1 Kant's Critical Teleology

1.1 Introduction: The *Logos* of *Telē*

Teleology is the study (*logos*) of ends (*telē*).[1] It is a branch of learning that dates back to Aristotle, who first made ends (or aims, goals, purposes) amenable to systematic investigation by conceiving of them as a special kind of cause: a *final cause*. Final causes name "that for the sake of which" (Aristotle 1985, 30) a thing is brought into being or the reason why it is there. Appeal to the that-for-the-sake-of-which of a thing explains the coming-into-being of the thing in terms of its propensity to bring about an effect. It thus explains the *thing as effect* in terms of the *effect of the thing*. If this sounds strange, it is! At the heart of all teleology dwells a curious teleological loop, which creates the central conundrum of this fascinating yet confounding science. The *logos* of *telē* is premised on the idea that the cause of a thing and the effect of that thing can – under certain conditions and in certain respects – be the same thing. The term "end" can, accordingly, be used to refer to one, the other, or both.[2]

Perhaps reflective of this unfathomable logic, which conjures the twin specters of backwards causality and self-causation, and in spite of its august and ancient roots, the study of ends remained nameless for centuries, a Frankenstein's monster among philosophy's children and one that is perhaps not incidentally related to the mystery of life. Enlightenment light was shed and the taxonomic embarrassment rectified in 1728, by the great German rationalist and systematizer of all things philosophical Christian Wolff. Remarking in his *Philosophia Rationalis Sive Logica* that the *logos* of *telē* "still lacks a name" (Wolff 1728, 25), Wolff gave the science an unceremonious adult baptism: "It can be called *teleology*" (25).[3]

But naming the beast hardly solved the philosophical problems. The teleological loop is relatively straightforwardly domesticated (if not thereby fully demystified) as it pertains to products of human intelligence, be they words, deeds, or artifacts. Here, the presence of intelligent agency allows us to say that it is not strictly speaking the effect of the thing but the anticipation of the effect

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[1] All references to Kant's works, with the exception of those to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, are to Kant (1902–) and are preceded by standard abbreviations (CJ for *Critique of the Power of Judgment*; FI for *First Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment*; CPrR for *Critique of Practical Reason*; JL for *Jäsche Logic*; UTP for *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy*; Corr for *Correspondence*). Following standard practice, references to the *Critique of Pure Reason* will be to the pagination of the A and B editions. All translations from Kant's works follow (with occasional slight modifications) Kant (1992, 1998, and 2000).

[2] Even Kant's otherwise rigorous account is not entirely immune to the potential for confusion this creates. On at least three occasions, Kant contradicts his official view – according to which a purpose is the *effect* of a conceptual cause – and refers to that conceptual cause *itself* as the "purpose" (see CJ, 05:180.31–32; FI, 20: 232.16–17; UTP, 08:181.13).

[3] See McLaughlin (2001, 16n1).

of the thing (usually tied to a desire for the reality of the effect so anticipated) that serves as the cause that helps explain the thing's coming-into-being. To say that the anticipated effect of the game coming on caused me to press the remote, because that typically has the effect of the game coming on, is to give a perfectly respectable teleological explanation of my remote-pressing.

Unfortunately, matters are not quite as straightforward concerning other features of the world that are not (or not in an obvious sense) products of human intentional agency – but to which teleological thinking nevertheless applies with near-equal intuitiveness and inevitability. These include (a) the organization of biological nature, (b) the order and unity of causal powers in nature,[4] (c) the nature and structure of mental phenomena, and (d) the nature and structure of systems of value (e.g., moral or aesthetic).

In the absence of a finite (human) purposing intelligence by means of which to explain these features of the world, the traditional strategy to defang the loop that their teleological explanation incurs was to posit an infinite (divine) purposing intelligence. However, reflexive recourse to speculative theology in matters of science and philosophy fell out of favor in the early modern era.[5] We can see this, for instance, in the gradual move, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from preformationist to epigenetic theories of biological development. Preformationists sought to minimize divine agency by relegating it to an original act of creation but could explain biological complexity only by making that act vastly complex. Epigeneticists sought to minimize divine agency further by conceding original creation while explaining the development of biological complexity naturally, without appeal to a creator-God.[6] In the same vein, the deistic strategy of invoking a divine artificer in order to render teleological loops innocuous began to lose its appeal as well[7] (a process that was itself far from linear[8]).

Eliminating divine agency from the teleological equation in nonartifactual domains meant that theorists had to naturalize teleology. The conceptual map of naturalized, nondeistic teleology accommodates three broad theoretical strategies: (a) reductive theories that seek to cut through the teleological loop by staying within the causal paradigm that governs the physical sciences, while

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[4] To be sure, causal laws are not teleological laws (they describe *what* happens, not *why* it happens). But the integration of these laws into a coherent system of scientific knowledge presupposes that the natural world is open to rational inquiry. And that, in turn, is intuitively (and near-inevitably) explained by the broadly teleological idea that nature exhibits rational order. The notion of such rational order is a central theme in Kant's discussion in the Appendix to the Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and again in the Introduction of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (see Section 3.2).

[5] See Hume (1998).   [6] See Mensch (2013, chs. 1–2).   [7] See McDonough (2011, 188).

[8] See McDonough (2020, 167).

allowing that the effect of a thing can nevertheless in some non-self-defeating (noncircular) sense be considered the cause of that thing (contemporary "selected effects" as well as "causal role" theories of biological function fall into this category);[9] (b) nonreductive, neo-Aristotelian, teleological realist theories that embrace the teleological loop by positing a nonmechanistic, teleological form of causality as metaphysically sui generis (the *vis essentialis* of proponents of vitalist epigenesis[10] as well as much of the metaphysics of nineteenth-century German Idealism fall into this category); (c) eliminative theories that dismiss the teleological loop by considering teleology as perhaps psychologically necessitated and heuristically expedient but, beyond that, metaphysically groundless ("fictionalist" theories of biological function fall into this category).[11] Contemporary teleological theorizing, especially concerning the functional organization of biological nature, continues to be circumscribed by these broad strategies.

1.2 The *Critique of the Power of Judgment*

The central contribution of Kant's mature teleological philosophy in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790), which shall be the focus of this Element, is to put an additional, nonintentionalist, nondeistic,[12] yet also nonnaturalized item on the teleological menu. Kant's solution to the teleological conundrum is distinctly critical and appropriately foundational as he seeks to vindicate teleological thinking as an a priori, necessary, and transcendentally justified form of cognition that is both logically respectable and epistemically indispensable to intellects like ours. He seeks to accomplish this in a three-part maneuver that begins with a subtle yet consequential reconceptualization of traditional teleology in terms of a transcendental-philosophically streamlined

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[9] See Garson (2016, chs. 3, 5).   [10] See Goy (2017, 333–344).

[11] See Garson (2019, 17–19).

[12] Kant is, of course, deeply interested in questions of rational theology. Kant, moreover, uses his teleological findings in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* in order to construct an "ethicotheology" (CJ, 5:442.12) in the book's concluding sections on the Methodology of the Teleological Power of Judgment (§§79–91). But while his critical teleology thus "does open up for us a prospect on nature that may perhaps allow us to determine more precisely the otherwise so fruitless concept of an original being" (CJ, 5:437.16–17) – and while it thus "naturally precedes" (CJ, 5:436.11) such a "more precise determination" of that concept – this "moral theology" (CJ, 5:436.08) transcends the proper bounds of Kant's critical teleology. Kant insists that if one understands the "physical teleology" (CJ, 5:442.06) that forms the terminal point of his *teleological* explorations in the third *Critique* in *theological* terms – as a "physicotheology" (CJ, 5:436.04, 5:442.06) – then one has "misunderstood" (CJ, 5:442.06) it. While Kant's argument for his critical teleology supplies materials for theological arguments, it neither starts from theological premises nor reaches theological conclusions. Kant's teleological thought stands independent of his theological thought. But see Goy (2017, 187–188), Guyer (2020, 204).

conception of purposiveness. Next, Kant introduces a transcendental principle based on that conception and identifies it as the principle of a hitherto over-looked cognitive faculty, the reflecting power of judgment. Finally, Kant employs this principle in a theory of a priori reflecting judgments of purposive-ness that systematically juxtaposes Kant's own technical with the conventional conception of purposiveness, in the process generating the fundamental subdiv-ision of his critical teleology into a part concerned with aesthetic phenomena and a part concerned with biological phenomena.

The interpretation of Kant's critical teleology advanced in this Element is a novel interpretation. It seeks to breathe new life into Kant's own conception of his critical teleology as highly systematic – both in the internal organization of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* itself and in its relation to Kant's critical epistemology in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. While an interpretation that takes this systematicity seriously is unusual and faces exegetical and philosophical difficulties that may make the project seem imprudent, the topic of this Element – *Kant and Teleology* – affords an opportunity to confront these challenges and take a fresh look at Kant's critical teleology as an internally coherent and transcendental-logically necessary part of Kant's critical philosophy.

Still, the Element's topic and my approach to it pose special challenges for an introductory text. The philosophical stakes Kant confronts in his critical tele-ology, as reflected in the various forms of cognitive chaos I discuss in Sections 4.2 and 5.5 (empirical, transcendental, critical), at times make the book operate at a level of abstraction that stretches the bounds of the genre. Need things really be so complicated? Schopenhauer, for one, thought teleology was an exceedingly simple idea and that Kant's treatment of it only exhibited his "peculiar talent for turning an idea about and about . . . until a book has come out of it" (Schopenhauer 1969, 532). I hope to show that Kant's treatment is not so much meandering and convoluted as it is the result of a struggle with genuine philosophical difficulties – and that, despite those difficulties, Kant's eventual solution to the teleological conundrum is, in its own way, simple and ingenious.

1.2.1 Backward-Looking and Forward-Looking Dimensions of Teleology

Kant's strategy for making teleology amenable to transcendental-philosophical treatment in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* is inspired by an old Aristotelian distinction. Kant analyzes the notion of teleology into a backward-looking dimension, concerned with the conceptual cause of a thing (roughly corresponding to Aristotle's *causa formalis*, which determines what sort of thing a conceptually caused object is[13]), and a forward-looking dimension,

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[13] See CJ, 5:227.17, 23.

concerned with the prospective effect of a thing (roughly corresponding to Aristotle's *causa finalis*, which determines what such a sort of thing is for). Kant notes that only the backward-looking dimension lends itself to transcendental-philosophical analysis because the forward-looking dimension ineliminably depends on empirical determinations (specifically, on the content of conceptually efficacious concepts as well as on the presence of agential aims and desires). Based on this analysis and evaluation, Kant defines his own technical notion of "purposiveness" strictly in terms of the former, backward-looking, etiological conception as "the causality of a concept with respect to its object" (CJ, 5:220.03–04).[14]

Even the backward-looking dimension of teleology is, of course, not entirely free from empirical determinations. To consider a thing's concept its cause appeals to that concept's content and to prospective aims and desires enshrined in it. I cannot explain what sort of thing a hammer is (*causa formalis*) if I cannot explain what it is for (*causa finalis*). This, too, was seen clearly by Aristotle, who cautions in *Physics* II.7 that, despite the theoretical distinction he draws between them, "the what [it is] and that for the sake of which are one" (Aristotle 1985, 30).

Note, however, that, while the backward-looking dimension of teleology is thus empirically inseparable from forward-looking considerations (hence, from questions regarding a causally efficacious concept's content as well as from contingent facts about human agency and desire), Kant's definition of purposiveness considers the central term of art in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* strictly "according to its transcendental determinations" (CJ, 5:219.31). Kant's aim is to highlight the fact that, despite this empirical inseparability, the backward-looking dimension of conceptual causality is not ineliminably dependent on contingent factors. By abstracting from questions relating to the content of a given formal cause as well as from attendant matters of intention and design, Kant isolates the nonempirical core of the causality of a concept with respect to its object. It consists in the bare metaphysical fact that there must be a representational link, in addition to a causal link, between a causally efficacious concept and its object-cum-effect.[15] Limited to this

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14 Kant appeals to this – his official – definition of the term throughout the text of the third *Critique*. See CJ, 5:177.20n., 180.31–34, 307.29–30, 367.01–03, 369.33–35, 372.31–33, 393.31, 408.04–06, 454.23–26; FI, 20:196.18–20, 217.24–27, 230.22–24; see also CPrR, 5:09.2n. See Ginsborg (1997), Teufel (2011a).

15 To be sure, the forward-looking dimension of conceptual causality – which concerns how a conceptually caused thing in turn engenders its intended effect(s) – also has a nonempirical core and depends on noncontingent factors. But those are not unique to a specifically conceptual form of causality. If we abstract from agential aims and desires and the content of the conceptually caused thing's conceptual cause, then the noncontingent factors of the forward-looking dimension of conceptual causality that remain are just causal. The same is not true of the

foundational feature of conceptual causality, Kant's etiological conception of purposiveness entails an ontological sorting of the world into objects whose concept figured in their causal ancestry and objects whose concept did not. Kant, in short, builds his critical teleology on a transcendental-philosophically purified, formal conception of artifactuality, deliberately freed from substantive, material questions about what a conceptually caused object may be, what it may be for, and whether it succeeds at being so.[16]

That Kant should accord the terminological top spot in his critical teleology to an etiological conception of purposiveness deliberately drained of conventional teleological motifs – hence to formal over final causality – has struck many commentators as problematic: a counterintuitive fact best ignored, discounted, or explained away rather than embraced and elucidated.[17] But there is no deep mystery here. Kant is not wavering on the teleological dimension of teleology. Rather, Kant's project of a duly critical teleology requires a streamlined conception of purposiveness at its heart precisely in order to assert philosophical control over the meanderings of the teleological loop. Specifically, by separating forward-looking and empirical (final) determinations of teleology from backward-looking and nonempirical (formal) determinations, Kant separates descriptive from justificatory contexts and thus delimits the conceptual space within which a proper critique of teleology first becomes possible.

1.2.2 Transcendental Teleology

Based on this transcendental-philosophically streamlined conception of purposiveness Kant then proposes a new transcendental principle as the supreme principle of a duly critical teleology, the "[transcendental] principle of the formal purposiveness of nature" (CJ, 5:181.13; or "principle of nature's purposiveness," for short). In simplest terms, the principle of nature's purposiveness demands that finite intelligences like ours approach the world with the assumption that cognizable order resides within it (see Section 4.4.1). This is a principle of formal "purposiveness" because Kant thinks that we cannot conceive of cognizable order except on the model of conceptual order and because he thinks that we cannot conceive of conceptual order residing *in* the world except on the model of artifacts. The idea here is that in the case of artifacts we know that concepts are in a sufficiently thick ontological sense *in* their objects – they in-form or structure their objects – because

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backward-looking dimension. If we abstract from contingent factors, then the noncontingent factors of the backward-looking dimension of conceptual causality that remain continue to include an ineliminable reference to the presence of a conceptual cause.

[16] See CJ, 5:311.16–20.

[17] See, e.g., Goy (2017, 38n15). In the anglophone world, the tendency is aided by the *Cambridge Edition*'s translation of "*Zweck*" as "end" (see Guyer 2000, xlviii).

they play a representational-cum-causal role in bringing their objects into being. And Kant's technical term for this conceptual inexistence – hence, for the type of causality in which a concept figures in the causal ancestry of its object – is "purposiveness."

Failure to accord Kant's transcendental conception of purposiveness its proper role as *causa formalis* is at the root of the widespread view that the transcendental principle of nature's purposiveness portrays nature finalistically – as purposive *for us*. There are, to be sure, multiple layers of cognitive utility at work in the principle, which play important roles in Kant's presentation: (a) since the counterfactually presumed absence of a principle of nature's formal purposiveness would spell chaos for our form of cognition, its transcendentally deduced presence is commensurately good *for us*; (b) the principle's "demand for an assumption of nature's purposive- ness" (see Sections 4.4.5–7) is a heautonomous demand both by and *for us* (namely by and for our reflecting power of judgment); (c) the assumption so demanded represents an isomorphism between intuitive manifolds and concepts that first makes those manifolds cognitively available *for us* (namely for our understanding); (d) transcendentally grounded teleological judgments of organized beings provide heuristic license to treat nature at large as a "system of purposes" (CJ, 5:377.26) of which we are part and that, accordingly, has benefits *for us* (not least in its beautiful products). But it is a terminologically induced oversimplification – predicated on which a transcendental deduction of the principle of nature's purposiveness becomes impossible – to take these attendant or derivative utilities (let alone appeals to foresight or intent) to be part of the content of Kant's principle.

The task of Kant's transcendental deduction of this principle is then to show that the principle's demand for an assumption of nature's purposiveness underlies all forms of theoretical judgment, not just forms of judgment we might consider overtly teleological. Kant, in other words, accords the principle an a priori, necessary, universal, and subpersonal cognitive role as a principle presupposed by all pure and empirical theoretical cognition. Accordingly, the principle is not itself a pure or empirical theoretical cognition. Indeed, the distinctive structure of a demand for an assumption makes the principle of nature's purposiveness different from all other transcendentally necessary principles in Kant's critical philosophy. Neither a principle of reason nor a pure principle of the understand- ing, it is identified by Kant as the principle of a hitherto overlooked cognitive faculty, the "reflecting power of judgment" (CJ, 5:180.05).

1.2.3 A Priori Reflecting Judgments of Purposiveness

The central if largely unheralded philosophical mechanism – or, perhaps more fittingly, the animating principle – of Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment*

is that the principle of nature's purposiveness, which finds universal employ-ment at the subpersonal level, also leaves a conscious signature in certain empirical contexts. In those contexts, the principle's standing subpersonal demand for an assumption of nature's purposiveness becomes phenomenally manifest as the sense that a sensibly given object originated in its concept and, a fortiori, that there is a way it is supposed to be (as fixed by the concept so presumed). The unconventional idea at the heart of Kant's critical teleology is that, even as it thus attaches directly to an empirical object, the principle's demand for an assumption of nature's purposiveness remains empirically – but not, therefore, transcendental-logically – ungrounded. The principle's demand here accordingly registers as a quasi-auratic sense of the object's artifactuality – a feeling of being unaccountably compelled to consider it as "of conceptual origin."[18] Notably, this sense is independent of the object's actual provenance and may attach to products of human ingenuity as much as to products of nature. The peculiar form of judgment in and through which the principle's demand for an assumption of nature's inexistent order thus comes to be applied to empirical objects, occasioning the feeling in question, is the principal philosophical vehicle for the doctrines of Kant's critical teleology: an a priori reflecting judgment of purposiveness.

The claim that, at the structural core of the third *Critique*, we find a form of a priori judgment that applies only to select individuals situated in certain empirical contexts, that is not determined by observable features of the objects in question, and whose signature attribution of purposiveness consequently conveys an ineffable sense of these objects' artifactuality will sound surprising to the reader familiar with the literature on Kant's third *Critique*. For one thing, the apriority of reflecting judgments is often treated as a peculiarity of Kant's aesthetics – where, for good structural reasons, it is on fuller display than in Kant's teleology – rather than as the key to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* as a whole. For another, this apriority is typically not treated as a characteristic of first-order reflecting judgments at all; not because that is not Kant's position but because – in the absence of a fully systematic account of Kant's critical teleology – it is hard to explain how it can be Kant's position.

That the importance and role of a priori reflecting judgments of purposive-ness has traditionally been miscast has to do with a delicate hermeneutic

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[18] Walter Benjamin's concept of "*Aura*" (Benjamin 1991, 438) is useful in this context because the sense of artifactuality at issue attaches to spatiotemporally *determinate* individuals, despite being perceptually and conceptually *in*determinate – it names an atmosphere, not a feature. Unlike Benjamin's "aura," however, this sense is not a mysterious, spiritual emanation we "breathe" ("*die Aura ... atmen*"; Benjamin 1991, 440) but a duly transcendental-logically backed form of awareness. Reminiscent of Benjamin's evanescent phenomenon, yet cognitively more robust, I accordingly consider it quasi-auratic.

difficulty that must be addressed up front. From the perspective of the *Critique of Pure Reason* – and, in general, within a logical framework whose paradigm case of judgment is predicative (i.e., determining) judgment – the combination of epistemic apriority, transcendental necessity, logical singularity, and quasi-auratic predicative holism that characterizes a priori reflecting judgments of purposiveness appears to be fully – and flagrantly – inconsistent.[19,20] According to that paradigm, epistemically a priori and transcendentally necessary judgments can only be logically universal, not logically singular judgments.[21] What they say applies to all or, failing that, to no objects; but not to some (and not to others). To make matters worse, the proposed phenomenal manifestation of these a priori-yet-singular reflecting judgments of purposiveness (namely an empirically ungrounded sense of their objects' artifactuality) cannot but sound unduly esoteric to Kantian ears and so appear to be well beyond the critical-philosophical pale. If, by the lights of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the price of admission to Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment* requires payment in illogical and uncritical coin, then that, surely, is not the show we came to see.

As a result, interpreters often try, incongruously, to retrofit Kant's systemic innovations in the third *Critique* with the more comforting conventions governing "the land of pure understanding" (A 235/B 294) from whose shores Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment* so intrepidly cuts loose (following a somewhat bungled maiden voyage in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic in the first *Critique*, of which more in Section 3.2.1). Even employing this inverted heuristic, admirable sense can still be made of some of the doctrines of the third *Critique*. But we cannot truly understand what Kant is trying to teach us about the reflecting power of judgment, its a priori principle, the a priori reflecting judgments that principle governs, and, most importantly, the broadly teleological (aesthetic and biological) phenomena those judgments seek to capture if, guided by a desire for safe passage, we misread reflection as a form of determination.[22]

Nor are the consequences of the hermeneutically sounder approach of casting off alongside Kant and meeting the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* on its own terms as dire as feared. First, there are sound structural considerations that make the transcendental principle of nature's purposiveness a philosophical

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[19] For the characteristic of epistemic apriority, see CJ, 5:193.25–27, 194.15–17; for transcendental necessity, see CJ, 5:288.14–20; for logical singularity, see CJ, 5:288.14–20; for quasi-auratic predicative holism, see CJ, 5:314.32–33, 377.10–13.

[20] See Beck (1978, 169). [21] See B 4.

[22] The "inverted heuristic" involves a cluster of related misreadings that include interpreting a priori reflecting judgments of purposiveness (a) as a posteriori judgments, (b) on the model of concept-forming syntheses, (c) as concerned with final causes, and (d) as primarily object-directed as opposed to self-given (autonomous) and self-governing (heautonomous) cognitions.

necessity within Kant's critical epistemology (see Sections 4.3.2 and 4.4.1–2) and that make the a priori-yet-singular reflecting judgments of purposiveness that derive from that principle consistent with logic and transcendental logic alike (see Sections 5.4.4 and 5.5). Second, scary talk of auras may lose some of its immediate terror when we consider a fundamental truth from the philosophy of biology that sometimes gets lost in contemporary debates about biological functions: functional relations are not observationally accessible – but they are not imaginary either. Kant's theory of a priori reflecting judgments of purposiveness is deeply committed to and expressive of that truth. In a pivotal passage, Kant puts the matter this way: "the purposiveness of a thing, insofar as it is *presented in perception*, is not a property of the object itself (since such a property *cannot be perceived*)" (CJ, 5:189.21–22, my emphases). We do not perceive a biological trait's for-the-sake-of-ness – but we necessarily judge the trait to exhibit it. The idea of *imperceptibilia* in perception reflects Kant's basic critical outlook that "all our cognition commences *with* experience, yet it does not on that account all arise *from* experience" (B 1). As applied here, the outlook suggests that judging a biological trait teleologically is entirely nonoptional. A trait would not be a *trait* – an organ would not be an *organ* – if we did not antecedently (and, in the absence of observational access, nonempirically) frame it in functional terms.

Despite an undeniable reimagining of the critical framework in response to unprecedented challenges from within – specifically, (a) a threat of "transcendental chaos" between sensibility and understanding (see Section 4.2.3) and, as a consequence of the critical-philosophical response to that first threat, (b) a subsequent threat of "critical chaos" between reflection and determination (see Section 5.5) – and despite a considerable degree of philosophical daring exhibited in the process, Kant's third *Critique* is, at bottom, a conservative book, one that seeks to complete rather than to undo critical philosophy.

1.2.4 Transcendental and Empirical Dimensions of Teleology

If a priori reflecting judgments of purposiveness are the principal vehicles for the aesthetic and biological doctrines of Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, then how do they work? As noted, the peculiarity of these judgments is that, despite the apriority of their attribution of purposiveness, they are logically singular first-order judgments or judgments that attribute purposiveness only to select individuals situated in certain empirical contexts. Setting aside the central question how these epistemic and logical characteristics can possibly coexist in the same cognitive structure and how the structure that unites them comes to be in the first place (see the discussion of nature's *saltūs* in Sections 2.2.4 and 5.4.4),