

ENEMIES IN AGREEMENT

Why do adversaries sometimes cooperate to restrain their military competition? Why do they design arms control agreements with intrusive verification in some cases but rely on minimal transparency in others? Amidst ongoing international competition, arms control remains rare despite potential mutual benefits, and agreements vary dramatically in their approaches to monitoring. This book reveals how uncertainty from domestic political changes – such as leadership transitions or social unrest – can enable arms control. It identifies two paths to agreement: during periods of uncertainty, states that previously relied on informal understandings hedge by establishing lightly monitored agreements, while those that anticipated deception take calculated risks through agreements with intensive verification. Through comprehensive data analysis and rich case studies, Jane Vaynman challenges conventional wisdom about uncertainty in international relations while offering insights for policymakers. As states confront challenges from nuclear competition to emerging technologies, understanding when arms control becomes viable is more vital than ever.

JANE VAYNMAN is Assistant Professor of Strategic Studies in the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. She holds a PhD in political science from Harvard University and a BA in international relations from Stanford University. Vaynman has been Lightning Scholar at Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania, a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a Fulbright Fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center. From 2022 to 2024 she served as a senior advisor in the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability at the US Department of State.

“A must-read for scholars and policymakers alike, this book offers a novel perspective on a long-standing puzzle in international security: why states sometimes agree to arms control while often failing to do so. Its multi-method approach combines theoretical innovation, rigorous data analysis, and detailed case studies – from Cold War-era treaties to contemporary nuclear negotiations – to challenge conventional wisdom on uncertainty in world politics. Its timely findings provide crucial insights for managing military competition in an era of geopolitical upheaval. A landmark contribution to the study of arms control and international diplomacy.”

Allison Carnegie
Professor of Political Science, Columbia University

“Jane Vaynman’s core insight in this wonderful book is unexpected and unique: arms control agreements arise from uncertainty. It is a great message to policymakers in Russia, China and the United States: look for windows of opportunity to negotiate during times of rapid change and mistrust – like today.”

Rose Gottemoeller, William J. Perry Lecturer, Stanford University

“Jane Vaynman’s new book is a generational leap ahead in our knowledge about arms control and international cooperation. It explores the puzzle of arms control – when states make choices to restrain themselves in developing military capabilities – and when they do not. Through multiple methods including quantitative analysis of arms control agreements and information exchange and detailed analysis of key cases from the Cold War. Her reframing of arms control as a strategic interaction provides a fascinating new path forward to understand the prospects for future international cooperation during a period of immense geopolitical instability. This book has huge relevance for both academics and policymakers. Highly recommended!”

Michael C. Horowitz, Richard Perry Professor,
University of Pennsylvania

“In this superb book, Jane Vaynman solidifies herself as the leading scholar of arms control. She develops a rigorous and compelling theory about when we might have windows of opportunity for arms control, and tests it using a variety of methods including incredibly detailed historical cases not just from the usual US-Soviet instance of arms control, but also from India-Pakistan and Israel-Egypt. She provides scholars with a comprehensive treatment of the rise and fall of arms control, and provides policymakers a blueprint to be prepared to take advantage of future opportunities for arms control agreements to help manage a volatile and dangerous new nuclear age.”

Vipin Narang, Frank Stanton Professor of Nuclear Security,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

“Enemies in Agreement could not be more timely. As Vaynman says, ‘arms control is relatively rare’, but it is also possible amidst the most acute competition. The return of great power competition and rise of China have created an urgent need for new arms control tools to avoid arms racing and misperception. Arms control, as a result, will continue to evolve and Vaynman’s findings will provide an important roadmap for navigating the benefits and tradeoffs of information-sharing, trust-building, and cooperation amidst competition.”

Heather Williams
Director, Project on Nuclear Issues and Senior Fellow, Defense and
Security Department, Center for Strategic and International Studies

ENEMIES IN AGREEMENT

Political Volatility and the Design of Arms Control

JANE VAYNMAN
Johns Hopkins University



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge University Press & Assessment
978-1-009-48650-7 — Enemies in Agreement
Jane Vaynman
Frontmatter
[More Information](#)



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India

103 Penang Road, #05-06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467

Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment,
a department of the University of Cambridge.

We share the University's mission to contribute to society through the pursuit of
education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781009486507

DOI: 10.1017/9781009486491

© Jane Vaynman 2026

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions
of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take
place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press & Assessment.

When citing this work, please include a reference to the DOI 10.1017/9781009486491

First published 2026

Cover image: Cover art by Matt Haynes

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

A Cataloging-in-Publication data record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

ISBN 978-1-009-48650-7 Hardback

ISBN 978-1-009-48648-4 Paperback

Additional resources for this publication at <https://cambridge.org/9781009486507>.

Cambridge University Press & Assessment has no responsibility for the persistence
or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this
publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will
remain, accurate or appropriate.

For EU product safety concerns, contact us at Calle de José Abascal,
56, 1º, 28003 Madrid, Spain, or email eugpsr@cambridge.org

Cambridge University Press & Assessment
978-1-009-48650-7 — Enemies in Agreement
Jane Vaynman
Frontmatter
[More Information](#)

*To my father, Izyaslav Vaynman, who believed in inspiration,
elegant ideas, and a lot of hard work.*

CONTENTS

<i>List of Figures</i>	x
<i>List of Tables</i>	xi
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xii
1 Arms Control Agreements in International Relations	1
2 Cooperation Under Uncertainty: The Domestic Political Determinants of Agreement Design	47
3 The Effects of Political Volatility: A Quantitative Analysis of Agreements	96
4 Agreement at the Height of Tension: The United States, the USSR, and the INF Treaty	144
5 A Hedge on Détente, a Risk After War, and a Bargain in Asymmetric Competition	223
6 Implications for Scholarship and Policy	275
<i>Bibliography</i>	309
<i>Index</i>	329

FIGURES

2.1 State interaction games 59

2.2 Beliefs about state type, degree of monitoring, and agreement outcomes 74

2.3 Increasing uncertainty and agreement likelihood 77

3.1 State participants in arms control agreements 106

3.2 Arms control agreements over time 107

3.3 Dependent variable agreement coding, dyadic view 109

3.4 Effect of domestic political volatility on the probability of an agreement 129

3.5 Effects of cabinet or executive change on agreements (generalized
Ordered Logit) 136

3.6 Effects of demonstrations, riots, or strikes on agreements (generalized
ordered logit) 137

3.7 Percent change in the probability of an agreement with cabinet or executive change
versus stable conditions (generalized ordered logit) 138

TABLES

- 1.1 Ways to categorize agreements 17
- 1.2 Number of agreements by information provision types 23
- 2.1 Beliefs, uncertainty, and theory predictions 79
- 3.1 Agreement information provision types and members 105
- 3.2 Percent of volatile and stable dyads in each agreement category 122
- 3.3 Additional characteristics of dyads by outcome 123
- 3.4 Cabinet and executive change effects on probability of an agreement (logit) 127
- 3.5 Demonstrations, riots and strikes effects on probability of an agreement (logit) 128
- 3.6 Cabinet/executive volatility effects on agreement types (generalized ordered logit) 134
- 3.7 Demonstrations, riots, or strikes volatility effects on agreement types (generalized ordered logit) 135
- 5.1 Theory predictions and case studies 227

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project has grown and evolved over many years of research, writing, and revision. In the world around it, perceptions have gone through periods of both optimism and skepticism about the prospects for arms control and security cooperation through international institutions. Yet each shift has reinforced my belief in the necessity of research that grapples with the complexity of arms control – both its enduring challenges and real opportunities – in ways that can inform real-world choices. I hope that the book has emerged as a text fitting for any moment, rooted in analysis rather than trend or tone.

The book would not have been possible without those who have supported and inspired this work. My dissertation committee played a foundational role. Scott Sagan, Beth Simmons, and Alastair Iain Johnston shepherded the PhD dissertation, which is the basis of this book. A book conference at George Washington University brought valuable perspectives from Charles Glaser, Erik Voeten, Andrew Kydd, Michael Horowitz, Caitlin Talmadge, Elizabeth Saunders, and Alexander Downs, whose detailed critiques strengthened the manuscript immensely.

Several mentors have profoundly influenced this project and my development as a scholar. From the first moment in the CISAC honors college seminar, when he insisted that research should investigate a puzzle, Scott Sagan's perspective has guided my thinking. Every project I undertake includes a "what would Scott think?" step and his voice in my head, along with countless conversations over the years, makes my work better every time. Charlie Glaser's support and his genuine interest in not only specific projects but also ideas and debate writ large, has been invaluable. I will always thank Charlie for instilling a greater confidence in me to pursue ambitious questions and long-term projects. I am also grateful for my longtime collaboration with Frank Gavin. Beginning with a pivotal discussion about the NPT regime while I was still a graduate student, continuing now as colleagues at SAIS, and through numerous conferences and spirited debates, I may not have convinced Frank on

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

xiii

arms control, but he has shaped my growth through his dedication to people and intellectual communities, and his willingness to engage with controversial ideas. I only wish I had more time with Janne Nolan before she passed in 2019. It is truly rare to immediately know that this is what people mean when they use the words mentor and friend. Janne's advice, friendship, and healthy dose of irreverence empower me to think about how to do things in my own way.

The broader academic community has enriched this project immeasurably. For their support and insights, I am especially grateful to Sarah Bush, Austin Carson, Andrew Coe, Fiona Cunningham, Julia Gray, Brenden Rittenhouse Green, Michael Joseph, Julia Macdonald, Alexander Montgomery, Adam Mount, Nicholas Miller, Vipin Narang, Jonathan Renshon, Jacquelyn Schneider, Todd Sechser, Tristan Volpe, and Heather Williams, as well as Temple University IR colleagues Orfeo Fioretos, Alexandra Guisinger, Mark Pollack, and Jessica Stanton. Research and writing for this project were conducted at several institutions that provided resources, space, and vibrant intellectual communities. The Government Department at Harvard University supported the dissertation with rigorous training and exceptional feedback from faculty and fellow graduate students. The Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University has been my intellectual home since undergrad, and I have benefited from numerous opportunities to return for workshops and discussions. The Brookings Institution provided an excellent DC-based environment for completing the initial manuscript draft. I am grateful to the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania, and the Department of Political Science at Temple University, where I completed many of the revisions. The support at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University was critical for getting the final draft over the finish line. My work on this project and related ones was made possible through funding support from The Paul and Daisy Soros Fellowship for New Americans, the Stanton Foundation, Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania, and the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University.

Specific chapters benefited from key individuals. Austin Carson and Jonathan Renshon offered crucial perspectives on the introduction. For Chapter 2, I spent weeks working on game theory with my brother, Igor Vaynman – my fondest memory of this project. Andrew Coe and Michael Joseph further advised me on the game theory, particularly on

how to present it. Alex Montgomery helped launch me on a good path for the statistical analysis in Chapter 3. For the INF case in Chapter 4, Svetlana Savranskaya and David Hoffman helped identify Soviet-side resources and contacts. Elizabeth Charles and James Graham Wilson shared their expertise and archival materials, as well as their enthusiasm for studying this historical period. Tim Tulenko kindly included me in INF Anniversary events and helped identify key participants on the US side of the negotiations.

Research assistants Dominic Cruz Bustillos, Gayden Erickson, Sevdenur Koru, and Ariana Rowberry were instrumental at various stages in hunting down details, suggesting rewrites, and polishing the manuscript. I am also grateful to Jenny Erdmann for editing and reformatting references, Yvette Chin for an excellent index, Isabella Cha for assistance with statistical replication, and Matt Haynes for the inspired cover art. John Haslam and Carrie Parkinson at Cambridge University Press oversaw the transformation from manuscript to book.

In the course of this project, I had the opportunity to engage with policymakers who are directly involved in arms control, build institutions, and develop international cooperation. Dozens sat for interviews, met with me informally, and gave feedback based on their real-world experience. I am very grateful for their time and eagerness to inform my research. I have been fortunate to work for and learn from three leaders in the arms control field – Rose Gottemoeller, Mallory Stewart, and Alexandra Bell. I had opportunities to serve in government in the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability (ADS), previously AVC, where I was a senior advisor from 2022 to 2024. While this book's substantive elements were written before my work at the State Department, the exceptional people in the ADS Bureau and particularly the team in the Office of Strategic Stability and Deterrence (SSD) helped bridge my academic work with policy implementation.

Of course, my government experience warrants an important disclaimer: The opinions and characterizations in this book are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government.

This book was made possible by those who support not just the work itself, but a whole lot of life that surrounds it. My friends Julia Gray and Andrea Tivig have been there for all my moments, good, bad, and really bad. Their friendship has given me strength and clarity when I needed it most. Jonathan Renshon has been a trusted friend and colleague since our graduate school days, offering perspective and encouragement at every stage of my career. Tristan Volpe served as an invaluable sounding

board, particularly in the project's final stages. Adam Mount has been a thoughtful presence through countless late-night conversations, and I am grateful for his support. In the early Cambridge days, Didi Kuo and Serene Hung's friendship sustained me through our shared "dissertating" journey. My family – Mila Epelbaum, Igor Vaynman, Brian Nagendra, and the Vindmans – has encouraged and supported me throughout, in ways both personal and professional. My children, Sadie and Ari, distracted me from writing in all the best ways.

A friend once told me that in government and policy, arms controllers are all optimists. This stems from self-selection; everyone else, disheartened by the long roads and constant setbacks, has long since moved on to other focus areas, and only the optimists are left. Skeptics see arms controllers as idealistic or misguided, advocating for policies that will be unlikely to work. However, having worked within this community, I have found among its members a deep understanding of agreement design complexities, international and domestic politics, and the frequency of failure. Yet they persist, often quietly, always determined, continuing to explore possibilities. The more I study arms control, the more I appreciate those willing to pursue potential pathways even in the most challenging conditions. I think being an arms control optimist means acknowledging reality while refusing to be paralyzed by it.