

Inside Parties

While extensive research examines electoral systems and institutions at the country level, few studies investigate rules within parties. *Inside Parties* changes the research landscape by systematically examining sixty-five parties in twenty parliamentary democracies around the world. Georgia Kernell develops a formal model of party membership and tests the hypotheses using cross-national surveys, member studies, experiments, and computer simulations of projected vote shares. She finds that a party's level of decentralization – that is, the degree to which it incorporates rank and file members into decision making – determines which voters it best represents. Decentralized parties may attract more members to campaign for the party, but they do so at the cost of adopting more extreme positions that pull them away from moderate voters. *Inside Parties* is an indispensable study of how parties select candidates, nominate leaders, and set policy goals.

Georgia Kernell is an associate professor in the Departments of Communication and Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles.



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(continued after the index)



Inside Parties

How Party Rules Shape Membership and Responsiveness

GEORGIA KERNELL

University of California, Los Angeles







Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,
New Delhi – 110025, India

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For my parents



Contents

$L\iota$	st of Figures	page xi
Li	st of Tables	xiii
Ac	knowledgements	XV
I	Introduction	I
	The Importance of Party Rules	5
	Inside Parties: The Tradeoff to Decentralization	7
	Competing Perspectives on Party Organization	9
	Data, Case Selection, and Methodology	12
	Plan of the Book	13
2	A Model of Party Membership	16
	Why Join?	20
	A Model of Party Membership	24
	Selective Benefits of Membership	25
	Instrumental Benefits of Membership	27
	Extensions	37
	Mobilization	37
	Party Weights and Majoritarian Systems	39
	The Role of Party Size	41
	Discussion	42
3	Comparing Party Organizations	46
	An Overview of the Data	47
	Definitions	47
	Case Selection	48
	Case Characteristics	49
	Data Sources: Statutes and Interviews	5 5
	Party Constitutions and Statutes	5 5
	Interviews	58

vii



viii Contents

	Varieties of Parties	60
	Candidate Selection	61
	Leadership Selection	71
	Platforms and Policy	76
	Other Organizational Rules	79
	Alternative Data Sources	79
	Discussion	81
4	Party Members: Motivations, Attitudes, and Behaviors	83
	A Brief Overview of Party Members	85
	Party Membership Data	90
	Party-Reported Membership Levels	91
	Cross-national Surveys	92
	Single Country or Party Surveys	93
	Party Organization and Aggregate Membership Levels	94
	Variables	95
	Results	99
	Individual-Level Determinants of Membership	104
	European Social Survey	105
	World Values Survey	118
	International Social Survey Programme	120
	Member Behavior in Canada	121
	Study of Canadian Political Party Members (2000)	121
	Canadian Election Study (2015)	124
	Discussion	125
5	A Causal Connection? A Survey Experiment of British	
,	Labour Voters	128
	Party Membership in the UK	129
	Screening Study	131
	Experimental Design	131
	Selective Incentives: Fees	132
	Instrumental Incentives: Party Organization	133
	Manipulation Checks	135
	Results	136
	Fees	137
	Party Organization	140
	Discussion	145
6	Party Responsiveness	148
	Decentralization and Responsiveness: Expectations	150
	Electoral Success	151



Contents	ix
Measurement	153
Locating a Party's Vote-Maximizing Position in the Electorate	154
Relating Party Organization to Responsiveness	161
Interior and Exterior Parties	162
Regression Results	165
Discussion	166
7 Conclusion	169
Revisiting the Argument and Findings	170
Causes of (De)centralization	171
Candidate Quality and Insights from American Primaries	174
Future Research on Party Rules in Comparative Democratic Polit	ics 177
Government Formation and Duration	177
Legislative Behavior and Candidate Heterogeneity	178
Partisanship and Participation	178
Concluding Example: Australia's Labor Party	179
APPENDICES	
Appendix A Proofs	185
Appendix B List of Interviews	189
Appendix C List of Party Statutes	197
Appendix D Chapter 4 Supplementary Tables	206
D.1 Regression Results for the World Values Survey	206
D.2 Regression Results for the International Social Survey	
Programme	212
D.3 Canadian Election Study (2015)	213
Appendix E Chapter 6 Supplementary Information	214
E.1 Decentralization and Representation: Theoretical Predictions	214
E.2 Party Responsiveness: Members Approve Policy	218
References	219
Index	235



Figures

2.1	Probability of joining when membership affects the party	
	position	page 31
2.2	Probability of joining when membership affects the	
	government	34
2.3	Probability of joining with high membership influence	35
3.1	Observations by vote share, age, and left-right position	5 5
3.2	Excerpt from Fine Gael (2010) statutes	56
3.3	The values of Members Control Candidate Selection for	
	various parties	70
4.1	Membership, as a percentage of the electorate (1950–2010)	87
4.2	"Become a member" page on the CD&V website	89
4.3	Distribution of parties' annual membership fees	98
4.4	Mean party member and voter locations	106
4.5	Individual-level determinants of party membership,	
	European Social Survey (2002–2011)	109
4.6	Predicted probabilities of joining a party	110
5.1	Membership fees and average interest	137
5.2	The effect of party organization on average interest	141
5.3	Member interest as a function of relative position to Labour	r 143
5.4	Average membership interest by centralized and	
	decentralized treatments	144
6.1	Vote-maximizing positions in eight elections	159
6.2	Vote share at vote-maximizing position versus initial position	on 160
6.3	Average distance from vote-maximizing positions	161



xii	List of Figures	
6.4	Interactive effects of Members Control Leadership Selection	
	and Interior	166
Е.1	Equilibrium and vote-maximizing positions	216
E.2	Stable limit cycle	217



Tables

2.1	Canadian members' motivations for joining	page 22
3.1	List of parties in the IPD	50
3.2	Average Pedersen volatility index, turnout, ENEP, and	
	ENPP, by country	53
3.3	Distribution of cases by electoral system, federalism, and	
	British legacy	54
3.4	Members Control Candidate Selection coding	68
3.5	Members Control Leadership Selection coding	75
4.I	Member-Voter Percent as a function of party fees and	
	decentralization	100
4.2	Membership as a function of various individual-level	
	attributes and fees, European Social Survey (2002–2011)	108
4.3	Party distance and membership in centralized parties,	
	European Social Survey (2002–2011)	II2
4.4	Membership as a function of various measures of member	
	influence, European Social Survey (2002–2011)	116
4.5	Membership motivations and behaviors, Study of Canadian	L
	Political Party Members (2000)	123
5.1	Fee experiment: three conditions	132
5.2	Decentralization experiment: three conditions	134
5.3	The conditional effect of fees and income on membership	
	interest and investment	139
5.4	Membership Interest as a function of Distance in the	
	centralized treatment	145
6. т	Vote shares by party decentralization	T 5 2

xiii



xiv	List of Tables	
6.2	Multinomial logit estimates of vote choice in Germany's	
	2009 election	156
6.3	Party distance from vote-maximizing position	164
$\mathrm{D.}\mathrm{I}$	Membership as a function of individual-level attributes and	
	fees, World Values Survey (2005–2020)	206
D.2	Party distance and membership in centralized parties,	
	World Values Survey (2005–2020)	208
D.3	Membership as a function of various measures of member	
	influence, World Values Survey (2005–2020)	210
D.4	Membership as a function of individual-level attributes and	
	fees, International Social Survey Programme (2004)	212
D.5	Members' motivations and behaviors, Canadian Election	
	Study (2015)	213
Е.1	Party responsiveness to vote-maximizing position	218



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xvi

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