

Part I The Story of Empire

Note A When did Athenian imperialism begin?

Athens was one of few settlements in southern Greece continuously occupied from the Bronze Age through into the archaic period. The territory of Attica, which Athens came to dominate, seems to have served as a temporary refuge for those who, in the upheavals surrounding the destruction of the Mycenaean palaces, made their way east. Graves in the cemetery at Perati, belonging to the very last phase of the Bronze Age (known as L(ate) H(elladic) IIIC), seem to give evidence of transitory settlement in Attica of men moving east across the Aegean. In particular the artefactual assemblages at Perati can be closely paralleled with those found at Ialysos on Rhodes. Two centuries or so later close archaeological links can once more be found between Athens and the new foundation at Miletos. These archaeological similarities do not justify our believing the details of later stories of an 'Ionian Migration' from Athens to the coast of Asia Minor, but they do make it clear that close links between Athens and the eastern Aegean and its coasts go back to, and were to some extent maintained during, the Dark Age (c. 1200-700).

Athens was certainly one of the best connected of Greek settlements during much of the Dark Age, receiving exotic goods from outside as well as within the Greek world, and exporting both her pottery and its innovative styles. In the eighth century Athens stands out in the Greek world for the quantity and quality of material recovered from her extensive cemeteries, and figurative art is pioneered by the painters of Athenian pottery. But in the eighth century Athens was increasingly isolated from the rest of the Greek world: little Athenian pottery of the second half of the eighth century was exported and Athens did not play any leading role in the establishment of settlements abroad that other cities pioneered during this period. At the end of the eighth century both the nature and the quantity of archaeological material recovered from Attica change markedly. The reasons for these peculiar developments are not certain, but some sort of social, and perhaps political, crisis seems highly likely.

It is only in the later seventh and early sixth century that Athens rejoins the mainstream of Greek cities, adopting a style of pot painting that borrows from Corinthian pottery and then eclipses it in the international market, establishing a settlement abroad at Sigeion at the mouth of the Hellespont, setting up a major festival involving competitive games (the Great Panathenaia, 566) and acquiring a 'tyrant' (a man who ruled by virtue of popularity and/or force, not constitutional position). Athenian families were prominent members of the international aristocracy of the sixth century (both the favourite and the eventual winner of the competition for the hand of the daughter of Kleisthenes, tyrant of Sikyon, were Athenians, Herodotos 6.126-131), but Athens as a state remained minor, having to fight repeatedly to remove the island of Salamis, just off her coast, from the control of her small neighbour Megara (finally sending settlers there in the last decade of the century, ML 14), and even at the end of the century engaging inconclusively in warfare with the small Saronic island of Aigina.

Why was Athens not a more important power in the Greek world before the Persian Wars? and why did she become so important in the early fifth century? The answer to the first question may lie in part in the size of Attica. At about 2,400 square km., Athens'

territory surpassed that of any other single city, except Sparta, in size. Archaeological evidence suggests that until the classical period even the agricultural potential of this territory was not fully exploited: Athenians had less reason than many to look elsewhere. Another part of the answer may lie in population size. Although the increase during the eighth century in the number of graves known from Attica has sometimes been taken to indicate a population explosion, changes in burial practice seem rather more likely. It may be only in the late sixth century that Athens began to have manpower at her disposal sufficient to encourage and sustain military activity on a large scale. Peter Garnsey has estimated that it was only in the fifth century that Athens began to need to import grain every year, rather than just in bad years, in order to feed her population.

Having manpower does not make a state powerful if it cannot organise that manpower. Whether or not Kleisthenes advertised to the Athenians that his reforms which established democracy would give them a more powerful army, there is little doubt that a more powerful army was indeed what they produced. The ten new ‘tribes’ that Kleisthenes created, which cut across regional loyalties within Attica and ensured that the Athenian Council always represented all local interest groups, were also used as the basis for an Athenian army. The effectiveness of the new army was immediately demonstrated by a victory over the Boiotians and Khalkidians together, which was used to establish an Athenian settlement at Khalkis, and the subsequent creation of 10 Generals and weakening of the military role of the Polemarch further strengthened the force.

If Athens’ emergence as a major power has something to do with organised manpower, it also has something to do with monetary resources. The silver mines in the Laureion area of southern Attica were exploited as early as the Bronze Age, but systematic exploitation on a large scale seems to have been a feature only of the later sixth century, by which time, at least, the silver resources were treated as public property. Athens’ earliest silver coinage, minted in the middle of the century, was not made of Laureion silver, but the ‘owl’ series, first struck probably in the 520s, was. Herodotos and the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* tell us that Themistokles persuaded the Athenians in the early fifth century to divert the considerable profits from the mines to the construction of the 170-oared warships known as triremes, and so create the naval power that ended up largely responsible for the defeat of the Persians at Salamis.

Some Athenian families had enjoyed close relations with the rulers of Lydia in the first half of the sixth century, and at the end of that century some were prepared to contemplate equally close relations with Persia. But by the time that an appeal came from the Ionians for help in throwing out their Persian-backed tyrants and revolting from Persia, Athens was prepared to send twenty ships, perhaps half her fleet, when the only other Greek mainland city to send help was Eretria which sent five ships, and then only, Herodotos says, to please the Milesians (Hdt. 5.99.1). The short-lived Athenian involvement in the Ionian Revolt showed that Athenians saw themselves as actors on more than just the local stage. By encouraging the Persian expeditions of 490 and 480-79, the Revolt ensured that Athens had to continue to embrace wider interests in order to protect her own.

Herodotos calls the Ionian Revolt ‘the beginning of evils for the Greeks’; it might also be called the beginning of Athenian imperialism, for it set in chain the events that put empire within the Athenian grasp. So why did Athens send those twenty ships? Herodotos views the fact that Kleomenes king of Sparta responded negatively to the

When did Athenian Imperialism begin?

3

Ionian request for help while Athens responded positively as a sign that it was easier to deceive 30,000 men than one man (Hdt. 5.97.2). That an Assembly meeting was involved at Athens, as apparently not at Sparta, may indeed have been decisive: emotional appeals may be hard for a group to resist, and it is relatively easy to ridicule speculation about possible future consequences when addressing a crowd. Later in the century Athenians seem to have had little trouble looking at difficult decisions exclusively from the viewpoint of their own interests, narrowly defined, but in 499 neither the young democracy nor its leaders were used to weighing up conflicting priorities. In any case, with Athenians by now settled not just at Sigeion but in the Khersonesos and on Lemnos (see 72), Athens did have interests which Persian expansionism directly threatened.

Athens' lack of a history of leadership over other states explains how she found it easy to allow Sparta (already head of the so-called Peloponnesian League) to take the lead in the Hellenic League against Persia; her involvement in the Ionian Revolt, defeat of the Persians at Marathon, massive attack on Paros in c.487, and crucial contribution to Greek naval successes against Xerxes' invasion explain why Ionian Greeks might quickly turn to her to spearhead the ongoing campaign against Persia when Sparta showed reluctance to continue the struggle and Spartan leaders showed dubious attitudes towards those who had been fighting on the Persian side. If Athenian intentions in the 470s are open to debate, that is perhaps not least because Athenians were new to international power and there was no popular consensus at Athens about the right way to use the opportunity that presented itself. Both later writers of an apologist persuasion, and those who believe that she had only her own interests at heart from the beginning of the so-called Delian League, may correctly identify views held by different groups within the Athenian citizen body.

Note B Handling Thucydides on the formation and growth of the Athenian Empire

Any account of the growth and (changing) character of the Athenian empire between its foundation in 478 and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War must rest heavily upon the account which Thucydides gives of the events of these years in the chapters known as the Pentekontaetia (the 'Fifty Years') (1.89-117). No other source offers a continuous independent account of these years; many later sources are probably or demonstrably inaccurate; contemporary inscriptions are few in number for this whole period, and particularly so for the period before 450, and when inscriptions survive they are often difficult to date or ill-preserved, and never give us adequate information about their context or causes, let alone their consequences.

But Thucydides' Pentekontaetia is not, and was never intended to be, a history of the Athenian Empire. Thucydides expressly gives an account of these years in order to explain Spartan fear of Athens' growing power, and he has manifestly selected the events he mentions to this end. As a result he omits events important in the internal history of the empire but without direct bearing on Sparta (most notably Athenian diplomatic relations with Persia, but also such matters as the movement of the League Treasury from Delos to Athens and the disciplining of allies of no great military strength), just as he omits events which were crucial in Athenian constitutional history and had important indirect effects on Athenian imperialism, but which were not in his view of great moment for relations with Sparta (note especially the absence of mention of the shadowy Ephialtic reforms, although he does mention subversive activities by desperate Athenian oligarchs a little later).

Two further features of the Pentekontaetia must be borne in mind: that Thucydides' account is also an interpretation, and that it is part of a larger work (whether that work was written as a unit or in parts which were more or less thoroughly revised in the light of what was written later). To take the second point first. Thucydides stops his account of the fifty years with the suppression of the Samian revolt, but that does not mean that he thought nothing relevant happened in the period 438–432. But he had already related incidents arising from disputes involving Poteidaia and Corcyra and would have occasion later to refer to Athenian activities in Akarnania and the north Aegean. The Pentekontaetia highlights a theme and sketches the case for its importance, but the reader is left to add in further relevant data when they are revealed: these later pieces of information are part of writing persuasive history, for the reader is made to feel that they independently confirm the interpretation that the historian has offered.

To confirm his hypothesis that the war which began in 431 was a result of Spartan fear of Athens' growing power, Thucydides needs to show not only that Athenian power grew and that Sparta was afraid, but also that the power and the fear were such as to cause war in 431 when they had not caused the two powers to come into continuous hostile contact at any earlier date. (The so-called 'First' Peloponnesian War from 460–445 involved only one battle between a Spartan and an Athenian army; most of the conflict was between Athens and Sparta's allies.) Thucydides has, therefore, to offer an interpretation of earlier events which shows both how they contributed to increasing Spartan fear in the long term and how it was that they did not lead Sparta to declare war immediately. Thus it is that he adopts the story that the Spartans were content to allow the Athenians to take over the leadership of the group of largely Ionian cities keen to continue the fight against Persia; the alliance formed by this group has come to be known as the Delian League because it initially established its Treasury on the sacred island of Delos; other contemporary observers were almost certainly telling a different story (16, 28). Similarly, Thucydides tells of the Spartans campaigning with a large army in central Greece in 458/7 because of a desire to help two tiny places to which they were linked by Dorian descent, and fighting a battle at Tanagra because they were unable otherwise to return through the Isthmus; but the size of the army and the position of Tanagra on the Aegean side of Boiotia, and close to the border with Attica at its easiest point of entry, strongly suggest that invading Attica, or threatening its invasion, were on the Spartan agenda from the beginning.

In reading the Pentekontaetia it is worth keeping an eye on how Thucydides constructs his account. If Thucydides' criticism of Hellanikos for inaccurate chronology (29 1.97.2) implies anything for his own account (in which he gives no precise dates), it should be that he narrates events in the order in which he believes they occurred. But if he denies himself manipulation of order as a way of drawing attention to, or from, particular events, he still can choose to discuss those events he selects at greater or lesser length. The sense that the Athenians were doing the Ionians a good deed in taking over the Delian League is strengthened by the amount of space devoted to problems with Pausanias (7). The impression of Athenian innocence is reinforced by the even longer account preceding this (4) of the ruse by which Themistokles succeeds in preventing Sparta stopping Athens rebuilding her walls, which suggests that in the years immediately after the Persian invasion Athens was primarily concerned with protecting herself, rather than with aggrandisement. By contrast, Thucydides runs rapidly through the capture of Eion and Skyros and the war with Karystos before pausing for general reflection on the suppression of the Naxian revolt, and this, together

with the glance forward contained in describing Naxos as ‘the first allied city deprived of its freedom’, leads the reader to see Athens’ relations with her allies as changing at this point (29 1.98-9). Interpretation is embedded in all these decisions about brevity or dilation, and readers must keep their eyes on the way they are constantly manipulated.

As a contemporary, almost certainly born during the 450s, Thucydides was in a much better position than we are to gather information about the events of these years. But not all sorts of information were equally easy to come by, and we may suspect that it was much easier to produce narrative of military events in their correct chronological order than to recover whose arguments prevailed in a political debate which occurred before Thucydides’ entry to the Assembly – even a debate at Athens, let alone one in Sparta. In having to infer intentions from results, Thucydides was in a position not so dissimilar from that in which we find ourselves, and just occasionally our knowledge of material unknown to Thucydides or different perspective on material with which he was familiar (e.g. Herodotos’ *Histories*) may enable us to question his conclusions.

The uniqueness of Thucydides’ account, and his (rightful) status as an outstandingly perceptive historian, have meant that modern scholars of very different interests have been reluctant to question his interpretation. Critical engagement with Thucydides’ Pentekontaetia is indeed essential for any history of these crucial central years of the fifth century, but that engagement should lead not to blind copying but to a sympathetic understanding of what Thucydides is doing and to a realisation that, in some circumstances, it is wise not to treat his account as the last word.

Note C Using literary sources other than Thucydides

Literary sources other than Thucydides (and Herodotos) fall into three broad categories. There is contemporary drama, which for our purposes effectively means comedy (there is much to be said about tragedy and empire, but little can be revealed by short quotations); there is a little fifth-century and much fourth-century oratory; and there are the compilations of later writers of histories and lives. Each of these categories of source presents different sorts of difficulties.

Comedy

Both the extant plays of Aristophanes and surviving quotations from lost plays by Aristophanes and other comic dramatists offer a window onto Athenian attitudes to empire which is at once direct and oblique. It is direct because comedy latches on to current issues, and the very choice of subject matter for jokes gives an indication of the Athenian political agenda at the time of the play. It is oblique because the issues are presented in a way designed to cause laughter, and it is not always easy to detect how that laughter is being produced. Basic comic techniques include exaggeration (as over the length of absence of the ambassadors to Persia in 58), defeating expectation (adding a fictitious and ridiculous element to an otherwise ‘straight’ description; as in 203), allegory (turning Kleon’s activities into those of a dog in the kitchen in *Wasps* 891-1008), and incongruity (a familiar fact put into unfamiliar company). These techniques can be combined. The historian has to be alive both to the possibility that genuine information is part of a joke, and that an audience may laugh at practices and attitudes which they themselves continue to support and promote outside the theatre. Kleon prosecuted Aristophanes for bringing Athens into disrepute before an audience that included allies in his play *Babylonians* of 426, which

suggests that it is not only we who find it difficult to draw the line between fact and fiction.

The Orators

If comic dramatists select the features that they ridicule with an eye to laughter rather than to making a political point, the distortions of the orator (as of the writer of a pamphlet such as [Xenophon]’s *Constitution of the Athenians*) tend in a rather more consistent direction. The orator’s aim is to persuade, and orators select ruthlessly with an eye to the favour of the court or Assembly which they are addressing (the same applies to speeches in Thucydides, which seem to reflect partly the arguments Thucydides knew to have been used by the speakers, and partly the arguments he thought *should* have been used). Scholars often suggest that the knowledge and memory of the audience addressed must have acted as a control upon the orator’s fictions, but neither court nor Assembly gave its participants much chance to talk among themselves, and the orator could certainly get away with statements which some of those addressed would know to be untrue. We rarely know the results of the debates of which surviving speeches were part, and even when we do, we are more or less entirely ignorant as to why the court or Assembly supported or did not support the speaker. Orators’ words cannot, therefore, be taken to indicate either the truth or what Athenians at large thought, and the overall intention of the speaker must always be taken into account in assessing the significance of what is said.

Later Historians

Herodotos and Thucydides work on the basis of what they observe themselves and are told by others. Those who later compiled historical accounts or wrote lives depended upon what had been written earlier. They were essentially in the same position as we are, albeit with considerably more fifth-century (and later) literature surviving for them to use. Often it is possible for us to see, in broad terms at least, what sources they are using and how they are using them. The Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* manifestly derives some of its information, sometimes even phraseology, from Herodotos and Thucydides; Diodoros shows that one of his most important sources, the fourth-century historian Ephoros of Kyme, produced an account of the origins of the Peloponnesian War by supplementing information drawn from Thucydides with suggestions made by Aristophanes in *Peace* in order to give an internal political motivation to Athens’ entry into war that Thucydides never even hints at. When in this way we can detect the sort of source being employed, we can also observe whether or not the writer has exercised good historical judgement. But in many cases the source of information remains obscure, and we can only decide the value of the information on the basis of the nature of the story told (is it an anecdote also told of another? is it internally consistent? is its chronology possible? and so on).

Major events of modern history are written up by numerous different individuals in different contexts, and the modern historian is always in a position to weigh one source against another. Often the ancient historian is faced with an event attested by a single source. In these circumstances it is important to go beyond the single sentence in which the information is given, assess the wider context and look at the way in which the writer in question deals with events about which we are better informed. It is for this reason that passages appear in this volume which do little more than paraphrase Thucydides as well as passages which contradict Thucydides or give quite different information. Before basing an argument on any single passage the wise historian will also look at what else the author in question is prepared to claim.

Note D Chronology

In Athens years were named after one of the nine archons (who was therefore called the Eponymous Archon) and ran from midsummer to midsummer (hence such modern datings as 424/3); in Sparta years were named after one of the five ephors. In Argos it was the priestess of Hera who was the eponymous figure, and since she held office for more than one year, dates were recorded according to the number of years a particular priestess had been in office. Thucydides uses all these three cities' dating systems to fix the start of the war (2.2.1, see also 4.133.2-3 and 5.19.1) but expresses the view that they are not adequate for the historian's task (5.20). He himself, having fixed the beginning of the war, dates the events of the war according to the year of the war and whether the event occurred in 'summer' (= spring and summer, March to early November) or 'winter'.

Archon dates are but rarely referred to in other Athenian literature, and, except when fixing a date is important to the argument, orators are mostly vague about when things happened. Some later historians took over Thucydides' dating system, others attempted to work by archon year. Diodoros, who does arrange his history year by year, dates his years by Roman consuls, Athenian archons, and the year of the Olympiad; but he is at best only as accurate as his sources allowed him to be, and, since he worked with sources which did not always indicate dates precisely, he not infrequently can be shown to record events under the wrong year, group events that lasted more than a year under a single year's entry, or record the same event twice under different years (he even records the death of King Arkhidamos of Sparta under the year 434 and then has him lead invasions of Boiotia in 429 and Attica in 426 (the year he really died) (12.35.4, 47.1, 52.1)). Plutarch, not writing history (as he insists at *Alexander* 1.2), has little interest in chronology and groups events as they illuminate his subject with little regard for whether they happened at similar times (compare 51 with 53 or 231 with 68).

Athenian public inscriptions often, although not always, gave a date by name of archon and by the tribe which was providing the prytaneis (see 238). When this information survives on a stone we can be sure of the year, but because which tribe provided the prytaneis at which stage of the year was not fixed, we often cannot pinpoint the time of the year. Most frequently, however, inscriptions survive in so damaged a condition that even if there was once an archon's name, it can no longer be read.

In the absence of an archon's name there are three ways of dating an inscription.

a) We may be able to identify the events to which the inscription relates with events preserved in the historical record. How securely such an identification can be made will vary: there is little dispute that 134 relates to the Athenian settlement after the revolt of Mytilene, a little more dispute as to whether 78 relates to the Euboian revolt of 445 (rather than an Athenian expedition to Euboia in 424/3 not recorded in Thucydides but alluded to by a scholiast on Aristophanes *Wasps* 718), and a very open question as to whether it is right to associate 190 with irregular tribute payment in the early 440s as revealed by the Tribute Quota Lists.

b) A second way of dating an inscription is from the individuals mentioned. Kleonymos is known to have moved one decree (121.32-56) in 426/5 (in this case we know because the Secretary's name appears in an inscription dated by archon name); when Kleonymos appears proposing another decree (136) the possibilities that he proposed both in the same year, and did so as a member of the Council for that year, must be good. A more difficult case is offered by 190. This decree was proposed by

one Kleinias. Kleinias is not a common Athenian name but was used in the family of Alkibiades. More particularly it was the name of Alkibiades' father, who is known to have been killed in the battle of Koroneia in 446. If Alkibiades' father was the proposer of the decree, then we have a firm date before which the decree must have been moved. But we cannot be absolutely confident that the same man was involved.

c) A third means of dating is on the basis of the way the inscription is carved. Certain styles of writing and certain arrangements of the script on the stone are fashionable at one period rather than another. More particularly, the forms of letters change over time: even slight acquaintance with inscriptions well dated by other means reveals how very different sixth-century inscriptions from Attica are from those from the same area written in the fourth century. Those who have made a detailed study of inscriptions acquire some confidence that they can date letter-forms rather more closely than just to a century. But how much more closely? That scholars can sometimes detect the individual idiosyncrasies of a single mason and ascribe a number of different inscriptions to his hand may be held to reduce rather than increase our confidence that it is the date alone that determines the letter-forms of inscriptions. It is reasonable to expect that an individual mason may change his writing style only slightly over a working life that may last 30 years or more, and that masons trained at different periods may produce very different work at the same time.

Much has been made in the scholarship of the changing shape of one letter in particular: sigma written with three strokes rather than four. Some scholars have suggested that the form written with just three strokes was not employed after the middle of the 440s, and that the presence of a 'three-bar sigma' therefore indicates that an inscription dates pre-445. This has long been a controversial claim, and recently the case against it has been strengthened. Laser photography has been used to detect distortions of the crystalline structure in a marble stele whose surface is abraded, and these distortions have been interpreted to suggest that a previously unreadable letter in an archon's name in an inscription (ML37) that includes a three-bar sigma indicates that the archon was Antiphon, who was in office in 418/7, almost thirty years after the three-bar sigma is supposed to have died out. Although scholars continue to debate the validity of the technique and the interpretation of the laser image, confidence in the validity of dating on the basis of the letter-forms has rightly been further undermined by this recent work: as well as the three-bar sigma this inscription includes the letter rho in a form that has in the past been reckoned not to have been used after the early 430s.

Where all three of these dating techniques point in the same direction, we may have some confidence in that conclusion. In some cases, however, the different forms of evidence conflict. Thus one fragment of **198** (from Kos, but inscribed in the Attic alphabet and thus perhaps by an Athenian mason) has a three-bar sigma, although the parody in Aristophanes *Birds* (**199**) suggests a context of the years immediately before 414. Identification of individuals involved, what is known as prosopographical information, is hardly conclusive here: the decree mentions a Klearkhos as proposer of a decree, and the only Klearkhos known to have been politically active in fifth-century Athens is a man who was on the Council in 408/7 (*IGi*³ 515.25 cf. 112.2); but other evidence (see notes on **198**) does seem to favour a later rather than an earlier date.

It is important therefore to be aware of whether the dating of epigraphic evidence is secure and of what its basis is. Inscriptions can provide solid independent pegs on which to hang floating literary data, but when it is the literary data which are the basis for the dating of an inscription, that inscription cannot then be deployed to support the interpretation of the literary data upon which its own date depends.

The formation of the Delian League

9

1.1. THE FORMATION OF THE DELIAN LEAGUE

None of the stories about the formation of the Delian League (see above p.4) that have come down to us date from earlier than the last quarter of the fifth century. Even the earliest writers had the benefit of hindsight, and are important as evidence not merely for what happened in 479-7 but for what were the issues argued about later in the century.

To carry the struggle against Persia into Ionia and the Hellespont? Differences between Athens and Sparta

- 1 [87.6] This decision of the [Spartan] assembly that the truce had been broken was taken in the fourteenth year [432] of the Thirty Years' Peace which was made after the Euboian affair [445]. [88] The Spartans voted that the Peace had been broken and that war should be declared, not so much because they were persuaded by the speeches of their allies as because they feared that the Athenians might become still more powerful, seeing that the greater part of Greece was already in their hands.

[89.1] To explain, the Athenians came to the situation in which they rose to greatness in the following way. [89.2] When the Persians retreated from Europe, defeated by the Greeks both at sea and on land, and after those Persians who fled with their ships to Mykale for refuge were destroyed, Leotykhidas the Spartan king, who was the leader of the Greeks at Mykale, went back home with the allies from the Peloponnese. But the Athenians and the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont who had now revolted from the Persian King stayed behind and besieged Sestos [479], which the Persians held. They spent the winter there and captured the city, which the Persians abandoned. After this they sailed away from the Hellespont and dispersed to their own cities [spring, 478]. [Continued in 4]

Thucydides 1.87.6-89.2

- 2 [106.1] When the Greeks had made an end of most of the Persians, some in the battle [of Mykale] and some as they fled, they burnt the Persians' ships and their whole fortification, after they had brought the booty out from it onto the shore and had found various chests of money. After burning the fortification and the ships, they sailed away. [106.2] When they reached Samos, the Greeks took counsel about uprooting from Ionia and about the best place to found an Ionian settlement in the Greece of which they had control, abandoning Ionia to the Persians. They thought, I should explain, that it was impossible for them to defend the Ionians and keep a constant guard over them, and they had no expectation that if they did not defend the Ionians, the Persians would leave the Ionians alone. [106.3] In addition, those in command of the Peloponnesians had it in mind to uproot from their centres of trade those Greek peoples who had collaborated with the Persians, and to give their land to the Ionians to live in. But the Athenians were not happy to see Greek rule in Ionia ended, nor to have the Peloponnesians taking decisions about people who were Athenian colonists. After a keen argument, the Peloponnesians gave way. [106.4] It was in this way that they brought the Samians, Khians, Lesbians and other islanders who had fought on the Greek side into the alliance [Hellenic League], taking pledges and oaths from them to be faithful and not to revolt. Once these oaths were secured, they sailed off to break down the bridges, for they thought that they would find the bridges still stretched in position across the Hellespont.

Herodotos 9.106

Although often passed over in accounts of the Athenian empire, this episode is in fact crucial in determining that the war against Persia goes on. By their action here the Athenians establish that they intend to continue the role of protectors of the Ionians which they had rather fitfully played in the Ionian Revolt. The emphasis here on oaths and on not revolting should be compared with the account of the origin of the Delian League given in 16.

- 3 [114.1] The Greeks who set sail from Mykale towards the Hellespont first moored around Lekton, held up by contrary winds. From there they came to Abydos and found that the bridges, which they thought that they would find still stretched out, had been broken. It was those bridges that were the main cause of their coming to the Hellespont. [114.2] The Peloponnesians with Leotykhidas decided to sail away to Greece, but the Athenians and their General Xanthippos decided to stay and make an attack on the Khersonesos. So the Peloponnesians sailed away; but the Athenians crossed from Abydos to the Khersonesos and began the siege of Sestos.

Herodotos 9.114

The Herodotean account is followed quite closely by Diodoros 11.37, which must ultimately derive from it. Comparison of 2 and 3 with 1 reveals how Thucydides cuts out Herodotos' debate and so does not indicate Spartan desire to evacuate the Ionian Greeks.

The behaviour of Themistokles and increasing tension between Sparta and Athens

- 4 [89.3, continuing 1] The Athenian people, when the Persians left their territory, immediately began bringing back their wives and children and those goods that remained from the places to which they had been evacuated, and they began preparations to rebuild the city and its walls. Only short sections of the city walls were standing and most of the houses were in ruins, although the few houses in which the high-ranking Persians had made their quarters survived.

[90.1] When the Spartans perceived what was going to happen, they sent ambassadors. It was partly that they themselves would rather see neither the Athenians nor anyone else having a wall, but more that their allies were urging them, frightened of the size of the Athenian fleet, which had not previously been of the same order, and of the daring which the Athenians had shown in the Persian war. [90.2] They expressed the view that the Athenians should not build a wall, but should join them in pulling down all the walls standing outside the Peloponnese. The Spartans did not reveal to the Athenians their intentions and suspicions but said the purpose was to deprive the Persians, if they invaded again, of any secure base for operations, as Thebes had been in the recent invasion. They said that the Peloponnese provided a refuge for all, and a sufficient base for counter-attack.

[90.3] After the Spartans had said this, the Athenians immediately sent them away, replying, on Themistokles' proposal, that they would send ambassadors to the Spartans to discuss what they proposed. Themistokles told the Athenians to send him to Sparta as quickly as possible, and to choose further ambassadors in addition to himself but not to send them immediately, but to keep them back until such a time as they had raised the wall to the necessary height for fighting from. He urged all in the city to help in the fortification, sparing no private or public building that might give them any material assistance in the task, but