Introduction

Revolution and Civil War as Forms of Conflict

Civil war, as a form of armed conflict within a single political unit rather than a foreign war between two different polities, is one of the oldest forms of strife. It may take one or more of many different forms, which include "most revolutions, sustained peasant insurrections, 'revolutionary' or ethnic insurgencies, anti-colonial uprisings, and resistance wars against foreign occupiers."[1] Significant political violence alone, however, is not enough to constitute genuine civil war, which must involve an extended contest of arms to win state power, even if waged by means of irregular warfare.

Historically, the most important civil wars have tended to cluster in three different sorts of conflicts: a) dynastic succession conflicts, b) wars of secession or national liberation, and c) full-scale political or ideological civil wars to impose or thwart the imposition of a new or revised model on the polity. In some of them more than one kind of conflict has been combined, or other features have been added to give them an even more complex character. Any of these conflicts, for example, may include secondary mini–civil wars fought to some degree within one of the contending sides, as in the internal civil war in some regions that attended the war of independence of the American colonies. Similarly, there may be mini–civil wars within a greater civil war, as happened during the Spanish civil war in May 1937 in Barcelona and in March 1939 in Madrid.[2]

The oldest and historically most common form of civil war has been succession conflict, for struggles over succession to the throne were frequent in traditional polities. They were often relatively uncomplicated contests for power, though exceptions might be found. In Castile, the greatest civil war was the dynastic succession struggle of the 1360s, which ended with the defeat and death of Pedro the Cruel. The famous Wars of the Roses that dominated

[1] S. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge, 2006), 19.
[2] There is no better brief discussion of the phenomenon than that in Gabriele Ranzato's introductory study, "Un evento antico e un nuovo oggetto di riflessione," in his edited work, *Guerre fratricide: Le guerre civili in età contemporanea* (Turin, 1994), ix–lvi.

the politics of fifteenth-century England were exclusively a dynastic struggle, though the Catalan civil war of that century was somewhat different insofar as it involved greater changes in policy and institutions. Something similar might be said about the revolt of the Communities of Castile in 1520–21. The greatest of all Spanish succession conflicts, which grew into the international war of 1702–14, was initially traditional in character, though it eventually produced major institutional changes in the Aragonese principalities. Beginning in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, even civil wars that stemmed from succession problems began to develop more complex agendas regarding religion, institutions, and state formation.

The second most common form of war within a polity have been struggles to achieve secession, which in recent times have often been called national liberation wars. Secession wars of one kind or another have been found in all periods of history, and were relatively common, for example, in the Middle Ages. They have often involved attempts to break away from empires or multinational states, but there have also been numerous efforts to secede from nonimperial polities. Secession struggles have sometimes been involved in dynastic succession conflicts, as well. In traditional societies, they have not usually sought to alter the institutional structure so much as to draw new boundaries.

In more recent times, beginning no later than seventeenth-century England, armed rebellion and civil war have sometimes sought to introduce radically different political models. The greatest civil war of the nineteenth century, however – the war that took place in the United States from 1861 to 1865 – was a purely secessionist struggle, and thus in principle not a full civil war, despite the terminology normally employed in the United States.[3] At no time did the seceding Confederacy propose to conquer the United States and impose on it a new political model. The Confederate Constitution was largely a copy of the United States Constitution, though with slightly greater rights for individual states and explicit guarantees for slavery. The struggle waged by the Confederacy may also be seen as the most extensive national liberation war to have ended in failure, just as the Spanish civil war of 1936 featured the most extensive revolution ever to have ended in failure.

The third type of civil war – ideological or revolutionary civil war – which seeks to alter the system drastically or introduce completely new ideas and policies, was rare to nonexistent in traditional polities. It might nonetheless be found in truncated form in the guise of slave or peasant revolts, the latter often seeking to regain aspects of a perceived earlier order. There seem to have been brief conflicts of this sort in some Greek city-states. Radical new political, social, and ideological features began to appear, sometimes in religious form or due to religious motivation, in Europe in the time of the Reformation, starting with the Bohemian Hussite rebellions of the fifteenth century. Such

[3] The term "American War of Secession," or variants thereof, sometimes found in European historiography, is more accurate than the common American usage.

features appeared in other Reformation-era struggles, particularly in the French Wars of Religion[4] and the Dutch revolt, even as the Bohemian and Dutch rebellions (especially the latter) became secessionist struggles.

In modern times this would take the form of the revolutionary civil war. "Revolution" is a term that passed into the general political lexicon during the seventeenth century.[5] For some time it was used to refer to violent and fundamental changes in government and political institutions, though this came increasingly to embrace basic changes in culture, values, and myths and symbols. The first major example was the English civil war and political revolution of the 1640s, so categorically different from the Wars of the Roses.[6] The first complete modern secular example, in which secular or political religion replaced traditional religion, was the great French Revolution of 1789, followed by the French civil war of 1793–94,[7] and later by various revolutionary urban insurrections, particularly in Paris in 1848, reaching a final climax in the bloody Paris Commune of 1871. By that time, the concept of revolution had been expanded to refer especially to violent attempts to bring about drastic changes in social and economic structures, and subsequently this expanded concept became fundamental to the definition of a "true revolution," as distinct from mere coups d'etat or takeovers. During the first half of the twentieth century Europe was the scene not merely of two great world wars, but also of several major revolutions, revolutionary civil wars, and other internal wars and insurrections.[8] During the second half of the twentieth century violent

[4] The conceptual relation between Calvinism and political revolution is treated in J. Witte, Jr., *The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion, and Human Rights in Early Modern Calvinism* (Cambridge, 2007).

[5] For the origins of the modern use of the term "revolution," see A. Rey, *"Révolution." Histoire d'un mot* (Paris, 1989), and I. Rachum, *"Revolution": The Entrance of a New Word into Western Political Discourse* (Lanham, Md., 1999).

[6] Recently Steven Pincus, in his *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (New Haven, Conn., 2009), has sought to claim this status for what has normally been called the "Glorious Revolution of 1688," but his elaborate effort is unpersuasive. The changes of 1688–89 were much less extensive than those of the Civil War, and merely restabilized and reformed English institutions following the moderate counterrevolution of 1660–88, which, as Pincus shows, entered a more radical phase under James II in 1685–88. They introduced significant reforms that became permanent and were fundamental to the rise of modern Britain, but they overturned not a single existing institution.

[7] The historiography of the French Revolution is immense. S. Neely, *A Concise History of the French Revolution* (Lanham, Md., 2008), provides an excellent recent summary. For the battle of interpretation, see A. Gérard, *La Révolution française: Mythes et interpretations, 1789–1970* (Paris, 1975); F. Furet, *Penser la Révolution française* (Paris, 1978); and S. L. Kaplan, *Farewell, Revolution: The Historians' Feud, France 1789–1989* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1995).

[8] The sociologist Pitirim Sorokin made an attempt to quantify the violence of this era as compared to other periods of history in "Quantitative Measurement of Internal Disturbances," in his *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, abr. ed. (Boston, 1957), 573–604. Writing around 1930, his conclusion was that "the first quarter of the twentieth century, 1901–1925, was not only the bloodiest period in the entire history of the international conflicts of mankind but also, when internal disturbances are considered, was one of the very turbulent periods" (p. 602).

revolutionary struggle became a worldwide phenomenon, as did national wars of liberation and secession.

Philosophers and historians have discussed the problems of civil war for nearly two and a half millennia, beginning with Thucydides[9] and Aristotle. Much more recently, the outbreak of modern revolutionary conflict led to attempts to understand and interpret the problem of revolution, the first major achievement being the work of Alexis de Tocqueville in the mid nineteenth century.[10] During the era of the Cold War, when the focus of struggle was increasingly transposed to the internal conflicts in what was then called the Third World, the effort to understand civil war and revolution became a growth industry. Taxonomies were developed,[11] multiple case studies published,[12] and numerous explanations and interpretations advanced. These ranged from economic arguments to speculations concerning social structure or historical sequences, and the formation of various political models.[13]

And worse was yet to come. Certainly the absolute number of people killed was greater than in any previous time, but the common perception that this was proportionately the most violent era known to the West is more a common perception than a measured reality, as David Gress reminds me. Death and violence were very common in the seventeenth century, but cannot be measured as accurately in proportionate terms. There is evidence of very high rates of deaths by violence in certain Paleolithic societies.

[9] J. J. Price, *Thucydides and Internal War* (Cambridge, UK, 2001).

[10] For an interesting new evaluation of the achievement of Tocqueville, see J. Elster, *Alexis de Tocqueville, the First Social Scientist* (Cambridge, UK, 2009).

[11] Perhaps the best taxonomy is M. N. Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution* (New York, 1974). See also M. Edmonds, "Civil War, Internal War, and Intrasocietal Conflict: A Taxonomy and Typology," in R. Higham, ed., *Civil Wars in the Twentieth Century* (Lexington, Ky., 1972), 11–26. On terminology, see R. Koselleck, "Revolution, Rebellion, Aufruhr, Bürgerkrieg," in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* (Stuttgart, 1984), 5:653–788.

[12] The best book on the history of modern revolutions is M. Malia, *History's Locomotives: Revolutions and the Making of the Modern World* (New Haven, Conn., 2006). Miscellanies may be found in R. Martins, *História das grandes revoluçoes* (Lisbon, 1953), 2 vols.; Col. G. Bonnet, *Les guerres insurrectionnelles et révolutionnaires de l'antiquité à nos jours* (Paris, 1958); M. Kossok, ed., *Revolutionen der Neuzeit 1500–1917* (Berlin, 1982); F. Martins and P. Aires Oliveira, eds., *As revoluçoes contemporâneas* (Lisbon, 2005); and more systematically in C. Tilly, *European Revolutions, 1492–1992* (Cambridge, 1993). J. DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements* (Boulder, Colo., 2007) is a textbook, and D. Close and C. Bridge, eds., *Revolution: A History of the Idea* (London, 1985), a collection of examples. On civil wars, see H. Eckstein, *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (New York, 1964); R. Higham, ed., *Civil Wars in the Twentieth Century* (Lexington, Ky., 1972); S. Neumann, "The International Civil War," *World Politics* (1948), 33–51; and J. N. Rosenau, ed., *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton, N.J., 1964). I. E. Shavrova, ed., *Lokalnye voiny. Istoriya i sovremennost* (Moscow, 1981), offers a lengthy compendium of internal wars from 1898 to 1975.

[13] Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, rev. ed. (New York, 1965), was an early classic. One of the best collections is G. A. Kelly and C. W. Brown, eds., *Struggles in the State: Sources and Patterns of World Revolution* (New York, 1970). Principal studies include G. S. Pettee, *The Process of Revolution* (New York, 1938); W. E. Mühlmann, *Chiliasmus und nativismus. Studien zur Psychologie, Soziologie und historischen Kasuistik der Umsturzbewegungen* (Berlin, 1961); P. Amann, "Revolution: A Redefinition," *Political Science Quarterly*, 77 (March 1962), 36–53; C. Johnson, *Revolution and the Social System* (Stanford, Calif., 1964); L. Stone, "Theories of Revolution," *World Politics*, 18 (1965), 159–77; H. Arendt,

In the later twentieth century, as the Cold War came to an end and the interest in and support for revolution dwindled in most regions of the world, studies of revolution declined. Nonetheless, as civil war and internal conflict became the normative kind of conflict in much of the world, studies of "internal war" soon proliferated once more.

The term "internal war" came to be preferred by some social scientists for two reasons. The first was the obvious one that this term was more flexible and might include more marginal phenomena whose status or classification could otherwise be a subject for debate. The second was that established governments, whatever their nature, that faced civil war insurgencies sometimes alleged that there was no civil war but simply a conspiracy or rebellion against legitimate government. This argument had first been used in 1793 by Robespierre and the French Jacobins, who maintained that a government that had a constitution and a parliament and had held elections could never be faced with a true civil war, no matter what its policies, for it legitimately represented "the people." Over the years, there have been many variations on this theme, most notably by Spanish Republicans in 1936–39.

Harry Eckstein has grouped all explanations of revolution and internal war into five categories: 1) hypotheses that emphasize "intellectual" factors, 2) hypotheses that emphasize economic factors, 3) hypotheses that emphasize aspects of social structure, 4) hypotheses that emphasize political factors, and 5) hypotheses that emphasize general characteristics of social process.[14] More broadly and simply, they can be divided into hypotheses and theories that stress economic and structural factors, which imply a certain determinism, and those that emphasize behavioral factors. In early twentieth-century Europe, the great catalyst of revolution was war, but war was only a precipitant, not the cause, for most states at war did not experience revolution.

On Revolution (New York, 1965); C. J. Friedrich, ed., *Revolution* (New York, 1966); R. Tanter and M. Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 11:3 (1967), 154–75; J. Ellul, *Autopsie de la révolution* (Paris, 1969) and *De la révolution aux révoltes* (Paris, 1972); K. Griewank, *Der neuzeitliche Revolutionsbegriff. Entstehung und Entwicklung* (Frankfurt, 1969); P. Calvert, *A Study of Revolution* (Oxford, 1970); T. R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J., 1970); J. C. Davies, ed., *When Men Revolt and Why: A Reader in Political Violence and Revolution* (New York, 1971); J. Dunn, *Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon* (Cambridge, 1972); K. von Beyme, ed., *Empirische Revolutionsforschung* (Opladen, 1973); A. S. Cohan, *Theories of Revolution: An Introduction* (London, 1975); T. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge, 1979); E. Zimmermann, *Krisen, Staatsstreiche und Revolutionen. Theorien, Daten und neuere Forschungsansätze* (Opladen, 1981); J. Krejci, *Great Revolutions Compared: The Search for a Theory* (New York, 1983); N. O'Sullivan, ed., *Revolutionary Theory and Political Reality* (New York, 1983); J. A. Goldstone, ed., *Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative and Historical Studies* (San Diego, Calif., 1986); and N. Bobbio, *Sulla rivoluzione. Problemi di teoria politica* (Milan, 1990). The Marxist-Leninist approach may be found in M. Kossok, ed., *Vergleichende Revolutionsgeschichte – Probleme der Theorie und Methode* (Berlin, 1988), and that of fascists in J. Streel, *La révolution du vingtième siècle* (Brussels, 1942).

[14] H. Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," *History and Theory*, 4:2 (1965), 133–63.

The classic behavioral theory of the origins of revolution was formulated by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1856, when he observed regarding France that "it was precisely in those parts of France where there had been the most improvement that popular discontent ran highest. This may seem illogical – but history is full of paradoxes." Tocqueville explains that deteriorating conditions do not generally provoke revolution, but that complaints tend instead to increase after conditions have begun to improve. "The regime destroyed by a revolution is almost always better than the one that immediately preceded it and experience teaches us that the most hazardous moment for a bad government is normally when it is beginning to reform."[15] The absolutist government of Louis XIV provoked much less resentment than the mild, semiliberal reign of Louis XVI. In other words, revolution is less likely when things are getting worse than it is after they have begun to get better. Fundamental is the revolution of rising expectations and the raising of consciousness, which are more important than objective conditions in themselves. Once such attitudes have taken hold, some new crisis or setback, which may or may not be of profound importance in itself, triggers revolution.

James C. Davies has elaborated the point: "Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a period of sharp reversal.... The actual state of socioeconomic development is less significant than the expectation that past progress, now blocked, can and must continue into the future."[16] Theodore S. Hamerow concurs: "Economic privation is not the key factor in the downfall of established authority any more than political repression.... What makes the economic situation seem intolerable is not deteriorating conditions but rising expectations." He further points out that "Leon Trotsky, the sharpest analytical mind produced by the revolutionary movements of the twentieth century, openly acknowledged this primacy of perception over actuality in the decline of established authority.... A revolution of expectations thus prepares the way for a revolution of deeds."[17]

Harry Eckstein concludes that "despite the fact that there is a danger that the behavioral approach might lead to naïve conspiracy theory ..., the arguments against a primary emphasis on structural theories are very strong.... Purely structural theories have generally been found difficult to sustain whenever they have been applied." He argues that the strongest reason to support

[15] A. de Tocqueville, *The Ancien Regime and the Revolution* (London, 2008), 174–75.

[16] J. C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, 27:1 (February 1962), 5–19. Davies tried to illustrate this conclusion in his article "Revolution and the J-Curve," the J-Curve being a graph revealing the difference between the extent to which expectations go up and opportunities either do not go up or do not go up as far and fast, in H. D. Graham and T. R. Gurr, *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (Washington, D.C., 1969), 2:547–77.

[17] T. S. Hamerow, *From the Finland Station: The Graying of Revolution in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1990), 7, 24. On pages 6–24 Hamerow describes various pre-revolutionary situations in terms of improving conditions, the relationship between modernization and destabilization, and changes in expectations.

behavioral theories is that "so many different objective social conditions seem capable of generating" revolution and civil war.[18] Karl Marx also reflected on the influence of behavioral factors, when he observed that even an increase in wages can stimulate the radicalization of workers, if other sectors gain even more, because the psychological effect is relative rather than absolute.[19] Very severe oppression and extreme hunger usually atomize a society, whereas improving conditions and greater education may stimulate political reactions, sometimes of a severely adversarial nature.

Modern revolutions do not take place in traditional societies, but only in polities in which a certain amount of modernization has already occurred. Some degree of modernization is a sine qua non for the preliminary revolution of rising expectations, though in revolutionary or pre-revolutionary situations there has almost always been a strong feeling that the existing degree of modernization has been inadequate. A sense of comparative backwardness or, alternatively, "disadvantaged positions within international arenas"[20] is also usually present, though the form taken by the latter may be simply military defeat.

Nearly all interpretations of revolution agree upon certain common preconditions, such as the loss of elite support, a rebellious intelligentsia, the rise of radical, often millenarian, expectations, and the existence of a weak and divided old order that has lost its nerve. Strongly organized revolutionary groups are important, but not always indispensable. The most crucial factor is, to use Jonathan Israel's term, "a revolution of the mind."[21]

Revolutions occur only when the old order has become relatively weak. Thus the initial revolution that accomplishes its overthrow is sometimes comparatively easy and often not accompanied by great disorder or bloodshed. Sometimes this is not the result of any great new exertion by the revolutionaries themselves; rather, the downfall of the old order is only the beginning of the revolutionary process, which usually leads to greater radicalization and more and more bloodshed, often involving civil war and sometimes major international war as well. The revolution often stimulates not merely opposition, but in some cases a competing new counterrevolutionary movement that may be almost as radical, though with a very different program, so that the struggle, as in Spain during the 1930s, may become a vicious contest of competing radicalisms.

[18] Eckstein, "Etiology of Internal Wars," 182–83.
[19] K. Marx and F. Engels, "Wage Labour and Capital," in *Selected Works in Two Volumes* (Moscow, 1955), 1:94, quoted in Davies, "Toward a Theory."
[20] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 19.
[21] J. Israel, *A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy* (Princeton, N.J., 2009). Israel notes the continued insistence by more than a few scholars upon the preeminence of structural factors in bringing about the American, Dutch, and French revolutions of the late eighteenth century, but argues convincingly that the most crucial and decisive factor was the prior "revolution of the mind," an argument that may be extended to almost every modern revolution.

Europe had earlier gone through two periods of protracted international war accompanied by violent internal conflict, during the era of the Thirty Years War[22] in the first half of the seventeenth century and later during the quarter-century of the French revolutionary wars. In the first, intense religious strife added a certain dimension of ideological civil war, but, with the exceptions of England and Holland, the traditional order generally prevailed.[23] The French revolutionary and Napoleonic era introduced modern revolutionism on an international scale, but this was largely restricted to politics and culture, and ended with universally triumphant counterrevolution, at least for some years. The twentieth-century conflict era, by contrast, extended war on a previously unimagined scale and produced political breakdown and continuing revolutionary confrontation to a degree totally unprecedented.

The era of twentieth-century revolutions began in 1905–11, with the First Russian Revolution of 1905, the Iranian quasi-revolution of 1906–11, the great Romanian peasant revolt of 1907, the successful Young Turk revolt of 1908, the Greek military coup for a more liberal system in 1909, and the beginning of the Mexican and Chinese revolutions in 1910–11, together with the successful republican revolt of 1910 in Portugal. The clustering of these events in the same years was not fortuitous, but in different ways the by-product of processes of change and modernization in underdeveloped societies, either on the periphery of Europe or outside it altogether,[24] just as the civil wars, national liberation movements, and national unification drives in the years between 1775 and 1871 had been the product of changes in the more developed societies. Most of these new cases were also accompanied by major outbreaks of political violence – the worst in peacetime since the Paris Commune of 1871 – involving trial runs for genocide in Turkey between 1894 and 1909 in which more than 200,000 Armenians were slaughtered in the twentieth century's first gigantic outbreak of jihadist violence, while between 1904 and 1907 Russia was the scene of the century's first large-scale systematic political

[22] P. H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009).

[23] The early and middle decades of the seventeenth century constituted an era of war and internal rebellion on an enormous scale, affecting not merely Europe but also Russia, the Middle East, and Asia. It was the period of the most extreme worldwide turmoil during the modern era prior to the twentieth century. Jack Goldstone, in *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (Berkeley, Calif., 1991), argues that such extensive conflict was provoked above all by a crisis in resources resulting from demographic and environmental catastrophe, while Geoffrey Parker contends that it was crucially influenced by major shifts in environment and climate: Goldstone, "Crisis and Catastrophe: The Global Crisis of the Seventeenth Century Reconsidered," *American Historical Review*, 104:4 (October 2008), 1053–79; and Parker, *The Global Crisis: War, Climate, and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth-Century World* (New Haven, Conn., 2010). In general, the consequences were not revolutionary change, despite the major reformist breakthrough in England and the pronounced shift toward absolutism and centralism in numerous European states, two kinds of change that moved in opposite directions. The aftermath is treated in T. K. Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe* (New York, 1975).

[24] The only recent study that attempts to treat these cases together (with the exceptions of Greece and Romania) is C. Kurzman, *Democracy Denied, 1905–1915* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008).

terrorism. The Young Turk regime soon became one of the most sinister of the twentieth century, its one-party state a partial precursor of Bolshevism and Fascism, its "Teshkilat" squads to some extent forerunners of the Cheka and the SS.

Revolution is usually not an event but a process.[25] In every case, none of these developments of the years 1905–11 was decisive, but merely marked the beginning of a process that either began to erode, or had initially accomplished the overthrow, of the old regime. In some cases, the full development of these processes would require decades to complete. They would usually lead to civil war or other convulsive internal conflict, though this was not so in every case, and in some the eventual civil war would not develop for years or decades. Forms of civil strife might continue for many years.

Twentieth-century revolutionary/counterrevolutionary civil wars began in Finland and in Russia in 1917–18, and would eventually spread around much of the world, but would not afflict any of the advanced countries save, to a degree, Germany. Among the various patterns of revolutionary conflict to appear was that of the east Baltic peoples, where the dominant goal was national liberation, with foreign powers playing major military roles, while a different one appeared in the societies of established states like Germany and Italy. In Hungary, where a complete revolutionary takeover briefly occurred, there was little civil war, but multiple liberation movements by the nationalities, accompanied by foreign intervention. In countries as far apart as Poland and Portugal political conflict was sometimes violent, but did not involve social revolution and never led to full civil war (except for two months in Portugal), while attempted Communist insurrections in Bulgaria and Estonia (1924) failed to reignite civil conflict. The last revolutionary civil war of the era took place in Spain from 1936 to 1939, though perceptions of it were heavily influenced by the foreign interventions that took place, so that in some interpretations the Spanish war is folded into World War II and is not treated simply as the bridge between two epochs. Within the strange world of the Soviet Union, massive violence and also a degree of insurgency (unable to achieve civil war) persisted, not merely because of the proclivity of the Soviet state to wage a kind of war against its own citizens, but also because of the continuing resistance of sectors of the Muslim nationalities. Outside Europe, the process of the Mexican revolution went on for years, with limited civil war reignited in the late 1920s, when the new regime sought to suppress Catholicism. The process was most chaotic of all in China, with complete disintegration a danger for some years. The eventual civil war between the new revolutionary Nationalist (Kuomintang) regime and the Communist movement began in 1927 and would weave its way through varying stages for more than two decades, a war in which the original revolutionaries would find themselves cast in the role of counterrevolutionaries.

[25] R. D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements," *Social Forces*, 28 (March 1950), 270–79.

During World War II a form of multisided revolutionary civil war developed in occupied Yugoslavia, and then also in Greece. A limited sort of civil war was waged in occupied northern Italy between 1943 and 1945, while in the western borderlands of the Soviet Union various forms of internal conflict and violence persisted throughout the 1940s. During the next two generations, during the Cold War, revolutionary insurrections broke out in many different parts of what was called the Third World – such places as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaya, Cuba, Yemen, Nicaragua, Angola, and Mozambique, to provide only a partial list – in most of these countries creating conditions of internal war or insurgency and in some cases full-scale civil war. Revolutionary terrorist organizations created severe conflict in Turkey, in various Latin American countries, and indeed in a sizable part of the world, including Spain, though this did not produce conditions approximating civil war, except in several Latin American cases. When these instances involved national liberation struggle as well, the conflict became even more intense.

Twentieth-century revolutionary civil wars typically featured a struggle between revolutionary collectivists (usually, but not always, Communists) and various kinds of more conservative, or at least anti-Communist, counterrevolutionary forces, ranging from liberal democrats to fascists. In some major cases, such as Russia and China, the revolutionaries won, though counterrevolutionaries were normally successful in Europe (Finland, the Baltic, Hungary, Spain, Greece), and later revolutionary insurrections were suppressed in the Philippines, Malaya, Central America, and elsewhere.

One major way in which revolutionary civil wars have differed from both international conflicts and more traditional civil wars has been their greater tendency to dehumanize opponents and the proportionate extent of their atrocities against civilians, though of course there are some atrocities against civilians in nearly all conflicts. In traditional civil wars, as in many international wars, there was sometimes greater willingness to recognize the common humanity of the other side, whereas revolutionary civil wars have been waged as wars between two totally different concepts of state, society, and culture that brook no compromise. Their protagonists have tended to regard the opposition not merely as a political foe but as the bearer of an entire adversarial culture or religion, a totally different system of belief, values, and morality, which threatens every dimension of life. Thus the goal is often not merely military victory but complete extirpation in one form or another, often leading to massive repression and executions. Even before the advent of modern revolutions, such a tendency in civil war was noted by a good many commentators.[26]

Two other aspects increase the potential bloodiness of civil wars. One is the absence of a clear demarcation between two contenders in the same country,

[26] The most thorough and intellectually sophisticated comparative analysis of this phenomenon will be found in S. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge, UK, 2007). See his discussion of "barbarism" in civil war, 52–86.