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Introduction

Douglas Cairns, with Nick Bouras and Eugene Sadler-Smith

Hubris Today

Hubris – in so many ways – is still with us: whatever the news agenda, one can almost guarantee that commentators will reach for the ancient Greek concept as a way of diagnosing the failings of leadership that underpin contemporary crises and catastrophes. It was only a matter of time before someone applied the term to Dominic Cummings' attitude in expecting the British public to believe that, in violation of lockdown restrictions imposed to check the spread of Covid-19, he drove to Barnard Castle to test his eyesight.[1] According to UCL psychologist Robert West, a member of the UK government's Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), the Cummings fiasco was 'playing out like a Greek tragedy with the protagonists trapped by their own proclivities to self-destruct – in his case by his hubris and inability to say sorry'. In a similar vein, 'Hicks, hubris, and not a lot of masks' was the *Guardian* headline that greeted the news that Donald Trump had caught Covid,[2] while the comment of their correspondent Marina Hyde as Boris Johnson's administration became engulfed by Partygate and other scandals was, 'Like me, you probably cannot BELIEVE that after hubris comes nemesis. If only there'd been some clue to this in all that Ancient Greek stuff Boris Johnson is forever wanging on about.'[3] As Johnson's mendacious regime gave way to the short-lived and incompetent

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[1] Sarah Boseley, 'Government's actions show government cannot be trusted, says adviser', *The Guardian*, 25 May 2020: www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/may/25/cummings-row-risks-breach-of-public-trust-says-psychology-expert.

[2] Luke Harding, 'Hicks, hubris and not a lot of masks: The week Trump caught Covid', *The Guardian*, 2 October 2020: www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/02/hicks-hubris-masks-week-donald-trump-caught-covid.

[3] Marina Hyde, 'No party could be worth the hangover Boris Johnson is now suffering', *The Guardian*, 17 December 2021: www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/dec/17/party-hangover-boris-johnson-prime-minister-leadership-contest.

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More Information

interregnum of Liz Truss in the summer of 2022, the chaos created by chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng's disastrous mini-budget brought another flurry of hubris-headlines.[4] In a more reflective vein, Yuval Noah Harari hoped that the Covid-19 pandemic would (but feared that it would not) engender humility rather than hubris in bringing human beings in general and scientists in particular to accept their intellectual and existential limitations.[5] Commentary on the Indian government's responses to the pandemic seemed to trace an arc from pride to complacency to disaster that an ancient Greek audience would readily have understood in terms of *hybris*[6] and its consequences.[7]

These appeals to the notion of hubris rest on aspects of the ancient phenomenon that would have been familiar to the ancient Greeks. But hubris has also taken on a life of its own in contemporary approaches to leadership and business studies and is widely considered to have congeners and analogues in contemporary psychology. But these disciplines are rarely brought into dialogue with the intellectual history of classical Greece, and ancient Greek approaches to *hybris* rarely take account of modern understandings of comparable phenomena. In this volume we seek to remedy that lack by outlining current approaches to hubris/*hybris* in classics, psychology, and business and management studies and exploring the overlap and potential for dialogue between ancient and modern conceptions. Thus the point of this volume is not merely to set ancient and modern conceptions side by side; it is to highlight the potential for comparison to underline points of similarity and difference that may be crucial in identifying what is distinctive about the ancient and modern concepts.

[4] For example, Peter Walker, 'Kwasi Kwarteng was logical choice as chancellor but hubris was his downfall', *The Guardian*, 14 October 2022, www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/oct/14/kwasi-kwarteng-logical-choice-chancellor-hubris-downfall.

[5] Yuval Noah Harari, 'Will coronavirus change our attitudes to death? Quite the opposite', *The Guardian*, 20 April 2020: www.theguardian.com/books/2020/apr/20/yuval-noah-harari-will-coronavirus-change-our-attitudes-to-death-quite-the-opposite.

[6] We use *hybris* for the ancient concept and hubris (no italics) for the modern.

[7] Pride, praise and success: Meenakshi Ray, 'India should be very, very proud: WHO's praise amid falling Covid cases', *Hindustan Times*, 11 February 2021, www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-should-be-very-very-proud-who-s-praise-amid-falling-covid-19-cases-101613056206080.html; complacency: Zainab Sikander in *The Print*, 'Modi govt got blinded by first wave success praise as corona waited to strike', 19 April 2021, https://theprint.in/opinion/modi-govt-got-blinded-by-first-wave-success-praise-as-corona-waited-to-strike/641784/; catastrophe: Michael Safi, '"We are not special": How triumphalism led India to Covid-19 disaster', *The Guardian*, 29 April 2021, www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/29/we-are-not-special-how-triumphalism-led-india-to-covid-19-disaster. See also Arundhati Roy, 'We are witnessing a crime against humanity', *The Guardian*, 28 April 2021, www.theguardian.com/news/2021/apr/28/crime-against-humanity-arundhati-roy-india-covid-catastrophe?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.

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Excerpt
More Information

One response to the proliferation of references to hubris in contemporary media would be to dismiss the phenomenon as merely a reflex, a clichéd slogan, a fossilised and garbled version of the ancient concept that represents no more than an isolated and disconnected fragment of an ancient value system in modern political discourse.[8] And yet, in contemporary disciplines such as psychology and business studies, hubris is increasingly theorised as a term of art with (what its proponents believe to be) real explanatory power. A crucial catalyst here has been the British politician Lord David Owen, former Labour Foreign Secretary and founder of the Social Democratic Party, and, before entering politics, a medical doctor trained in neurology and psychiatry. In 2007 Owen published *The Hubris Syndrome: Bush, Blair and the Intoxication of Power*, focusing largely on the role of Bush and Blair in the invasion of Iraq in 2003.[9] This was followed in 2008 and 2009 by two influential articles on the same subject, one jointly written with Duke University psychiatrist Jonathan Davidson, which diagnosed the syndrome in US presidents and UK prime ministers over the previous century. This body of work led in 2011 to Owen's founding of the Daedalus Trust, dedicated to exploring 'for the public benefit the effects on decision making of leaders in all walks of life who suffered personality change – commonly known as hubris – while in office and who in the words of Bertrand Russell became "intoxicated by power"'.[10]

In specifying the symptomatology of the proposed 'hubris syndrome', Owen and Davidson give the following checklist of symptoms:[11]

1. A narcissistic propensity to see their world primarily as an arena in which to exercise power and seek glory; NPD.6
2. A predisposition to take actions which seem likely to cast the individual in a good light – that is, in order to enhance image; NPD.1
3. A disproportionate concern with image and presentation; NPD.3

[8] Along those lines, see Vincent Azoulay in *Le Monde*: 'Aujourd'hui, l'hubris désigne le comportement d'Emmanuel Macron, de Carlos Ghosn ou de l'homme face à la nature', 29 December 2018, www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2018/12/29/aujourd-hui-l-hubris-designe-le-comportement-d-emmanuel-macron-de-carlos-ghosn-ou-de-l-homme-face-a-la-nature_5403433_3232.html.

[9] Joined more recently by Owen 2018b on Donald Trump: see also his Foreword in this volume.

[10] See 'Note to all visitors to this site' at www.daedalustrust.com.

[11] Owen and Davidson 2009: 1398; simplified at www.daedalustrust.com/about-hubris/. See also Sadler-Smith 2019: 54–68. Abbreviations given after individual symptoms indicate where a symptom is shared with a disorder recognised in the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* (fourth edition, 2000); APD = Antisocial Personality Disorder; HPD = Histrionic Personality Disorder; NPD = Narcissistic Personality Disorder. For a recent statement in favour of the adoption of the Owen-Davidson checklist by psychiatrists, see Selten 2023.

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Excerpt
More Information

4. A messianic manner of talking about current activities and a tendency to exaltation; NPD.2
5. An identification with the nation or organization to the extent that the individual regards his/her outlook and interests as identical; (unique)
6. A tendency to speak in the third person or use the royal 'we'; (unique)
7. Excessive confidence in the individual's own judgement and contempt for the advice or criticism of others; NPD.9
8. Exaggerated self-belief, bordering on a sense of omnipotence, in what they personally can achieve; NPD.1 and 2 combined
9. A belief that rather than being accountable to the mundane court of colleagues or public opinion, the court to which they answer is: History or God; NPD.3
10. An unshakable belief that in that court they will be vindicated; (unique)
11. Loss of contact with reality; often associated with progressive isolation; APD.3 and 5
12. Restlessness, recklessness and impulsiveness; (unique)
13. A tendency to allow their 'broad vision', about the moral rectitude of a proposed course, to obviate the need to consider practicality, cost or outcomes; (unique)
14. Hubristic incompetence, where things go wrong because too much self-confidence has led the leader not to worry about the nuts and bolts of policy; HPD.5

In the course of its seven-year existence, the Daedalus Trust worked with the Philosophy Group at the Maudsley Hospital in London (a charity that promotes dialogue between psychiatrists and philosophers on the understanding of mental illness), but also with scholars in business and management studies and in particular with Surrey Business School. Business and management studies has given rise to a further current of contemporary research on hubris, focusing on its effects in senior leadership and management.[12] The roots of this approach go back to a seminal article by Richard Roll of UCLA's Management School entitled 'The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers', published in the *Journal of Business Research* in 1986.[13] Since then the number of published articles, chapters and books on the topic has shown a consistent upward trend. While much hubris research

[12] For further introduction to this research, exemplified in Part III of this volume, see Chapter 8 by Robinson and Wray.
[13] Roll 1986. See also Kahneman 2011: 258; Sadler-Smith 2019: 71–3.

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Excerpt
More Information

in business and management continues to be in behavioural corporate finance (often replicating, extending and testing Roll's hubris hypothesis), a significant broadening of the field took place in the early 2000s, as the study of hubris was extended to top management team (TMT) research, corporate governance, leadership studies, entrepreneurship, business venturing and business ethics. Most of the early behavioural finance work was quantitative and undertaken in North America and Europe, but there is now an emergent hubris literature in Far East contexts, with particular interest being shown in China and South Korea. A flurry of studies in the 2010s has seen hubris research in business and management blossom into a synthesis that combines theoretical work, case studies and empirical data (both quantitative and qualitative) and includes significant inputs from the behavioural and brain sciences, as well as other novel research areas such as computational linguistics, as researchers endeavour to work in more interdisciplinary ways. Business and management researchers have identified hubris as a significant factor in leadership derailments and corporate failures and sought to offer suggestions for how its destructive effects might be obviated. Building on the insights of psychology and behavioural economics into phenomena such as 'the winner effect',[14] optimism bias,[15] hyper core self-evaluation,[16] self-enhancement,[17] the Dunning-Kruger effect,[18] self-aggrandisement and epistemic hubris,[19] the business and management literature – as summarised and analysed in a recent book by Sadler-Smith (2019) – is beginning to assemble large amounts of data linking the personality traits of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and leaders, the trajectories of their businesses in the marketplace, and the nature and outcomes of their decisions. These data demonstrate relationships between power, prior successes, praise, self-confidence, the tendency to underestimate risk,

[14] First observed in Landau 1951. See Robertson 2012 and cf. Sadler-Smith 2019: 42–4.

[15] Sharot 2011; O'Sullivan 2015; cf. Kahneman 2011: 245–65, esp. p. 255:

> Most of us view the world as more benign than it really is, our own attributes as more favourable than they truly are, and the goals we adopt as more achievable than they are likely to be. We also tend to exaggerate our ability to forecast the future, which fosters optimistic overconfidence. In terms of its consequences for decisions, the optimistic bias may well be the most significant of the cognitive biases.

[16] Hiller and Hambrick 2005; Simsek, Heavey and Veiga 2010.

[17] See Sedikides and Gregg 2008 and in this volume (Chapter 6).

[18] By which (to quote the title of Kruger and Dunning 1999) 'difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments'. For a topical application, see Polly Toynbee on Liz Truss' premiership: 'The "left wing establishment" did not bring Liz Truss down. Reality did', *The Guardian*, 6 February 2023, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/feb/06/leftwing-economic-establishment-liz-truss-small-state (and cf. n. 4 in this chapter).

[19] See Eckhaus and Sheaffer 2018; Asad and Sadler-Smith 2020; Sadler-Smith and Cojuharenco 2021.

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Excerpt
More Information

detrimental business practices and decisions, and unintended negative business outcomes that are certainly not trivial for the individual concerned, the organisations they lead or (in some cases at least) entire industries and economies. More recently still, researchers in business and management studies have begun to question whether hubris is exclusively a 'dark-side' phenomenon.[20] For example, while many hubristic business start-ups inevitably fail, their leaders nonetheless excel in creating and communicating visionary scenarios to potential investors, have the confidence and self-belief to take control in volatile and uncertain situations, and ultimately are willing to engage in high-risk investments in order to generate large potential returns. In the bigger picture hubris can, on this view, be seen as an important cog in the engine of business and economic development, whereby the inevitable failures are both sources of learning and unavoidable collateral damage. It has been argued recently that the practical challenge for business leaders is how to minimise the dark-side negative effects of hubristic leadership without forgoing bright-side outcomes of confidence, ambition and the will to push the boundaries of what is possible.[21]

Ancient *Hybris*

Modern accounts of hubris often refer to its roots in 'Greek mythology' (especially the myth of Daedalus and Icarus),[22] but while ancient Greeks certainly did invoke mythological paradigms in connexion with *hybris*,[23] ancient *hybris* is much more deeply rooted in the rough and tumble of Greek life than might be assumed on the basis of an association with 'mythology'. For *hybris* was an offence in Athenian law,[24] and it is as an everyday phenomenon, a way of belittling others that provokes them to

[20] See Picone, Pisano and Dagnino 2021; Sundermeier, Gersch and Freiling 2020; Zeitoun, Nordberg and Homberg 2019. We return to this notion in the section of this Introduction on 'Ancient *Hybris* and Modern Hubris'. It is discussed in this volume in particular by Sedikides and Gregg (Chapter 6); by Robinson and Wray (Chapter 8); by Nordberg, Homberg and Zeitoun (Chapter 10); by Picone, Levanti and Mocciaro Li Destri (Chapter 11); and by Tourish (Chapter 12).

[21] Bordoni 2019; Zeitoun, Nordberg and Homberg 2019.

[22] For example, Miller 1992; Petit and Bollaert 2012. The best-known version of the myth of Icarus' flight is Ovid's *Metamorphoses* 8.183–235. The first account to survive in Greek is a rationalising version in the (possibly late fourth-century) mythographer Palaephatus (12), but the familiar story is clearly older. The earliest of a number of representations in art may be a sixth-century BCE Attic vase-painting, *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* III, Daidalos et Ikaros no. 14. See further Gantz 1993: 274–5; Nyenhuis 1986.

[23] See the index in Fisher 1992 *s.vv.* Centaurs, Giants, Titans, Typhon/Typhoeos.

[24] A document purporting to give the text of the law at section 47 of Demosthenes' speech 21 (*Against Meidias*) is a forgery (Canevaro and Harris 2019), but the existence of such a law is not in doubt.

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Excerpt
More Information

anger, that it receives its most significant ancient theorisation (in the second book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, 2.2, 1378b14–15, 1378b23–31).

It is worth pausing on Aristotle's definition: *hybris* is discussed precisely because of its effect on others – it makes them angry. And it does so because it is, according to Aristotle, a matter of 'doing and saying things over which there is shame/disgrace (*aischynē*) for the victim, not in order that the agent should obtain anything beyond the deed, but in order to please himself' (1378b23–5). Here *hybris* is a type of act or speech-act, specified both by its intended effects and by the motive from which it springs.[25] In having an event-structure of this kind *hybris* is what we might call a 'script' – indeed, as a cause of anger, it is a script within a script, given that Aristotle's account of the emotions in *Rhetoric* 2 also encompasses their script-like character.[26] This, the script-like or narrative nature of the phenomenon, is a crucial feature, both of Aristotle's account of *hybris* and of ancient understandings of the concept in general. Elsewhere in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle gives us a glimpse of how the exploitation of this script-like character, both for emotion and for *hybris*, might play out in rhetorical practice. In *Rhetoric* 3.7 he describes how emotional diction invites an audience to construe a scenario in a certain way: speaking in the way an angry person speaks, he tells us, invites an audience to identify a scenario as a case of *hybris* and can make it more plausible that the scenario is indeed as the speaker presents it, even if it is not, because (1408a20–3)

> the mind draws a false inference that the speaker is telling the truth, because in such situations people do feel that way, with the result that [the audience] think, even though the situation is not as the speaker makes out, that things are as he says they are.

There are a number of points in Aristotle's account to which we shall need to return, both in this introduction and elsewhere in the volume;[27] but even from these few remarks it is clear that, for him, *hybris* involves a kind

[25] A complication lies in the reference to the victim's *aischynē*, first because *aischynē* can be a state of mind (shame) or a state of affairs (disgrace) and second because neither of these is in fact an inevitable result of hubristic words or deeds – the very fact that the account of *hybris* is part of an account of anger as a reaction to *hybris* shows that victims of *hybris* do not typically react with shame; and the fact that *hybris* is a pejorative term, condemning the agent and not the victim, shows that we are not dealing straightforwardly with actual disgrace for the victim. It is likely, then, that *aischynē* is focalised here from the perspective of the hubristic agent – the victim's shame or disgrace is what that person *would like* to be the result of the action.

[26] Just so, in the more technical discussion the *De anima* 1.1, emotions and other *pathē* (affections, experiences) of the *psychē* are 'enmattered accounts (*logoi*)' whose definition must include their causes and their ends as well as their physical changes (403a25–7).

[27] See especially the chapters by Fisher, Cairns and Canevaro (Chapters 1–3).

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Excerpt
More Information

of story-pattern in which action, motive, results and reactions are all important. This is something that ties his approach to *hybris* to its representation in narrative, for example in Homeric epic, where accusations of *hybris* arise almost as soon as the *Iliad* – and thus the entire Greek literary tradition – has begun, and in drama, especially Athenian tragedy.

In many ways, research on ancient *hybris* over the past fifty years has centred on the Aristotelian approach and the question of how to balance its various elements of action, motive and effects. Aristotle's emphasis on *hybris* as a way of attempting to dishonour others is rightly central to Nick Fisher's account of the concept, first in articles published in the 1970s and then in his magnum opus *Hybris*, published in 1992.[28] Fisher incontrovertibly refutes what he calls the 'traditional view' of *hybris* as a form of human presumption which meets with divine *nemesis* or retribution, particularly in tragedy.[29] Fundamentally, *hybris* is a feature of social interaction. Fisher's emphasis on the importance of the victim of *hybris* is also fully warranted: not only is *hybris* discussed in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* precisely because it is a trigger for anger in its victims, but consideration of Aristotle's remarks on *hybris* across the range of his writings also makes it clear that the philosopher considered *hybris* to be a form of injustice, a way of seeking to deprive others of the honour or respect that is their due.[30] It is presumably on that basis that it is proscribed in Athenian law; though a prosecution for *hybris* could be brought by any Athenian who wished (i.e. not only by the victim of the alleged offence), and though the *hybris* that is prohibited by law might in theory encompass victimless cases, it is in practice unlikely that such an action would be brought unless *someone*'s rights had been violated.

In his original formulations, however, Fisher's emphasis on the perpetration of acts of dishonour came with a tendency to diminish the concept's dispositional aspect and to reduce Aristotle's emphasis on the character and motivation of the agent to no more than the intention to commit acts with the potential to result in dishonour or shame for their victims. These points were the focus of criticism first by Cairns and more recently by Canevaro.[31] Aristotle himself makes clear in Book 1 of the *Rhetoric* (1.13, 1374a13–15) that *hybris* also characteristically depends on a particular motivation – not every case of striking is a case of *hybris*, but only when one strikes with the particular motive of dishonouring the other person or pleasing oneself.

[28] Fisher 1976, 1979, 1992. [29] See Fisher 1992: 2–3, 32, 142–8.
[30] See Cairns 1996: 5–6 and 2020 for an examination of the numerous passages that confirm this.
[31] Cairns 1994, 1996, 2020; Canevaro 2018.

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Excerpt
More Information

The intention to dishonour the other party and the intention to obtain the pleasure of feeling or appearing superior that occur together in Book 2's definition of *hybris* are complementary and intrinsically linked. It is important that, on Aristotle's account, simply revelling in the pleasure of one's own superiority is not sufficient for *hybris* – that pleasure has to be derived from ways of speaking or acting that are intended to diminish the honour of another. But equally it is very important that words and deeds, too, are not in themselves sufficient for *hybris* (because one can commit an act that looks like a hubristic act without actually committing *hybris*). On this view, *hybris* depends on the kind of choices one's character leads one to make, on the kind of person one is.[32] *Hybris* is a way of treating others that at the same time expresses one's view of how others relate to oneself. It is about the *balance* between a person's own honour and the honour of other people.

For Aristotle the motive that defines *hybris* as such (an application of deliberate choice, *prohairesis*, 1374a6–13) presupposes a settled state of character.[33] His emphasis, both in his definition of *hybris* and, more widely, on its dispositional aspect, chimes with numerous examples in ancient Greek texts of many genres in which that aspect of *hybris* is to the fore. Cairns emphasises aspects of overlap between *hybris* and other ways of referring to dispositions of excessive self-assertion (such as 'thinking big' or 'thinking more than mortal thoughts'), while Canevaro notes that the Athenian legal prohibition on *hybris* even against the enslaved is very unlikely to indicate a primary concern for the rights and claims of enslaved people as such (for they had few such claims in Athenian law), and much more likely to indicate a concern with the attitudes and dispositions of those who might be tempted to treat others, including the enslaved, with *hybris*, as well as with the danger that such attitudes and dispositions may, when translated into action, prove socially disruptive in general. The ancient concern with the evils of *hybris*, in Athenian law and in Greek societies more generally, often involves a focus on the character and attitudes of its agents as well as on its effects on its victims.

Yet there is a sense in which the approach of Fisher, on the one hand, and those of Cairns and Canevaro, on the other, are complementary rather than contradictory. All agree – what is indeed incontrovertible – that *hybris* is an aspect of the complex of ancient Greek values centred on a notion, *timē*,

[32] See Demosthenes, *Against Meidias* 21.72, on how the *hybris* of the assailant is discerned not in the blow, but in the assailant's demeanour.

[33] *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.2, 1139a33–5. See Cairns 1996: 3–4; 2020: 149–50. For more on *prohairesis*, see e.g. Merker 2016.

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Excerpt
More Information

which is normally translated 'honour'. Aristotle's concise formulation – 'Dishonour (*atimia*) is an aspect of *hybris*, and a person who tries to dishonour (*atimazein*) slights' (*Rhetoric* 2.2, 1378b29–30) – is widely confirmed in ancient Greek sources. But this is not just a matter of specific acts of insult; nor is honour (*timē*) a property only of certain classes within society, a feature only of certain types of interaction or only one form of value among many.[34]

Aristotle's focus on *hybris* as the expression of a *prohairesis* that in turn depends on an individual's developed moral character is also a focus on *hybris* as a form of vice, a variety of what Aristotle calls 'particular injustice'. Particular injustice is defined by means of analogies with the sphere of economic exchange: it involves obtaining a profit and inflicting a loss in involuntary transactions (as opposed to the voluntary exchange of goods and services) in a way that is unequal or unfair.[35] All forms of particular injustice, accordingly, rest on what Aristotle calls *pleonexia* (often translated 'greed'); but this is a form of greed that is not solely material: it can focus on any external good, on any of those goods that signify success or failure, good or bad fortune (*Nicomachean Ethics* 5.1, 1129b3). This is a category that includes money, material success and security; but the greatest of external goods (Aristotle thinks) is honour (*Nicomachean Ethics* 4.3, 1123b20–1). So particular injustice can focus on honour as well as on material wealth; it is motivated by the pleasure of profit or gain (*kerdos*, 5.2, 1130b4) – this pleasure in the *kerdos* that is characteristic of *pleonexia* is the generic version of the particular pleasure of feeling superior to others that is characteristic of *hybris*. *Hybris* is that form of particular injustice that relates to illegitimate ways of creating inequality and unfairness in one-to-one transactions involving honour.

This analysis makes it clear that *timē* is a good that can be distributed justly or unjustly: the desire to have it must be balanced by recognition of others' claims to have it. Though some individuals have more and others have less, *timē* is not something of interest or relevance only to the haves. It is in play not only in the competitive pursuit of esteem, but also in cooperation. It is operative not only in prestigious, high-stakes contexts – in arenas that have come to be particularly associated with competition for honour, such as duels and gang fights, or other situations in which men (in particular) feel that their masculinity has been impugned – but also in

[34] So far from being one value among many, *timē*, in fact, *is* the ancient Greek for value. *Timē* is a property of all that one values, both economically and socially.

[35] See esp. *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.1, 1129a32–b11, 5.2, 1130a32–b5, 5.4, 1132b11–20, 5.5, 1133b29–32, with Cairns 2020: 152–8.

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