

Index

1267 targeted sanctions regime definition of, 215 2003 Iraq war audience reactions, 228-229 conduct of agents, 229-232 contested norms, 212-215 context, 212-215 implications for norm strength, 255-258 norm recognition, 211 uncertainty about output legitimacy, 224-227 2011 Libya no-fly zone argumentation, 180-183 audience reactions, 176–180 contested norms, 159-161 context, 161-165 delegation, 183-186 implications for norm strength, 204-206 norm neglect, 158-159 overview of case study findings, 174 Abu Ghraib, 284 agents effect of problem structure on. See problem structure identity-based legitimacy, 108-112, 132–133, 148–149, 198–200, 229-232 identity-based legitimation, 240-249 management of norm contestation, 18-19, 26, 106, 116, 210, 221, 228, 240, 260, 305 mandate, 19, 110, 132, 147-148 norm clarification, 105 output legitimacy, 112-114, 132-133, 135, 184–187, 200–201, 236–240 agreement on norm interpretations operationalization of, 40 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 65

Ahtisaari Plan, 121, 137-138 Ahtisaari, Martti, 121, 132-134, 154 Al-Dulimi case, 238 Al-Ghabra case, 237, 254 Al-Qaida, 47, 215, 234, 237, 249, 268, 276, 353 alternate endings norm clarification. See norm clarification norm impasse. See norm impasse norm neglect. See norm neglect norm recognition. See norm recognition relationship to other theories, 20–22, 70 - 75typology of, 9-11, 54-63 Amnesty International, 284 applicatory contestation, 21, 71, 73-74 Arab League. See League of Arab States (LAS) argumentation identity-based legitimation, 17, 98-99, 264, 284, 291-292, 296-297 implications for norm strength, 116 - 117legitimizing, 17, 95-96 output legitimation, 17, 26, 96-98. 130, 180-181, 264, 270, 272, 274–275, 289, 291–292, 297 precedent-based legitimation, 17, 99, principle-based legitimation, 100, 264, 272, 274, 293, 297 process-based legitimation, 17, 273 quasi-legal. See international law questioning of credibility, 264, 285, 289, 292, 297 arguments backings, 46 claim. See claim

355



356 Index

first-order, 9, 53-54 arguments (cont.) frame. See frame second-order, 9, 53-54 grounds. See grounds claim agreement reflection of norms in, 8, 41-42 facilitates delegation, 104 the structure of, 8-9, 41-42, 44-46 implications of, 104 Aristotle, 81, 98 claim disagreements Association of Southeast Asian Nations types of, 53-54 (ASEAN), 170, 178, 192-193, claim rapprochement, 220, 233, 236, 196, 204 238 audience reactions Clinton, Bill, 273 implications for norm strength, Clinton, Hilary, 147 116 - 117Collective Security Treaty Organization intensity, 16, 90-91 (CSTO), 90, 127, 130, 144, 303 role of domestic audiences, Committee Against Torture, 263, 267, 15, 92, 131, 146, 191–192, 288-289 Commonwealth of Independent States 197–198, 228, 286–287, 290, 308 (CIS), 127, 130, 145, 303 role of in-group. *See* in-group role of out-group. See out-group competence-control trade-off concept of, 18, 102-103 Barnett, Michael, 82, 98, 108 ex ante control, 250, 253 Ben-Josef Hirsch, Michal, 11, 20, 35, obstacle to delegation, 103 63, 70, 74–75 role of indirect costs, 28, 249-254 contested statehood of Kosovo black sheep effect, 87 black sites, 281, 285, 288, 290, 294 argumentation, 136-140 Blair, Tony, 92, 99, 224-226, 229-231, audience reactions, 129-131 274, 277 contested norms, 120-121 Blix, Hans, 112, 214, 224, 226-227, context, 121-123 230-231, 259 delegation, 131-136 boomerang effects model, 22, 84 implications for norm strength, Bower, Adam, 24, 59, 72 149-152 Bush, George H.W., 272 norm impasse, 126 Bush, George W., 29, 48, 66, 92, 213, overview of case study findings, 225, 277, 280, 283–284, 287–291 12.7 Bybee memorandum, 281, 285 relevance of international law, 124-125, 152 Cameron, David, 8, 164 contested statehoods of South Ossetia and Abkhazia case selection "building block" approach, 28 argumentation, 140-144 focus on security issues, 30 audience reactions, 144-147 norm clarification, 29, 261 contested norms, 120-121 norm impasse, 28, 126 context, 123-124 norm neglect, 29, 174 delegation, 147-149 norm recognition, 29, 221-223 implications for norm strength, structured, focused comparison, 28, 149-152 norm impasse, 126 261, 306 CC trade-off. See competence-control overview of case study findings, 127 trade-off relevance of international law, 125, Chilcot Inquiry, 1, 210 Convention Against Torture and Other concept of, 8, 43, 53 Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading



Index 357

Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 263, 279, 281–282, 285, 288–289 covert exceptionalism, 94 Bush administration contestation of torture prohibition, 280-281 identity-based legitimation. See argumentation social norm strength. See social norm strength covert validity contestation, 280 critical actors. 57, 83 critical states, See critical actors cruel, inhuman or degrading (CID) treatment, 281, 286-287, 291 Cyclone Nargis, 56 data and sources, 32-34 de Villepin, Dominique, 227 Deitelhoff, Nicole, 20, 35, 70-71, 73-74, 206, 280 delegation to agents competence-control trade-off. See competence-control trade-off compliance constituencies, 19, 26-27, 36, 107-115, 157, 186,

73–74, 206, 280
delegation to agents
competence-control trade-off.
See competence-control trade-off
compliance constituencies, 19,
26–27, 36, 107–115, 157, 186,
201, 207, 210, 223, 234, 236, 242,
248
definition of, 101
implications for norm strength, 116–117
legitimacy politics, 106–107
occurrence of, 19, 102–105, 131,
170, 217, 221
output legitimacy, 224–227
disagreement on norm interpretations
operationalization of, 40
Dixon, Jennifer, 11, 20, 35, 63, 70,
74–75

due process rights, 10, 19, 36, 60, 69, 93, 108, 209–211, 215–223, 232–235, 242–245, 255

Duterte, Rodrigo, 92, 157, 172–173, 175, 188–193, 201, 207

dotted line. See nine-dash line frame

ElBaradei, Mohamed, 214, 227, 230 European Court of First Instance (CFI), 216, 218 European Court of Justice (ECJ), 10, 40, 60, 93, 111, 209, 216–219,

222, 234–240, 256–260, 309

European General Court, 218, 237, 254 ex post output legitimacy, 175, 184, 186, 207, 228–229, 231, 259 exceptionalism, 17, 52, 94 covert. See covert exceptionalism overt. See overt exceptionalism extraordinary rendition, 281, 288, 294

factual data. See grounds Falkland Islands, 8 Finnemore, Martha, 13, 40, 57, 82, 98, 108, 265–266, 308 Fischer, Joschka, 275 four sha frame, 158, 202, 204 frame concept of, 8, 42 frame adaptation, 175, 181, 204, 302 frame agreement facilitates delegation, 19, 103-104 stabilizing role of, 10-11, 44, 59-60, 78, 211 frame disagreements types of, 49-53 frame rapprochement, 36, 203

Gaddafi, Muammar, 15, 87, 156, 161–162, 178–179, 181–182, 185, 269 generally applicable norm change, 17, 37, 52, 79, 98, 101, 128, 136, 264–265, 267, 278, 280, 296, 302 Geneva Conventions, 279, 281, 283–285, 290 Greenstock, Jeremy, 1, 14, 34, 225

Friendly Relations Declaration, 47-48,

120, 123, 142

grounds clarification of, 52

contestation of, 66 definition of, 27, 45 Guantanamo, 263, 281–285, 288–290 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 15,

Haridinaj, Ramush, 132 Hart, H.L.A., 3, 51 historic rights. *See* nine-dash line frame Human Rights Watch, 243, 288

in-group context-dependence of, 88

162, 179



358 Index

in-group (cont.) overview of case study findings, 267 dissent of, 15, 86-88, 144-146, international terrorism and the right to 176–179, 228, 270–271, 289–290 self-defense, 293–296 identification of, 16, 88-90, 1986 US reinterpretation attempt, 126-127, 177 269-272 influence of, 85-86, 145-146, 180 1998 US reinterpretation attempt, support of, 90, 129-131, 134, 139, 272-275 192-196, 228, 270, 274-275, 283, 2001 norm clarification. 275-278 contested norm, 268 institutional power, 83-84 context, 269 intergroup sensitivity effect, 85 observable implications, 262-266 International Atomic Energy Agency overview of case study (IAEA), 212, 214, 222–223, findings, 267 226–227, 229–230, 232 interpretive community, 24-26, 72, 93, International Committee of the Red 110-111, 241, 248 Cross (ICRC), 284–285, 290 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), 215, 237, 249, 295 International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on the Accordance Ivanov, Igor, 276 with international law of the unilateral declaration of Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus, 10, 42-43, independence in respect of Kosovo, 60, 158 135-136, 139-140, 151 Johnstone, Ian, 17, 25, 72, 93 Nicaragua case, 55, 268 Jurkovich, Michelle, 43 International Covenant on Civil justiciability of due process rights, 108, and Political Rights 216, 233, 235, 255, 259 (ICCPR), 3, 50, 51 justificatory discourse. See International Criminal Court (ICC), argumentation 102, 162, 181, 251 International Fact-Finding Mission on Kadi case, 209, 216-219, 234, 239 the Conflict in Georgia Keating, Vincent, 279 (IIFFMCG), 128, 147–149 Kipfer Fasciati, Daniel, 219, 235, 241, international law 243, 247, 253–255 customary law, 9, 120 Kosovo Force (KFOR), 130 interpretive community. Kouchner, Bernard, 56 See interpretive community Krebs, Ronald, 10, 42-43, 60, 158 legal argumentation, 11, 100, 152, 264, 293, 308 Lavrov, Sergey, 145 precision of, 22 League of Arab States (LAS), 15, 90, quasi-legal argumentation, 7, 119, 157, 161–162, 164, 175–178, 181, 128, 143, 151, 186, 202-204 183, 207, 274 relationship of norms to, 2, 8, 39 legal argumentation. See international law international terrorism and the legitimacy, 95. See argumentation prohibition of torture logic of appropriateness, 85 2001-2003 contestation, 282-284 logic of consequences, 85 2004-2005 contestation, 284-288 Lukashenko, Alexander, 145 2006-2008 contestation, 288-291 contested norm bundle, 279, 281–282 Malanjum, Richard, 220, 240-241, 251 Marchi-Uhel, Catherine, 219, 233, 241, implications for norm strength, 293-295 245-246, 249, 254-255 legitimation strategies, 291–293 Marcos, Bongbong, 158, 195–196, 2.01 observable implications, 262–266



Index 359

material power, 23, 29, 41, 46, 80, 83, effect on reputation of, 58 93-94, 115, 152, 157, 159, stability of, 11, 59 173–174, 195, 261, 296, 306 norm interpretations public reactions to, 9, 39, 55 McCain, John, 288, 291 Medvedev, Dmitry, 47-48, 51, 123, spectrum of precision of, 46-48 141-142, 145 vague, 48 Mischief Reef. See South China Sea norm neglect 2011 Libya no-fly zone. See 2011 (SCS) dispute Libya no-fly zone nine-dash line frame, 61, 156-158, definition of, 10 165–169, 171–172, 175, 203–207 effect on reputation of, norms 61 - 62"dual quality" of, 6, 24, 40, 100 South China Sea (SCS) dispute. See contestation of. See norm contestation South China Sea (SCS) dispute definition of, 2 stability of, 11, 61-63, 310 incompleteness of, 3 norm recognition 2003 Iraq war. See 2003 Iraq war internalization, 23 tensions between, 3 definition of, 10, 59 well-established, 2, 39 effect on reputation of, 10, 59-60 norm "life cycle", 2, 22 stability of, 10, 59-60 norm clarification targeted sanctions. See targeted definition of, 9 sanctions effect on reputation of, 9, 57 norm strength prohibition of torture. See definition of, 11, 63 international terrorism and the relative. See relative norm strength prohibition of torture social. See social norm strength right to self-defense. See international undermining of norm core, 12, 69-70 terrorism and the right to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 65, 89, 112-113, 118, self-defense stability of, 9, 58 121, 130–131, 183–185, 207, 276, through acceptance, 56 286 through rejection, 56 through synthesis, 56 Obama, Barack, 86, 151, 164, 177, norm contestation 182, 232, 290 definition of, 3 Ombudsperson to the ISIL (Da'esh) and different views on, 5 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, endpoints. See alternate endings See Targeted Sanctions outcomes. See alternate endings Organization of the Islamic Conference reasons for, 1, 3 (OIC), 15, 179, 192 norm core out-group contestation of, See norm strength context-dependence of, 88 definition of, 69 dissent of, 86, 129-131, 192-194, norm frame. See frame 271-274, 285, 289 norm impasse muted criticism of, 16, 91-92, 146–147, 283 support of, 26, 275–277 contested statehood of Kosovo. See contested statehood of Kosovo contested statehoods of South Ossetia overt exceptionalism explicit, 52-53, 94, 119, 128, 137, and Abkhazia. See contested statehoods of South Ossetia and 140, 152 Abkhazia implicit, 61, 94, 175, 181, 205, definition of, 11, 58 302



360 Index

penumbra of doubt, 3, 49, 51–52, reverse consensus, 218, 222, 234, 239-240, 252 67–68, 278, 295 Percy, Sarah, 22, 69 rhetorical approach Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). overview of, 6-8 See South China Sea (SCS) rhetorical entrapment, 7, 38, 125 arbitration the structure of arguments. persistence of norm interpretations See arguments extrinsic influences on, 12-20, 35, the three elements of rhetoric, 12-13, 41, 44, 78-117 internal source of stability, 10-11, 21, rhetorical coercion, 25 35, 44, 55–63, 74, 78, 159, 211 Rice, Condoleezza, 137, 231, precedent. See norm clarification 286 - 287problem structure right to remedial self-determination, 16, status quo bias, 113, 226 48, 50, 91–92, 118–119, 121, 128, uncertainty, 19, 113, 226, 259 139-148, 150, 153 process-based legitimation, 99, 264 right to self-defense prohibition of the use of force, 30, 39, broadening to apply against states 160, 257, 272, 295 that actively support or prohibition of torture, 279, 281-282, willingly harbor terrorist groups See international terrorism and the that have already attacked, 9, 17, prohibition of torture 29, 47, 55–56, 69, 96–97, 268-278, 295 Prost, Kimberly, 217, 219, 234, 237, 240, 246, 248, 251, 253 interpretation of armed attack, 47, protection of civilians (PoC), 36, 158, 50, 55, 68, 268, 272, 275, 293 preventive, 49, 213 161, 163–164, 175, 181–182, 204, 206, 208 right to self-determination external, 51, 120, 148 Putin, Vladimir, 53, 65, 138, 147, 151, internal, 51, 120, 148 193, 277 right to territorial integrity, 11, 29, 35, 39, Reagan, Ronald, 269, 272 50, 52, 58, 118-131, 136-140, relative norm strength 143-144, 150-153, 156-157, 161, 164, 172, 180, 272, 301 breadth of collective expectations, 12, 21, 36, 68–69, 74, 76, 206, Risse, Thomas, 17, 62 256-257, 294-295, 301 rule inconsistency, 50 changes in scope, 12, 67-68 depth of collective expectations, 12, Saakashvili, Mikheil, 47, 123, 142 21, 36, 68–69, 74, 76, 206, Saifuddin, Abdullah, 204 256-257, 294-295, 301 Sandholtz, Wayne, 55, 69, 72 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 164 reputation as a great power, 187-189, 194, 207 Scarborough Shoal. See South China for law-abidance, 7, 9-11, 14-15, 26, Sea (SCS) dispute 38, 41, 54–63, 72, 89–90, 98, 107, Schimmelfennig, Frank, 17, 42 187–189, 194, 207, 218, 231, 282, Second Thomas Shoal. See South China 284, 302, 306 Sea (SCS) dispute responsibility to protect (R2P), 30, 36, 56, shaming lack of, 306-307 62, 73, 121, 156, 158–161, 163-164, 175, 180-186, 204-208 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 127, 130, 144 responsibility while protecting (RwP), 185 Sikkink, Kathryn, 13, 40, 57, 62, 82, Reus-Smit, 7, 100 265–266, 280, 308



Index 361

silence conduct of agents, 240-249 future research into, 309 contested norms, 215-221 context, 215-221 interpretation of, 39, 309 normative concern, 309 explaining backlash, 249-255 Simmons, Beth, 92 explaining relative stability, 233-249 social dynamics, 7, 19, 25, 77, 79, 93, implications for norm strength, 107, 128, 147, 157, 174, 186, 207, 255-258 262, 306 norm recognition, 211 social identity approaches, 84 Thatcher, Margaret, 271 social influence. See audience reactions tipping point, 13, 40, 57, 71, 82, 97, social norm strength 206, 265, 309 changes in precision, 12, 21, 64-67, torture prohibition. See prohibition of 74, 105, 150, 205–206, 255–257, torture Toulmin, Stephen, 42, 44, 94 294-299 covert exceptionalism, 66-67, 294 Trail Smelter arbitration, 44 relationship to alternate endings, 12, transboundary environmental harm principle, 45-46 64-66 socialization, 21, 62, 74, 101, 111, 251, transnational advocacy networks 310 (TANs), 13, 84, 108, 309 Troika, 113, 119, 121, 128, 133-134, South China Sea (SCS) arbitration composition of arbitral tribunal, 200 137, 153–154 jurisdiction, 164-198 Trump, Donald, 65 ruling, 157, 171–172 two-level game, 92 South China Sea (SCS) dispute argumentation, 198-204 United Nations (UN) Charter audience reactions, 188–198 Article 103, 215–216 contested norms, 165-174 Article 2, 120 Article 39, 212, 223 context, 165-174 delegation, 186-188 Article 51. See right to self-defense implications for norm strength, chapter VII norms, 30, 33, 36, 40, 83, 204-206 209, 212–213, 215, 221–223, norm neglect, 158-159 256-257 overview of case study findings, 174 United Nations Convention on the Law sovereignty norm bundle, 30-31, 39, 160 of the Sea (UNCLOS). See South speakers China Sea (SCS) dispute decision-making authority, 40 United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 121-122, 130-131 role of states as, 39 spiral model, 22, 62, 84 United Nations Monitoring, Straw, Jack, 225, 231 Verification and Inspection sui generis frame, 15, 23, 52, 58, 118, Commission (UNMOVIC), 136–141, 143, 150, 153–154, 301, 213-214, 222-223, 225-227, 229-231 303 United Nations Security Council Tagliavini Report, 148-149 (UNSC) Tagliavini, Heidi, 147-149 authorization of the use of force, 1, 15, Taliban, 47, 215, 268, 273, 276, 285 30, 160, 163, 206, 212–214, 257 targeted sanctions close ties of P3, 86 audience reactions, 233-236 constructive ambiguity, 22 prerogative of, 69, 215-217, 219, certainty about output legitimacy, 236-240 240, 252-253, 256, 258



362 Index

United Nations Security Council validity contestation, 21, 70, 72–74, 280 (UNSC) (cont.) Resolution 687 (1991), 212, 214 warrant. See frame Resolution 1244 (1999), 131-132, waterboarding, 42, 282, 288-290, 295, 137, 154 Resolution 1267 (1999), 215 weapons inspectors, 19, 36, 108, 111, Resolution 1284 (1999), 213 210, 212, 214, 221–223, 226, 232, Resolution 1333 (2000), 215 258, 305 Resolution 1390 (2002), 215 weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Resolution 1422 (2002), 60 15, 27, 49, 112, 212-215, Resolution 1441 (2002), 49, 53, 209, 222–232, 259, 284, 305–306 213–214, 223, 225, 230, 257 widespread agreement. See tipping Resolution 1904 (2009), 217 point Resolution 1970 (2011), 162, 181 Wiener, Antje, 40 Resolution 1973 (2011), 156-158, Winston, Carla, 43 162-164, 176-185, 204-206 within-case analysis, 31 Resolution 1989 (2011), 218 World Summit Outcome Document, 160 Resolution 2161 (2014), 245 World Trade Organization (WTO), 147 Resolution 2249 (2015), 86 Resolution 2368 (2017), 247 Yi, Wang, 172 Resolution 2610 (2021), 235 Yoo memorandum, 285 Resolution 2734 (2024), 248 Youssef v. Secretary of State, 237 role of permanent members (P5), 13, 57, 83 Zhenmin, Liu, 172, 199, 201 United Nations Special Commission Zimmermann, Lisbeth, 20, 35, 70, 72-74, 206, 280 (UNSCOM), 212, 222, 224-225