur chiefly in the earlier nineteenth century, with romanticism, and to declare expressive aesthetics anachronistic to our concerns. Yet expression was in fact a very familiar watchword in treatises and other writings on music throughout the eighteenth century. Indeed, expression, together with ‘taste’, are probably the most commonly encountered terms of reference in such discussions. Johann Georg Sulzer, for example, in his *Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste* of 1771–1774, asserted that ‘Expression is the soul of music. Without it, music is but an entertaining diversion.’²³ Further to the point, composers were increasingly discussed as though they had distinct personas, their music interpreted as an expression of their personality. In the case of Haydn, for instance, many of his more unaccountable and odd musical moments came to be explained with reference to his reputation as a ‘humorist’.²⁴

Nevertheless, this may not be quite the same thing as saying that Haydn ‘expresses himself’ in music. What is implied is less that listeners are given an insight into the inner life of the composer, than that they recognize that

²² A revealing instance of this may be found in the article ‘Emotions in Music’ by Jenefer Robinson and Robert S. Hatten, *Music Theory Spectrum* 34/2 (2012), 71–106. They offer a rich theoretical account of just what it might mean to say that ‘music has an especially intimate connection with the emotions’ (71), but then choose pieces for closer study that fit the customarily narrow understanding of ‘expression’. First they analyse J. S. Bach’s Prelude in E flat minor from Book 1 of the *Well-Tempered Clavier*, which is quite definitively slow and sad, and then in an account of the (also) slow movement of Brahms’s Piano Quartet in C minor, Op. 60, they emphasize its ‘yearning’ character, which is surely one of the definitive expressive conventions of ‘romantic’ music.

²³ Johann Georg Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste*, four volumes (Leipzig: M. G. Weidmann und Reich, 1771–1774), volume 1, 271, cited in translation in *Aesthetics and the Art of Musical Composition in the German Enlightenment: Selected Writings of Johann Georg Sulzer and Heinrich Christoph Koch*, ed. and trans. Nancy Kovaleff Baker and Thomas Christensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 51.

²⁴ Reception of Haydn in terms of his perceived personality has been treated at length, with a visual and an iconographical focus, in Thomas Tolley’s *Painting the Cannon’s Roar: Music, the Visual Arts and the Rise of an Attentive Public in the Age of Haydn, c.1750 to c.1810* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). See in particular chapter 5, ‘Musical Icons and the Cult of Haydn’, 162–206.

he has a distinctive manner – in other words, a way of behaving.²⁵ And behaviour means how we appear to the outside world. Personality, therefore, becomes apparent in interaction rather than being understood as an essence, as ‘how one really is’, which was a private matter and hence not readily knowable. And so if sociability is to be lined up alongside an imperative of ‘expression’, it implies an expression of feeling that is directed outwards, that is concerned with how one’s own nature and one’s own views interact with those of others. To put it differently: no matter how strong one’s personal feelings or convictions are, one can be sure that they are unlikely to be felt in the same way by one’s fellows. As this might suggest, the modern sense of expression as issuing from an individual – rather than involving the codified affects or ‘passions’ of an earlier time²⁶ – has in fact already emerged, and complicates any attempt to place expressive aesthetics outside our purview.

Another way to try to capture this is to suggest that in later eighteenth-century instrumental music the emphasis lies in communication rather than expression, in the now-customary sense of revealing ‘pure’, internal feelings. The brand of discourse is one of constant qualification, of always conceding another point of view or way of feeling; it is relativistic rather than revelatory. Indeed, sociability may be understood as involving a strongly performative orientation, which means being less concerned to tell a single truth, as it were, than to investigate the nature of utterance. This type of performativity approximates that found in J. L. Austin’s theory of speech acts, which ‘reverses the priority held by language as truth and correspondence over language as action and creation’.²⁷ This is a musical style that rarely declaims, that does not seem to want to persuade in any straightforward way, but is instead more self-conscious about its mission in the world. Often the main information conveyed to a listener seems to be less a determinate affect, or even series of affects, than something akin to what we might call ‘discourse’, or ‘structure’, or indeed ‘language as action’ – an invitation to contemplate the agency of all parties in the construction of a work of music.

²⁵ Wye Jamison Allanbrook puts this in terms of a more specific sort of outward sign, physical movement as embodied in dance steps, and more broadly rhythms and the metres within which they are held, in *Rhythmic Gesture in Mozart: ‘Le nozze di Figaro’ and ‘Don Giovanni’* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). For example, ‘rhythm . . . is a primary agent in the projecting of human postures and thereby of human character. . . . a character in the motion of action would reveal himself more naturally than could any number of explanatory soliloquies’ (8–9).

²⁶ On the replacement of the passions by ‘sentiment’ see Georgia Cowart, ‘Sense and Sensibility in Eighteenth-Century Musical Thought’, *Acta musicologica* 56/2 (1984), 251–266.

²⁷ Benjamin Lee, *Talking Heads: Language, Metalanguage, and the Semiotics of Subjectivity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 23.

This comes about because of a self-consciousness that is evident in such aspects as the constant changeability of rhythm and texture or the playing with musical formulas and their implications. And the way in which the listener is more or less directly addressed by such phenomena may generate self-consciousness at the receiving end too, a sense of ‘guilt by association’ when a musical work takes odd turns, as happens frequently enough. The listeners who are implied by such stylistic traits need to be alert, to keep their wits about them, to exercise judgment – all sociable attributes – rather than simply immerse themselves in the musical flow. If – as suggested earlier – the style of music under examination can imprint itself on the style of scholarly discourse associated with it, then such self-awareness may explain the characteristically allusive, decentred way in which later eighteenth-century music has often been discussed, relatively bashful about making grand claims or engaging head on with aesthetic properties and implications.

If constructs like ‘discourse’ and ‘communication’ may help to loosen the hold of ‘expression’ (though certainly not replace it) in addressing the instrumental music of the later eighteenth century, another point of orientation might be ‘behaviour’. Certainly, as already implied, sociable music provides some equivalent for the mental processes of qualification and inhibition that we undergo in order to interact with others, which are then manifested in musical action. Behaviour has the advantage over discourse that it is less narrowly linguistic in its implications, enabling us to invoke analogies not just of verbal language but also of body language, such as gesture, and of course interpersonal conduct is generally marked by a mixture of the two.²⁸ Behaviour also encompasses the notion of manners, which allows us to start to account for such perceived musical attributes in this repertory as politeness and pleasantness. Once more, such qualities may seem to us today to be inimical to the proper purpose of art, certainly by the standards of our current expressive model, in which inhibition plays no part. But manners – how one acts – could not always be separated so readily from what was inside – how one feels. As Wye J. Allanbrook has commented: ‘Comportment was for the eighteenth century . . . no thin veneer of society manners, but an expression of character and the key to

²⁸ For a gloss on this from a sociological standpoint see Tia DeNora, *Music in Everyday Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 17: ‘Music may influence how people compose their bodies, how they conduct themselves, how they experience the passage of time, how they feel . . . about themselves, about others, and about situations. In this respect music may imply and, in some cases, elicit associated modes of conduct.’

a man's worth.²⁹ In fact, as we shall see in due course, there was always anxiety that good manners were indeed a 'thin veneer', but this contended with the ideal articulated by Allanbrook, that manners were a holistic expression of the human being and thus something more akin to ethics, a complete system of behaviour. This broader understanding of manners, explicitly linked to the art of music, is apparent in John Brown's 1763 *Dissertation on the Rise, Union, and Power . . . of Poetry and Music*. In a section in which Brown contemplates the stages that will be gone through by 'savages' should the 'use of letters' (literacy) come among them, he suggests that

The Genius of their *Music* would vary along with their *Manners*: For Manners being the leading and most essential Quality of Man; All his other Tastes and Accomplishments naturally correspond with *These*; and accommodate themselves to his Manners, as to their chief and original Cause. / As a Change of Manners must influence their Music, so, by a reciprocal Action, a Change in their Music must influence Manners.³⁰

Clearly 'manners' here are to be considered as more than outward signs, and it is striking in Brown's closing proposal that music functions symbiotically with them: music does not just reflect but actively influences human conduct. Positing a relationship between the two was not exactly a new idea, of course, as was apparent when Thomas Twining, in a comment to his 1789 translation of Aristotle's *Poetics*, affirmed that 'music alone possesses this property of resemblance to human manners'.³¹ But the behavioural model can also be situated within a development that is more peculiar to the eighteenth century: simply put, the intense interest in how people get on with each other. This is one aspect of Gordon's 'invention of the social as a distinctive field of human experience', and it led to the rise of what we might call the human sciences over the course of the century.³²

My characterization of a self-conscious brand of musical behaviour may well seem remote from some widely held perceptions of later eighteenth-century instrumental style: where are the qualities such as ease, elegance and

²⁹ Allanbrook, *Rhythmic Gesture in Mozart*, 69–70.

³⁰ John Brown, *A Dissertation on the Rise, Union, and Power, the Progressions, Separations, and Corruptions, of Poetry and Music* (London: L. Davis and C. Reymers, 1763), 45.

³¹ Thomas Twining, *Recreations and Studies of a Country Clergyman of the Eighteenth Century, Being Selections from the Correspondence of the Rev. Thomas Twining, M. A.* (London: John Murray, 1882), 54, cited in David P. Schroeder, *Haydn and the Enlightenment: The Late Symphonies and Their Audience* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 116.

³² See Nicholas Cronk, Introduction to Denis Diderot, *Rameau's Nephew and First Satire*, trans. Margaret Mauldon, with Introduction and notes by Nicholas Cronk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), vii–xxv.