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Introduction: An Islamist Monopoly

The years following the overthrow of Egypt's long-reigning dictator, Hosni Mubarak, have been unkind to those who hoped for a new era of liberty and pluralism in the Arab world's most populous country. Though the protests that resulted in Mubarak's departure on February 11, 2011, seemed at first to have been inspired and organized by a diverse group of liberal, progressive, and technologically savvy young people – represented, in Western minds at least, in such personalities as Wael Ghonim, a U.S.-educated Google employee, and Gihan Ibrahim, a graduate of the American University in Cairo – that heady victory gave way to a nearly unbroken string of triumphs for religiously conservative Islamist parties that had been at best reluctant participants in Egypt's revolutionary drama.[1] First, in January 2012, the Freedom and Justice Party (Ḥizb al-Ḥurriyah wa al-ʿAdālah) – the political arm of the eighty-five-year-old Society of Muslim Brothers (Jamāʿat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) – captured 37 percent of the vote and 46 percent of the seats in the country's first post-authoritarian parliament (before

[1] I define Islamist parties as those that arise out of Islamic pietist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Jamāʿat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) and the Salafi Call Society (Jamāʿat al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya). These parties invariably call for the application of some version of *sharīʿa*, but I refrain from using a stated desire for *sharīʿa* as a definitional criterion because Egyptian parties generally recognized as non-Islamist often pay lip service to *sharīʿa* as well. For example, Islamic themes once figured prominently in the platform of Egypt's ruling National Democratic Party, which, according to Egyptian columnist Fahmī Huwaydī, called not only for the primacy of the *sharīʿa* but also for the strengthening of religious education and the use of state-owned media for the reinforcement of religious principles and values. See Fahmī Huwaydī, "*Misr … Al-Marjāʿiyya al-Dīniyya Bayn al-Ḥaẓr wa al-Tawẓīf* (Egypt: The Religious Frame of Reference between Prohibition and Exploitation)," *Al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ*, Issue 10347, March 28, 2007. Similarly, the platform of Egypt's Wafd Party – long referred to as "secular," "liberal," or both – declares that "Islam is the official religion of the state and therefore the Islamic *sharīʿah* must be the principal source of legislation." (See *Birnāmij Ḥizb al-Wafd: Al-Shuʾūn al-Dīniyya* (Wafd Party Platform: Religious Matters); available at http://www.alwafdparty.org/details.aspx?t=prog&id=136.) An alternative, and useful, definition of Islamism is provided by Hegghammer (2013, 1), who calls it "activism justified with primary reference to Islam," although what constitutes "primary reference" is of course subjective.

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the body was dissolved by the country's highest court). In addition, an even more conservative newcomer called the Party of Light (*Ḥizb al-Nūr*) – variously described as "populist-puritans,"[2] "ultra-Orthodox," or "ultra-conservative religious monsters,"[3] – captured 28 percent of the vote and 24 percent of the seats. Six months later, in June 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi captured the country's presidency. Given the Brotherhood's electoral dominance, one could have been forgiven for concluding the Egypt's revolution had simply replaced one hegemonic ruling party with another. To many, the eighteen days from January 25, 2011, to Mubarak's resignation, during which U.S. President Barack Obama reportedly wished aloud for "the kids on the street to win and for the Google guy to become president" came to seem like a distant and outlandish dream.[4]

In fact, wherever the so-called Arab Spring gave rise to elections, Islamists captured pluralities, if not majorities, of voters. For example, in Tunisia, the country that touched off the current upheavals, the Renaissance Movement Party (*Ḥizb Ḥarakat al-Nahḍa*) – which promised to end the marginalization of Islam in public life and which had been brutally suppressed during the dictatorship of Zayn al-ʿĀbidin Bin ʿAlī – captured 89 of 217 parliamentary seats and 40 percent of the vote in the October 2011 constituent assembly elections. In the July 2012 elections to Libya's General National Congress (al-Muʾtamar al-Waṭanī al-ʿĀm), the Brotherhood – affiliated Justice and Construction Party appeared at first to have done relatively poorly, placing second and garnering only 17 of the 80 seats reserved for party lists. However, Brotherhood allies later picked up an additional 60 of the 120 seats reserved for individual constituencies, bringing the party to within a few seats of being the largest bloc in the country's first democratically elected legislature.

Nor were political Islam's electoral gains restricted to those polities that managed to unseat their strongmen and ruling parties. In Morocco – a country not yet free of the authoritarian yoke – the Party of Justice and Development (Ḥizb al-ʿAdālah wa al-Tanmiya), which claims an "Islamic frame of reference" (*marjaʿiyya Islāmiyya*), won more than a quarter of legislative seats in November 2011 and now leads the country's government.[5] In Kuwait, Islamists of various ideological stripes and organizational affiliations, ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated Islamic Constitutional Movement (al-Ḥarakah

[2] Robin Wright, "Don't Fear All Islamists, Fear Salafis," *New York Time*s, August 20, 2012; available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/opinion/dont-fear-all-islamists-fear-salafis.html?_r=0.

[3] Khalil al-Anani, "Egypt's 'blessed' Salafi Votes," ForeignPolicy.com, May 5, 2012; available at: http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/02/egypts_blessed_salafi_votes.

[4] Mark Landler, "Obama Seeks Reset in the Arab World," *New York Times*, May 11, 2011.

[5] References to the PJD's "Islamic frame of reference" can be found on the party's website, http://www.pjd.ma. See, for example, the section entitled "The project," which states in its opening line, "The Party of Justice and Development is a nationalist political party that strives – based on its Islamic frame of reference and in the context of a constitutional monarchy based on the command of the faithful – to contribute to the building of a modern, democratic Morocco." Available at: http://www.pjd.ma/pjd/page-8; accessed March 1, 2012.

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al-Dustūriya al-Islāmiyya) to the ultra-Orthodox Islamic Salafi Alliance (al-Taḥāluf al-Islāmī al-Salafī) to various ideologically congenial independents, won a majority in the February 2012 elections for the fifty-seat Chamber of Deputies. The entire region, it seemed, was voting for Islam.

For many observers, the political ascent of the partisans of political Islam was entirely expected. Though many of those who make it their business to understand the Middle East would famously prove unable to predict such events as the flight of Bin Ali, the resignation of Mubarak, the scourging of Qaddafi, and the ongoing struggle against al-Assad, they were nevertheless able to predict almost perfectly what would occur if democracy (or, rather, more-or-less free elections) were to alight on the Arab world. For example, to return the focus to Egypt, the scholar Fawaz Gerges wrote in 2006 that "if free and open elections were held today, the Brotherhood would win a comfortable majority."[6] Also in 2006, the *New York Times* informed us that the Brothers "would probably sweep any wide-open elections."[7] In 2007, an Israeli official testified that "if free elections were held in Egypt today, the Muslim Brotherhood would win by a landslide."[8] That same year, sociologists Nancy J. Davis and Robert V. Robinson (2007, 23) wrote that "if truly open elections were held in Egypt today, the Muslim Brotherhood would win in a landslide." In 2004, an Egyptian leftist activist divined that "if there were free elections tomorrow, the Brotherhood would win 60 percent of the seats" (Onians 2004). Even earlier, in the 1990s, Hishām Mubārak, the late Egyptian human rights activist (and no relation to the former dictator), confided to Miller (1996, 65) that "if the Brotherhood ever ran in a free election, it would win overwhelmingly." More restrained was the analysis of the *Jerusalem Report* more than twenty years ago, which ascribed to "many observers" the belief that if the Brotherhood "ran free elections and was given free access to the media, its supporters would take no more than ten years to become the parliamentary majority."[9] In actuality, it took less than ten months.

What explains the totality of the Islamists' victory? Why did a revolution whose principal demand was not for the rule of the *Qur'ān* but rather for "bread, freedom, and social justice [*ʿaysh, ḥurriyah, ʿadālah ijtimāʿiyya*]" yield so quickly to the dominance of religious political parties? After all, it is frequently reported that 40 percent of Egyptians subsist on less than two dollars per day (in 1993 international prices).[10] The country's per capita income of $5,349 places it in the

6 Fawaz A. Gerges, "Making Sense of the Cartoon Controversy: From Protests to Recent Elections, Islamists Hold Sway," ABC News, February 8, 2006; available at: http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=1595281&page=1.
7 James Glanz, "A Little Democracy or a Genie Unbottled," *New York Times*, January 29, 2006.
8 Uri Dromi, "Reverberations in Egypt: Gaza Fallout," *International Herald Tribune*, June 22, 2007; available at: http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/22/opinion/eddromi.php.
9 Jeffrey Phillips, "A Holy War on the Nile," *Jerusalem Report*, June 18, 1992.
10 Most invocations of the figure leave off the fact that it is denominated in 1993 dollars. See, for example, Tadros (2005), El-Khawas (2012a), and Bush (2011), as well as Amitai Etzioni, "It's the Egyptian Economy, Stupid," *The National Interest,* January 24, 2013. For journalistic uses,

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lower half of nations. Ranked by its score on the United Nations Development Programme's human development index (which aggregates health, education, and national income indicators), Egypt places 112th, behind Cape Verde and Guatemala and just ahead of Nicaragua.[11] Egypt would thus seem to possess a large and ready constituency for a politics of class rather than creed, of redistribution rather than religion. And yet, in the 30 months from Mubarak's ouster to the military's overthrow of his successor, Mohamed Morsi, whenever Egyptians took to the polls, they cast ballots not for the tribunes of workers and peasants but for Islamist parties led by technocrats (such as President Morsi, a U.S.-trained engineering professor) and businessman (such as Khayrat al-Shāṭir, a multi-millionaire entrepreneur and the Muslim Brotherhood's second-in-command). To echo a question asked by anthropologist Lila Abu Lughod (1995, 54), why is it that Egyptians, who are overwhelmingly poor, seem to find so appealing a "political discourse in which morality replaces class as the central social problem?" Is it a case of some false consciousness? To expropriate the title of a well-known American book, should we be asking "What's the matter with Cairo?"[12]

Scholarly attempts to answer this question have coalesced around two types of responses. The first, and most influential among the public, is that there is simply something special about Islam. It may be that Muslims are primed by their creed to desire Islamic government (leaving aside, for the moment, what exactly Islamic government might require), or that Muslims find religious rhetoric inherently comforting in hard and uncertain times, or that secular ideologies have been tried and failed, or that Islamic messages are simply more easily understood and processed by the average Egyptian than, say, Marxist ones. Though these mechanisms differ from each other in important ways, they all locate the source of Islamist parties' electoral success in the *religious* nature of their discourse and ideology. The second family of explanations for Islamist success is organizational. In these accounts, Islamists are hypothesized to be more disciplined, competent, and cohesive than their secular counterparts; to run better election campaigns; or to expend more effort to purchase the loyalties of voters with social services and other goods that the state should, but does not, provide. In short, these accounts hold that Muslims aren't necessarily voting for Islam when

see John Ydstie, "Empty Pockets Stoked Discontent in Egypt, Tunisia," National Public Radio, February 1, 2011; Jeffrey Fleishman, "Under Egypt's Political Unrest Seethes the Rising Anger of the Poor," *Los Angeles Times,* February 2, 2013; Tony Karon, "From Bad to Worse: Economic Woes May Compound Egypt's Pain," *Time*, January 29, 2013; Yolanda Kell, "The Complicated Legacy of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak," *BBC News*, January 25, 2013. Given inflation, $2 per day in 1993 prices is equivalent to approximately $3 in current (2012) prices. The actual number of Egyptians subsisting on less than two (current) dollars a day is closer to 15.4 percent. See *2006 World Development Indicators*; available at: http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/wdi06.pdf.

[11] *Human Development Report 2009*, United Nations Development Programme. See http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_EGY.html.

[12] Thomas Frank, *What's the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America*, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 2004.

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they mark their ballots for groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood but rather are responding to Islamist effectiveness or expressing gratitude for free healthcare or writing off secular parties for being so feckless and divided.

All these arguments undoubtedly capture important reasons for political Islam's electoral prowess. Anyone who has witnessed a Muslim Brotherhood rally firsthand cannot help but be struck by the totemic power of religious rhetoric, by the ways in which invocations of the will of Allah and the way of Muhammad can imbue voters with a sense of righteous duty. Anyone who has witnessed the well-oiled machine of a Muslim Brotherhood election campaign, with its disciplined cadres and unified messaging, would be hard-pressed to find greater displays of political competence in Egypt. And finally, anyone who observed the decay of that country's institutions and infrastructure, the increasing immiseration of its poor, and the seeming nonchalance of its former authoritarian rulers to both would have had little difficulty believing that any movement that stepped into the breach and took it on itself to provide sustenance and care would reap rewards at the ballot box.

And yet these explanations for Islamism's remarkable rise are partial at best. If Islam is sufficient to explain why Islamists win, then we would observe little variation in Islamist success over time and space. Instead, in reality, we see that not all Arabs vote Islamist, and those who voted Islamist in one election may not do so in another. Indeed, as we saw in July of 2013, when the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi was overthrown in a military coup, a country that once elected Islamists to office in vast numbers could scarcely a year later celebrate its army as it escorted those same individuals from the halls of power to the country's prisons. And if Islamist victories were purely the function of efforts to fill empty stomachs, or of slick and well-run electoral campaigns, we would have to wonder why it never occurred to their opponents to do these things. Why should Islamists have a monopoly on organizational discipline or machine politics?

This book argues that the secret of political Islam's stunning electoral successes – both under authoritarianism and during Egypt's founding elections – is not to be found purely in the minds of voters or in the tactics of political parties, but in broader, structural factors that shape both citizens' choices and parties' strategies. Specifically, this book argues that Egypt's relative economic underdevelopment generates two primary dynamics that advantage Islamists and disadvantage parties of the left. The first is by limiting the ability of voters to choose. For although Egypt's economic backwardness may generate large numbers of voters with a theoretical hospitality to parties of the left, with their programs of wealth redistribution and state provision of welfare, poverty robs citizens of the ability to vote based on their long-term economic interests – not because they are unable to perceive those interests, but because disadvantage renders them susceptible to vote buying, offers of patronage, and other forms of clientelism (Lust 2006; Blaydes 2010). This was particularly true during the Mubarak era, when the ruling National Democratic Party was able to capture

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impoverished voters through its command over state resources. A leftist party that wanted to reap the suffrages of Egyptians during that grim period had to either try to compete with the ruling party's patronage machine (largely impossible) or to redirect its attentions to more affluent voters (who were less likely to be receptive to the party's radically redistributive aims). The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand – which began its life as a movement of the educated middle classes and which espoused a vague economic platform that could appeal across class lines – faced little difficulty in attracting affluent voters. As a result, the Brotherhood racked up a string of victories during the Mubarak years while its secular counterparts built only a reputation for failure.

The second way in which underdevelopment advantages Islamist and inhibits the growth of leftist parties is by stunting the organizational basis on which left parties are typically erected. Scholars have long recognized that forms of social organization, such as labor unions and mutual-benefit associations for workers and farmers, constitute the principal channels through which leftist parties link themselves to potential voters (Radcliff and Davis 2000, Levitsky 2001, Roberts 2003). However, such forms of collective life are weak in most of the Middle East, and in Egypt in particular. The most often cited reason for this weakness is that the authoritarian state severely curtailed the ability of workers and farmers to organize themselves independently and press for their rights (Bianchi 1986, Posusney 1997). But as important, I argue, are developmental factors external to the policies of the military-backed regime that dominated Egypt for most of the last sixty years. The country's vast agrarian workforce – dominated by small landholders – and its sizable informal sector are simply inconducive to large-scale, class-based mobilization. To the extent that such forms of collective action exist, they are limited to the country's small industrial enclaves and do not constitute the basis for a national political movement capable of claiming a share of power. In contrast, the country is replete with religious institutions, from mosques to religious societies to charitable associations that, though forced to be apolitical during Mubarak's reign, embed both ordinary citizens and Islamist political activists in common "networks of social action" (Desai 2002), making it easy for the latter to build trust with the former when an opening in the political system finally presented itself.

I argue, then, that the electoral successes of Islamist parties both before and after Egypt's 2011 revolution did not mean that economic issues were somehow less salient than matters of faith, that citizens were somehow sublimating their "real" interests on the altar of religion. On the contrary, I find that when we examine the correlates of support for the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt's first parliamentary election after Mubarak's overthrow, citizens voted for that party not because of its stance on the application of Islamic law, but because they believed it would pursue economic policies on behalf of the poor. That leftist parties were unable to capture these votes has less to do with their lack of Islamic garb than with their lack of means of connecting to voters. Social scientists are accustomed to inferring from the nature of a country's party system

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the dominant sociopolitical "cleavages" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) or "master narratives" (Varshney 2002) that shape its political life. This book argues that to do so in the case of the polities of the Arab world courts misunderstanding. Although, as we shall see, some people certainly do vote for Islamist parties because of their positions on religious issues, the lopsidedness of the Egyptian party system in favor of Islamist parties is less a reflection of the collective mind's thirst for God than it is of resource asymmetries that endowed Islamists with more opportunities to convince voters of their ability to serve Mammon. In short, this book argues that Islamist electoral victories are not, in the main, about Islam.

An important implication of this argument is that the electoral advantage enjoyed by Islamists is likely to be temporally bounded, limited principally to so-called founding elections (Schmitter 1986) when the party system is less a "system" than a highly fluid menagerie of organizations and personalities with little in the way of name recognition or reputation. This would not be the case, of course, if Islamists were swept into power on the basis of religious rhetoric and a popular passion for Islam (Murphy 2002). In such a universe, we would expect popular support for Islamist parties to be durable even in the face of continuing economic hardship or increasing popular immiseration. But if the Islamists' advantage is primarily organizational, and based on beliefs about their likely economic policies, it stands to reason that the Islamists' acquisition of power would provide voters with opportunities to update those beliefs. And as the post-authoritarian state opens media access to parties and politicians from across the political spectrum, the magnitude of the informational advantage that Islamists enjoyed in founding elections should diminish. As we shall see, the fundamentally economic nature of voting for the Muslim Brotherhood in the aftermath of Mubarak's overthrow helps us to understand how an organization that seemed to have won hearts and minds across classes and ideological affiliations could lose all but its most hard-core supporters scarcely a year after assuming power.

This book proceeds in two parts: Part I investigates the fortunes of Islamists in elections during Egypt's long authoritarian period, explaining how the Muslim Brotherhood was able to establish itself as the principal opposition to the authoritarian state and how the left – despite a moment of intellectual energy in the late 1970s – became by the end of the Mubarak years a virtual cipher in Egypt's electoral landscape. Part II takes up the story of the Muslim Brotherhood and its rivals after the 2011 revolution. Though that period seemed to disrupt old authoritarian dynamics and open up previously unfathomed possibilities, they were possibilities that the left – hobbled both by reputation and structural factors – was distinctly ill equipped to take advantage of. The remainder of this introduction describes each of the book's chapters.

Chaper 1 explores the state of theorizing on the rise and electoral success of Islamist movements. I argue that the two most influential answers found in the literature – those emphasizing cognitive features of Islamist discourse and those

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emphasizing the organizational strategies and tactics of Islamist parties – have proven unable to explain variation over time and space in the size and nature of the Islamist movement's base of supporters. I then lay out the argument of this study, which redirects our attention to the ways in which the social and institutional environment constrains parties' abilities to appeal to voters, shaping whom they can and cannot reach. Chapter 2 then takes up the story of political Islam's dominance during the Mubarak era by asking not why Islamists won but the inverse: Why is it that non-Islamist parties – particularly those of the left – were singularly unable to establish themselves as credible elected opponents of the Mubarak regime? In contrast to theories that locate the sources of leftist enfeeblement in the discrediting of their ideology, or the fall of the Soviet Union, or their co-optation by the authoritarian state, this chapter demonstrates how parties of the left were systematically disadvantaged by the very nature of an electoral game built not on policies but rather on the politics of patronage and clientelism.

Chapter 3 turns to the question of how the Muslim Brotherhood was able to overcome the dynamics that led to the electoral enervation of the Egyptian left. I argue that a regular assertion in the literature – that Islamists won by mobilizing the poor recipients of Islamic social services – actually neglects the ways in which the authoritarian state worked to prevent precisely such an outcome, both by destroying Islamists' own "bricks and mortar" institutions (Cammett and Issar 2010) and by heavily policing their links to other ones. Thus, though Islamic political activists continued to join and participate in religious social services networks during the Mubarak era, they were profoundly unable to turn these into a base for clientelistic politics that would have allowed them to challenge the state for the political loyalties of the poor.

But, if Islamists did not win through the provision of social services to the masses, how were they able to routinely defeat candidates of the ruling party and emerge with their storied reputation for electoral prowess? Chapter 4 shows that the Muslim Brotherhood won elections under Mubarak by mobilizing a small middle-class constituency that could afford to forego offers of regime patronage and instead cast their ballots as "paper stones" (Przeworski and Sprague 1986) against the regime. This middle-class basis, I argue, was reflected in everything from the makeup of the organization's leaders to the types of services the movement's parliamentarians offered to voters to the socioeconomic profiles of the districts in which they fielded candidates. Moreover, I show that the appeal to the middle classes is one that the Brotherhood was better positioned than other parties to make, given its long history of recruiting primarily among the educated.

Thus, by the end of the Mubarak era, parties of the secular left appeared to have permanently failed, whereas the Muslim Brotherhood looked increasingly set to inherit the country's future. And then came the events of January 25, 2011 and its aftermath, which demarcate Part II of this book. Though we had long been taught to expect that the greatest threat to the durability of the Mubarak regime came from the forces of political Islam, in the end it was photogenic, wired, Western-oriented young people who seemed to lead the charge. Moreover, the

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left appeared to be heavily represented among the forces of revolution. Protests were organized by such groups as the Revolutionary Socialists (al-Ishtirākiyūn al-Thawriyūn) and the April 6 Movement (Ḥarakat 6 Abrīl), which took its name from the date of an aborted textile workers' strike in al-Maḥalla al-Kubrā in 2008. The relative absence of Islamists from Taḥrīr Square in the revolution's early days caused many to wonder if perhaps political Islam had been overrated. Wael Ghonim – the "Google guy" who was reportedly the focus of President Obama's hopes – went so far as to dismiss concerns about a Muslim Brotherhood takeover by declaring that the movement constituted no more than 15 percent of the protesters.[13] However, as the days after Mubarak's February 11 resignation turned to weeks and weeks to months, it appeared that the youths who had sparked that revolution had done little more than trade one single-party regime for another. Where once the country's legislature had been dominated by Mubarak's satraps, it was now dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and its ultra-Orthodox allies, who seemed every bit as illiberal as their National Democratic Party predecessors (albeit in different ways).

Chapter 5 asks what, precisely, Egyptians were doing when they fulfilled decades of social scientific and journalistic prediction and voted overwhelmingly for Islamists in the country's first free and fair parliamentary elections. Were they enacting a long-theorized desire to deepen the role of religion in public life, finally bringing to office those who promised the *sharīʿa*-based governance that they had always craved? Did the fact that the elected legislature would be charged with writing a new constitution generate popular anxiety over the place of religion in public life, causing Egyptians to vote into power Islamists who would preserve the country's Islamic heritage and make sure to encode it in the nation's new charter? Drawing on a combination of qualitative and quantitative evidence, I argue that the issue of *sharīʿa* and the legislation of morals appeared to matter little to voters in that election. Though the Salafist Nūr party may have ridden to office on the backs of the quarter of the voting population that had religion front of mind, the plurality of voters who cast ballots for the Freedom and Justice Party appeared to do so beause they believed that the party would pursue the policies of wealth redistribution and strengthening of the social safety net that the Mubarak regime appeared to have long abandoned.

The fact that so many Egyptians voted for the Muslim Brotherhood for identifiably redistributive and welfare-statist reasons again raises the question of why the left performed so poorly. Given the dissolution of Mubarak's party, and with it the diminution of the patronage politics that robbed the left of its natural constituencies, one might have expected parties of the left to finally reap the rewards of their long championing of economic policies for which Egyptian voters had

[13] Usāma Khālid, "*Ghunaym li al-Miṣrī al-Yawm: Maṭālibunā lam yakun tanaḥī al-raʾīs* (Wael Ghonim to al-Miṣrī al-Yawm: Our Demands Did Not Include the President's Resignation)," al-Miṣrī al-Yawm (Cairo), February 9, 2011; available at: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/313710.

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demonstrated a considerable and sustained appetite. However, on examining citizens' perceptions of political parties and their stances, we find that most Egyptians appeared to think that leftists stood *against* redistribution and that Islamists were *more* redistributive than the non-Islamists who had made redistribution their bread and butter for the better part of half a century. Chapter 6 explains why this was so. It argues that although the revolution temporarily disrupted the patronage structures that had previously deprived the left of access to its most likely voters, it did not magically put in place an organizational and social infrastrucure that could offer parties of the left a means of establishing sustained contact with those voters.

Instead, in the postrevolutionary scramble to establish linkages to the vast majority of previously depoliticized Egyptians, Islamists could take advantage of religious forms of collective life to make their case for why they should be entrusted with the country's economy, whereas the forms of associational life that the left could mobilize, such as labor unions and occupational associations, were not nearly so encompassing. As a result, voters (thought they) knew more about Islamists than they did about parties of the left. Drawing on aggregate and individual-level econometric evidence, I show that a voter's assessment of a party's economic positions was powerfully conditioned by the associations in which he or she was embedded. Those embedded in Islamic networks thought that Islamists were redistributive and welfare-statist. Those embedded in networks of labor organization thought leftists were. The problem for the left was simply that many more people were embedded in Islamist networks than in labor unions. And while this fact is partially attributable to a long legacy of state policies designed to co-opt and weaken independent forms of political organization among the poor, it is also a function of the fact that such forms of organization are notoriously hard to build in agrarian, nonindustrialized societies.

If the story up to this point is one of success after Islamist success, Chapter 7 explores the changing trajectory of Islamist support after Egypt's founding elections. By the time the country had moved to presidential elections in the summer of 2012, the Islamist advantage appeared to have faded. Voters who had supported the Freedom and Justice Party on the basis of their perceptions of its economic policies now turned away from it, viewing the party – and the movement behind it – more as a grasping hand that sought to replace the NDP as a new hegemonic party than as the best steward for the country's resources. The broad coalition that had delivered to the Muslim Brothers nearly 45 percent of the seats in parliament had, by the presidential election, given way to a far narrower one, made up primarily of religiously minded voters who had supported the Salafist Nūr party. And though the Brotherhood's candidate, Mohamed Morsi, eventually won office – buoyed in large part by the votes of revolutionaries who could not abide the alternative, a former minister and prime minister under the ousted Mubarak – the results of that election revealed that the Egyptian people had a far wider variety of affiliations and allegiances than the earlier, lopsided parliamentary result would have suggested. The Muslim Brotherhood's superior

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