1

Introduction

In May 2002 Jean-Marie Le Pen shocked the world by making it to the second round of the French presidential election. In that second round of voting, Le Pen received six million votes – 18 percent of the ballots cast – an unusually high number for the candidate of an overtly xenophobic party in a mature democracy. No doubt there was some truth to explanations that attributed Le Pen's first-round triumph to the fragmentation of the electoral field among a record sixteen candidates. Similarly, structural, economic, and social factors also surely played a role in his success. The themes of unemployment, immigration, and crime on which the Front National (FN) has campaigned for three decades now have incontestably emerged as the issues of greatest concern to French voters. In turn, the advent of similar sociostructural problems in other European countries has brought many analysts to view the FN as part of a broader, pan-European resurgence of the radical Right.

Yet, there is more to the present electoral success of the FN than the coincidence of rising unemployment with large non-European immigrant populations in Western European societies. These factors tell only half the story. If the FN is to be seen as part of a European-wide trend, how does one explain that its emergence predated that of radical right-wing parties in other European countries by at least a decade? Similarly, if its rise was attributable simply to economic factors, why did the FN remain popular through the boom period of the1990s? And why did antisystem parties of the radical Left, which explicitly campaign on socioeconomic issues, not achieve the same electoral success? Likewise, why did support for the FN continue to increase even as the French immigrant population stagnated or even declined?[1] Subtending these explanations is the notion that the FN represents an exception or aberration in contemporary French political life.

[1] Census figures show that the proportion of immigrants in the total population has not substantially changed since the mid-1970s, remaining essentially steady at 7.4% of the total population from 1975 to 1999. This invalidates the direct causal relationship inferred by many researchers between the FN's rise and immigration, since it was not until the mid-1980s, that is, over a decade after the great wave of immigration the country experienced from 1956 to 1973, that Le Pen's party rose to political prominence. Similarly, the previous period of large-scale immigration, lasting through the

Even those accounts that highlight its continuities with previous radical right-wing movements in France emphasize its anachronistic and unnatural character.

I would submit that the rise of the FN represents the reestablishment of the radical Right in its traditionally influential role within French politics. As a function of its pattern of social and political modernization, the country developed a peculiar class structure in which certain groups became significant sources of support for the radical Right. In addition to presenting socioeconomic interests and anxieties, these groups evolved particular cultural traits that disposed them favorably to it.

The foregoing suggests that prevailing theoretical interpretations inadequately account for the periodic – even cyclical – evanescence of radical right-wing movements and parties in the country since the advent of republican rule in 1875. These interpretations fall into one of two theoretical schools, each of which presents its own particular shortcomings. The first is the historical school, which identifies the ideological, programmatic, and discursive features of successive radical right-wing movements and describes their principals and rank-and-file members. These are situated in a coherent, autochthonous political tradition extending more or less far back in French history.[2] In their focus on the internal characteristics of radical right-wing movements and, in particular,

1920s and reaching a peak of 6.6% of the population in 1931, did not coincide with a surge of the radical Right. It was only in the following decade, as immigration rates paradoxically fell off, that radical right-wing movements gained political traction. Jacques Barou, "Immigration. Grandes tendances," in *L'état de la France. Un panorama unique et complet de la France 2005–2006*, ed. S. Cordellier and E. Lau (Paris: La Découverte, 2005), 39–40; Fabienne Daguet and Suzanne Thave, "La population immigrée. Le résultat d'une longue histoire," *INSEE Première*, no. 458 (June 1996), 1–4; and Gérard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity*, trans. G. de Laforcade (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

[2] This historical school subsumes a number of approaches and emphases. Some interpretations, for example, link the French radical Right to distinct political-philosophical traditions. For works that seek to tie it to fascism, see the trilogy by Zeev Sternhell, *Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Fayard, 2000), *La droite révolutionnaire, 1885–1914. Les origines françaises du fascisme* (Paris: Seuil, 1978), and *Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France*, trans. D. Maisel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Robert Soucy, *Fascism in France: The Case of Maurice Barrès* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); and Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism*, trans. L. Vennewitz (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966). Others link it to political traditions that emerged in the wake of the French Revolution, such as Bonapartism and Legitimism. In this vein, see René Rémond, *The Right Wing in France: From 1815 to de Gaulle*, 2nd ed., trans. J. Laux (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969). A third strain situates the contemporary radical Right in a populist tradition dating back at least to the Second World War. See Jim Shields, *The Extreme Right in France from Pétain to Le Pen* (London: Routledge, 2007), and Catherine Fieschi, *Fascism, Populism and the French Fifth Republic* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). Others still have chosen to emphasize the philosophical, programmatic, and leadership continuities presented by successive movements of the French radical Right. Contributions in this vein include Peter Davies, *The Extreme Right in France, 1789 to the Present: From de Maistre to Le Pen* (London: Routledge, 2002); Edward J. Arnold, ed., *The Development of the Radical Right in France: From Boulanger to Le Pen* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); Michel Winock, *Nationalism, Anti-Semitism and Fascism in France*, trans. J. M. Todd (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia, *L'extrême droite en France. De Maurras à Le*

on the intellectual and organizational elites who led them, such accounts have little to say about why ordinary French people have been periodically attracted to these movements. Historical accounts make no systematic attempt to elucidate the social causes that underlay their historical formation or to specify the sociopolitical dynamics by which they respectively emerged. At one level, they fail to establish the relationship between the fortunes of the radical Right and long-term processes of social and economic modernization. Second, they neglect the proximate socioeconomic and sociopolitical factors that fueled its resurgence at particular historical junctures. In short, they pay insufficient attention to the conditions of political "demand" that determined the success of the radical Right over the past one and a quarter centuries.

The second major school into which studies of the latter fall is the political-institutional school. If historical approaches tend to excessively concentrate on continuities in ideology and personnel without paying adequate attention to the structural causes and contexts that governed the emergence of particular radical right-wing movements, political-institutional ones tend to almost exclusively focus on these second types of factors. This is particularly evident in many contemporary analyses of the Front National, which examine the party strictly on its own terms and dismiss comparison with anterior parties of the French radical Right.

A raft of political-institutional approaches to studying the radical Right has emerged, particularly in its contemporary guise. The first, deriving from the field of electoral sociology, seeks to determine the "ecological" (class, religious, educational, income) attributes and strategic motivations (whether people vote in protest or for sincere ideological or interest-based reasons) of the FN's electorate. These are then related back to adverse developments affecting contemporary French society, such as structural unemployment, rising crime rates, and especially the presence of a large non-European immigrant minority.[3] Such factors are correlated with the sociological characteristics of the typical FN voter in order to explain his or her electoral choices. In a variant of this argument, the electoral impact of these sociostructural factors is magnified by the particularities of the

Pen (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 1996); Winock, ed., *Histoire de l'extrême droite en France* (Paris: Seuil, 1993); Jean-Yves Camus and René Monzat, *Les droites nationales en France* (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1992); and Pierre Milza, *Fascisme français, passé et présent* (Paris: Flammarion, 1987).

[3] Contributions in this vein include Nonna Mayer, "Pourquoi votent-ils pour le Front national?" *Pouvoirs*, no. 55 (1990), 163–81, "Du vote lepéniste au vote frontiste," *Revue française de science politique* 47(3–4) (1997), 438–53, and *Ces Français qui votent Le Pen* (Paris: Flammarion, 2002); Pascal Perrineau, *Le vote de crise* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1995), *Le symptôme Le Pen. Radiographie des électeurs du Front National* (Paris: Fayard, 1997), and *Le vote incertain: les elections régionales de 1998* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1999); Pierre Bréchon, "The National Front in France: Emergence of an Extreme Right Protest Movement," *Comparative Politics* 25(1) (1992), 63–82; Colette Ysmal, Philippe Habert, and P. Perrineau, eds., *Le vote sanction: les élections législatives des 21 et 28 mars 1993* (Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1993); Jonathan Marcus, *The National Front and French Politics: The Resistible Rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen* (New York: New York University Press, 1995); Mayer and Perrineau, eds., *Le Front National à découvert* (Paris: Presses de la FSNP, 1989); and Ysmal and Perrineau, eds., *Le vote de tous les refus: les élections présidentielle et législatives 2002* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2002).

French political system. For example, in the late1980s, the FN's rise was broadly imputed to the Socialists' introduction of proportional representation in order to divide the Right before the 1986 legislative elections. The result was that it was able to break onto the national political stage and assume a degree of visibility and prominence that it was never again to lose.

In both its sociostructural and political institutional variants, the FN vote is portrayed in these electoral sociological accounts as essentially a protest against current political institutions and elites, who are held to be unresponsive to voters' needs and concerns.[4] Yet neither stands up very well to empirical scrutiny, because sociostructural factors such as immigration and economic performance in and of themselves are not reliable predictors of the FN's popularity. Similarly, it is impossible to view the FN's rise as simply the byproduct of the introduction of proportional representation before the 1986 parliamentary elections because, had this been the case, the FN would have fallen back into obscurity once a first-past-the-post system was restored before the 1988 elections. Thus, although they are clearly part of the picture, these factors are better seen as intervening rather than causal variables in the party's emergence.

A second political-institutional approach analyzes the FN from a comparative perspective, conceiving of its rise as part of a broader trend toward the radical Right evident across a number of Western European democracies.[5] It attempts to elucidate the common sociostructural, economic, and political features that

[4] These sociostructural analyses are often accompanied by social psychological theories of authoritarianism to explain the present-day appeal of the radical Right. They take for granted the fact that, in the presence of socioeconomic insecurity, rising crime rates, and large numbers of nonwhite immigrants, growing numbers of Frenchmen evince an "authoritarian personality," which politically translates into support for the FN. At a proximate level of causality, such behavioralist accounts may well be accurate, but they have next to nothing to say about why certain groups of voters are more disposed to this kind of authoritarian reaction than others are, or why it was the FN that was most successful in politically harnessing their latent authoritarianism. Totally absent from the analysis is any consideration of the long-standing historical influence of the radical Right in shaping voters' political preferences and causing them to adopt authoritarian orientations. For accounts of the contemporary radical Right that deploy this concept of authoritarian personality, see Piero Ignazi, "Un nouvel acteur politique," and H. Lagrange and P. Perrineau, "Le syndrome lepéniste," in Mayer and Perrineau, *Front National à découvert*, specifically 69–70 and 236–9; and P. Perrineau, "The Conditions for the Re-emergence of an Extreme Right-Wing in France: The National Front, 1984–98," in Arnold, *Development of the Radical Right in France*, 266. For the original formulation of the concept, see T. Adorno, E. Fraenkel-Brunswick, D. Levinson, and R. Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1950). For a revised and updated formulation, see Paul Sniderman, *Personality and Democratic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

[5] Cf. P. Ignazi, "The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypothesis on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe," *European Journal of Political Research* 22(1) (July 1992), 3–34; Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall, eds., *The New Politics of the Right* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Jean-Yves Camus, *Les extrémismes en Europe: état des lieux en 1998* (La Tour d'Aigues: Éd. de l'Aube, 1998); Pascal Perrineau, ed., *Les croisés de la société fermée: l'Europe des extrêmes droites* (La Tour d'Aigues:

hold across countries in which strong radical right-wing parties exist in order to explain their roughly simultaneous emergence within them. Most often, these parties are portrayed as the byproducts of sweeping sociocultural changes and the ensuing transformation of political competition in Western European countries as a result of their shift from a manufacturing-based industrial economy to a services-based postindustrial economy.[6] According to one variation of this argument, the processes of social fragmentation and individualization occasioned by this societal transition have eroded the communal ties and modes of social integration that underpinned political arrangements in industrial society, thereby undermining people's trust in those arrangements.[7] Alternatively, others have argued that the emergence of left-libertarian values in concert with the postindustrial transformation of society generated reactionary neoconservative values, which have been successfully repackaged by various European radical right-wing parties.[8]

A common thread running through these analyses of the contemporary radical Right is that the political landscapes of the advanced Western democracies have been fundamentally transformed by their transition from an industrial to a postindustrial form of society. This transformation is held to have opened up a space in the structures of political competition, which radical right-wing parties have been quick to occupy. Implicit in this spatial conception of contemporary European politics is the assumption that social classes have diminished in importance as a factor of political aggregation in postindustrial society, thereby transforming traditional class-based parties into catchall political formations seeking to broaden their appeal among all segments of the electorate.[9] Accordingly, formerly class-based parties are believed

Éd. de l'Aube, 2001); and Pierre-André Taguieff, ed., *Le retour du populisme: un défi pour les démocraties européennes* (Paris: Universalis, 2004). For a more sociologically grounded comparative study, see Michel Wieviorka, ed., *Racisme et xénophobie en Europe* (Paris: La Découverte, 1994).

[6] In this connection, see the contributions of Daniel Bell, Alain Touraine, Michel Crozier, and Herbert Marcuse, the first technocratic theorists to identify this fundamental evolution in the workings of the capitalist economy and to analyze its social and political implications: Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Touraine, *The Post-Industrial Society: Tomorrow's Social History; Classes, Conflicts and Culture in a Programmed Society*, trans. L. Mayhew (New York: Random House, 1971); Crozier, *The Stalled Society* (New York: Viking Press, 1973); and Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

[7] Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, chs. 2 and 6. See also Michael Minkenberg, *Die neue radikale Rechte im Vergleich: USA, Frankreich, Deutschland* (Opladen: Westdeutscher 1998), and "The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and Antimodernity," *Government and Opposition* 35(2) (2000), 170–88.

[8] Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe*, ch. 2, particularly pp. 57–8, and Ignazi, "The Silent Counter-Revolution," 18–19. For a discussion of the causes and consequences of the emergence of left-libertarian values with the advent of a new 'postmaterialist' politics, see Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

[9] Ignazi, "The Silent Counter-Revolution," 1–6; Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe*, 14–19; and Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, 27–9, 36–41, and 174–80.

to have moved to the center of the political spectrum, effectively delinking voters from their traditional partisan attachments and thus ushering in a heightened electoral volatility among them. Leaving them increasingly dissatisfied with the choices offered to them as consumers in the electoral marketplace, this process supposedly translated voters' democratic disillusionment with mainstream political parties. Such partisan fragmentation created electoral openings on the extremes of the political spectrum, which both the radical Left and radical Right were well positioned to fill.[10] In short, the rise of the FN is seen to reflect the general "crisis of representation" resulting from the fragmentation of the French party system since the early 1980s.

There are significant problems with this postmaterialist politics argument, however. For one thing, it is unable to account for why radical left-wing or left-libertarian parties have failed to achieve the same degree of political popularity as parties of the radical Right. This incongruity is particularly striking in France, where parties that correspond to these appellations, the Greens and Trotskyist formations such as Lutte ouvrière and the Ligue communiste révolutionnaire, have remained endemically weak. A second question, with broader application, concerns why parties of the radical Right have failed to take root in other advanced capitalist nations, since the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial society is held to have similar political consequences in a substantial number of them. This has been particularly evident in the case of the Anglo-Saxon countries and, most notably, the United States. As the most advanced postindustrial society and economy, the United States would presumably best embody the political attributes imputed to the latter group. Instead, the failure of radical right-wing parties to take hold in these countries suggests that other, noninstitutional factors are at work.

More generally, the electoral success of the FN cannot simply be attributed to a crisis of representation reflecting the dysfunction of the French political system. Such an explanation mistakes the effect for the cause, the breakdown in political representation representing the symptom of a deeper societal crisis that has outstripped the capacity of the party system to give voice to the discontent that pervades the country today. Indeed, the FN might well be regarded as a logical institutional response to this crisis, proof of the continuing capacity of the political system to provide a voice to the discontented. However, the root

[10] On the dynamic of political dealignment imputed to the postindustrial transformation of contemporary European societies, see R. Inglehart, *The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages among West European Elites and Publics*, EUI Working Paper, no. 32 (Florence, 1982); and Russell Dalton, Scott Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck, *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment and Dealignment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). On the growing disillusionment of French voters with the choices open to them within the electoral marketplace and their resulting turn to the radical Right, see P. Perrineau, ed., *Le désenchantement démocratique* (La Tour d'Aigues: Ed. de l'Aube, 2003); and Pippa Norris, *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

cause of their discontent lies elsewhere, at a more elemental structural and cultural level. As Michel Wieviorka has observed,

> If [the FN's] populism expresses a crisis of the political parties, it is that the latter give the impression of no longer being able to effectively process social demands. The political elites in this country are seen as a more or less corrupt clique, offering neither convictions nor projects for the future, driven by a thirst for money and personal power, and disconnected from the day-to-day realities of French people [and] unaware of their actual problems . . . numerous are those for whom the political system has ceased being representative and capable of fulfilling their aspirations and addressing their claims . . ., fuel[ing] the widespread feeling that the state is unable to communicate with the society and to manage its diversity. . . . However, such an analysis has its limits. . . . On the one hand, it fails to specify the principle of causality at work and to account for the how and the why of this crisis of the political system and of the state. On the other hand, it misses an important dimension of the populist phenomenon which, while it is profoundly reactive, also offers a means of interpreting social and political realities, simultaneously testifying to a loss of meaning and the attempt to compensate for this loss by reconstituting new forms of identification to orient political discourse and action.[11]

Most recently, there has been a movement away from broad sociostructural and institutional explanations that detail the political opportunity structure of the FN toward refocusing the analysis onto the party itself. Writing in this vein, some scholars have called for studying the party's internal discursive and organizational capacities in capturing the support of discontented voters and transforming them into a loyal base of support – namely its continued ability to disseminate its nativist ideology as a function of the persistence of a large, non-European immigrant presence in France as well as the dynamics of global economic competition and European integration.[12] Thus, the interpretive cycle has come full circle, with immigration returning to the fore of scholarly debate on the French and European Radical right.

Yet, by shunning the broader sociostructural and cultural context and focusing instead on the FN's discursive and organizational capabilities, internal supply-side explanations are unable to satisfactorily account for variations in the party's electoral fortunes over its thirty-seven-year history. Though its organizational and propagandistic capacities were certainly not as evolved in the 1970s compared to what they would become in the 1980s and 1990s, it seems far-fetched to assume that the party's breakthrough and subsequent consolidation had nothing to do with the social costs engendered by the fundamental transformation of the French economy during the 1980s and 1990s as a result of intensifying global competition and deepening European integration.

[11] Michel Wieviorka, "Les bases du national-populisme," *Le débat*, no. 61 (Sept.–Oct. 1990), 36–7.
[12] Cf. Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

Finally, and more broadly, these various institutional approaches implicitly or explicitly assume that the FN and the radical right-wing movements that preceded it respectively derived from incommensurable social realities obviating any meaningful comparison between them. Consequently, little analytical importance is accorded to the radical Right as a coherent political tradition capable of influencing voters' preferences through its ideology and program. Along similar lines, no serious attempt has been made to tie the FN to previous formations of the French radical Right as a function of its ideological attractiveness to certain social or class groups. Thus, in contrast to historical analyses that overlook the conditions of political "demand" underlying the radical Right's appeal, such political-institutional approaches neglect the conditions of political "supply" attending its resurgence.

The purpose of this study is to move beyond this interpretive imbalance and show how these various factors of political supply and demand related to and articulated with one another in order to account for the radical Right's periodic political breakthroughs in France. Chiefly, it seeks to explain how its ideology and discourse expressed the hopes and harnessed the anxieties of certain class groups within French society, in particular those who lost out from the processes of economic modernization and saw their political capacity to halt their decline progressively diminish. As their social and political identities disintegrated under the impacts of the country's economic and social transformation, these groups latched onto alternative forms of collective identification through which they could sustain their sense of corporative worth. In modern industrial France, it was more often than not the radical Right that was able to supply a coherent sense of identity and purpose to these groups in crisis.

However, before one can show how such an outcome came about, a few remarks are in order regarding the continuing salience of class as an object of political analysis and of the importance of the political value and belief systems – in essence, the political cultures – that attach to it.

TOWARD A CLASS-CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH RADICAL RIGHT

Current political scientific analyses of the French radical Right suffer from two main theoretical weaknesses: the inadequacy of the postindustrial conception of society and the model of postmaterialist politics that such accounts take for granted, and the simplistic conception of political interest and action they assume. The portrayal of the Front National as a byproduct of the advent of a postindustrial society in France is contradicted by a substantial body of evidence that suggests that the social and political impact of this shift has been dramatically overstated. Chiefly, the assumption that class identification would decline in importance as a basis of political aggregation in postindustrial society has not been borne out. Despite the growth of service-sector employment and the rise in the general level of affluence, class conflict persists in

advanced capitalist societies, along with its related modes of sociopolitical structuration.[13]

Those opposed to abandoning the concept of class in political analysis convincingly argue that the advent of a service-based postindustrial economy has not only generated a more complex class structure but also tended to preserve, if not widen, socioeconomic divides between social classes.[14] Citing a variety of indicators of class inequality such as earning and wealth disparities among social groups, the continuing preeminence of property as a basis of social differentiation, and the persistence of low social mobility, these authors show that class divisions remain as entrenched in contemporary postindustrial society as they were in industrial society.[15] First and foremost, they point to the growing underclasses in advanced capitalist societies to confute the argument that class no longer matters within them.[16] On the contrary, the ongoing differentiation of economic roles as well as persisting material and status differences among occupational groups "suggest conclusions about the impending death of class are premature."[17]

The persistence of class structuration within advanced capitalist societies invalidates the thesis of "de-alignment" or "unfreezing" of class-based political cleavages that has been advanced by many contemporary social scientists.[18] As

[13] By structuration is meant, *pace* Anthony Giddens, the process whereby "economic classes," as defined by the "market capacities" of their members, "are transformed into 'social classes'" that present common material, political, and cultural attributes and affinities. Giddens, *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), 105, 107.

[14] For contemporary Marxist perspectives that posit the continuing salience of class in advanced capitalist society, see Erik Olin Wright, *Classes* (London: Verso, 1985) and "Rethinking the Concept of Class Structure," in *The Debate on Classes*, ed. E. O. Wright (London: Verso, 1989), 269–348, as well as Mike Hout, Clem Brooks, and Jeff Manza, "The Persistence of Classes in Post-Industrial Societies," *International Sociology* 8(3) (Sept. 1993), 259–77. For non-Marxist perspectives, see Giddens, *Class Structure*; and John H. Goldthorpe and Gordon Marshall, "The Promising Future of Class Analysis: A Response to Recent Critiques," *Sociology* 26(3) (Aug. 1992), 381–400.

[15] Hout et al., "The Persistence of Classes in Post-Industrial Societies," 261–3; Goldthorpe and Marshall, "The Promising Future of Class Analysis," 387–90; Giddens, *Class Structure*, chs. 14 and 15. For specific examples of persisting and even worsening wealth disparities within various advanced capitalist societies, see Kevin Phillips, *The Politics of Rich and Poor: Wealth and the American Electorate in the Reagan Aftermath* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991); and John Gray, *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism* (New York: New Press, 1998), chs. 2 and 5.

[16] Giddens, *Class Structure*, 219–20, 289; Hout et al., "The Persistence of Classes in Post-Industrial Societies," 262–3; and Gray, *False Dawn*, 30, 42.

[17] Hout et al., "The Persistence of Classes in Post-Industrial Societies," 263.

[18] Contributions that take this position include Terry Nichols Clark and S. M. Lipset, "Are Social Classes Dying?" *International Sociology: Journal of the International Sociological Association* 6(4) (Dec. 1991), 397–410; S. M. Lipset, T. N. Clark, and Michael Rempel, "The Declining Significance of Social Class" *International Sociology* 8(3) (Sept. 1993), 293–316; Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters, "The Reshaping and Dissolution of Social Class in Advanced Society," *Theory and Society* 25(5) (Oct. 1996), 667–691; and Mattei Doggan, "Classe, religion, parti: triple déclin dans les clivages electoraux," *Revue internationale de politique comparée* 3(3) (Dec. 1996), 515–40.

with the "death of class" thesis advanced by postindustrial theorists, this model of political aggregation and competition does not stand up to empirical scrutiny. Electoral studies of Western European countries have demonstrated the persistence and stability of class-based political cleavages throughout the period equated with these countries' transitions to an advanced stage of capitalist development.[19] Similarly, it has been shown that the postmaterialist issues and values that are held to constitute novel sources of political aggregation in advanced capitalist societies continue to be conceived in terms of a traditionally class-based Left–Right antinomy.[20] In this sense, it would appear that the concept of social class is not as obsolete as postindustrial theorists would have us believe and that, to the contrary, it remains useful for analyzing processes of political aggregation and identification within advanced capitalist societies.

The failure of class divisions to disappear as a basis of social and political differentiation underscores the speciousness of the universal vision of a classless and technocratic society toward which postindustrial theorists project Western capitalist countries will converge. These have each evolved in their own ways, as a function of their own specific experiences of social modernization and the particular economic and political institutions that grew up within them. These societies have also developed distinctive class systems, which present their own structural particularities and degrees of political integration and conflict. Likewise, the institutional legacies of modernization also differ across advanced capitalist countries. As a function of these varying sociostructural and institutional outcomes, capitalist countries have developed distinctive political traditions, characterized by their own peculiar ideologies, movements, and rituals.

In turn, these varying outcomes of modernization raise the question of how macrosocial developments inform people's political behavior. Political-institutionalists conceive this relationship in terms of more or less explicitly self-interested models of political action according to which individual or collective actors pursue wealth, power, or other advantages as a basis of their political calculations and decisions. Such models come in two principal guises. First are

[19] Cf. Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), and Stefano Bartolini and Jeff Mair, *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates, 1885–1985* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For the original elaboration of the "freezing" thesis, see S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, ed. Lipset and Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967), 1–64.

[20] Cf. Paul Sniderman, Richard Brody, and Philip Tetlock, *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For a similar analysis pertaining to France, see Guy Michelat and Michel Simon, *Classe, religion et comportement politique* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1977), and "Déterminations socio-économiques, organisations symboliques et comportement électoral," *Revue française de sociologie* 26(1) (Jan. 1985), 32–69.