Introduction

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Over the last couple of centuries, classical archaeology has applied a number of theoretical and methodological models to the great empirical morass of ancient materials which it studies. Most of these methods and theories are modern constructs and come from outside the ancient world, to which they are then applied. This includes some of our most familiar scholarly reflexes – such as the use of style to date an artefact, to attribute it to an artist or circle of artists, to give it a provenance. In other words, our approaches and conceptual frames for dealing with Greek and Roman art and archaeology are, to use a perhaps old-fashioned anthropological term, 'etic', and would not have been familiar to the actors within antiquity who made, handled, viewed and possessed the objects which we use these models to explain. In general classical archaeology and art history have not been very successful at finding 'emic' theoretical models or formulations – that is, conceptualizations of the material-cultural world which come from within antiquity itself and might have been recognizable by the ancients.[1] It is here that the subject of this book has a genuine, and surprisingly under-exploited, value for the historian of Roman art.[2] For rhetoric was a pervasive and dominant aspect of Graeco-Roman culture, central to the school curriculum, carefully adumbrated in a series of surviving textbooks and profoundly theorized in more than one significant philosophically inflected treatise.[3]

[1] Exceptions include Donohue 1988 which examines the terminology of ancient religious images in relation to the origins of sculpture; Neer 2010 which explores the ancient Greek language of dazzle and brightness in relation to marble and bronze sculpture; Perry 2005: 28–77 who discusses the concept of *decor* in relation to Roman art; Anguissola 2012 for some aspects of 'emulation'. None of these, however, offers an emic model of how the social world of art, from producer via object to viewers, might have been conceived.

[2] The importance of classical rhetoric to art history in later periods has been significant: See e.g. Gombrich 1966; Baxandall 1971; Van Eck 2007; Carruthers 2010; Sánchez Amiejeira 2011. Within antiquity, it is clear that the potential for a rhetorically-inflected understanding is not limited to Roman art; for a rhetorically sensitive interpretation of Hellenistic art (following T. J. Clark's model of works of art as 'utterances') see Stewart 1993b.

[3] The literature on ancient rhetoric is large. Some starting points include Kennedy 1994; Corbeill 1996; Porter 1997; Gunderson 2000, 2003 and 2009; Heath 2004: esp. ch. 9; Habinek 2004; Pernot 2005; Dominik and Hall 2007; Connolly 2007; Booth 2007; Worthington 2010; Smith

As a cultural phenomenon spanning all aspects of education (which included slaves and freedmen as well as the elite) from the Republic well into the Christian empire in late antiquity, rhetoric is fundamental to the thought structures and *mentalités* of the Roman world. While in modernity it is too easy to think only of oratory, legal addresses, panegyric or political philippics as being 'rhetorical', in antiquity all forms of writing and speaking – from history and philosophy to poetry and prose fiction – were rhetorically inflected and composed using the specific tropes and techniques set out in the many surviving rhetorical handbooks (known as the *progymnasmata*). [4] One of the richest textual areas for the study of ancient art – the poetic epigram – reflects systematic and creative use of such technical rhetorical tropes as *ekphrasis* (description), *enargeia* (vividness) and *phantasia* (imagination) to bring aspects of art objects, buildings or monuments (some real and some fantastic) to the reader's or listener's mind's eye.[5]

It is important to note at the outset that visual and architectural forms of rhetoric function differently from words, in that the kinds of propositions made by images, and the means by which they are structured in formal terms, are inevitably different from those of language or writing – both in the ways that connections are made and in the ways that the audience's mind grasps them. In particular, questions of the viewer's body come strongly to the fore in the rhetoric of material culture – whether it is contained (by buildings, monuments, tombs which may be above or below ground, and painted or decorated with reliefs, and so forth), whether it can itself hold an object (a statuette, small relief, cameo, and so on), or whether it is addressed in some form that is parallel to it or even mimetic of it (as with life-size statues in the round).[6] The differences between material-cultural and textual rhetoric are somewhat liable to be underplayed both in the frequent ancient attempts to compare the visual with the verbal

and Corrino 2011. Among the key modern texts on rhetoric, one might begin with Richards 1936; Toulmin 1958; Burke 1969; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; Meyer 2008. An attempt to sketch a rhetorically inflected picture of Roman art is Meyer 2007; also, on propaganda and rhetoric in Roman art, Stewart 2008: 108–27 and Mayer 2010.

[4] These are now helpfully translated as Kennedy 2003. For discussion see Webb 2001 and Webb 2009: 39–60.

[5] There has been a recent explosion of work on the art-related ecphrastic epigram, sparked in part by the recent discovery of so many hitherto unknown examples in the papyrus book attributed to the Hellenistic poet Posidippus. See, for instance, Gutzwiller 2002 and 2004; Platt 2002a and 2011: 170–211; Stewart 2005; Sens 2005; Coleman 2006; Goldhill 2007: 15–19; Männlein-Robert 2007b: 37–81; Prioux 2007; Bing 2009: 194–216; Squire 2010a and 2010b.

[6] This theme in Greek art is now the subject of Osborne 2011.

(notably, Horace's famous 'ut pictura poesis' – 'poetry is as painting')[7] and in those modern models of understanding Roman art which see it as a kind of language or system of communication.[8]

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In what has become perhaps its classic definition, Aristotle (384–322 BC) described rhetoric as having a tripartite structure in which the flow of persuasive argument was directed tendentiously to creating certain effects upon the third element of that structure, the audience:[9]

> Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches. For of the three elements in speech-making – speaker, subject, and person addressed – it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object. The hearer must be either a judge, with a decision to make about things past or future, or an observer. (*Ars Rhetorica* 1.3.1. 1358[ab] (trans. Rhys Roberts)[10]

Following Aristotle, we may distinguish these three fundamental elements as *ēthos*, *logos* and *pathos*:[11]

> Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character (*ēthos*) of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself (*logos*). Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character (*ēthos*) when the speech (*logos*) is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as

[7] Horace, *Ars Poetica* 361. This is one of the most quoted tags in Latin, yet it has been subject to strikingly little analysis, for instance in relation to the careful disjunction between poetic and artistic licence at the opening of the poem (vv. 1–13 and esp. 12–13). For some discussion see Brink 1971: 368–72 and Hardie 1993.

[8] Esp. e.g. Zanker 1988: 3–4, 335–9 and Hölscher 2004 (first published in German in 1987): 1–3, 7, 86–100, 113–16, 126, followed for instance by Clarke 2003: 2 and 9.

[9] For a repetition of this tripartite model, see Dionysius of Halicarnassus (writing in Rome at the end of the first century BC), *Lysias* 19; for eloquence depending on the state of mind to be moved, to conceive images and so forth (i.e. the third element), see Quintilian (writing in the second half of the first century AD), *Institutio oratoria* 1.2.30; on the centrality of persuasion, see Quintilian, *Inst. or.* 2.15.3–22 (usefully sumarizing a large and now mainly lost Graeco-Roman literature). For a brief account of the history of Aristotle's text and the earliest rhetorical handbooks, see Kennedy 2007: app. 2, pp. 293–311. For the 'near universal approval' of Aristotle's definition, see Quintilian, *Inst. or.* 5.1.1.

[10] Rhys Roberts 2004.

[11] For discussion of these three in Aristotle as 'the psychology of rhetorical persuasion', see Rorty 1996: 8–23. For a general account of their place in rhetorical theory, see Meyer 2008: 151–88.

some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character (*ēthos*) may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions (*pathos*). Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the emotions (*pathos*). Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself (*logos*) when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question. (*Ars Rhetorica* 1.2.3–6. 1356[a]1)

Rhetoric is an inter-subjective relationship that is inevitably tendentious in that it involves the act of, or attempt at, persuasion. In this act, someone – whom Aristotle characterized with the term *ēthos* – addresses himself to an audience – whose fame of mind he called *pathos* – through a medium, a language, called *logos*.[12] If we allow *logos* to be not only words but any medium by which an audience is addressed (that is, by which *ēthos* applies itself to *pathos*), then *logos* in this context consists not only of speech, but of any performative aspect of address, and specifically in the context of this book, it includes images and buildings.[13] In an intriguing epigraph of the first century BC, Antiochus I of Commagene specifically uses the term *logos* to describe visual style, ordering statues and reliefs to be made 'according to the ancient *logos* of Greeks and Persians – blessed roots of my clan'.[14]

That is, to understand the work of art as rhetoric is to grasp its discursive function as a mediating tool between a series of addressers – commissioners, patrons, artists, who in their different ways constitute an *ēthos* – and an audience of viewers, a *pathos*. The triangulation explicit in Aristotle's *ēthos–logos–pathos* formulation of rhetoric is extremely useful for analysing the work of art, since it offers the opportunity to emphasize any of the three parties within the tripartite totality – maker/patron, object or viewers – depending on one's argument, and it implies a variety of signifying, identity-making or communicative strategies embodied in objects that depend on the specific relations of the patron/artist and the audience. It is striking that Aristotle insists that *ēthos* – as the speaker's moral character, which renders what is said as worthy of confidence – is

[12] On the development of this model from Aristotle to Roman rhetoric, see Wisse 1989.
[13] Note that Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Lysias* 19, names them *ēthos*, *pathos* and *pragma*. This last – the 'act', 'matter', 'thing' that communicates between *ēthos* and *pathos* – is directly applicable to art and material culture.
[14] See Dittenberger 1903: vol. 1, p. 597, no. 383, line 30.

due to the act of rhetoric (the *logos*) itself and not to any preconceived notion of the speaker's character. Thus both *ēthos* and *pathos* (as the effect intended in the audience) are inscribed in the act of rhetoric – in the case under discussion here, in the work of art.

This originally Aristotelian model is of great interest because it provides, from within antiquity, a form of the kinds of sociological or anthropological modelling that modern scholarship has been searching for in order to grasp the complex nexus of relations embedded in the work of art in terms of a means of affective connection between its producers and its viewers.[15] It has purchase, notably, in offering the potential to develop – according to normative Graeco-Roman concepts and paradigms of thinking – the insights offered by some of the most distinguished recent attempts in classical archaeology to combine accounts of visual communication within a given social context with the material specificity of style, artistic handling and archaeological context.[16] Crucially, the *ēthos–logos–pathos* formulation may direct us away from any too specifically linguistic or political model of communication, as formulated by modern theoretical concerns, towards a rhetorical model – which of course inevitably includes discursive, political and ethical overtones, but in a mix and with an emphasis that is directly located in the culture we are studying.[17]

In any rhetorical situation, *logos* is the way to discuss or handle questions that are more or less problematic and conflictive, but strives to present the conflict as solved, since the questions have disappeared in the

[15] One might see aspects of the analytic work done by seeing art as rhetoric in Alfred Gell's anthropological analysis of art in the work of art as a movment between artist and recipient. See Gell 1998: 12–65 on the 'art nexus' with helpful discussion by Osborne and Tanner 2007b: 10–22 and Davis 2007. Likewise, Talcott Parsons's model of 'expressive symbolism' (as advanced for instance in Parsons 1951: 384–427) has been skilfully applied to Greek and Roman imagery by Tanner 1992 and 2000. Tanner 2006: 292–5 recognizes that the model of rhetoric fulfils some aspects of the artistic agency of Hellenistic and Roman art.

[16] The major and now classic Roman contributions are Zanker 1988 and Hölscher 2004. See also the general theoretical discussion by Smith 2002.

[17] So, to take the classic works just cited, Zanker's book may be criticized as anachronistic precisely because the model of propaganda with which it works is explicitly related to the Third Reich (see Wallace-Hadrill 1989), while Hölscher's book adopts too linguistic a model of the 'semantics' and 'grammar' of Roman art (the quotations are from p. 2), indebted to the linguistic semiotics of Umberto Eco's poststructuralism (p. xxv), and an insufficiently discursive or rhetorical one. Both, it might be added, in their emphasis on the 'expressive' aspects of communication, remain heavily indebted to the theoretical programme of a collective cultural world-view first presented by Alois Riegl at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through the concept of *Kunstwollen*: see Elsner 2010: 54–7. For some attempts to push Hölscher's model in a more rhetorical and less semantic direction, see Wyler 2006: 215 and Varner 2006: 280; and our comments below.

discourse offered as their answer.[18] In the inscription of Antiochus I of Commagene, cited above, this is beautifully demonstrated by the claim that the artistic style (explicitly named *logos*) of the works produced in his kingdom – a precarious monarchy, which faced east and west, towards both the Persian empire and the Hellenistic Greek world, the latter increasingly dominated by Rome – reflected this political and cultural reality in a visual hybridity (entirely observable in the surviving material culture) that signalled the 'roots of his clan'. That is, Commagenean culture and identity are problematically placed politically between Persia and the West, and the potential conflicts for Antiochus' subjects (the *pathos* addressed in his art) arising from this question are resolved artistically through a rhetoric of visual syncretism of Persian and Greek styles, which are themselves tied to the monarch's own identity through his origins (that is to his *ēthos*).[19] When those questions are highly controversial, *ēthos* and *pathos* argue, give motivations and reasons, may accept or reject each other's positions, and can even go to court to settle the issues at stake. But if the questions dealt with are quite unproblematic, then *ēthos* and *pathos* give rise to conventional and polite discourse, such as the communication implicit in the question 'How are you?', or in Erwin Panofsky's famous example (which introduced his discussion of 'iconology') of the implications of when a man greets an acquaintance by raising his hat.[20] Rhetoric is the negotiation of the distance between individuals on a given question, which reveals their difference or their proximity.[21] Rhetoric is the performance of the social and psychological differences between the speaker (or the author, the builder, the painter, the writer) and his audience.

Despite their distance from normal usage, there is value in keeping the Greek words – *ēthos*, *logos* and *pathos* – to define the main components of the rhetorical relationship. *Ēthos* is much broader than simply a speaker, artist or patron. It represents at the same time the character of the speaker, his social virtues as well as his human values. It is the social role that allows the speaker to display those virtues, namely his persona. In the case of a work of art, it includes all those responsible for its creation from patrons and commissioners to designers and artisans. From the point of view adopted here, *ēthos* is a claim to the capacity or expertise or virtues

[18] See Meyer 1995: 219–23. [19] On Commagenean art, see esp. Versluys, forthcoming.
[20] See Panofsky 1939: 3. As Panofsky rightly saw, while the act of greeting is conventional, there are a multitude of potential expressive meanings that nuance the specific negotiation of relations in how the hat is lifted, the expression on the face and so forth, or in how the words 'How are you?' are articulated.
[21] See Meyer 2008: 317.

necessary to respond, to give an appropriate or just answer to a question raised in the debate or simply in social interaction. *Ēthos* is supremely the marker of authority to speak, write or produce images and buildings – it is a claim made in doing any of these things. *Pathos* likewise is much more than the audience *per se*. *Pathos* is the addressee's frame of mind, by extension assimilated to the questions the addressee can raise, linked certainly with passions and emotions; but more essentially, it is the locus of problematization, which may be based on anguish, curiosity, anger or joy, whether emotional or intellectual. All lawyers know that in order to convince a jury, they must rely in part at least on its emotions and feelings. The same feelings guide the problems and the questions at the core of rhetoric. *Ēthos* provides the answers, *pathos* raises the questions, and *logos* is the locus of the play of their difference and similarity, difference and commonality between individuals, between opinions, between the questions and the answers that reflect them, on both the subjective and objective levels.

As a consequence, in applying this rhetorical model to the history of art, we examine works of art not as existing in themselves, independently of their viewers and their makers (including both patrons or commissioners and artists). Rather, a range of messages is conveyed from one to the other, with the purpose of bringing out specific effects and emotions in the audience – of which the work of art is both the means and (from our point of view as investigators from a much later period) the empirical evidence.

We may ask in what sense is the rhetoric of art a form of rhetoric *sui generis*, different from, say, a plea or from political discourse. This question was famously raised in antiquity in the comment, attributed to the sixth-century BC poet Simonides and much repeated afterwards, especially in the Roman period, that 'a poem should be a painting that speaks, a painting a silent poem'.[22] The implication is that there is a fundamental parallelism of visual and verbal effects, but that they operate differently – as Quintilian puts it 'a picture, which is silent and motionless, can penetrate our innermost feelings with such power that it may seem more eloquent than language itself' (*Institutio oratoria* 11.3.67). The work of art stands for itself. There is no speaker addressing himself directly to someone physically present, capable of responding to the interlocutor and assuming his role in turn. As a consequence, the work of art must build into itself the impact it wants to have on the audience (*pathos*), through the form and

[22] The quotation is from the *Auctor ad Herennium* 4.28.9. See also Plato, *Phaedrus* 275d; Plutarch *Moralia* 17f, 58b, 346f, 748a, with Sprigath 2004 and Männlein-Robert 2007b: 20–2.

Figure 0.1 Arch of Titus, east side, with original inscription. After AD 81.

style of art selected (*logos*) and on behalf of someone who purports to express himself in an exemplary way through that work of art (*ēthos*).

Take the triumphal arch. This is a distinctive form in Roman art, whose origins lie in a combination of entry portal and sophisticated statue base,[23] but which became a self-standing monument designed to impress the populace of a city through the achievements of its rulers. The significance of the inscriptions carved on such an arch is to stress the question – the visually and architecturally posed proposition, problem, challenge or desire (the victory celebrated, for instance) – that the building is designed to resolve and whose answer is meant to impress. Hence, the Arch of Titus (Figures 0.1 and 0.2), probably erected under his brother Domitian after AD 81, narrates the triumph that succeeded the victory over the Jews and the signal episode of the sack of the Temple in Jerusalem in AD 70.[24] But the funerary implications of its attic inscription ('The Senate and Roman People to the deified Titus Vespasian Augustus, son of the deified Vespasian', Figure 0.3),[25] coupled with the apotheosis of Titus depicted in

[23] See Kleiner 1985: 11–13; da Maria 1988: 31–8.
[24] The fundamental archaeological account is Pfanner 1983; also da Maria 1988: 287–9.
[25] *CIL* 6.945. See e.g. Ross Holloway 1987: 184. Note that Karl Lehmann's assumption that Titus was buried in the upper storey of the arch is unwarranted, see Lehmann-Hartleben 1934.

Figure 0.2 Arch of Titus, west side. After AD 81.

Figure 0.3 Arch of Titus, east side, inscription and small frieze.

the vault of the passageway (Figures 0.4 and 0.5),[26] refine these triumphal intimations towards the specific purposes of posthumous memory.

The Arch of Titus displays the triumphal glory in life and the divine apotheosis in death of the emperor. The combination of the inscription, the great sculpted relief panels depicting the emperor in his chariot and the triumphal procession with implements from the Temple in the central

[26] See Beard and Henderson 1998: 209–11; Beard 2007: 237–8; generally on the topic see Zanker 2000a and Arce 2010.



Figure 0.4 Arch of Titus, the vault of the passageway.

Figure 0.5 The Apotheosis of Titus, showing the emperor astride an eagle, from the vault of the arch's passageway.