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Introduction 1

HISTORIOGRAPHY

In September 1346, in the midst of war with France, a document was presented to the English parliament at Westminster that purported to reveal a plot by the king of France, dating from 1339, 'to destroy and ruin the whole English nation and language' (*a destruire et anientier tote la nacion et la lange Engleys*).[1] The plot, in which the king of France was alleged to have made secret plans to invade England with a force of Norman soldiers, had been discovered when Edward III's army took Caen in 1346. It now served as a vivid illustration to the assembled English parliament of how essential their continued support for the king's overseas campaigns was to the successful defence of the kingdom of England. This was a salient point to make. As parliament met, Edward III was laying siege to Calais, following his army's resounding victory at the battle of Crécy, and funds garnered from the previous subsidy, granted in 1344, had run dry. Politically, therefore, this dramatic revelation was a valuable, if unsubtle, means of persuading parliament to loosen its purse-strings once more. It proved successful; the next day, the Commons granted Edward a further two fifteenths, 'in aid of him and of the final completion of his war'.[2] Yet the motifs and vocabulary deployed by the government at this moment of crisis – the English nation, the English tongue, a foreign threat – had a deeper resonance in English society than their immediate political expediency.

The idea of an imminent French invasion that threatened the English tongue was not new in 1346; it had first been used as a justification for tax during the reign of Edward I. It also continued to feature intermittently in government documents throughout the rest of the fourteenth century, woven in and out of official rhetoric alongside the more conventional formulae of governance and war.[3] As such, it appears to have represented

[1] *PROME*, IV, p. 390.
[2] *PROME*, IV, p. 393. See also *PROME*, IV, pp. 383–6 for background.
[3] See Chapter 3, p. 161–3.

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a deliberate selection from a rich cultural repertoire of symbols, words, phrases and concepts relating to ideas about English nationhood that were not only used in official rhetoric but also infused the chronicle-writing, poetry and broader political discourse of late medieval England. It is the object of this study to explore some of these ideas in more detail and, in particular, their function and significance in the political and constitutional context of later medieval England. The intention of this book, therefore, is to ask how a sense of nationhood was conceived in late thirteenth- and fourteenth-century England, how it was expressed, by whom and for whom, and what role it played in English politics, society and culture.

THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

Present-day academic approaches to medieval national sentiment are contradictory. The view that nations and nationalism are strictly modern phenomena has become something of a self-perpetuating platitude in many modern works.[4] On the other hand, historians of medieval Europe have been vociferous in recent decades in insisting that the concept of the nation had genuine political and cultural meaning in the pre-modern period.[5] Yet even this increasingly polarised positioning of modernists and medievalists over the past two decades has now reached something of an intellectual impasse, a stalemate in which 'stale' might be seen as the operative word.[6] Moreover, a real analysis of the role of national identity in later medieval English political culture is still lacking, despite the confident assertions of medievalists that such an identity existed and, more than this, mattered.

It is worth taking some time at the outset to examine why this is the case. The origins of this neglect of medieval English identity can be partly located in the general history of political thought about nations and nationalism and its impact upon historiography. Few medieval

[4] E.g. B. Jenkins and S. A. Sofos (eds.), *Nation and identity in contemporary Europe* (London, 1996); K. Kumar, *The making of English identity* (Cambridge, 2003); H. Schulze (ed.), *States, nations and nationalism from the middle ages to the present* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 137–58; S. Woolf (ed.), *Nationalism in Europe, 1815 to the present: a reader* (London, 1996), p. 1.

[5] E.g. C. Bjorn, A. Grant and K. J. Stringer (eds.), *Nations, nationalism and patriotism in the European past* (Copenhagen, 1994); S. Forde, L. Johnson and A.V. Murray (eds.), *Concepts of national identity in the middle ages* (Leeds, 1995); L. Scales and O. Zimmer (eds.), *Power and the nation in European history* (Cambridge, 2005). On England in particular, e.g. M. T. Clanchy, *England and its rulers, 1066–1272* (Oxford, 1998, 2nd edn), pp. 173–89; K. Lavezzo (ed.), *Imagining a medieval English nation* (Minneapolis, 2004); M. Prestwich, *Plantagenet England, 1225–1360* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 554–70; T. Turville-Petre, *England the nation: language, literature and national identity, 1290–1340* (Oxford, 1996).

[6] See summary in Scales and Zimmer, *Power and the nation*, pp. 1–12.

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historians would deny that 'nationalism' as a political doctrine is, indeed, a modern development, in the sense of a specific political ideology that holds the 'nation' to be the most natural and effective form of human association and, consequently, of political organisation. The ultimate ideal of this modern nationalism, therefore, is the coincidence of political, territorial, cultural and, frequently, ethnic or racial boundaries to form an independent, self-conscious nation-state.[7] The origins of this ideology are indisputably modern and have been well documented, with two main variants identified.[8] The first of these is the voluntaristic, political model of the nation, developed from the ideas of Rousseau and other French Enlightenment figures in the eighteenth century as an alternative to the empires and dynasties that had, in their view, distorted the political map of Europe. In this model, citizens found freedom and security through absorption into the benevolent 'general will' of the national community, living contentedly within the boundaries of an autonomous national territory.[9] A second variety of nationalism grew out of nineteenth-century German Romanticism, notably the ideas of Herder and his disciples, who envisaged the nation as an involuntary, cultural entity, based on 'natural' boundaries of language and culture, which provided a shape and rationale for a people's political association.[10] Herder's brand of ethnic nationalism has also been seen as laying the foundations for the more systematic development in the later nineteenth century of theories about race and nationhood. As 'race' came to be viewed as an objective biological factor that determined national characteristics, nationality was no longer defined by political theory, but in quasi-scientific terms, and considered to be observable through the study of physiology and anatomy. From this, a more racialist form of nationalism developed, in which nation, state and race were seen as ideally coterminous, most infamously in the theories of racial superiority underpinning National Socialism in the 1930s.[11] In fact,

[7] J. Breuilly, *Nationalism and the state* (Manchester, 1982), pp. 2–3; Jenkins and Sofos, *Nation and identity*, pp. 9–32; Woolf, *Nationalism in Europe*, pp. 1–7, 25–6.

[8] E.g. A. B. Cobban, *The nation state and national self-determination* (London, 1969), pp. 118–22; E. Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London, 1960), pp. 28–41, 64–70, 96–8, 105–6; H. Kohn, *Nationalism: its meaning and history* (Princeton, 1965), pp. 40–4, 73–80; J. Huizinga, 'Patriotism and nationalism in European history', in *Men and ideas: history, the middle ages and the renaissance* (London, 1960), pp. 97–153.

[9] E.g. V. Gourevitch (ed. and trans.), *The Discourses and other early political thought, by Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. xiv–xv, xxii–xxiii, xxv, 22, 114–17, 227.

[10] E.g. F. M. Barnard, *Herder's social and political thought: from Enlightenment to nationalism* (Oxford, 1965), pp. xvii–xx, 54–67, 73–6, 140–5, 153–62; F. M. Barnard (ed. and trans.), *On social and political culture, by J. G. Herder* (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 7–9, 16, 29–32.

[11] M. D. Biddiss, *Father of racist ideology: the social and political thought of Count Gobineau* (London, 1970), pp. 97–9, 171–2; I. Hannaford, *Race: the history of an idea in the West* (Baltimore, 1996), pp. 224–31, 264–8. See Woolf, *Nationalism in Europe*, p. 5, for an alternative view.

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most modern definitions of the nation combine elements of all of these approaches – political, territorial, ethno-cultural and racial – which may explain why a consistent, universal definition of 'the nation' or 'nationalism' has proved elusive.[12] In whatever way the nation is defined, however, the underlying assumption of most analyses from the mid-twentieth century onwards has been that nationalism and, by extension, the nation are unambiguously the products of modernity.

However, in many ways, the form that this approach has taken in the last half-century or so has been a reaction against the presuppositions of an earlier historiography, particularly in relation to English history. Nationalist assumptions prevalent in nineteenth-century political thought and society had a profound effect on the history-writing of the period. To the first generations of English professional historians, the ideal of the nation-state was most fully expressed in their own political institutions, especially parliament, champion of the great 'English' virtues of liberty and justice, an approach exemplified by William Stubbs' *Constitutional History of England*, written in 1874–8.[13] Stubbs was not a lone voice; in 1848, T. B. Macaulay had described the English constitution as 'the best under which any great society has ever yet existed', while, nearly a century later, G. M. Trevelyan explained how the development of parliament, common law and constitutional monarchy had 'raised the political history of Britain into a sphere apart from the political life of the Continent'.[14] This teleological 'Whig' interpretation of English history charted the inevitable, triumphant progression of the English nation towards a contemporary apotheosis of national self-consciousness and political sovereignty. The emphasis was on continuity throughout English history, both institutionally, drawing parallels between the Anglo-Saxon Witan and modern-day parliament, for example, and with respect to national character, an idea that frequently had a strongly racial element. These writers did not represent one uniform viewpoint; historians disagreed over how far back the origins of English liberties could be traced, particularly with regard to the relationship between pre-Conquest constitutional forms and later medieval developments.[15] Nonetheless, they all

[12] E.g. Jenkins and Sofos, *Nation and identity*, pp. 21–9; Woolf, *Nationalism in Europe*, pp. 13–14.
[13] W. Stubbs, *The constitutional history of England* (Oxford, 1874–8), 3 vols.
[14] T. B. Macaulay, *The history of England from the accession of James II* (London, 1882, 2nd edn), vol. I, p. 13; G. M. Trevelyan, *A history of England* (London, 1926), p. xviii. See also E. A. Freeman, *The history of the Norman Conquest: its causes and its results* (Oxford, 1877), 6 vols.; J. R. Green, *A short history of the English people* (London, 1895, 2nd edn).
[15] J. W. Burrow, *A liberal descent: Victorian historians and the English past* (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 2–5; L. Georgianna, 'Coming to terms with the Norman Conquest: nationalism and English literary history', *REAL: yearbook of research in English and American literature* (1998), pp. 33–42.

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shared a fundamental belief in the historical unity and greatness of the English nation, evident from its earliest times.

This also helps to explain the rather ambiguous view afforded of the medieval period by Victorian historians, particularly in respect of the Norman Conquest. Norman rule was often portrayed as a temporary aberration, during which time the English were oppressed as a subject race.[16] Even so, the contribution of the Normans to English national development also had to be acknowledged, and the Conquest was usually portrayed as ultimately beneficial to England. The Normans, it was argued, had provided discipline, administrative efficiency and a greater sense of national unity, and thus laid the foundations for the re-emergence of a refined, strengthened English identity by the thirteenth century.[17] This, some argued, was evident in the creation of Magna Carta and, later, under Edward I, a king described by the popular Victorian historian J. R. Green as 'English to the core'.[18] Different interpretations of the Norman Conquest were also central to the infamous debate between the historians E. A. Freeman and J. H. Round in the late nineteenth century, as Round attacked Freeman's romanticised view of Anglo-Saxon kings and political institutions and argued in favour of the 'strong, purposeful monarchy' brought in by the Normans.[19] Yet the teleological perspective of Whig historians also meant that the medieval period was seen only as an early step along the road towards the nation-state. Although Stubbs lauded the rise of the Commons in parliament during the middle ages, he and other historians viewed the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as a time of decline and civil war, and variously credited the break with Rome, Elizabethan government and the Parliamentarians of the seventeenth century with a more central role in national development.[20]

Since at least 1945, however, such self-confident, nationalistic history-writing has been increasingly challenged, despite its survival in works of popular history.[21] This retreat of Whig history in England was in

[16] E.g. Green, *Short history*, pp. 63–4; Freeman, *History of the Norman Conquest*, vol. I, p. 2; Macaulay, *History of England*, pp. 9–10.

[17] E.g. Trevelyan, *A history of England*, p. 132, for the argument that the English were 'trodden under foot only to be trodden into shape' by the Conquest. See also Burrow, *A liberal descent*, pp. 139–47; Georgianna, 'Coming to terms with the Norman Conquest', pp. 36–9.

[18] Green, *Short history*, p. 181.

[19] J. H. Round, *Feudal England* (London, 1909), p. 317. See M. Chibnall, *The debate on the Norman Conquest* (Manchester, 1999), pp. 59–63, quoting Round at p. 62.

[20] E.g. Stubbs, *Constitutional history of England*, vol. II, pp. 158–304, cf. vol. III, p. 2; Green, *Short history*, pp. 271–303. For the influence of this view on modern textbooks, e.g. Schulze, *States, nations and nationalism*, p. 123, cf. comments in C. Carpenter, *The Wars of the Roses: politics and the constitution in England, c. 1437–1509* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 6–10.

[21] E.g. A. L. Rowse, *The spirit of English history* (London, 1943); A. Bryant, *The story of England: makers of the realm* (London, 1953), cf. H. Butterfield, *The Whig interpretation of history* (London, 1931). See also comments in C. Carpenter, 'Political and constitutional history: before and after McFarlane',

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large measure influenced by a broader reaction against nationalist ideology, as two world wars made it clear that the doctrine had frequently brought about precisely the opposite of the worldwide peace for which Enlightenment thinkers had hoped. One result of such disillusionment was a substantial rejection of nationalist history, as academics sought to shake off the association between history and nationalism by demonstrating the latter to be a modern development, rather than a natural, perennial feature of human society. Hence, in 1960, Elie Kedourie began his polemical critique of Arab nationalism in the Middle East with the claim that 'nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century', a sentiment echoed in countless textbooks up to the present day.[22] This ideological volte-face was reinforced by the concurrent emergence of new approaches to history, which challenged traditional nationalist readings. Particularly notable in this respect was the attempt of political scientists, sometimes with a Marxist agenda, to expose nationalist ideology as a modern fabrication, promoted by the elite to legitimate their rule and conceal class divisions.[23] It was in this context that the political philosopher and sociologist Ernst Gellner famously argued that nationalism 'is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist'.[24] According to this interpretation, nationalism arose not from Enlightenment political thought, but from material forces such as industrialisation and capitalism, and government bureaucracy, which used mass communication and education to propagate a sense of corporate, national identity. All of these developments were located by Gellner firmly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in a definitively 'modern' society.[25] In such an explanatory model, consequently, Gellner had to insist on the modernity of the nation, not only to discredit nationalist ideology, but also to maintain the internal logic of his own understanding of history.

Scholars, however, have varied in their chronology and models of causation regarding the rise of nationalism and nations, even while agreeing on their modernity. The French revolution is sometimes cited as a turning point, with its combination of a voluntaristic, political nation-state with cultural, involuntary elements, such as myths of ancient origins and

in R. H. Britnell and A. J. Pollard (eds.), *The McFarlane legacy: studies in late medieval politics and society* (Stroud, 1995), pp. 177–85.

[22] Kedourie, *Nationalism*, p. 1.

[23] E.g. P. Corrigan and D. Sayer, *The great arch: English state formation as cultural revolution* (Oxford, 1985); E. Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780: programme, myth and reality* (Cambridge, 1990), *passim* esp. pp. 14–18, 101–30.

[24] E. Gellner, *Thought and change* (London, 1964), p. 169.

[25] E. Gellner, *Nations and nationalism* (Oxford, 1983), esp. pp. 5, 19–43, 62–87.

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natural frontiers.[26] Benedict Anderson, on the other hand, located the crucial transition in the sixteenth century. He argued that it was in this period that the power of the old forces ordering society, namely the international church (also the bugbear of Protestant Whig historians) and dynastic monarchy, was dissolved by forces of mass communication and commerce that he described as 'print-capitalism'. Before this, Anderson claimed, national identity was not a meaningful, or even a possible, category of thought.[27] Central to Anderson's thesis was his definition of the nation as an 'imagined political community'. According to this model, a nation is created when a group of people who have never met, but who inhabit a particular territory and political system, share a sense of comradeship based on their belief in a collective national history and culture.[28] In contrast to Gellner, who saw the inventedness of nations as making them false, even illegitimate, Anderson's concept of the 'imagined community' of the nation focused not on judgements about authenticity, but rather on how the nation was conceptualised by its inhabitants.[29] Yet what all of these ideologically and methodologically diverse approaches share is an agreement that not only nationalism, but also the nation itself, was a product of modernity.

The impact of these developments on the medieval historiography of the later twentieth century was profound. As the Scottish historian G. W. S. Barrow put it in 1980: 'The last two generations of medieval scholars… have been so anxious to correct the false romantic nationalism of the nineteenth century that the very idea of nationalism in the middle ages has become one of our most rigidly observed taboos.'[30] Medieval historians became so concerned to avoid association with nationalist doctrine and its Whiggish connotations that the very discussion of national identity in the middle ages was regarded as potentially ideologically suspect. If anything, this determination by historians to dissociate history from a nationalist agenda intensified during the 1990s, in response to the rise of racism and ethnocentrism in European politics following the fall of communism, notably the bloody conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and USSR and the resurgence of the far right in western Europe. This has prompted medievalists to denounce as misleading the parallels drawn by some contemporary politicians between modern ethnic groups and the

[26] E.g. H. Kohn, *The idea of nationalism: a study of its origins and background* (New York, 1944), p. 10; Woolf, *Nationalism in Europe*, pp. 10, 26.
[27] B. Anderson, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism* (London, 1991, 2nd edn), pp. 16–22, 36–46.
[28] Anderson, *Imagined communities*, pp. 4–7.
[29] For a similar approach, see also E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.), *The invention of tradition* (Cambridge, 1983); R. Samuel and P. Thompson, *The myths we live by* (London, 1990).
[30] G. W. S. Barrow, *The Anglo-Norman era in Scottish history* (Oxford, 1980), p. 148.

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peoples of early medieval Europe as a way to legitimate their own ethnocentrist policies. Hence the well-known comments of Patrick Geary, in his tellingly entitled book *The myth of nations: the medieval origins of Europe*, that nationalist history-writing since the nineteenth century 'has turned our understanding of the past into a toxic waste dump, filled with the poison of ethnic nationalism', which it is the urgent moral duty of historians to clean up.[31] Yet the response of medievalists such as Geary to nationalist historiography has not been an outright denial of the existence of nations and national identity in the middle ages. In fact, as noted above, scholarly work on medieval Europe over the past two decades has been marked by an increasingly vocal defence of medieval concepts of nationhood, and a concern that the baby of medieval national identity was in danger of being thrown out with the bathwater of discredited nationalist ideology. This resurgence of interest in medieval nationhood has, however, been accompanied by a concurrent desire to maintain a dissociation between historiography and nationalist ideology, by applying methodologies that distance newer analyses of the medieval nation from older, nationalist readings of history – ironically, often by using conceptual tools borrowed from social and political scientists who themselves insist on the modernity of the nation.

Developments in social sciences and anthropology have proved particularly useful to this ideological rehabilitation of pre-modern nationhood. This has been most obvious in respect of changing concepts of race and ethnicity over the past half-century. Since the mid-twentieth century, the idea of race as an objective, biologically determined basis for national character has been viewed as both scientifically and ideologically flawed. Instead, it is argued, group cohesion is better understood in terms of belief in a shared ancestry, which, although usually fictional, leads to observable common cultural traits by which the group can be identified.[32] This has been accompanied by a semantic shift as the ideologically loaded vocabulary of 'race' has been replaced by the terminology of 'ethnicity'.[33] Consequently, it has become easier for historians to talk about pre-modern cultural manifestations of nationhood without importing

[31] P. J. Geary, *The myth of nations: the medieval origins of Europe* (Princeton, 2002), p. 15.

[32] E.g. R. Bartlett, 'Medieval and modern concepts of race and ethnicity', *Journal of medieval and early modern studies*, 31 (2001), pp. 39–42; A. D. Smith, *The ethnic origins of nations* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 12–18; A. D. Smith, *National identity* (London, 1991), pp. 19–22.

[33] Although the terminology of 'race' is still used by social scientists to describe the social consequences of being classed as 'black', 'white', etc., as in 'race relations' in the USA or South Africa. In other words, 'race' is now often defined as a social construct, rather than the belief that a group's social and behaviourial qualities are actually biologically determined. See S. Fenton, *Ethnicity: racism, class and culture* (Basingstoke, 1999), pp. 1–4, 61–2, 66–9; S. Fenton, *Ethnicity* (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 25–42.

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unhelpful presuppositions about 'race' into the discussion. Related to this is the view that ethnic identity is constantly evolving rather than fixed and unchanging. This idea has been emphasised by several early medieval historians, including Geary, who argue that ethnic identity in post-Roman Europe (as at other times) was not rigidly defined but shifting and unstable. They argue that, through a process of 'ethnogenesis', peoples in this period were formed from polyethnic military and political groups, who forged fictive but coherent identities through strategies such as the adoption of law codes, customs or old tribal names. These ideas have been particularly influential among German scholars keen to discredit the nineteenth-century model of a primordial 'Germanic culture' and its more sinister mid-twentieth-century associations.[34]

The medievalist who appropriates the terminology of ethnicity still runs the risk of misinterpretation if terms are not carefully defined. Modern sociological analyses of national identity tend to be based on carefully constructed definitions of the differences between the 'ethnic community', 'nation' and 'nation-state'. Although there is little agreement as to precisely where the boundaries between these different categories lie, all tend to share a strongly modernist definition of the nation. According to such models, the nation and nation-state are viewed as modern developments, to be distinguished from a mere 'ethnic community' by certain hallmarks of modernity, such as a more formal political and territorial dimension, often encompassing more than one ethnic group.[35] Consequently, this is often linked to a reluctance to see medieval ethnic groups as 'nations'. This is not to say that pre-modern ethnic units have been entirely ignored. The political theorist A. D. Smith, in particular, has argued that pre-modern 'ethnic bases' laid the foundations for the later development of some modern nation-states, although he stresses the historically contingent nature of this process.[36] Others are reluctant even to go this far, and emphasise the discontinuities between modern and pre-modern concepts of nationhood that might at first sight be concealed by similarities in terminology.[37] In fact, many medievalists would

[34] E.g. P. Amory, *People and identity in Ostrogothic Italy, 489–554* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. xiv, 14–18, 34–8; Geary, *The myth of nations*; P. Geary, 'Ethnic identity as a situational construct in the early middle ages', *Medieval perspectives*, 3 (1988); W. Pohl (ed.), *Strategies of distinction: the construction of ethnic communities, 300–800* (Leiden, 1998), pp. 1–4, 10, 17–22. See also Smith, *National identity*, pp. 19–38.

[35] E.g. A. Hastings, *The construction of nationhood: ethnicity, religion and nationalism* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 3–4, 29–30; L. Johnson, 'Imagining communities', in Forde, Johnson and Murray, *Concepts of national identity*, pp. 6–13; Smith, *National identity*, pp. 13–23.

[36] Smith, *Ethnic origins*, pp. 129–73; Smith, *National identity*, pp. 39–42, 59–61, 71. See also J. Armstrong, *Nations before nationalism* (Chapel Hill, 1982), pp. 283–98.

[37] E.g. J. Breuilly, 'Changes in the political uses of the nation: continuity or discontinuity?', in Scales and Zimmer, *Power and the nation*, pp. 67–93.

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be the first to acknowledge that there is no necessary causal link between medieval nations and modern nation-states; it is, indeed, one of the most significant means by which scholars of medieval nationhood can dissociate their project from the Whiggish grand narratives of the past.[38]

This refusal to draw straight lines from medieval ideas about nationhood to modern nationalisms has been accompanied by a conviction that national identity in the middle ages needs to be investigated on its own terms, rather than trying to shoehorn medieval concepts of nationhood into modernist definitions. Again, the conceptual tools for the task have been borrowed from social and political science, notably the enthusiastic appropriation by medievalists of Benedict Anderson's notion of the nation as an 'imagined political community', despite his own rejection of the idea of nationhood in the middle ages.[39] This is not a new idea to medievalists; as early as 1984, Susan Reynolds suggested that the medieval nation should be seen not just in terms of its institutions, but also as 'a product of its members' belief that it exists'.[40] The adoption of Anderson's model by medievalists from the mid-1990s gave this idea greater conceptual ballast, as the usefulness of his approach became evident. As with the shift from the theory of 'race' to that of 'ethnicity', Anderson's focus on the 'imagined' quality of past beliefs about group identity has enabled historians to describe pre-modern ideas about nationhood without the implication that they themselves adhere to a nationalist ideology. By acknowledging the fictive and contingent aspects of the medieval evidence, even while taking them seriously as cultural phenomena, historians have been able to move away from teleological nationalist historiography without dismissing medieval concepts of nationhood as modern fabrications. As one historian of pre-modern Russian identity has put it, the concern is with 'the authenticity of perception rather than with the objectivity of the historical analysis implied by that perception'.[41] In addition, an Andersonian focus on perceptions of nationhood has reinforced the contention of medieval historians that these medieval 'imaginings' need not necessarily fit modernist criteria in order to have validity.[42] Rather,

[38] For discussion, see Scales and Zimmer, *Power and the nation*, pp. 13–19.

[39] E.g. Johnson, 'Imagining communities'; P. C. Ingham, *Sovereign fantasies: Arthurian romance and the making of Britain* (Philadelphia, 2001), pp. 7–9; Lavezzo, *Imagining a medieval English nation*; Turville-Petre, *England the nation*.

[40] S. Reynolds, *Kingdoms and communities in western Europe, 900–1300* (Oxford, 1984), p. 253.

[41] S. Franklin, 'The invention of Rus(sia)(s): some remarks on the modern perceptions of continuity and discontinuity', in A. P. Smyth (ed.), *Medieval Europeans: studies in ethnic identity and national perspectives in medieval Europe* (Basingstoke, 1998), pp. 180–93, quote at p. 184. Franklin does not cite Anderson's model, but takes a similar approach.

[42] E.g. R. R. Davies, 'The peoples of Britain and Ireland, 1100–1400: 1. identities', *TRHS*, 6th series, 4 (1994), pp. 3–4; H. M. Thomas, *The English and the Normans: ethnic hostility, assimilation and identity, 1066–c. 1220* (Oxford, 2003), p. 17.

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