

EXPLAINING THE EVIDENCE

How do we make sense of complex evidence? What are the cognitive principles that allow detectives to solve crimes and lay people to puzzle out everyday problems? To address these questions, David Lagnado presents a novel perspective on human reasoning. At heart, we are causal thinkers driven to explain the myriad ways in which people behave and interact. We build mental models of the world, enabling us to infer patterns of cause and effect, linking words to deeds, actions to effects, and crimes to evidence. But building models is not enough; we need to evaluate these models against evidence, and we often struggle with this task. We have a knack for explaining, but less skill at evaluating. Fortunately, we can improve our reasoning by reflecting on inferential practices and using formal tools. This book presents a system of rational inference that helps us evaluate our models and make sounder judgments.

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How the Mind Investigates the World

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For Tracy

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Preface

The apartment was in the wildest disorder – the furniture broken and thrown about in all directions . . . On a chair lay a razor, besmeared with blood. On the hearth were two or three long and thick tresses of grey human hair, also dabbled in blood, and seeming to have been pulled out by the roots. Upon the floor were found . . . an earring of topaz, three large silver spoons . . . and two bags containing nearly four thousand francs in gold . . .

Of Madame L'Esplanade no traces were here seen; but an unusual quantity of soot being observed in the fire-place, a search was made in the chimney, and (horrible to relate!) the corpse of the daughter, head downward, was dragged therefrom; it having been forced up the narrow aperture for a considerable distance.

'The Murders in the Rue Morgue', Edgar Allan Poe (1841)

Who can resist a murder mystery? Whether it's a classic detective novel or a psychological thriller, we rise to the challenge of the whodunit, revelling in the twists and turns, the false leads and the surprise denouement. And despite their tragedy, we are fascinated by real-life crime stories, when evil characters do bad things to good people. In this book I will explore another mystery: how do we – with our limited-capacity minds – manage to tackle such puzzles? This mystery is remarkable but often passes unnoticed. We take our inferential skills for granted. But, if you stop to think, it's amazing that we can formulate – let alone solve – such complex problems. How do we generate hypotheses, weigh up evidence and draw sensible conclusions? How do we leap from a smattering of clues – a bloody razor, uprooted hair, a body shoved up a chimney – to conjure possible causes of a crime scene we have never witnessed before? Even the ability to come up with the *wrong* answer is a feat worthy of awe.

To see how the mind works its magic, we must look beneath the surface, at the cognitive machinery that impels us. Firstly, we are causal thinkers, driven to explain the myriad ways in which people (and things)

behave and interact. Who killed the daughter? Why was her body rammed up the chimney? Why was no money taken? To answer such questions we build *mental* models – crude models ‘in the mind’ that we can probe and manipulate, allowing us to explain what we have observed, to predict what happens next and to imagine how events might have been different. These models enable us to reason about intricate patterns of cause and effect, linking words to deeds, actions to effects and crimes to evidence. They allow us to dig deeper into human behaviour, helping us to understand rather than just describe what we witness.

But building models is not enough, especially if we are trying to solve a crime or find someone guilty. We need to support our models with evidence, and this adds another layer of complexity. We must evaluate how well the evidence fits our favoured account as compared to other possibilities and also assess the quality of the evidence itself. Who was the source of the blood? How reliable was the blood test? Can we trust what the witnesses say? How do we factor these concerns into our overall judgment? To make things even harder, those closely involved in a crime often have motive to deceive us. Is the accused giving an honest account or lying through his teeth?

Despite being adept at creating mental models to explain events, we find evaluating these models much harder. We can readily devise an elaborate story of how a suspect might have committed the crime and yet struggle to produce convincing evidence for this version of events. We have a knack for *explaining*, but less skill at *evaluating*. And sometimes a compelling narrative can outstrip the evidence, with disastrous consequences.

Fortunately, all is not lost. We can improve our reasoning, learning to evaluate our hypotheses with consistency and balance. And there are tools to support us. I will present a system of rational inference that can help us build better models and make sounder judgments.

Structure of the Book

I use crime investigation as a lens through which to explore the principles of evidential reasoning. My premise is that we use the same forms of reasoning, whether we are solving crimes, diagnosing diseases or dealing with everyday concerns. But I focus on legal cases because they provide engaging examples – where bad reasoning can have serious costs.

Each chapter starts with a different crime case, showing how investigators, legal experts or jurors have grappled with difficult and often contentious questions. The cases highlight important principles of reasoning

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which are not restricted to legal settings but apply to any sphere where people must use evidence to draw conclusions.

Chapter 1 traces a crime from the discovery of a body to the verdict of a court, exposing the challenges faced by decision-makers at each step of the process. How do we generate initial hypotheses from sparse information? How do we develop our hypotheses as we gather new evidence? How do we make sense of a large body of conflicting evidence to reach a final decision?

The next two chapters make the case for the critical role of causal models in reasoning. Chapter 2 focuses on the models we manipulate in our heads and on our impressive capacity to reason about new situations (even the terrible scene at Madame L'Espanaye's apartment!). But how do we know when our causal reasoning is good or bad? Chapter 3 introduces the causal modelling framework, showing us how to draw rational inferences from evidence. In Chapters 4 and 5 we look at how people reason and make judgments under uncertainty, with Chapter 4 focusing on people tackling small-scale problems in the lab and Chapter 5 switching to the expert reasoning of detectives solving murder cases.

Our focus then shifts to evidence evaluation. Chapter 6 looks at the legal concept of evidence, while Chapter 7 explores the subtleties that arise when people assess competing causes of the same evidence. Chapter 8 examines the strategies that people use to gather and interpret evidence, focusing on classic confirmation bias.¹ Chapter 9 then looks at how people construct stories to make sense of complex evidence, using the well-known Sally Clark case.

In Chapter 10, I present a Bayes net approach to modelling legal cases and suggest that this method could be used as a training tool to improve inferential reasoning in the legal domain. Note that this is a more technical chapter than the others and can be skipped by those not wanting the nitty-gritty details. But I do recommend reading the Agatha Christie story and looking at the proposed Bayes net.

Chapter 11 summarizes the key messages in the book by applying them to our thinking during the coronavirus crisis. I show how many of the concepts – from psychology and formal modelling – recur in expert and lay reasoning during the pandemic. I argue that the danger of jumping to

¹ Confirmation bias occurs when we gather and interpret evidence according to our prior expectations or preferences. Sometimes this is a reasonable strategy but in other contexts it can lead to biases. Again the murders at Rue Morgue provide a neat example. The police collect and evaluate evidence under the (very reasonable) assumption that the murderer is human. But in this peculiar case this assumption is misleading.

premature causal claims, without careful evidence evaluation, is particularly rife in situations of radical uncertainty. But causal thinking is also an essential tool for dealing with such crises.

Who Is This Book for?

This book is for anyone interested in evidential reasoning – how people reason about evidence and how this reasoning can be improved using formal models. Several disciplines are straddled in the book, so I hope it appeals to students from psychology, crime science, law, computer science and beyond. Ideally, I'd like to encourage the crossing of discipline boundaries: for example, introducing psychologists to legal decision-making, law students to causal modelling, and computer scientists to modelling of legal cases. More ambitiously, I hope the book might be of interest to expert decision-makers outside academia, such as crime investigators, forensic scientists and criminal lawyers.

The book is aimed at students and researchers, and I introduce all necessary technical concepts as the book progresses. It only presupposes some basic probability theory. I actually think that an introduction to causal modelling is a nice route into probabilistic thinking because (as I claim in the book) we are better attuned to causal rather than statistical reasoning. To accompany the book the website www.explainingtheevidence.com provides additional learning materials, including an introduction to probability theory and models of all the Bayes net examples to download and explore.

What This Book Does Not Cover

Human reasoning admits of many levels of explanation. In this book I focus on the cognitive level, how individual minds represent and reason about evidence, with little discussion of the broader social context of reasoning, and nothing on the lower-level neuroscience. Partly this is due to lack of space, but I also feel that the cognitive level is the natural starting point, indispensable for seeing how all the other levels fit together. Neither do I cover the broad literature on the non-cognitive factors – such as emotions and prejudice – that undoubtedly influence legal decision-making. Again, I believe that understanding the cognitive perspective is a precursor to seeing how these other factors might distort and bias our reasoning.

Two Senses of Why

A central theme in the book is that we are better at explaining than evaluating. This can be a slippery distinction to grasp because the two activities are so closely linked – we use evidence to build and revise our models, and we use our models to look for evidence. One way to think about the distinction is to see these activities as responses to two different types of why-question. Carl Hempel (1965) distinguishes between *explanation-seeking* and *reason-seeking* why-questions. The former question asks us why things in the world happen as they do, whereas the latter asks for the justifying grounds to support our claims. For example, when a husband is accused of killing his wife, we can ask why he would do it – what would be his motive for such a crime? To answer this question we point to his violent nature and the fact that his wife wanted to leave him. But we can also ask why we should believe that he did it – how strong is the evidence? Here we point to forensics, CCTV footage or witness testimony.

The two activities are closely interwoven, especially if we don't know the truth of the things we are trying to explain. We use evidence to generate our explanations, and our explanations in turn guide our search for evidence. But they answer distinct questions – *explaining* is about what happens (or happened) in the world, whereas *evaluating* is about our reasons to believe these claims. And our cognition seems more geared towards the former than the latter – or so I shall argue in this book.

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