

Index

- academic censorship in China, 10
- alternative mechanisms, improves
 - cooperation, 3
- anarchy
 - economic analysis of, 1
 - explanation from law and economics
 - scholars, 1
 - explanation from public choice scholars, 1
 - Hobbesian anarchy, 2
 - life under, 1
 - public choice analysis of, 1
 - a state of, 1
 - undermines social cooperation, 1
 - as an unstable outcome, 1
- assurance, concept of, 125
- authoritarian state, 7
 - achieves legitimacy, 7, 92
 - impacts the development of illegal markets, 9
 - lacks checks and balances, 6
- bargaining power
 - concept of, 17, 35–36
 - against governmental interference, 104
 - in small property right housing market, 103
- Bo Xilai, 53
- Boettke, Peter, 16
- campaign-style anti-corruption approach, 113
- campaign-style law enforcement, 39
- campaign-style policing, 78
- case study, definition of, 43
- chengguan*, 12, 43
 - adopt soft strategies, 43
 - and corruption, 77
 - create a “grey space,” 75, 77
 - earn extra-budgetary revenue, 75
 - enforce laws and regulations, 44
 - frontline city management officers, 48
 - and informal payments, 77
 - notorious reputation, 74
 - power abuse, 77
 - regulate street vending, 62, 71
 - sell genuine protection, 77
 - street vendor removal policy, 80
 - violent conflicts with street vendors, 73–74
- China, 8
 - allocation of public resources in China, 125
 - authoritarian state, features of, 7
 - its cadre management system, 52
 - central government of, 7
 - as a decentralized authoritarian system, 5
 - first-tier cities, 47, 50
 - lacks political constraints, 5
 - local governments
 - implement policies, 7
 - weak local governments, 7
 - personnel system, 6, 53, 126
 - as a predatory state, 4–5, 172
 - second-tier cities, 47
 - third-tier cities, 50
 - uneven development, 6
 - urbanization
 - features of, 8
 - and land value, 91
 - and small property right housing
 - markets, 49
 - urban–rural gap, 5
- China’s anti-corruption campaign, 45, 52–53, 111, 113, 128, 165
 - anti-corruption agencies, 113
 - reforms of, 128
 - and increased risk of punishment, 128

- Chinese government
 - anti-crime policies, 7
 - creates and promotes illegal markets, 5–7
 - crime control, 78, 174
 - outright dismissal, 37
 - as a predatory state, 9
- Chongqing, 53
- Chongqing model, 53
- CNKI, 57
- Coase, Ronald, 23
- collective action capacity, 103
- collective action problems, 23
- collective resistance, 32
 - its effectiveness, 32
- commitment problem, definition of, 19
- community, attributes of, 25
- community-based institutions, 9
- compromising information, 20
 - asymmetric sharing of, 144, 157
 - and development of technologies, 144
 - examples of, 141, 144
 - as hostage-taking, 144
 - sharing of, 20, 140
 - symmetric sharing of, 144
- consumerism, culture of, 148
- conventional study of law and economics, 2
- corrupt intermediaries, 129, 136
 - categories of, 132, 135
 - choice of, 131
 - facilitate corrupt exchanges, 130
 - facilitate information-sharing, 132
 - initiate corrupt exchanges, 130–131
 - lobbying, 132
 - mianzi* of, 133
 - as a protective shield, 133
 - and reputation, 131
 - roles of, 129–130, 132–133, 138
 - secretaries, 135
- corrupt relations, 116
- corrupt transactions
 - actors, 116
 - asset specificity, 116
 - asynchronous nature of, 14
 - bribe payment, 13, 111, 118, 122–123, 133–134, 138
 - cultural meanings of, 134
 - buyers of corrupt benefits, 110, 117–118, 120
 - characteristics of, 115, 137
 - compromising information, 14, 118, 120, 128–129
 - dishonesty and loss of reputation, 127
 - emotional bonds, 120
 - and face, 126, 166
 - favor-givers, 111, 115, 117, 123, 126, 128, 131–134
 - favor-seekers, 111, 115, 117, 121, 127–128, 130, 138
 - ganqing, 110, 119, 121, 138
 - hostages, 14, 111, 121, 138
 - illustration of, 120
 - information, 110, 115, 121, 123
 - information sharing, 121
 - initiation, 13, 111, 115, 130–131
 - intermediaries, 110, 112, 129–131, 166
 - intermediaries-enabled corrupt exchanges, 131, 134
 - loyalty, 123
 - mianzi*, 110, 166
 - mutually dependent relations, 124
 - and network governance, 110
 - as non-simultaneous transactions, 116
 - opportunistic behavior, 115, 120, 127
 - power asymmetry, 123
 - and prevention of opportunistic behaviors, 110
 - punishment, differential levels of, 111, 117, 120, 128, 174
 - roles of, 134
 - sellers of corrupt benefits, 119, 132
 - social embeddedness of, 110, 118–120, 123, 126, 138, 167, 173
 - strong-tie relations, 14, 120, 122–123, 138
 - transaction costs and exchange risks, 13
 - trustworthiness, 123
 - weak-tie relations, 120
- corruption
 - among *chengguan*, 76
 - among street-level bureaucrats, 75
 - buying and selling of government jobs, 52
 - in China, 6, 137
 - classifications of, 112
 - common misunderstanding of, 124
 - and conflicts of interest, 174
 - definition of, 112
 - in different sectors, 113
 - its effects on China's economic growth, 113
 - extravagant position-related consumption, 6
 - family corruption, 126
 - forms of, 112
 - gift-giving, 6
 - greases the wheels of economic growth, 113
 - intensification of, 6
 - intermediaries, 53

- misuse of office, 6
 - primary form of, 6
 - within the public sector, 6
 - rent, 75
 - as sand in the wheels, 113
 - transaction costs of, 116
 - transactive corruption, 6
- credible commitment, 20, 32, 143
- customary institutions, 42
- customary organizations in a fragile state, 4
- cybersex crime in Hong Kong, 34
- cyberviolence, concept of, 159
- democratic states, 9
- diamond industry, 3
- differential punishments, 27, 37, 41, 45–46, 168
- dual-track land system in China, 84
- economic governance, 23
 - bounded rationality, 23, 26, 114
 - definition of, 23, 114
 - ex ante screening, 115, 118, 138
 - ex post safeguards, 115, 117–118
 - opportunism, 23, 114
 - definition of, 115
- economic organization, 23
- Emerson, Richard, 35
- exchange relationships
 - betrayal, price of, 128
 - characteristics of, 10
 - criminal punishment, risk of, 35
 - high-power actors, 35, 40, 117
 - high-risk actors, 35, 37, 40, 117
 - and intermediaries, 38
 - low-power actors, 35–36, 40, 117
 - coercive strategies, 129, 138
 - power-balancing strategies, 36, 111, 118, 136
 - low-risk actors, 35, 37, 40, 46
 - nature of, 11, 17, 34
 - power, unequal distribution of, 36
 - power-dependence perspective, 35
 - power-dependence relationships, 10, 35–36
 - power-imbalanced relationships, 8, 17, 36, 40–41, 45–46, 111, 117, 168
 - punishment, different levels of, 35, 111
 - social space structured around sellers and buyers, 35
 - triadic structure of, 24
- extra revenue from land conveyancing, 5
- extrabudgetary revenue, 7
- extralegal governance institutions, 8, 166–167, 170
 - in authoritarian states, 3
 - bilateral-punishment mechanism, 19
 - collective resistance, 167
 - community-based governance, 163
 - complexity of, 166
 - compromising information, 20, 167
 - concept of, 18
 - customary institutions, 42
 - in dysfunctional states, 3
 - facilitate cooperation, 4
 - facilitate corrupt transactions, 6
 - formation, prevalence, evolution and function of, 3, 163
 - gossip, 20
 - hostage-posting, 20
 - hostage-taking, 164
 - informal control strategies, 164
 - informal elements, 163
 - their interactions with formal institutions, 171
 - lynching, 164
 - multilateral reputation mechanism, 21
 - multilateral punishment mechanism, 19
 - in offline illegal markets, 167
 - past research on, 3–4, 9, 165
 - perform multiple roles, 2–3, 18
 - pirate code, 164
 - prison gangs, 3, 164
 - reputation, 20
 - third-party enforcement, 21
 - arbitrators, 21
 - community-level organizations, 21
 - credit-rating agencies, 21
 - mafia, 21, 30, 61
 - market association leaders, 21
 - merchants' guilds, 21
 - prison gangs, 21
- extravagant position-related consumption, 113
- face
 - Barbalet's account of, 126
 - as a compelling power, 135
 - concept of, 111, 124–125
 - and corrupt transactions, 126
 - as an ex post safeguard, 118
 - functions as the assurance mechanism, 125, 130, 133, 136, 138–139
 - as a governance mechanism, 112
 - governs intermediaries-enabled corrupt exchanges, 137
 - loss of, 111, 125

- face (cont.)
 - and *mianzi*, 124
 - nature of, 135
 - and reciprocity, 126
 - saving face, 125
 - and social norms, 133
 - and social sanctions, 136
- Gambetta, Diego, 143
- ganqing
 - and allocation of public resources, 125
 - and bribe payment, 134
 - definition of, 14, 138
 - depth of, 131
 - and face, 120
 - as a guarantee in exchange relationships, 120
 - as hostage, 138
 - and intermediaries, 133
 - as a prerequisite for corrupt transactions, 119
 - in social exchanges, 121
 - and strong ties, 119
- gossip, 20
 - and face, 125
 - information sharing, 125, 127, 136–138
 - and reputation, 125, 127, 134, 136
 - role of, 125
 - transmits reputation information, 20
 - and WeChat groups, 98
- governance, concept of, 17
- government
 - facilitates social exchanges, 18
 - local governments implement policies, 7
 - modern governments, 2
 - nondemocratic governments, 2
 - as a protector, 1
- government appointments, buying and selling of, 14, 52
 - nature of, 110
 - price, 121
- Granovetter, Mark, 24, 119
- guanxi*
 - and anti-corruption investigations, 128
 - changing function of, 4
 - definition of, 110
 - facilitates corruption, 110
 - and *guanxi wang*, 97
 - norms, 126
 - and *renqing shigu*, 126
 - resilience of, 9
 - triadic structure of, 125
 - and WeChat groups, 97–98
- Hobbes, Thomas, 1, 4
- hostage holding, 38
- hostage-posting, 20
- hostage-taking, 143
 - compromising information as
 - hostage-taking, 144
 - social ties as hostage-taking, 143
- hukou*, 6
- human behavior, basic assumptions of, 25
- illegal entrepreneurs
 - bribe public officers, 30
 - create legal business ventures, 31
 - lower the risk of being punished, 31
 - use internet-based strategies, 7
 - use network information, 31
- illegal markets
 - categorization of, 39
 - characteristics of, 8, 11
 - hidden and nonviolent, 7
 - in China, 7
 - core features of, 44
 - decriminalization of, 172
 - definition of, 21–22
 - grease the palms of regulators, 29
 - grease the wheels of the commerce, 29
 - illegal and illegitimate markets, 30
 - illegal but legitimate markets, 29, 33
 - illegitimate illegal markets, 10, 39
 - internal differentiation of, 28
 - vs. legal markets, 143
 - legitimate illegal markets, 10, 39, 59
 - legalization of, 172
 - major risks, 143
 - moral legitimacy of, 27
 - nature of, 16
 - social legitimacy of, 8, 16, 39
 - social order of, in cyberspace, 140
 - state responses to illegal markets, 27, 30, 143, 172
- illegal moneylending, concept of, 142
- illegal online lending market. *See* peer-to-peer lending market
- illegal transactions
 - actors, 116
 - context-specific explanations of, 168
 - cooperation in illegal transactions, 143
 - in cyberspace, 162
 - and dispute resolution, 116
 - governance mechanism of, 14
 - regulation of, 146
 - social embeddedness of, 36, 38

- illicit markets
 - morality of, 16, 27, 29
 - in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, 29
- informal economies
 - in China, 79
 - informal and illegal economies,
 - distinction of, 21–22
 - nature of, 79
- informal financing mechanisms, 4, 9
- informal institutions. *See* extralegal governance institutions
- informal land use, 92
- informal markets in Lagos, 3
- information hostages, 34
- information technologies, 33
- institutions
 - definition of, 18
 - as equilibria, 18
 - as rules of the game, 23
- interdisciplinary collaboration, 41
 - between new institutional economics and economic sociology, 24–26
- internet anonymity, 33
 - and dishonesty, 34
 - facilitates online illegal markets, 38
- internet finance industry, 147
- internet technologies
 - internet-based strategies used by illegal entrepreneurs, 7
 - promote illegal businesses, 40
- land property rights in China, 5, 9
 - characteristics of, 5
 - land-use rights, 45
 - urban and rural land, ownership of, 5
 - user rights to collectively owned land, 81
- land use order in China, 81
- lawlessness and economics, 2
- lawyers as crime facilitators, 158
- legal rules, the effect of, 2
- legitimacy
 - concept of, 27–28
 - connections between social legitimacy and political legitimacy, 28
 - moral legitimacy, 29
 - social legitimacy, definition of, 28
- legitimate illegality, 29
- loan sharks, 141
 - bribe police officers, 146, 162
 - confront risks, 145
 - debt-trapping strategies, 151
 - avoiding criminal punishment, 156
 - false advertising, strategy of, 152
 - obfuscation of interest rate information, 152, 154, 156
 - prolonging the borrower's indebtedness, 156
 - employ deceptive techniques, 141
 - face new challenges in cyberspace, 146
 - meet normative expectations, 151
 - and networked technologies, 146
 - purchase services from lawyers, 158–159
 - and repayment enforcement, 145–146
 - threaten use of litigation, 159
 - use compromising information as collateral, 14, 157, 167
 - naked photos and pornographic videos, 157–158, 160, 162, 174
 - social contacts, 157, 162
 - use cyberviolence, 147, 160, 162
 - text-bombing, 160–161
 - use relational repression, 147, 159, 161
- loan-sharking businesses, social embeddedness of, 145
- local law enforcement agencies
 - adopt a zero-tolerance approach, 78
 - and extrabudgetary revenue, 7
 - their strategies to curb illegal markets, 17
 - their willingness to curb illegal markets, 7, 30
 - their willingness to implement laws, 30
- mafia
 - literature on mafia, 61
 - mafia-like organizations, 21
 - and privatized coercion, 30
 - as protectors, 61
- market association leaders, 3, 21
- money, perception of, 122
- moral hazard, 33
- multidisciplinary approach, 169
- multiple case study approach, 14
- multiple case study design, 8, 12, 42–43, 46, 57, 166
 - its limitations, 58
 - research implications, 170
 - vs. single case design, 43
- neoclassical economics, 22
- networked technologies, 27
- new economic sociology, emergence of, 24
- new institutional economics
 - differs from economic sociology, 25
 - methodological individualism, 22
 - and its sociological turn, 24
 - transaction costs, 22

- new socio-economics, 26
- non-state institutions. *See* extralegal governance institutions
- online loan-sharking, 55
- organized crime
 - concept of, 142
 - as criminal activities, 142
 - as a form of extra-legal governance, 142
 - hide and bribe, 31
 - as a hierarchical enterprise, 142
- organized crime groups
 - bribe police officers, 145
 - harness the internet, 140
 - as protectors, 143
 - recruit solicitors, 145, 158
- peer-to-peer lending market, 55
 - conventional criminal groups, roles of, 141
 - criminal opportunities in cyberspace, 150
 - and culture of consumerism, 148
 - dark side of, 147
 - demand-side explanation of, 147
 - e-commerce players, 149
 - financial exclusion of university and college students, 149
 - and growth of consumer borrowing, 148
 - nature of, 45
 - parents, roles of, 150, 158, 161
 - police officers, roles of, 151
 - reputation mechanism, roles of, 14
 - rise and demise of, 147
 - students as suitable targets, 150
 - students as victims, 150, 158
 - supply-side explanation of, 149
 - universities and colleges, roles of, 150
- peer-to-peer lending platforms, 55
- pirates
 - and pirate code, 3
 - and pirate customs, 3
- political legitimacy, 32
 - concept of, 28
- political patronage, 33
- political–criminal nexus, 53
 - abuse of power and provision of protection, 32
 - bribery, 31
- politically sensitive topics in China, 11, 166
- power, perception of, 122
- power dynamics, 27
 - theory of, 17
- power-dependence theory, 35, 114, 117–118, 138
- power–money exchanges, 6, 52, 122
- predatory governments, 2
 - Soviet Union, 29
 - undermine social cooperation, 2
- prison gangs, 3, 21
- prisoner's dilemma, 1
- private governance. *See* extralegal governance institutions
- private ordering through internal organization (hierarchy), 23
- public appointments, buying and selling of, 6, 117–118
 - bribery, 6
 - and capability, 124
 - consultation before formal meetings, 127
 - decisions concerning personnel matters, 126
 - as an investment, 123
 - nature of, 45
 - power abuse, 122, 127
- qualitative research methods, 42, 47
 - comparative historical research, 170
 - ethical issues, 49, 54, 57, 166
 - field trips, 51
 - informal conversations, 51
 - in the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis, 43
 - interviews, 47, 50, 53–54, 57
 - language barriers, 10
 - their limitations, 58
 - participant observation, 48–49, 69
 - participant recruitment, 56, 171
 - and political atmosphere, 55, 166
 - published materials, 51, 57, 171
 - CNKI, 57
 - roles of intermediaries, 54
 - roles of social connections, 53
 - selection bias, 51
 - snowball sampling method, 47, 50
 - WeChat groups, 50
- rational–legal principle, 125
- real-estate sector
 - in China, 81
 - price of commercial housing, 84
- reciprocity, principle of, 78
- relational repression, 140
 - concept of, 141, 160
- relational work, 26
- relationship-based mechanisms, 27, 33
- reputation, 20
 - and compromising information, 144

- and corrupt intermediaries, 131
- and corrupt transactions, 126–127
- in dense networks, 98
- and face, 110–111, 124, 136
- functioning of, 101
- and gossip, 19–20, 98, 125, 127
- as hostage, 96
- informational function of, 14
- and information-sharing, 13, 99
- loss of, 21, 96–97, 111, 127
- and *mianzi*, 14, 124
- in offline illegal markets, 167
- reputation for trustworthiness, 13, 115
- reputational information, 34, 98, 121, 145
- sanctioning function of, 14
- and WeChat, 83, 109
- research questions, 4
- risk, 11
 - context-specific risks, 17, 41
 - criminal punishment, 39, 166
 - different categories of, 39
 - lenient punishment, 39
 - market-based uncertainties, 4, 12, 39, 44–45, 166
 - political–legal risks, 4, 9, 45, 166–167
 - risks experienced by exchange partners, 10
- routine activity theory, 149
- routine policing, 78
- rural-to-urban migrants, 6, 61
- shared knowledge, concept of, 73
- Silk Road, 34
- small property right housing
 - categories of, 109
 - definition of, 12, 44, 81
 - development patterns of, 82, 87
 - its effects on social welfare, 82
 - illegal nature of, 12, 45, 81
 - price of, 82, 86–87
 - social legitimacy of, 107–108
 - and village redevelopment programs, 107
- small property right housing market, 12, 50, 81, 91, 101
 - agencies as information transmitters, 99–100
 - agencies as institutional entrepreneurs, 99
 - in Beijing, 105
 - collective action problems, 104
 - demand side, 85
 - external developers' small property right housing, 83, 89, 108
 - demolition, 105
 - feature of, 89
 - price of, 90
- extralegal governance institutions, 83, 93–94, 102, 109, 173
 - codified documents, 93, 95
 - collective resistance, 13, 83, 103–104, 109
 - common knowledge, 93–95
 - contracts, 94
 - contract-signing rituals, 94–96
 - exchange testimonies, 94
 - green books, 93
 - home address as hostage, 96
 - hostage-posting, 96–97
 - political patronage, 13, 83, 106, 109
 - professional third parties, 95
 - reputation, 98
 - reputation as hostage, 96
 - signaling, 96
 - social sanctions and collective resistance, 104
 - titling certificates, 95
 - WeChat groups, 13, 97
 - WeChat groups and gossip, 98
 - WeChat groups and information transmission, 98–99
 - WeChat groups members, 97
 - written documents, 13
- farmer housing
 - definition of, 87
 - spatial feature of, 87
- government interference, 13, 92
- lacks access to state institutions, 93
- market uncertainties, 82, 90
 - opportunistic behavior, 90
- nature of, 13, 43, 84
- political uncertainties, 82, 90
 - demolition, 105–106
 - government interference, 91, 103, 105–108
- purchasing informal housing as an investment, 100
- roles of village committees, 100, 102, 105
 - managing a registration database, 100
 - punishing opportunists, 101
 - punishments as public services, 102
 - as sellers and buyers, 100
 - solving information asymmetry, 101
 - third-party witness, 100
- in Sanya, 106
- in Shenzhen, 86
- size of, 81, 86
- social legitimacy of, 44, 85–86, 92, 104, 107, 173
- supply side, 85

- small property right housing market (cont.)
 - village committee small property right housing, 83, 88
 - Bai Ge Zhuang village, 88
 - collective resistance, 89, 104
 - daily management of, 89
 - features of, 88
 - green books, 89
 - social legitimacy of, 107
- village committees
 - dual organizational nature of, 102
 - multiple roles of, 13
- village leaders, 104
- social acceptability, 21
- social embeddedness, 24–25
 - assures secrecy, 31
 - network information, 31
 - strong bonds among criminal collaborators, 31
- social relations
 - as hostage-taking, 31, 162
 - provide information, 33, 156
- socio-economic approach, 10–11, 16, 26, 58, 139, 167, 169
 - analytical approach, 16–17, 26, 44, 169
 - macro dimensions, 10, 16, 27, 39–40, 45, 168
 - micro dimensions, 10, 16–17, 27, 34, 41, 45, 168
 - sociological concepts, 168
 - transaction cost theory, 168
 - socio-economic approach to study corruption, 114
- soft policing strategies, 47
- state capacity, 1
- state capacity libertarianism
 - concept of, 2
 - contradicts political economy literature, 2
- state capacity literature, 1
- state enforcement of prohibitions, 30, 143
- state enforcement of property rights, 2
- state intervention in economic life, 30
- state protection, 18, 30
 - formal institutions, 165, 170
 - change of, 171
 - their relations with extralegal governance institutions, 163, 170
 - safeguarding legal markets, 142
 - state-provided governance institutions, 18
- state repression, 16
 - outright dismissal, 37
 - role of, 39
 - selective or lax enforcement, 31–32
 - state repression of illegal markets, 30
 - strong state repression, 31
 - weak state repression, 32
- state-constructed dichotomy of legal/illegal, 28
- street vending, 59
 - criminalization of, 78
 - in Guangzhou, 62
 - and local gangs, 78
 - regulatory measures in Guangzhou, 63
 - regulatory policies on street vendors, 62–63
 - state regulation of, 63, 173
- street vendors, 47–48
 - attract media and academic attention, 62
 - avoid competitive bidding and marketing, 67–69
- avoidance
 - definition of, 71
 - strategy of, 71
- cat-and-mouse game, 71
- in China, 47
- common interests, 64
- coordinate actions, 64
- create situational stress to resist law enforcement, 74
- crowd-source moral support from the public, 74
- definition of, 61
- develop norms of distributing space, 69–70
- establish close ties with *chengguan*, 76
- face fines, 63
- face market-based risks, 60
- face political–legal uncertainties, 60
- and failed cases, 79
- first come, first served rule, 69–70
- form cohesive groups, 64
- form mutual aid groups, 64
- form private governance organizations, 59–60, 78
- form strong groups, 75
- gain licences through formal procedures, 76
- gentle regulation of, 63
- in Guangzhou, 65
- hierarchical structure of, 76–77
- information-sharing, 65–66
- join QQ groups, 65
- join the informal consignment system, 67
- join WeChat groups, 65
- migrants as street vendors, 61
- and mutual aid, 12, 73
- number of, 62
- purchase protection from state agents, 59, 75, 79
- rental fee, 77

- resistance, 72
 - collective resistance, 72, 74
 - definition of, 72
- rule of first possession, 69
- safeguard two types of property right, 60
- share warehouse storage costs, 67
- and shared knowledge, 73, 78
- street vendor gangs, 73
- in Thailand and India, 69
- unwritten rule of avoiding competition, 68
- use information-sharing to address
 - chengguan*'s harsh enforcement approach, 71
- use intermediaries, 76
- use violence to against law enforcement, 73
- as walking devils, 62
- strict enforcement of prohibitions, 31
- strong ties
 - and ganqing, 119
 - in the illegal job market, 119
- strong-tie relationships, informational
 - function of, 118
- subjective game model, 23
- Sweep Away Black and Eradicate Evil
 - campaign, 45, 57, 166
- tax-sharing system in China, 91
- third-party intervention, 24
- thugs-for-hire, 30
- tie strength, 119
 - indicator of, 119
- traditional organized crime groups
 - their cooperation-enhancement strategies, 141
 - definition of, 142
 - harness the internet, 140
 - move their businesses online, 141
- transaction as a bilateral or dyadic relation, 23
- transaction cost economics
 - analyse corrupt transactions, 115
 - cognitive and behavioral assumptions, 115
 - and embeddedness, 26
- transaction cost theory, 23, 114, 118, 137
- transaction costs, 22
 - asset specificity, 116
- transaction-cost economics, 114
- triad members in Hong Kong, 31, 61
- urban-biased land development policy, 5
- Varese, Federico, 61, 143
- village committees, dual organizational
 - nature of, 100
- violence as a means of enforcement, 7, 14, 38, 96, 140, 143, 145–146, 160
- Weber, Max, 16, 168
- WeChat, 97
- Wedeman, Andrew, 6, 113
- Yin, Robert, 43, 46