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Elements in Epistemology
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STRATIFIED VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY

A Defence

J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow



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Cambridge University Press & Assessment
978-1-009-46826-8 — Stratified Virtue Epistemology
J. Adam Carter
Frontmatter
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Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,
New Delhi – 110025, India

103 Penang Road, #05–06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467

Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment,
a department of the University of Cambridge.

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education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781009468268

DOI: 10.1017/9781009067546

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When citing this work, please include a reference to the DOI 10.1017/9781009067546

First published 2023

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-1-009-46826-8 Hardback

ISBN 978-1-009-06619-8 Paperback

ISSN 2398-0567 (online)

ISSN 2514-3832 (print)

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DOI: 10.1017/9781009067546
First published online: December 2023

J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow

Author for correspondence: J. Adam Carter, adam.carter@glasgow.ac.uk

Abstract: This accessible Element defends a version of virtue epistemology shown to have all-things-considered advantages over other views on the market. The view is unorthodox, in that it incorporates Sosa's animal/reflective knowledge distinction, which has thus far had few takers. The author shows why embracing a multi-tiered framework is not a liability within virtue epistemology but instead affords it an edge not attainable otherwise. The particular account of knowledge goes beyond Sosa's own view by introducing and incorporating several theoretical innovations (regarding both basing and risk, as well as the introduction of multiple species of reflective knowledge) that are aimed at revamping how we think about 'high-grade' knowledge, how we attain it, and what it demands of us. The result is a new and improved stratified virtue epistemology that can hold up against scrutiny.

Keywords: virtue epistemology, Sosa, performance normativity, epistemic competence, cognitive achievement

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ISBNs: 9781009468268 (HB), 9781009066198 (PB), 9781009067546 (OC)
ISSNs: 2398-0567 (online), 2514-3832 (print)

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