

Resolving Controversy in the European Union

How does the European Union (EU) resolve controversy when making laws that affect citizens? How has the EU been affected by the recent enlargements that brought its membership to a diverse group of twenty-seven countries? This book answers these questions with analyses of the EU's legislative system that include the roles played by the European Commission, European Parliament, and member states' national governments in the Council of Ministers. Robert Thomson examines more than three hundred controversial issues in the EU from the past decade and describes many cases of controversial decision-making as well as rigorous comparative analyses. The analyses test competing expectations regarding key aspects of the political system, including the policy demands made by different institutions and member states, the distributions of power among the institutions and member states, and the contents of decision outcomes. These analyses are also highly relevant to the EU's democratic deficit and various reform proposals.

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Resolving Controversy in the European Union

Legislative Decision-Making Before and After Enlargement

Robert Thomson





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Contents

| | * * • | page vii |
|----|--|----------|
| | List of tables | ix |
| | Acknowledgements | xii |
| 1 | Introducing the political system of the European Union | n 1 |
| 2 | Research design: measuring controversy spatially | 21 |
| | Part I: Inputs | 49 |
| 3 | The European Union's political space | 51 |
| 4 | The European Commission's policy positions | 79 |
| 5 | The European Parliament's policy positions | 102 |
| 6 | Member states' policy positions | 132 |
| | Part II: Processes | 157 |
| 7 | Transforming policy positions into decision outcomes | 159 |
| 8 | The relative power of the institutions | 188 |
| 9 | The relative power of the member states | 212 |
| | Part III: Outputs | 227 |
| 10 | Decision outcomes | 229 |
| 11 | Delegation | 252 |
| 12 | Evaluating and improving the European Union | 279 |

v



vi Contents

| Appendix: The selection of legislative proposals | 297 |
|--|-----|
| References | 304 |
| Index | 320 |



Figures

| | freedom | page 9 |
|-----|--|--------|
| 1.2 | The consultation and co-decision procedures. | |
| | Source: Article 251 TEC; Thomson and Hosli (2006a) | 12 |
| 2.1 | Controversial issues raised by the proposal on sugar | |
| | sector reform | 23 |
| 3.1 | The main controversial issue raised by the proposed | |
| | working time directive | 59 |
| 3.2 | Structure in actor alignments in the EU-15 | 63 |
| 3.3 | Structure in actor alignments in the post-2004 EU | 64 |
| 3.4 | Confidence intervals (95 per cent) for the positions of | |
| | actors on issues concerning choices between different | |
| | levels of harmonization before (above) and after (below) | |
| | the 2004 enlargement | 71 |
| 3.5 | Confidence intervals (95 per cent) for the positions of | |
| | actors on issues concerning choices between regulation | |
| | and free market alternatives before (above) and after | |
| | (below) the 2004 enlargement | 72 |
| 3.6 | Confidence intervals (95 per cent) for the positions of | |
| | actors on issues regarding financial subsidies before | |
| | (above) and after (below) the 2004 enlargement | 73 |
| 4.1 | The main controversies raised by the proposed directive | |
| | on emission allowances in the aviation sector | 88 |
| 4.2 | The structure of the data analyses | 91 |
| 4.3 | The Santer, Prodi and Barroso Commission's policy | |
| | positions on different types of controversies | 93 |
| 5.1 | Controversial issues raised by the proposed regulation | |
| | establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership | |
| | Instrument | 115 |
| 5.2 | The fourth, fifth and sixth EP's policy positions on | |
| | different types of controversies | 118 |
| | | |

1.1 EU member states' wealth and domestic economic

vii



| viii | List of figures | |
|------|---|-----|
| 5.3 | EP party groups' policy positions on a subset of issues | |
| | from the sixth legislature | 120 |
| 5.4 | Frequency of national factions in the sixth legislature | 122 |
| 6.1 | The main controversial issue raised by the proposed | |
| | directive on postal services | 141 |
| 7.1 | Predictions of a procedural model. Source: Adapted | |
| | from Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) and König and | |
| | Proksch (2006) | 163 |
| 7.2 | Controversial issues raised by the proposed regulation | |
| | on production aid for cotton | 174 |
| 8.1 | A controversy raised by the proposed directive on | |
| | data retention | 199 |
| 8.2 | Errors from varying the Commission and Council's | |
| | relative power under consultation | 205 |
| 8.3 | The distribution of power between the Commission | |
| | and the Council under the consultation procedure | 206 |
| 8.4 | Errors from varying the three institutions' relative | |
| | power under co-decision | 208 |
| 8.5 | The distribution of power among the three | |
| | institutions under the co-decision procedure | 209 |
| 9.1 | The regressive power distribution in the Council | 215 |
| 9.2 | A controversy raised by the payment services directive | 218 |
| 10.1 | Controversial issues raised by the proposed directive | |
| | on rules for the protection of chickens kept for meat | |
| | production | 239 |
| 10.2 | Distances between actors' policy positions and decision | |
| | outcomes before and after enlargement | 243 |
| 11.1 | Controversial issues raised by the proposed directive | |
| | on the taxation of savings income | 263 |
| 11.2 | The effect of polarization in the Council on delegation | |
| | to member states in national regulatory issues | 274 |



Tables

| 1.1 | EU member states' population sizes and voting weights | page 11 |
|-----|---|---------|
| 2.1 | Distribution of selected proposals and issues by | |
| | decision-making procedures | 29 |
| 2.2 | Distribution of the selected legislative proposals by | |
| | policy area | 31 |
| 2.3 | Interviews held to obtain information on the selected | |
| | legislative proposals | 33 |
| 2.4 | Numbers of actors that took positions on the | |
| | controversial issues | 42 |
| 2.5 | The importance of the controversial issues in the | |
| | sugar sector reform to each of the actors | 46 |
| 3.1 | Frequency of actor alignments identified in the MDS results | s 66 |
| 3.2 | Frequency of other actor alignments | 68 |
| 3.3 | Frequencies of prominent actor alignments on different | |
| | types of controversial issues | 69 |
| 4.1 | The commissioners who were primarily responsible | |
| | for the selected legislative proposals | 87 |
| 4.2 | Factors affecting the distance between the Commission | |
| | and member states' positions on regulation and subsidy | |
| | issues | 94 |
| 4.3 | Factors affecting the distance between the Commission | |
| | and member states' positions | 97 |
| 5.1 | The composition of the fourth, fifth and sixth legislatures | 113 |
| 5.2 | Factors conditioning the effect of rapporteurs' nationalities | |
| | on the distance between the EP and member states' | |
| | positions | 125 |
| 5.3 | The effect of rapporteurs from different party groups | 128 |
| 5.4 | The effect of rapporteurs' nationalities under different | |
| | conditions | 129 |
| 6.1 | Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent | |
| | variables | 140 |

ix



x List of tables

| 6.2 | Factors affecting the distance between member states' | |
|------|--|-----|
| | positions on issues regarding the strength of regulation | 146 |
| 6.2 | and levels of financial subsidies | 146 |
| 0.3 | Factors affecting the distance between member states' | |
| | positions on issues regarding the level of European | 150 |
| | integration | 150 |
| 6.4 | Factors affecting the distance between member states' | |
| | positions on issues in the policy area of internal market | 151 |
| 6.5 | Factors affecting the distance between member states' | |
| | positions on issues in the policy area of agriculture | 153 |
| 7.1 | Differences between point predictions of models, | |
| | reference points and actual decision outcomes | 180 |
| 7.2 | Errors of the models in predicting decision outcomes | |
| | before and after enlargement | 181 |
| 7.3 | Errors of the models by policy area | 182 |
| 7.4 | Errors of the models by number of policy alternatives | |
| | on policy scales | 182 |
| 7.5 | Number of times the row prediction was better than | |
| | the column prediction | 183 |
| 8.1 | The intergovernmental and supranational models | |
| | compared | 202 |
| 8.2 | Errors of the models in predicting decision outcomes | |
| | before and after enlargement | 203 |
| 8.3 | The relative predictive accuracy of supranational and | |
| | intergovernmental models | 204 |
| 9.1 | Differences between models' predictions and actual | |
| ,,, | decision outcomes | 221 |
| 9.2 | Errors of the models in predicting decision outcomes | |
| ٠.٥ | before and after enlargement | 222 |
| 93 | Number of times the row prediction was better or | 222 |
| 7.5 | worse than the column prediction | 223 |
| 10.1 | Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent | 223 |
| 10.1 | variables on the observations included in this chapter's | |
| | _ | 242 |
| 10.2 | analyses Factors affecting the distance between member states' | 242 |
| 10.2 | | 245 |
| 10.2 | policy positions and decision outcomes on all issues | 245 |
| 10.3 | Factors affecting distances between states' positions | |
| | and outcomes on issues subject to different decision- | |
| | making rules | 246 |
| 10.4 | Factors affecting distances between states' positions | |
| | and outcomes on issues before and after enlargement | 247 |



| | List of tables | xi |
|-------|--|-----|
| 11.1 | The nine decision outcomes that delegate discretionary | |
| | power to the Commission | 268 |
| 11.2 | Factors affecting delegation to the Commission | 269 |
| 11.3a | The relative frequency of decision outcomes that | |
| | delegate discretionary power to member states with | |
| | a narrow definition of delegation | 272 |
| 11.3b | The relative frequency of decision outcomes that | |
| | delegate discretionary power to member states with | |
| | a broad definition of delegation | 272 |
| 11.4a | Factors affecting delegation to member states | |
| | (narrow definition of delegation) | 273 |
| 11.4b | Factors affecting delegation to member states | |
| | (broad definition of delegation) | 273 |



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xii



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xiii

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