

Index

The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law

(Reinach), 2–3, 7–8, 14, 26. *See also*
phenomenological method

gifts in, 255

law in, 54–57

legal concepts in, 54–57

liberties in, 189–190

morality in, 54–57

personhood in, 178

phenomenological method in, 169, 186

positive law in, 159–164

private law theory in, 2–3

a priori legal concepts, 14. *See also* positive law
being and, 85

causation, 156, 158–159

normative theories of, 159

omissions liability, 159

in civil law, 150–152

truths about, 151–152

cognition and, 85

conceptual approach to, 82–87

definitions of, 84–86

enacting and, 45–47

essential propositions in, 86, 89–94

conceptual jurisprudence, 89–90

in contract law, 91, 93

establishment of essence in, 90–91

intuition and, 92–93

ontologism of, 89–90

positive law and, 90, 93

fulfillment of obligations, 82–83, 96, 101–102

in German Basic Law, 87–88

under German constitution, 87–88

giving voice and, 45–47

Kant on, 85–86

legal wrongs, 155–156

necessary propositions in, 86–89

plausibility of, 88

positive law and, 87

prohibitions for, 88

non-positive propositions in, 94–104

fulfillment of obligations and, 96

minimal preconditions for, 103–104

morally-based legal propositions, 96–98, 101–102

ontological classifications of, 98–99

positive law and, 94–96, 100–101

pre-supposed legal propositions, 94–96

uncertain legal propositions, 98–101

normative disputes under, 154–155

ontology of, 85–86, 156–157

for essential propositions, 89–90

of non-positive propositions, 98–99

plausibility of, 86–87

of essential propositions, 92–93

of necessary propositions, 88

private law and, 102, 129–140, 144, 146–147,
150–152

interpretations of, 142–145

problems with, 83–85

for Reinach, 27–28

revisability as distinct from, 84

temporality of law and, 222–225

positive law and, 223–225

thinking and, 85

absolute claims, 212–213

absolute rights, 15, 39–41

allowing as, 209

claims as distinct from, 192–193, 206–207

commanding and, 213

enacting and, 213

essential features of, 204

granting and, 213

- absolute rights (cont.)
 - liberties compared to, 189–190
 - liens and, 208
 - positive law and, 208
 - promising and, 208, 213
 - references to other persons and, 208
 - relative rights compared to, 207–208
 - rights over rights, 205
 - rights to perform actions, 205
 - rights to things, 205
 - sources of, 208
- acceptance, as performative act
 - in contract formation
 - characteristics of, 318–320
 - juridical acts and, 318–319
 - Necessity of Agreement Axiom and, 319
 - of gifts, 260–263
 - as bilateral act, 260, 262–263, 273–274
 - as illocutionary act, 261–263
 - intuition in, 261, 264
 - as social act, 261–263
 - as unilateral act, 260
 - of promises, 32–33, 287–290
 - conditions for, 290
 - non-communicative, 287–289
 - non-intentional, 287–289
 - as social act, 287–288, 323
 - as speech act, 287–288
- actio in personam*, 40
- actio in rem*, 40
- agency law, 142–143
- agents, persons as, 176–177
- allowing
 - as absolute right, 209
 - of liberties, 208–211
 - contradictions in, 210
 - forbidding and, 210–211
 - as social act, 209
 - transferring and, 209–210
- altruism, in private law, 129
- American Legal Realism, 3
- anti-psychologism, 70–76
 - Frege and, 71–72
 - Husserl, E., and, 71–72
 - jurisprudence and, 75
- Aristotle, 107
- asset partitioning, 142–143
- attunement, in social act theory, 182, 185–186
- Auer, Marietta, 129
- Augustine, 221–222
- Austin, John, 254. *See also* performative verbs
 - on gifts, 255–256, 264
 - on transference of ownership, 263–264
- How to Do Things with Words*, 28, 255–256, 260
- illocutionary acts and, 255–256
 - Reinach and, 28–30
 - speech act theory and, 1, 170
- authentic social acts, 182–183
- Avenarius, Richard, 60, 68. *See also* Pragmatists
- Baldwin, Carliss, 143
- Basic Law, in Germany, 87–88
- being, *a priori* legal concepts and, 85
- Being and Time* (Heidegger), 242, 244
- Beling, Ernst, 6, 115–117
 - schemas for, 117–119
- bestimmen*. *See* giving voice
- BGB. *See* *Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*
- Brentano, Franz, 112–113, 220, 227
- bundle theory, for property rights, 42, 136
- Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch* (BGB), 120
- Burkhardt, Armin, 255–256
- Carnap, Rudolf, 9
- causation, as legal concept, 156, 158–159
 - normative theories of, 159
 - omissions liability, 159
- charity acts, 270
- Chrudzimsk, Arkadiusz, 255–256
- civil law
 - a priori* legal foundations in, 150–152
 - truths about civil law, 151–152
 - contract law and, 23–24
 - history of, 152
 - phenomenology and, 23–24
 - private law theory and, 126, 131–132, 144
 - representation in, 137
 - rights in rights and, 135
 - Reinach and, 4
 - theory of representation under, 137
- claims
 - absolute, 212–213
 - absolute rights as distinct from, 192–193, 206–207
 - elements of, 193
 - legal correlatives for, 192–194
 - converse relations, 194
 - duties of non-interference, 194–196
 - liberties as distinct from, 192, 212
 - liens and, 208
 - obligations and, 194
 - property rights and, 201
 - temporality of law for, 221
- Clark, Kim, 143
- cognition. *See also* thinking
 - a priori* legal concepts and, 85
- Collected Writings of Adolf Reinach* (Stein), 8–9
- collective promises, 292
- commanding, as performative act, 210

- absolute rights and, 213
- common law, private law theory and, 132, 134–135
 - rights in, 135
- computational theory of mind, 68–69
- conceptual jurisprudence, 89–90
- conditional promises, 235
- Confessions* (Augustine), 221–222
- Conrad, Theodor, 6, 106, 115
- Conrad-Martius, Hedwig, 8–10
- consciousness
 - legal, 249–250
 - temporality of law and, 239–240, 245
 - Husserl, G., on, 249–250
- consequentialism, 35–37, 128–129
- constitution, of Germany
 - a priori* legal concepts under, 87–88
 - as legal being of legal community, 244–247
- contextualism, property law and, 130
- contract law, contract formation and
 - acceptances as part of
 - characteristics of, 318–320
 - juridical acts and, 318–319
 - Necessity of Agreement Axiom and, 319
 - architecture of, 305–306
 - asset partitioning and, 142–143
 - conceptual approach to, 305–306
 - contractual conscription and, 305
 - contractual subscription and, 311, 313
 - enabling forms in, 308–313
 - acceptance models, 308–309
 - contract-enabling norm, 309
 - for marriage contracts, 310–311
 - theoretical possibilities with, 312–313
- essential propositions in, 91, 93
- juridical acts and, 313–316
 - acceptances and, 318–319
 - deontic effects, 315, 320, 323–324
 - essential explanatory dependency in, 315
 - offers and, 315, 317
- morality of, 312–313
 - monistic approaches to, 312
 - moral effects, 313
 - Necessity of Agreement Axiom and, 312
- Necessity of Agreement Axiom, 18, 305–308, 324–326
 - acceptance of contracts and, 319
 - contents in, 307–314
 - modal-dependence, 307
 - morality of, 312
 - promises and, 320–321
 - unilaterality in, 307–308
- offers in, 313–320
 - characteristics of, 316–317
 - firm, 325
 - irrevocable, 325
 - juridical acts and, 315, 317
 - phenomenology and, 23–24
 - in civil law, 23–24
 - efficient breach in, 23–24
 - positive, 305–306
 - positive law and, 313–314, 318–319
 - promises and, 34, 36, 320–326
 - customs and, 320
 - Necessity of Agreement Axiom and, 320–321
- contract theory. *See also* contract law
 - Ockham's razor and, 32
 - promising and, 34, 36
- contracting. *See also* contract law
 - in performative acts, 29–30
- contractual conscription, 305
- contractual subscription, 311, 313
- conviction, convictions and
 - negative, 110–111
 - in negative states of affairs, 108
 - positive, 110–111
- corporate personality, 178
- Critical Legal Studies movement, 3
- Critical Theory, 56
- Crosby, John, 267
- Darwin, Charles, 57, 60
 - evolutionary psychology and, 59–60
- Darwinism, natural selection, 54
- Daubert, Johannes, 6, 107
 - on state of affairs, 112–114
- declarative utterances, 28–29
- deontologism, 128–129
- Descartes, Rene, 32
- determinations, in temporality of law, 231, 238–239
- Dinani, Maryam Ebrahimi, 273
- directed obligations, 281
- Doctrine of Right* (Kant), 167
- document acts, 260
- double negative judgments, 110
- duration, temporality of law and, 219–220, 228, 230
 - continuum as distinct from, 229–230
- duties of non-interference, 194–197
- Duxbury, Neil, 179
- Dworkin, Ronald, legal realism and, 3
- Economics Studies movements, 3
- enabling forms, in contract formation, 308–313
 - acceptance models, 308–309
 - contract-enabling norm, 309
 - for marriage contracts, 310–311
 - theoretical possibilities with, 312–313

- enacting, as performative act, 45–48, 172
 - a priori* legal concepts and, 45–47
 - absolute rights and, 213
 - positive law and, 47–48
 - as social act, 47–48
- Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness, 68
- Essence and Systematics of Judgment* (Reinach), 116
- essential propositions, 86, 89–94
 - conceptual jurisprudence, 89–90
 - in contract law, 91, 93
 - establishment of essence in, 90–91
 - intuition and, 92–93
 - ontology of, 89–90
 - positive law and, 90, 93
- essentialism, 190–191
- ethics, state of affairs and, 109
- evolutionary psychology
 - analysis of, 76
 - anti-psychologism and, 70–76
 - Avenarius and, 60, 68
 - computational theory of mind and, 68–69
 - conceptual approach to, 57–60
 - Darwin and, 59–60
 - Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness, 68
 - foundations of, 60
 - legal theory and, 58–59
 - logic in, 61
 - Mach and, 60, 68
 - mathematics in, 61, 63
 - metaphysical realism and, 64, 69
 - modern, 59–60
 - natural selection and, 57, 64–69
 - ontological elements of, 71
 - nominalism of, 67–68
 - ontology of, 64–69
 - natural selection and, 71
 - positive law and, 59
 - Pragmatists and, 60
 - Psychologismus-Streit* and, 61–63
 - Frege and, 61
 - psychologism and, 61, 64–65, 67
 - World War I as end of, 76
 - species relativism and, 64
- existentialism, 9–10
- experience, phenomenology of, 28
 - for phenomenological method, application to
 - objects, 169–170
 - in phenomenological method, 168
- explicit performatives, 258
- false representation, 182–183
- Ferrari, Don, 108
- fiduciary law, 137
- firm offers, 325
- Formal Causality principle, 107
- formalism. *See* legal formalism
- Foundations of Arithmetic* (Frege), 61, 63
- free law, 26
- Frege, Gottlob, 61, 63
 - anti-psychologism and, 71–75
- Freud, Sigmund, 61
- Fried, Charles, 290, 322–323
- Fundamental Ontology* (Heidegger), 220
- gehören*. *See* hearing
- Geiger, Moritz, 6
- general theory of law, 26
- generative grammar theory, 13–14
- German Civil Code
 - Conrad on, 115
 - phenomenology and, 24
 - promising under, 31, 34
 - property rights under, 42–45
 - temporality of law and, 238–239
- Germany. *See also* German Civil Code
 - a priori* legal concepts in, 87–88
 - Basic Law in, 87–88
 - Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch* in, 120
 - constitution of
 - a priori* legal concepts under, 87–88
 - as legal being of legal community, 244–247
 - property rights in
 - under Civil Code, 44–45
 - private law and, 45
 - revocation of, 44–45
 - transference models, 43–45
 - transference of rights, 43–44
 - waiving of, 44–45
 - Uniform Commercial Code, 133
- gifts, gifting and
 - in *The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law*, 255
 - acceptance of, 260–263
 - as bilateral act, 260, 262–263, 273–274
 - as illocutionary act, 261–263
 - intuition in, 261, 264
 - as social act, 261–263
 - as unilateral act, 260
 - Austin on, 255–256, 264
 - on transference of ownership, 263–264
 - charity acts and, 270
 - conceptual approach to, 254–257
 - definition of, 257–258
 - document acts and, 260
 - explicit performatives and, 258
 - in *How to Do Things with Words*, 260

- as illocutionary act, 254–260, 273
 - acceptance as, 261–263
- intuition and
 - acceptance of gifts and, 261, 264
 - Ownership View of Gift and, 266–267
 - in transference of ownership, 264–265
- nature of, 257–260
- overview of, 273–274
- positive law and, 255
- primitive performatives and, 258
- scope of, 257
- social act theory and, 255–260, 273
 - acceptance and, 261–263
- speech act theory and, 254–256, 269
- Strawson on, 257–260
- by transference of ownership, 263–270
 - Austin on, 263–264
 - intuition as part of, 264–265
 - Ownership View of Gift in, 266–270
 - shortcuts in, 267
 - target of gifts, 266
- Vendler on, 255–256
- waiving of property rights and, 256–257, 271–272
- Waldron on, 270–273
- wills and, 259–260
- Gilbert, Margaret, 17, 277–282
 - on intuitions, 279–282
 - claims and, 281–282
 - directed obligations, 281
 - Inevitability Point, 279–281, 301
 - promissory obligations, 281–282
 - on promises, 277–278, 282–287
 - authors of, 291–297
 - content of, 297–301
 - fourth dogma for, 301–302
 - Immoral Promises dogma, 278–279, 301–302
 - Moral Requirement dogma, 279, 282, 301–302
 - No Willing dogma, 278–279, 288, 301–302
 - three dogmas approach, 278–282
- giving voice (*bestimmen*), as performative act, 45–48
 - a priori* legal concepts and, 45–47
 - etymology of, 46–47
 - as social act, 47–48
- Goldsmith, Timothy, 59
- good faith purchase, 141–142
 - transfer of property and, 133–134
- granting, as performative act, 172, 183
 - absolute rights and, 213
- Green, Mitchell, 254, 268
- Hancher, Michael, 254, 262
- Hansmann, Henry, 138–139, 142
- Hart, H. L. A., legal realism and, 3
- hearing (*gehören*), as performative act, 38–45, 306–322
 - etymology of, 39
 - temporality of law and, 232
 - theory of property and, 38–39
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. *See* Neo-Hegelianism
- Heidegger, Martin, 220
 - Being and Time*, 242, 244
 - Husserl, E., and, 9
 - on temporality of law, 242–243
- Hershovitz, Scott, 56
- Hildebrand, Dietrich von, 6, 9–10
- Hobbes, Thomas, 183–184
- Hohfeld, Wesley, 15. *See also* absolute rights; claims; liberties
 - essentialism for, 190–191
 - jural relations and, 157
 - on legal power, 192
 - on liberties, 189–190, 213–214
 - Reinach compared to, 190–192
 - on rights
 - as collections, 131
 - ontology of rights, 211–213
 - “Some Fundamental Legal conceptions as applied in Judicial Reasoning,” 189–190
- holism, private law theory and, 145–146
- How to Do Things with Words* (Austin), 28, 255–256, 260
- Hume, David, 34–35, 112, 278–279
- Husserl, Edmund
 - anti-psychologism and, 71–75
 - criticism of Brentano, 227
 - Heidegger and, 9
 - on inner time consciousness, 227
 - Logical Investigations*, 6–9, 62, 113, 115
 - in Munich Circle, 112–113
 - on phenomenological method, 168–169
 - on phenomenology, 6
 - of law, 219–220
 - Prolegomena*, 62
 - psychologism and, 61–62, 64
 - Reinach influenced by, 6–7, 9, 26
 - on temporality of law, 223, 242
 - transcendental idealism and, 9
 - on transfer or property, 268
 - Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenology Research*, 7–8, 26
- Husserl, Gerhart, 16
 - on temporality of law, 219–220, 242–251
 - abstract time of works of art and law, 244–245
 - detemporalization of law, 245–247
 - legal consciousness and, 249–250

- Husserl, Gerhart (cont.)
 legal validity and, 244, 246
 philosophical influences on, 243–244
 retention and, 245
 temporalization of experiential law, 247–248
- idealism. *See* transcendental idealism
- idealist thought, in phenomenological method
 phenomenological idealist thought, 168
 transcendental idealist thought, 168
- illocutionary acts
 Austin and, 255–256
 gifts as, 254–260, 273
 acceptance of, 261–263
- Immoral Promises dogma, 278–279, 301–302
- Imperial German Code of Civil Procedure, 7
- inauthentic social acts, 182–183
- individual promises, 292
- individualism, in private law, 129
- Inevitability Point, 279–281, 301
- information, theory of, 142
- Ingarden, Roman, 9–10, 107
 on state of affairs, 114
- intuition
 essential propositions and, 92–93
 gifts and
 acceptance of, 261, 264
 Ownership View of Gift and, 266–267
 in transference of ownership, 264–265
- Gilbert on, 279–282
 claims and, 281–282
 directed obligations, 281
 Inevitability Point, 279–281, 301
 promissory obligations, 281–282
 private law theory and, 125–126
 state of affairs and, 108
 theory of ownership and, 265
 theory of representation and, 138
- irrevocable offers, 325
- James, William, 60–61. *See also* Pragmatists
- joint commitment account, for promises, 282–287,
 297–301
 personal commitments, 283–284
 rescinding of commitments, 284
- Jones, Owen, 59
- judgment theory, 106–107
 definitions in, 107–108
 negative judgment, 109–112
- jural relations, 157
- juridical social acts
 contract formation and, 313–316
 acceptances and, 318–319
 deontic effects, 315, 320, 323–324
- essential explanatory dependency in,
 315
 offers and, 315, 317
 in phenomenological method, 170–173, 182
 representation and, 183–184
- jurisprudence
 anti-psychologism and, 75
 conceptual, 89–90
 phenomenological method and, 170
 speech act theory and, 170
 state of affairs and, 115–119
- jurisprudence of interests, 26
- justice, law as distinct from, 109
- Kanger, Helle, 194
- Kanger, Stig, 194
- Kant, Immanuel
 on *a priori* legal concepts, 85–86
Doctrine of Right, 167
 Neo-Kantianism, 26–27
 on phenomenological method, 166–167
 private law theory and, 2
 space and time theory for, 241
 on temporality of law, 224
- Kant Studies*, 8–9
- Kantorowicz, Hermann, 115
- Kelsen, Hans, 48
 on temporality of law, 231
- Kennedy, Duncan, 129
- knowledge production, *a priori* legal concepts and,
 158
- Kocourek, Albert, 131
- Kraakman, Reinier, 138–139, 142
- Kripke, Saul, 87
- law, laws and. *See also* phenomenology of law;
specific topics
 justice as distinct from, 109
 negative states of affairs and, 119
 reasonable doubt and, 119
 philosophy of law, 169–170
 “right law,” 171–172
- Law and Economics, 56
- Lawrence v Fen Tigers*, 154
- legal abilities, 192
- legal acts, temporality of, 233–241
 promising and promises, 234–238
 speech act theory and, 233
- legal conceptualism, 4–5
a priori legal concepts, 14
 conceptual approach to, 52–54
 legal realism and, 56
- legal consciousness, 249–250
- legal correlatives

- for claims, 192–194
 - converse relations, 194
 - duties of non-interference, 194–196
- for liberties, 192–194, 203–208
 - absolute rights and, 203–205
 - ad hoc* status, 197
 - duties of non-interference, 196–197
 - as no-claims, 196–200
 - reification of negations, 197
 - relative rights and, 203–205
 - for violation of same-content requirements, 197–200
- legal formalism
 - property law and, 130
 - Reinach and, 4
- legal oughts, 160
- legal personality, legal personhood and, 174.
 - See also* persons
- legal phenomenology. *See* phenomenology of law
- legal power
 - definitions of, 192
 - legal abilities as distinct from, 192
- Legal Realism
 - American Legal Realism, 3
 - Dworkin and, 3
 - Hart and, 3
 - legal concepts and, 56
 - phenomenology and, 26
 - private law theory and, 127–128, 131
- legal validity, 244, 246
- legal wrongs, 155–156
- liabilities, legal
 - omissions, 155
 - primary, 155
- liberties
 - absolute rights compared to, 189–190, 203–208
 - lack of legal correlatives for, 203–205
- allowing of, 208–211
 - contradictions in, 210
 - forbidding and, 210–211
 - as social act, 209
 - transferring and, 209–210
- claim rights as distinct from, 192, 212
- conceptual approaches to, 189–190
- Hohfeld on, 189–190, 213–214
- lack of legal correlatives for, 203–208
 - absolute rights and, 203–205
 - relative rights and, 203–205
- legal correlatives for, 192–194
 - ad hoc* status, 197
 - duties of non-interference, 196–197
 - as no-claims, 196–200
 - reification of negations, 197
 - for violation of same-content requirements, 197–200
- ontology of, 211–213
- privileges as distinct from, 196
- property rights and, 200–203
 - absolute obligations and, 202–203
 - number of, 201–202
 - rights *in personam*, 200
 - rights *in rem*, 200
 - transfer of, 202
- Reinach on, 189–190
- transfer of, 213
 - for property rights, 202
- liens, 208
- linguistics, *nemo dat* principle and, 133–134
- Lipps, Theodor, 6, 26, 61
 - on promises, 278–279
 - psychologism and, 62
 - Reinach and, 28, 115
 - theory of moral obligations, 35
- logic, in evolutionary psychology, 61
- Logic* (Lotze), 113
- Logical Investigations* (Husserl, E.), 6–9, 62, 113, 115
- logical thinking, positive law compared to, 75
- Lotze, Hermann, 113
- Lyons, Davis, 194
- Mach, Ernst, 60, 68. *See also* Pragmatists
- marriage contracts, 310–311
- Massin, Olivier, 130, 265, 274
- material necessity, 112
- mathematics, in evolutionary psychology, 61, 63
- Meinong, Alexius, 113
- Mertens, Karl, 278
- metaphysical realism, evolutionary psychology and, 64, 69
- metaphysics
 - private law theory and, 4
 - Reinach and, 1
 - private law and, 4
- moral obligations. *See* obligations
- Moral Requirement dogma, 279, 282, 301–302
- morality, moral theory and
 - in *The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law*, 54–57
- of contract law, 312–313
 - monistic approaches to, 312
 - moral effects, 313
 - Necessity of Agreement Axiom and, 312
- personhood and, 179–180
- phenomenological method and, 170–171
- positive law and, 171
- “right law” and, 171–172

- morality, moral theory and (cont.)
 - positive law and, 56, 160–162
 - legal oughts and, 160
 - normativity for, 161
 - obligations of, 162
 - sources of morality, 161–162
- morally-based legal propositions, 96–98, 101–102
- Mulligan, Kevin, 255–256
- Munich Circle, 112–113
- Munich Realists, 9. *See also* Reinach, Adolf
Bernhard Philipp
- natural law theory
 - phenomenological method and, 171–172
 - phenomenology and, 26–27
 - private law and, 129
 - Reinach and, 4
 - temporality of law and, 220–224
- natural selection, 54
 - evolutionary psychology and, 57, 64–69
 - ontological elements of, 71
- necessary propositions, 86–89
 - plausibility of, 88
 - positive law and, 87
 - prohibitions for, 88
- Necessity of Agreement Axiom (NOA), 18, 305–308, 324–326
 - acceptance of contracts and, 319
 - contents in, 307–314
 - modal-dependence, 307
 - morality of, 312
 - promises and, 320–321
 - unilaterality in, 307–308
- negation, in state of affairs
 - analysis of, 119–121
 - conceptual approach to, 106–107
 - conviction in, 108
 - judgment theory and, 106–107
 - definitions in, 107–108
 - negative judgment, 109–112
 - law's reliance on, 119
 - negative judgments, 111
 - double negative judgments, 110
 - judgment theory and, 109–112
 - negative conviction of positive state of affairs, 110–111
 - positive conviction of negative state of affairs, 110–111
 - positive convictions, 110–111
 - positive states of affairs and, 113
 - reasonable doubt and, 119
 - reification of, 197
 - terminology for, 107–109
- negative conviction of positive state of affairs, 110–111
- negative judgments, 111
 - double negative judgments, 110
 - judgment theory and, 109–112
 - negative conviction of positive state of affairs, 110–111
 - positive conviction of negative state of affairs, 110–111
 - positive convictions, 110–111
- nemo dat* principle
 - good faith purchase and, 141–142
 - linguistics and, 133–134
 - representation and, 137–138
 - transfer of property and, 132–134, 138
- Neo-Hegelianism, 26–27
- Neo-Kantianism, 26–27
- New Private Law, as legal school, in private law theory, 3–5, 13, 146
- No Willing dogma, 278–279, 288, 301–302
- NOA. *See* Necessity of Agreement Axiom
- Nolan, Donal, 155–156
- nominalism, private law and, 131
- non-institutional norms, positive law and, 162–164
 - private rights, 163–164
 - public rights, 163
 - unilateralism and, 164
- non-moral demands, of positive law, 160–162
 - juridical elements of, 161
 - normativity for, 161
- non-positive propositions, 94–104
 - fulfillment of obligations and, 96
 - minimal preconditions for, 103–104
 - morally-based legal propositions, 96–98, 101–102
 - ontological classifications of, 98–99
 - positive law and, 94–96, 100–101
 - pre-supposed legal propositions, 94–96
 - uncertain legal propositions, 98–101
- norms, norming and, temporality of law and, 231–232
- notion of participation, 107
- objects
 - sphere of natural objects, 151
 - state of affairs as distinct from, 108
- obligations, moral
 - absolute, 202–203
 - claims and, 194
 - directed, 281
 - fulfillment of, 82–83, 96, 101–102
 - Lipps on, 35
 - positive law and, 162
 - promising and, 30–32, 34–35
 - promissory, 281–282
 - temporality of law and, 221
- Ockham's razor, 32

- offers, in contract law, 313–320
 - characteristics of, 316–317
 - firm, 325
 - irrevocable, 325
 - juridical acts and, 315, 317
 - omissions liability, 159
 - On Assumptions* (Meinong), 113
 - ontology
 - of *a priori* legal concepts, 85–86, 156–157
 - for essential propositions, 89–90
 - of non-positive propositions, 98–99
 - of evolutionary psychology, 64–69
 - natural selection and, 71
 - of liberties, 211–213
 - of personhood, 174
 - of phenomenology, 48–49, 106–107
 - of rights, 211–213
 - for state of affairs, 118–120
 - of temporality of law, 221–222, 224
 - for time and space, 227
 - ordering, as performative act, 210
 - organizational law, 142–143
 - The Origin of Species* (Darwin), 57, 60
 - OVG. *See* Ownership View of Gift
 - ownership, theory of
 - intuition and, 265
 - Massin on, 265
 - possession compared to, 131–132
 - property law and, 130–132
 - reconstruction of, 265
 - Ownership View of Gift (OVG), 266–270
 - owning, as performative act, 38–45
 - absolute rights, 39–41
 - actio in personam*, 40
 - actio in rem*, 40
 - in phenomenological method, 172
 - positive law and, 41–42
 - rights over/to things, 39–41
 - as social act, 41–42
 - paradox of movement, 241
 - passive representation, 139
 - passive social acts, 170, 184
 - Patel v Mirza*, 154
 - perceiving, perception and, as performative act, 232
 - performative utterances, 28–29
 - explicit, 258
 - primitive, 258
 - performative verbs, as legal concept, 25, 28–30.
 - See also* owning; promising
 - acceptance of promise, 32–33
 - classes of, 30
 - commanding, 210
 - absolute rights and, 213
 - contracting in, 29–30
 - declarative utterances in, 28–29
 - enacting as, 45–48
 - a priori* legal concepts and, 45–47
 - absolute rights and, 213
 - positive law and, 47–48
 - as social act, 47–48
 - giving voice as, 45–48
 - a priori* legal concepts and, 45–47
 - etymology of, 46–47
 - as social act, 47–48
 - granting as, 172, 183
 - absolute rights and, 213
 - hearing as, 38–45, 306–322
 - etymology of, 39
 - temporality of law and, 232
 - theory of property and, 38–39
 - ordering, 210
 - perceiving as, 232
 - performative utterances in, 28–29
 - private law theory and, 29–30
 - questioning as, 232
 - representing as, 172
 - speaking as, 30–38
 - etymology of, 37, 39
 - in private law theory, 38
 - right to, 41
 - transferring as, 172, 183
 - truth value for, 29
- personality, 174
 - corporate, 178
- personation, 185
- persons, personhood and, 15
 - in *The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law*, 178
- as agents, 176–177
- analysis of, 186–187
- definition of, 174
- inter-personal encounters, 176–177
- personation and, 185
- in phenomenological method, 174–181
 - ambivalence for, 174–175
 - as bearers of entitlements and burdens, 176
 - as bearers of legal statuses, 177
 - as bearers of status-mediated claims and obligation, 177
 - conceptual development of persons, 174
 - incoherence of, 180
 - juristic notions, 175–176
 - limitations of, 178–179
 - moral judgments on, 179–180
 - ontology of, 174
 - positive law and, 177–178
 - social act theory and, 176–177, 179

- persons, personhood and (cont.)
 - speech act theory and, 174
 - synthetic truths about, 179–180
- philosophical views on, 176
- social act theory and
 - experiencing of social acts, 177–178
 - in phenomenological method, 176–177, 179
- Pfänder, Alexander, 6
- phenomenological idealist thought, 168
- phenomenological method, 168–173
- phenomenology
 - contract law and, 23–24
 - in civil law, 23–24
 - efficient breach in, 23–24
 - of experience, 28
 - free law and, 26
 - general theory of law and, 26
 - Husserl, E., on, 6, 28
 - jurisprudence of interests and, 26
 - legal language of, 25–30
 - legal realism and, 26
 - natural law theories and, 26–27
 - Neo-Hegelianism and, 26–27
 - Neo-Kantianism and, 26–27
 - ontology of, 48–49, 106–107
 - positive law and, 26–27
 - private law and, 23–25, 126–127
 - in *The A priori Foundations of the Civil Law*, 24–25
 - performative verbs concept, 25
 - property law and, 24
 - under German Civil Code, 24
 - realist, 4, 9–10
 - in pre-war era, 16
 - sociological jurisprudence and, 26
 - state of affairs and, 112–114
 - of transcendence, 28
- phenomenology of law
 - conceptual approach to, 219–220
 - Husserl, E., on, 219–220
 - Reinach on, 219–220
 - Troller on, 219
- Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein), 32
- philosophical positive law, 120–121
- philosophy of law, in phenomenological methods, 169–170
- Plato, 5–6, 107
- Platonism, 75
- positive contract law, 305–306
- positive convictions, 110–111
 - of negative state of affairs, 110–111
- positive law, 4
 - in *The A priori Foundations of the Civil Law*, 159–164
- a priori* legal concepts and, 152–159
 - essential propositions and, 90
 - knowledge production and, 158
 - necessary propositions and, 87
 - non-positive propositions and, 94–96, 100–101
- contract formation and, 313–314, 318–319
- enacting and, 47–48
- evolutionary psychology and, 59
- gifts and, 255
- Husserlian logical thinking compared to, 75
- morality and, 56, 160–162
 - legal oughts and, 160
 - normativity for, 161
 - obligations of, 162
 - sources of, 161–162
- non-institutional norms and, 162–164
 - private rights, 163–164
 - public rights, 163
 - unilateralism and, 164
- non-moral demands of, 160–162
 - juridical elements of, 161
 - normativity for, 161
- owning and, 41–42
- personhood and, 177–178
- phenomenological method and, 171, 173
 - morality and, 171
 - personhood and, 177–178
 - representation and, 181–182
- phenomenology and, 26–27
- philosophical, 120–121
- temporality of law and, 221–222
 - as *a priori* legal concept, 223–225
 - abstraction from, 223
 - induction from, 223
- validity of, 150
- positive states of affairs, 111
 - negative conviction of, 110–111
 - negative state of affairs and, 113
- Pragmatists, 60
- pre-supposed legal propositions, 94–96
- primary duty, in private law, 155
- primary liabilities, in private law, 155
- primitive performatives, 258
- private law theory
 - in *The A priori Foundations of the Civil Law*, 2–3, 24–25
- a priori* legal concepts and, 102, 129–140, 144, 146–147, 150–152
 - interpretations of, 142–145
- analysis of, 146–147
- civil law and, 126, 131–132, 144
 - representation in, 137
 - rights in rights and, 135
- common law and, 132, 134–135
 - rights in rights in, 135

- complex structure of, 140–146
 - as deep structure, 140–141
 - intuitive access to, 143–145
 - modularization of, 143–144
- conceptual approach to, 125–127
- holism and, 145–146
- intuition and, 125–126
- Kant and, 2
- Kennedy on, 129
- legal realism and, 127–128, 131
- methodological approach to, 127
- natural law and, 129
- nemo dat* principle
 - good faith purchase and, 141–142
 - representation and, 137–138
 - transfer of property and, 132–134, 138
- New Private Law school in, 3–5, 146
- performative verbs and, 29–30, 38
- phenomenology and, 23–25, 126–127
 - performative verbs concept, 25
- polarization within, 125, 127–129
 - consequentialism and, 128–129
 - deontology and, 128–129
 - external perspectives as element of, 127–129
 - individualism and altruism in, 129
 - internal perspectives as element of, 127–129
 - legal realism and, 127–128, 131
 - nominalism and, 131
 - reductionism and, 127–128, 145–146
- primary duties in, 155
- primary liabilities in, 155
- promising in, 38
- property rights and, 45, 130–136
 - contextualism and, 130
 - formalism and, 130
 - ownership and, 130–132
- public law and, 144–145
- Reinach and, 12–15, 125–127
 - in *The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law*, 2–3, 14
 - a priori* legal concepts for, 14
 - legal concepts for, 12–13
 - metaphysics and, 4
 - New Private Law school, 4–5, 13
- representation in, 136–140
 - in civil law, 137
 - in fiduciary law, 137
 - intuition and, 138
 - nemo dat* principle and, 137–138
 - passive, 139
- rights in rights and, 135
 - under civil law, 135
 - under common law, 135
- transfer of property in, 130–136
 - bundle of rights theory and, 136
 - good faith purchase and, 133–134, 141–142
 - nemo dat* principle, 132–134, 138
 - under Uniform Commercial Code, 133
- private rights
 - in *Doctrine of Right*, 167
 - positive law and, 163–164
- privileges, liberties as distinct from, 196
- Prolegomena to Pure Logic* (Husserl, E.), 62
- promising
 - promises and, as performative act, 30–38, 118
 - (See also obligations)
 - absolute rights and, 208, 213
 - acceptance of, 32–33, 287–290
 - conditions for, 290
 - non-communicative, 287–289
 - non-intentional, 287–289
 - as social act, 287–288, 323
 - as speech act, 287–288
- authors of, 291–297
- binding nature of, 32–36
- collective, 292
- commanding and, 210
- conceptual approach to, 277–278
- conditional, 235
- with conditional content, 235
- consequentialism and, 35–37
- content of, 297–301
- contracts and, 34, 36, 320–326
 - customs and, 320
 - Necessity of Agreement Axiom and, 320–321
- declaration of will and, 36
- definitions of, 31
- dissolution of promises, 34
- etymology of, 37–38
- fourth dogma of, 301–302
- under German Civil Code, 31, 34
- Gilbert on, 277–278, 282–287
 - authors of promises, 291–297
 - content of promises, 297–301
 - Immoral Promises dogma, 278–279, 301–302
 - Moral Requirement dogma, 279, 282, 301–302
 - No Willing dogma, 278–279, 288, 301–302
 - three dogmas approach, 278–282
- Hume on, 34–35, 278–279
- individual, 292
- joint commitment account of, 282–287, 297–301
 - personal commitments, 283–284
 - rescinding of commitments, 284
- Lipps on, 278–279
- modifications of, 236–237
- Ockham's razor and, 32

- promising (cont.)
 ordering and, 210
 in phenomenological method, 172
 in private law theory, 38
 as reliance, 36
 second-order, 296
 as social act, 32, 237, 287–288, 323
 temporality of law and, 232
 temporality of legal acts and, 234–238
 theory of obligations and, 30–32, 34–35
 unconditional, 290, 295–296
 utilitarian theory and, 35–37
- promissory obligations, 281–282
- property rights, property law and
 claims and, 201
 in Germany
 under Civil Code, 44–45
 private law and, 45
 revocation of rights, 44–45
 transference rights models, 43–45
 waiving of rights, 44–45
- hearing and, 38–39
- liberties and, 200–203
 absolute obligations and, 202–203
 number of, 201–202
 rights *in personam*, 200
 rights *in rem*, 200
 transfer of, 202
- organizational law, 142–143
- phenomenology and, 24
 under German Civil Code, 24
- private law theory and, 45, 130–136
 contextualism and, 130
 formalism and, 130
 ownership and, 130–132
- Reinach on, 42–45
 bundle theory, 42
 under German Civil Code, 42–43, 45
 as legal power, 43–44
 private law and, 45
 as social power, 43–44
 waiving of, 256–257, 271–272
- psychologism. *See also* anti-psychologism
 evolutionary psychology and, 61, 64–65, 67
 Husserl, E., and, 61–62, 64
 Lipps and, 62
- Psychologismus-Streit*, 53–54
 evolutionary psychology and, 61–63
 Frege and, 61
 psychologism and, 61, 64–65, 67
 World War I as end of, 76
- public law, 126
 private law theory and, 144–145
 public rights, positive law and, 163
- punctual temporal phenomena, 228–229
Pure Theory of Law (Kelsen), 48
- questioning, as performative act, 232
- Quine, W. V. O., 142
- Rauterberg, Gabriel, 142–143
- Raz, Joseph, 321–322
- realism, metaphysical, 67
 metaphysical, 64, 69
 realist phenomenology, 4, 9–10
 pre-War era, 16
- reasonable doubt, negative state of affairs and, 119
- reductionism, private law and, 127–128, 145–146
- Reinach, Adolf Bernhard Philipp. *See also*
 performative verbs; phenomenological
 method; phenomenology; *specific topics*
 The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law, 2,
 7–8, 15–16, 26
 private law theory in, 2–3
 a priori legal concepts for, 27–28
 American Legal Realism and, 3
 anti-psychologism and, 70–76
 Austin and, 28–30
 civil law and, 4
 conceptual approach to, 1–5
 conversion to Christianity, 8
 death in World War I, 8
 educational and training, 5–6, 26, 115–118
 Husserl, E., as influence on, 6–7, 9, 26
 legal writings, 116
 Essence and Systematics of Judgment,
 116
 essentialism for, 190–191
 Hohfeld compared to, 190–192
 legal conceptualism and, 4–5, 15–18
 conceptual approach to, 52–54
 legal formalism and, 4
 legal philosophy for, 13–15, 76
 on liberties, 189–190, 213–214
 Lipps and, 28, 115
 metaphysical realism theory for, 67
 metaphysics and, 1
 in private law, 4
 methodological approach to, 5
 natural law theory and, 4
 phenomenology and, 1, 9
 ontology for, 106–107
 realist, 4, 9–10
 on phenomenology of law, 219–220
 philosophical legacy of, 1–5, 9–12, 166–168
 decline of, 2–3
 legal philosophy, 1–5, 76

- philosophical method for, 9–12
 - methodological approach, 10–12
- private law theory and, 12–15, 125–127
 - in *The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law*, 2–3, 14
 - a priori* legal concepts in, 14
 - legal concepts in, 12–13
 - metaphysics and, 4
 - New Private Law school, 4–5, 13
- social act theory and, 1–2, 25–28
- speech act theory and, 1
- on temporality of law, 220–242
- World of Legal Forms and, 5
- relative rights
 - absolute rights compared to, 207–208
 - liberties and, 203–205
 - typology of, 206
- representation, theory of, 15
 - in phenomenological method, 181–186
 - authentic social acts, 182–183
 - efficacy of, 183
 - false representation, 182–183
 - inauthentic social acts, 182–183
 - juridical social acts and, 183–184
 - limitations of, 184–186
 - personation, 185
 - positive law and, 181–182
 - speech act theory and, 184
 - in private law, 136–140
 - in civil law contexts, 137
 - fiduciary law and, 137
 - intuition and, 138
 - nemo dat* principle and, 137–138
 - passive representation, 139
- representing, as performative act, 172
- retention, in temporality of law, 245
- revisability, *a priori* legal concepts as distinct from, 84
- “right law,” 171–172
- rights. *See also* absolute rights; claims; *specific topics*
 - Hohfeld on, 131
 - ontology of rights for, 211–213
 - to perform actions, 205
 - private, 163–164
 - in *Doctrine of Right*, 167
 - public, 163
 - relative
 - absolute rights compared to, 207–208
 - liberties and, 203–205
 - typology of, 206
 - rights in rights, 205
 - rights over/to things, 39–41, 205
 - temporality of law and, 240
 - to speaking, 41
 - universal, 204
 - rights in *personam*, 200
 - rights in *rem*, 200
 - rights in rights, 135
 - under civil law, 135
 - under common law, 135
 - in private law, 135
 - rights over things, temporality of law and, 240
 - rights to things, 205
 - rule of law, 154
 - Russell, Bertrand, 9
 - Salice, Alessandro, 274
 - Scheler, Max, 6, 9–10
 - on personhood, 176
 - schemas, 117
 - for Beling, 117–119
 - Schuppe, Wilhelm, 36, 234–235, 278–279
 - Searle, John, 170, 254, 290
 - second-order promises, 296
 - Shannon, Claude, 142
 - Sichelman, Ted, 136, 142
 - Smith, Barry, 255–256, 260
 - Smith, Henry, 264
 - Smith, Stephen, 146, 150–151
 - social act theory. *See also* juridical social acts; temporality of law
 - acceptance of promises, 287–288
 - allowing of liberties as, 209
 - enacting in, 47–48
 - gifts and, 255–260, 273
 - acceptance of, 261–263
 - giving voice and, 47–48
 - owning and, 41–42
 - personhood and
 - experiencing of social acts, 177–178
 - in phenomenological method, 176–177, 179
 - phenomenological method and, 169–171
 - active social acts, 184
 - attunement in, 182, 185–186
 - authentic social acts, 182–183
 - external states for, 170
 - inauthentic, 182–183
 - internal states for, 170
 - juridical social acts, 170–173, 182–184
 - passive social acts, 170, 184
 - personhood and, 176–177, 179
 - spontaneous, 170
 - promising as, 32, 237, 287–288
 - public law and, 126
 - Reinach and, 1–2, 25–28
 - space and time in, 225–226, 229–230
 - speech act theory and, 1–2, 29
 - Sociobiology* (Wilson), 59
 - sociological jurisprudence, 26

- “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (Hohfeld), 189–190
- space and time, theory of
- Kant on, 241
 - social acts and, 225–226, 229–230
 - temporality of law and, 225–230
 - ambiguity of, 226–227
 - as continuum, 227–230
 - ontology of, 227
 - punctual temporal phenomena, 228–229
 - social acts and, 225–226, 229–230
- speaking, as performative act, 30–38
- etymology of, 37, 39
 - in private law theory, 38
 - right to, 41
- speaking (*versprechen*), as performative act, 30–38
- species relativism, 64
- speech act theory
- Austin and, 1, 170
 - gifts and, 254–256, 269
 - personhood and, 174
 - phenomenological method and, 170, 172
 - conceptual analysis of, 170
 - general jurisprudence and, 170
 - origins of, 170
 - personhood and, 174
 - representation and, 184
 - Reinach and, 1
 - social act theory as foundation of, 1–2, 29
 - temporality of legal acts and, 233
- sphere of natural objects, 151
- spontaneous social acts, 170
- Stammler, Rudolf, 220–221
- state of affairs. *See also* negation
- characteristics of, 108–109, 111–112
 - Daubert on, 112–114
 - ethics and, 109
 - Ingarden on, 114
 - intuition in, 108
 - jurisprudence and, 115–119
 - Meinong on, 113
 - negative evidence in, 110
 - objects as distinct from, 108
 - ontology for, 118–120
 - phenomenology and, 112–114
 - positive, 111, 113
 - temporal states for, 109
- Stein, Edith, 8–10
- on personhood, 176
- Stettenheimer, Anna (Reinach), 7–9, 116
- Stevens, Robert, 155–156
- Strawson, John, 254, 256
- on gifts, 257–260
- Stumpf, Karl, 112–113
- synthetic truths, about personhood, 179–180
- temporality of law
- a priori* legal concepts and, 222–225
 - positive law and, 223–225
 - analysis of, 241–242, 250–251
 - Augustine on, 221–222
 - for claims, 221
 - conceptual approach to, 219–220
 - consciousness and, 239–240, 245
 - Husserl, G., on, 249–250
 - definition and scope of, 225
 - duration and, 219–220, 228, 230
 - continuum as distinct from, 229–230
 - expansion of, 227–229
 - German Civil Code and, 238–239
 - Heidegger on, 242–243
 - Husserl, E., on, 223, 242
 - Husserl, G., on, 219–220, 242–251
 - abstract time of works of art and law, 244–245
 - on detemporalization of law, 245–247
 - on legal consciousness, 249–250
 - on legal validity, 244, 246
 - philosophical influences on, 243–244
 - on retention, 245
 - on temporalization of experiential law, 247–248
 - Kant on, 224
 - of legal acts, 233–241
 - promising and promises, 234–238
 - speech act theory and, 233
 - natural law and, 220–224
 - for obligations, 221
 - ontology of, 221–222, 224
 - for time and space, 227
 - paradox of movement and, 241
 - positive law and, 221–222
 - as *a priori* legal concept, 223–225
 - abstraction from, 223
 - induction from, 223
 - for rights over things, 240
- Schuppe on, 234–235
- social acts and, 230–233
- Brentano on, 232
 - through determinations, 231, 238–239
 - hearing as, 232
 - Kelsen on, 231
 - norms and, 231–232
 - perceiving as, 232
 - promising as, 232
 - questioning as, 232
 - time and space and, 225–226, 229–230

- social meaning of, 219
- Stammmler and, 220–221
- time and space in, 225–230
 - ambiguity of, 226–227
 - as continuum, 227–230
 - ontology of, 227
 - punctual temporal phenomena, 228–229
 - social acts and, 225–226, 229–230
- theory of information. *See* information
- theory of mind. *See* computational theory of mind
- theory of representation. *See* representation
- theory of space and time. *See* space and time
- thinking, *a priori* legal concepts and, 85
- transcendence, phenomenology of, 28
- transcendental idealism, 9, 16
- transcendental idealist thought, 168
- transfer of property
 - Husserl, E., on, 268
 - in private law, 130–136
 - bundle of rights theory and, 136
 - good faith purchase and, 133–134, 141–142
 - nemo dat* principle, 132–134, 138
 - under Uniform Commercial Code, 133
- transference of ownership, gifts by, 263–270
 - Austin on, 263–264
 - intuition as part of, 264–265
 - Ownership View of Gift in, 266–270
 - shortcuts in, 267
 - target of gifts, 266
- transferring, as performative act, 172, 183
 - of liberties, 213
 - for property rights, 202
- Troller, A., 219
- truth values
 - for performative verbs, 29
 - in phenomenological method, 173
 - synthetic truths, 179–180
- UCC. *See* Uniform Commercial Code
- uncertain legal propositions, 98–101
- unconditional promises, 290, 295–296
- Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), 133
- unilateralism, 164
- universal rights, 204
- utilitarian theory, 35–37
- Vendler, Zeno, 254–256
- versprechen*. *See* speaking
- Vincent v Lake Erie Transportation Co.*, 163
- Waldron, Jeremy, on gifts, 270–273
- Weinrib, Ernest, 153, 163–164
- will, declarations of, 36
 - gifts and, 259–260
- Wilson, Edward O., 59
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 9, 32
- World War I
 - Psychologismus-Streit* and, 76
 - Reinach's death in, 8
- Wundt, Wilhelm, 61
- Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenology Research* (Husserl, E.), 7–8, 26
- Yun-chien Chang, 131–132