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Elements in Epistemology
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ON BELIEVING AND BEING CONVINCED

Paul Silva Jr
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Elements in Epistemology

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Abstract: Our doxastic states are our belief-like states, and these include *outright* doxastic states and *degreed* doxastic states. The former include believing that *p*, having the opinion that *p*, thinking that *p*, being sure that *p*, being certain that *p*, and doubting that *p*. The latter include degrees of confidence, credences, and perhaps some phenomenal states. But we also have *conviction* (being convinced *simpliciter* that *p*) and *degrees of conviction* (being *more or less* convinced that *p*). This Element shows: how and why *all* of the outright doxastic states mentioned above can be reduced to conviction thresholds; what degrees of conviction fundamentally are (degreed reliance-dispositions); why degrees of conviction are not credences; when suspending a belief is compatible with continuing to believe; and the surprising extent to which Kant endorsed the theory of conviction that emerges in this Element.

Keywords: belief, convinced, conviction, credence, certainty, confidence

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