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Introduction

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The revolutions and military confrontations that rocked the world during the decades around 1800 saw forced movements – both old and new – on a massive scale. It was during these years that the transatlantic slave trade reached its peak; that decades of almost uninterrupted inter-imperial warfare drove hundreds of thousands of soldiers and military agents across the globe, causing the number of prisoners of war and captives to rise to unprecedented heights; that long-standing imperial practices of convict transportation went into high gear; and that political refugees and exiles emerged as a mass phenomenon. Bold attempts by state authorities to control and regulate mobility led to new legal practices and statuses and to further waves of deportation.

Mobility and Coercion in an Age of Wars and Revolutions: A Global History, c.1750–1830 brings this explosion in forced mobilities into full view. Rather than describing forced migrations as an aberration in a period usually identified with national independence struggles, the quest for liberty, and new concepts of citizenship and democratic participation, this book recognizes these mobilities as a crucial dimension of the momentous transformations that were underway. By putting the history of exclusion and forced removal center stage, *Mobility and Coercion* recovers the fundamental messiness, violence, and contingency of the era often described as the cradle of political modernity.

AN AGE OF WARS, REVOLUTIONS, AND COERCED MOBILITY

The decades between 1750 and 1830 comprise a chaotic and momentous period in world history. A long-standing, mainly Western, intellectual tradition has referred to this period as the transition to (Western) modernity. This

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Sattelzeit (saddle period), to borrow a term coined (half-seriously) by the historian Reinhart Koselleck, was marked by simultaneous transformations in politics, societal structures, and economic production, and by the attendant emergence of new worldviews, some of which permanently altered the experience of time and historicity.[1] Most scholars of non-Western and global history have cautioned against universalizing concepts of historical change that, in many cases, only apply to a subsection of Western European regions and peoples during this period. Yet most global accounts of the period agree on its transformative character, especially with regard to political and geopolitical upheaval in many parts of the world.[2]

Building on this characterization of the years between 1750 and 1830, *Mobility and Coercion* emphasizes two forces that shaped this era: revolution, on the one hand, and warfare, on the other. These dual "expressions of mass human violence" have long been understood as defining features of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, although they are usually studied in isolation.[3] A long-standing historiographic tradition has referred to the revolutions of this period as the cradle of Western political modernity. This Age of Revolutions came to scholarly life as an elite-centered picture of the American and the French Revolutions and their interconnections.[4] Over time, historical scholarship has broadened this focus on the North Atlantic to include the major political convulsions across Latin America and the Caribbean, West and Central Africa, and southern Europe.[5] In so doing, historians have brought into view an increasingly diverse set of actors, including Indigenous communities

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[1] Reinhart Koselleck, "Einleitung," in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, eds., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 8 vols. (Stuttgart, 1979), 1: xv.

[2] C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden, MA, 2004), 86–120; Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, NJ, 2014), 59–63; David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds., *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760–1840* (Basingstoke and New York, 2010).

[3] Linda Colley, *The Gun, the Ship, and the Pen: Warfare, Constitutions, and the Making of the Modern World* (London, 2021), 4.

[4] Classic accounts include R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760–1800*, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ, 1956–64); Jacques Godechot, *La Grande Nation: L'expansion révolutionnaire de la France dans le monde de 1789 à 1799* (Paris, 1956); Jacques Godechot, *Les révolutions, 1770–1799* (Paris, 1963).

[5] For overviews of this scholarship, see Lester D. Langley, *The Americas in the Age of Revolution, 1750–1850* (New Haven, CT, 1996); Wim Klooster, ed., *The Cambridge History of the Age of Atlantic Revolutions,* 3 vols. (Cambridge, 2023); Maurizio Isabella, *Southern Europe in the Age of Revolutions* (Princeton, NJ, 2023); Joseph Miller, "The Dynamics of History in Africa and the Atlantic 'Age of Revolutions,'" in Armitage

across the Americas, West African jihadists and war captives, rebellious ship crews and privateers, and enslaved and free insurgents from Haiti and other American slave societies.[6] At the same time, our understanding of the Atlantic Age of Revolutions has grown to recognize the revolutions' inherent imperial character.[7] Instead of following narratives of national self-liberation and exceptionalism, scholars now tend to highlight the imperial frameworks within which the era's great political revolutions unfolded, and they argue for a better understanding of the dialectics of continuity and change that shaped this period.[8]

Scholarship that looks beyond the Atlantic world and seeks to understand the Age of Revolutions within even wider vistas must recognize that empires, rather than nation-states, functioned as political superstructures and that established chronologies were created from Eurocentric perspectives and should therefore be viewed critically. For British historian C. A. Bayly, the Atlantic Age of Revolutions was just one variant of a "world crisis," a confluence of fiscal and military shocks that unsettled not just the colonial empires of Western European states

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and Subrahmanyam, eds., *Age of Revolutions*, 101–24; David A. Bell, "The Atlantic Revolutions," in David Motadel, ed., *Revolutionary World: Global Upheaval in the Modern Age* (Cambridge, 2021), 38–65.

[6] See, for example, Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (London, 2000); Laurent Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1840* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004); Claudio Saunt, *West of the Revolution: An Uncommon History of 1776* (New York, 2014); Kathleen DuVal, *Independence Lost: Lives on the Edge of the American Revolution* (New York, 2015); Paul E. Lovejoy, *Jihād in West Africa during the Age of Revolutions* (Athens, GA, 2016); Marcela Echeverri, *Indian and Slave Royalists in the Age of Revolution: Reform, Revolution, and Royalism in the Northern Andes, 1780–1825* (New York, 2016); Edgardo Pérez Morales, *No Limits to Their Sway: Cartagena's Privateers and the Masterless Caribbean in the Age of Revolutions* (Nashville, TN, 2018); Christian Ayne Crouch, "The French Revolution in Indian Country: Reconsidering the Reach and Place of Atlantic Upheaval," in Megan Maruschke and Matthias Middell, eds., *The French Revolution as a Moment of Respatialization* (Berlin, 2019), 85–105; Vanessa Mongey, *Rogue Revolutionaries: The Fight for Legitimacy in the Greater Caribbean* (Philadelphia, PA, 2020).

[7] Jeremy Adelman, "An Age of Imperial Revolutions," *American Historical Review* 113 (2008): 319–40; Manuel Covo and Megan Maruschke, eds., "The French Revolution as an Imperial Revolution," *French Historical Studies* 44 (2021); Josep M. Fradera, *The Imperial Nation: Citizens and Subjects in the British, French, Spanish, and American Empires* (Princeton, NJ, 2017); Jan Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ, 2010), 219–50.

[8] See, for example, Matthew Brown and Gabriel Paquette, eds., *Connections after Colonialism: Europe and Latin America in the 1820s* (Tuscaloosa, AL, 2013).

4   *Jan C. Jansen and Kirsten McKenzie*

but also those ruled by the Russian tsars, the Ottomans, the Qing in China, the Crimean Tatars, and the Mughals.[9] While these crises seldom led to complete imperial breakdowns, and while they affected the regions of the world in varied and uneven ways, they ushered in lasting geopolitical shifts: the worldwide expansion of European overseas empires, in particular the ascendancy of the British Empire to global supremacy, soon thereafter sustained by the increasing socioeconomic divergence between Europe and Asia.[10] In the Pacific and Indian oceanic worlds, expanding Western empires encountered, clashed with, or coalesced with manifold Indigenous efforts toward political and social reordering and state-building.[11] The decades around 1800 also saw a higher level of subaltern unrest at sea – seaborne revolutionary action, mutinies, and rebellions – across the world's oceans.[12] This myriad of sociopolitical upheavals at land and at sea brought about a complex web of global interactions whose origin and impetus often lay outside of Europe and the (North) Atlantic world.

The upheavals of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century "world crisis" were violent affairs, and the dividing line between revolution and warfare cannot be drawn sharply. Each of the great revolutions in North and South America, in the Caribbean, and in Europe involved large outbursts of civil war violence. Revolutions also grew out of major interstate wars, starting with the Seven Years War (1756–63), which has already been correctly described as a true world war.[13] The wars of US American, Haitian, and Latin American independence, the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars across Europe, and revolutionary and religious wars in West and Central Africa yielded a state of almost ceaseless warfare across the globe, one in which long-standing

[9] C. A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830* (London and New York, 1989), 164–92; Bayly, *Birth of the Modern World*, 86–120.
[10] John Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400–1800* (London, 2007), 157–217; C. A. Bayly, "The First Age of Global Imperialism, c. 1760–1830," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 26 (1998): 28–47.
[11] Sujit Sivasundaram, *Waves across the South: A New History of Revolution and Empire* (London, 2020); in comparative perspective, including the Americas, see Kate Fullagar and Michael A. McDonnell, eds., *Facing Empire: Indigenous Experiences in a Revolutionary Age* (Baltimore, MD, 2018).
[12] Niklas Frykman, Clare Anderson, Lex Heerma van Voss, and Marcus Rediker, eds., "Mutiny and Maritime Radicalism in the Age of Revolution: A Global Survey," *International Review of Social History* 58, Special issue 21 (2013).
[13] Marian Füssel, *Der Preis des Ruhms: Eine Weltgeschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges* (Munich, 2019); Daniel A. Baugh, *The Global Seven Years War 1754–1763: Britain and France in a Great Power Contest*, new ed. (London, 2021).

geostrategic interests were overlaid by the new ideological and politi-
cal front lines of the era. The formation and reformation of empires
and polities in South Asia became entangled with increasing European
incursions in the wake of revolutionary conflicts, linking the world
of the Indian Ocean with that of the Atlantic and Mediterranean.[14]
The world had long known major military conflicts. But after 1750,
large-scale armed conflicts became more frequent, and they expanded
massively in their geographic scope, both on land and at sea. These
sustained armed conflicts also transformed the practice of warfare: In
the decades around 1800, states built up massive naval forces, and mil-
itary strategists put new and greater emphasis on artillery on the bat-
tlefield. As armies grew, civilians were increasingly drawn into warfare,
a process exacerbated by the elaboration of the concept of "irregular"
guerilla warfare ("small war").[15] Considering revolution and war as
equally defining – and inextricably connected – features of the years
between 1750 and 1830 improves our understanding of the period's
military and political history. It helps us better grasp the transforma-
tive character of warfare well beyond the battlefield, and it illuminates
the violent, disruptive, and contingent realities that are too often over-
looked in a teleological view of the Age of Revolutions.

   Mobility and Coercion also emphasizes a third characteristic of the
period that was closely connected with the era's sociopolitical and mil-
itary confrontations and with the broader transformations then under-
way: greater human mobility. Against the idea of a long-term shift
from "unfree" to "free" (labor) migration – still widespread in general
accounts of migration history – the chapters in this volume highlight
the ubiquity, persistence, and expansion of coerced mobility. Building
on important advances in the historical scholarship on mobility and
labor, *Mobility and Coercion* departs from the classic idea of migra-
tion as a free, linear movement between a clear starting point (place
of origin) and a clear endpoint (place of permanent settlement).[16]

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[14] Kaushik Roy, *War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia, 1740–1849*
   (London, 2011).
[15] David A. Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Modern
   Warfare* (Boston, MA, 2007); Martin Rink, "Der Kleine Krieg: Entwicklungen und
   Trends asymmetrischer Gewalt 1740 bis 1815," *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift* 65
   (2006): 355–88.
[16] For a critique of the classic concept of migration as a free and linear movement, see Jan
   Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, "Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and
   New Perspectives," in Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, eds., *Migration, Migration History,
   History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives*, 2nd ed. (Bern, 1999), 11–13; Clare Anderson,

This normative account only ever concerned a slice of human mobility, not only between 1750 and 1830 but also during any other period in world history.

Mobility and Coercion seeks to shift and expand the scholarly conversation on migration by following three key principles. First, the essays collected in this volume challenge the notion of "free" and "unfree" mobility as two discrete types of human migration and instead regard them as points on a continuum of varying degrees of coercion. The agency exercised by individuals who were moved against their will and the forms of resistance, strategies, and choices they deployed in response to systemic forces are central concerns of this book. Second, the case studies introduced in subsequent chapters emphasize the circular and multidirectional nature of human mobility across the planet and the importance of transit and temporary destinations. Third, the featured case studies underscore the importance of coerced *im*mobility, the crucial and yet largely understudied role played by border controls, forms of identification and registration, the regulation of legality and illegality, and of practices of expulsion and deportation, and the undoing of migration in the history of mobility.

MAJOR AREAS OF FORCED MOBILITY

The forms of forced movement that characterized this age of wars and revolutions had very different origins and trajectories. Although political refugees, as a mass phenomenon, date to our period of focus, most forms of forced mobility that we address have much longer histories. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the transatlantic slave trade, for example, had already been conducted as a large-scale system of forced migration for several centuries. The same can be said of the transportation networks for convicted criminals. Nonetheless, all of the forms of forced mobility addressed in this volume entered into a particular stage during the globe-spanning political and military upheavals between 1750 and 1830. For the sake of clarity, we distinguish between five major areas of forced mobility that feature prominently throughout this volume:

- *Slave trade*: Almost six million enslaved Africans were boarded onto ships to the Americas between 1750 and 1830, accounting for half of the estimated 12.5 million Africans who were forced to cross the Atlantic

"Global Mobilities," in Antoinette Burton and Tony Ballantyne, eds., *World Histories from Below: Disruption and Dissent, 1750 to the Present* (London, 2016), 169–96.

between the early sixteenth and the late nineteenth centuries.[17] In the 1790s, the transatlantic displacement and enslavement of Africans reached both an all-time high and a crucial breaking point. While the extent and decisive causes of the nineteenth-century abolitions of the slave trade and slavery are still subject to debate, we argue that revolutions and wars were crucial factors.[18] Seen most clearly in the case of the slave revolution in Saint-Domingue/Haiti, the contestation of slavery was integral to all revolutionary struggles throughout the Atlantic world.[19] It was central to the revolution in France and had repercussions across the French Empire as well. The American Revolution and the various independence struggles across Spanish America were likewise shaped by the involvement of enslaved people and by conflicts over emancipation. Even more important, arguably, was the destabilizing impact of war. Disruptions caused by inter-imperial and civil wars and the access to arms and military service provided crucial paths to emancipation and put greater pressure on the slavery-based

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[17] For regularly updated numbers, see the database www.slavevoyages.org; and for maps, see David Eltis and David Richardson, *Atlas of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (New Haven, CT, 2010).

[18] David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823* (Ithaca, NY, 1975); Robin Blackburn, *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848* (London, 1988); Christopher Leslie Brown, *Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2006); Seymour Drescher, *Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery* (New York, 2009); Manisha Sinha, *The Slave's Cause: A History of Abolition* (New Haven, CT, 2016); for the often-overlooked case of late antislavery struggles in Brazil, see Angela Alonso, *The Last Abolition: The Brazilian Antislavery Movement, 1868–1888* (Cambridge, 2021).

[19] On Haiti, see Laurent Dubois, *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 2004); Jeremy D. Popkin, *You Are All Free: The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery* (Cambridge, 2010); on France and the French Empire, see Yves Bénot, *La Révolution française et la fin des colonies, 1789–1794* (Paris, 2004); Lorelle Semley, *To Be Free and French: Citizenship in France's Atlantic Empire* (Cambridge, 2017); on the American Revolution, see Sylvia R. Frey, *Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age* (Princeton, NJ, 1991); Jim Piecuch, *Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians, and Slaves in the Revolutionary South, 1775–1782* (Columbia, SC, 2008); Douglas R. Egerton, *Death or Liberty: African Americans and Revolutionary America* (New York, 2009); on Spanish America, see Alfonso Múnera, *El fracaso de la nación: Región, clase y raza en el Caribe colombiano, 1717–1810* (Bogotá, 1998); Aline Helg, *Liberty and Equality in Caribbean Colombia, 1770–1835* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004); Marixa Lasso, *Myths of Harmony: Race and Republicanism during the Age of Revolution, Colombia, 1795–1831* (Pittsburgh, PA, 2007); Silvia C. Mallo and Ignacio Telesca, eds., *"Negros de la patria": Los afrodescendientes en las luchas por la independencia en el antiguo Virreinato del Río de La Plata* (Buenos Aires, 2010).

plantation system.[20] The short- and medium-term effects of warfare and revolutions on the slave trade and slavery were complex. Under the pressure of self-liberation, particularly in Haiti, and of state-led efforts to ban both the trade in and ownership of slaves, the locus of the slave trade shifted to places where Atlantic slavery continued (or started) to thrive, such as Brazil and Cuba. The British ban on the slave trade in 1807 itself produced new forms of bondage and unfree movement, such as the trade in indentured "recaptives," "liberated Africans," and "prize slaves," and the ongoing clandestine trade in enslaved Africans in the Atlantic was accompanied by not-so-hidden slave trades in other parts of the world.[21]

- *Convict transportation*: From the early fifteenth century, the transportation of convicted criminals and their use for forced labor had been a long-standing form of punishment practiced by all major Western, and some non-Western, empires.[22] The multidirectional displacement of convicts to penal colonies created wide-ranging networks between colonies and metropoles across the globe. Important overlaps existed between the movement of convicts and other forms of forced labor (such as indentured labor) and labor-based punishment. Convict transportation also proved crucial in times of war and political upheaval, when the criminal justice system could be used for forced military service and impressment or to expel recalcitrant

[20] Christopher Leslie Brown and Philip D. Morgan, eds., *Arming Slaves: From Classical Times to the Modern Age* (New Haven, CT, 2006); Peter Blanchard, *Under the Flags of Freedom: Slave Soldiers and the Wars of Independence in Spanish South America* (Pittsburgh, PA, 2008); Jane Landers, *Atlantic Creoles in the Age of Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 2010); Roger Norman Buckley, *Slaves in Red Coats: The British West India Regiments, 1795–1815* (New Haven, CT, 1979).

[21] Christopher Saunders, "Liberated Africans in the Cape Colony in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 18, no. 2 (1985): 223–39; Anita Rupprecht, "'When he gets among his Countrymen they tell him that he is free': Slave Trade Abolition, Indentured Africans, and a Royal Commission," *Slavery and Abolition* 33, no. 3 (2012): 435–55; Padraic X. Scanlan, *Freedom's Debtors: British Antislavery in Sierra Leone in the Age of Revolution* (New Haven, CT, 2017); Richard Anderson and Henry B. Lovejoy, eds., *Liberated Africans and the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1807–1896* (Rochester, NY, 2020); Lisa Ford and Naomi Parkinson, "Legislating Liberty: Liberated Africans and the Abolition Act, 1806–1824," *Slavery & Abolition* 42 (2021): 827–46.

[22] For overviews, see Clare Anderson, ed., *A Global History of Convicts and Penal Colonies* (London, 2018); Hamish Maxwell-Stewart, "The Rise and Fall of Penal Transportation," in Paul Knepper and Anja Johansen, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Crime and Criminal Justice* (Oxford, 2016), 635–54; Gwenda Morgan and Peter Rushton, *Banishment in the Early Atlantic World: Convicts, Rebels and Slaves* (London, 2013); Clare Anderson, *Convicts: A Global History* (Cambridge, 2022).

political opponents or unruly slaves. The independence of the thirteen North American colonies in the 1780s, hitherto an important destination for British convicts, ushered in the rise of the Australian penal colonies. At the same time, Russia began to use Siberia more systematically as a place of exile for criminals and political dissidents alike, and the British East India Company established new convict transportation systems. An increasing number of political exiles found themselves alongside "regular" criminals and undisciplined soldiers in other European extraterritorial possessions, such as French Guiana and (after 1830) North Africa.[23]

- *Dispossession and expulsion*: The political emancipation of European settler societies in the Americas went hand in hand with the shrinking autonomous spaces of Indigenous populations. Aggressive frontier colonization, land dispossession, and the state-sponsored displacement of nomadic and hunting populations on the American continents were part of a global push of White-settler land expropriation that could also be seen in places such as Australia, New Zealand, Russia, and southern Africa.[24] If convict transportation was fundamental to the economic and geostrategic needs of imperial expansion, so too was it central to the ethnic violence of settler colonialism and the forced removal of Indigenous populations.[25] Imperial strategies of dispossessing and expelling colonized populations and Indigenous resistance leaders resulted in particular iterations of forced removal, particularly variants of banishment and transportation, that either utilized intracolonial networks or took advantage of internal methods of isolation, often on islands.[26] Neither these practices nor the local

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[23] Alice Bullard, *Exile to Paradise: Savagery and Civilization in Paris and the South Pacific, 1790–1900* (Stanford, CA, 2000); Miranda Frances Spieler, *Empire and Underworld: Captivity in French Guiana* (Cambridge, MA, 2012); Michel Pierre, *Le temps des bagnes 1748–1953* (Paris, 2017).

[24] James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1780–1930* (Oxford, 2009); Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World*, 322–91.

[25] A. Dirk Moses, ed., *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History* (New York, 2008).

[26] For a discussion of these practices of forced removal used against Indigenous resistance leaders and colonized populations in Asia, the Indian Ocean world, and the Pacific, see Kerry Ward, *Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company* (Cambridge and New York, 2009); Kristyn Harman, *Aboriginal Convicts: Australian, Khoisan, and Māori Exiles* (Sydney, 2012); Michael Powell, "The Clanking of Medieval Chains: Extra-Judicial Banishment in the British Empire," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 44 (2016): 352–71; Ronit

resistance they encountered were confined to the Americas or the Global South. The connection between state-building and ethnically motivated mass expulsions also became apparent in the struggles between the Ottoman Empire and national independence movements in southeastern Europe, especially, for example, during the Greek War of Independence.

• *Military mobility*: Decades of virtually uninterrupted warfare saw the massive buildup and projection of armies across the world, making war "an arena for heightened human mobility."[27] The resulting mobilities of soldiers and sailors were the most obvious expression of sustained imperial wars. The treatment and movement of captives and prisoners of war and of demobilized military personnel and veterans on a global scale were major issues faced by belligerent states.[28] Lacking standing armies, warring states satisfied their insatiable hunger for military recruits through coercive means, ranging from the impressment of (formerly) enslaved individuals and convicts to early experiments in compulsory military service. Prisoners of Central and West African wars also made up a significant proportion of the enslaved captives crossing the Atlantic. As a result, major outbursts in the constant state of war that was slavery, such as Tacky's Revolt in Jamaica (1760), look like extensions of African military history.[29] In the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804) and other later slave uprisings of the era, African-born captives were in both the armed resistance against planter regimes and

Ricci, ed., *Exile in Colonial Asia: Kings, Convicts, Commemoration* (Honolulu, HI, 2016); Robert Aldrich, *Banished Potentates: Dethroning and Exiling Indigenous Monarchs under British and French Colonial Rule, 1815–1955* (Manchester, 2018; Ann Curthoys, "The Beginnings of Transportation in Western Australia: Banishment, Forced Labour, and Punishment at the Aboriginal Prison on Rottnest Island before 1850," *Studies in Western Australian History* 34 (2020): 59–77.

[27] Catriona Kennedy, *Narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: Military and Civilian Experience in Britain and Ireland* (London, 2013), 7.

[28] Renaud Morieux, *The Society of Prisoners: Anglo-French Wars and Incarceration in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 2019), 131–82; Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, "Spanish Prisoners: War and Captivity in Spain's Imperial Crisis," in Akiko Tsuchiya, ed., *Empire's End: Transnational Connections in the Hispanic World* (Nashville, TN, 2016), 131–47; Juan Luis Simal, "Unexplored Connections: Spanish Prisoners of War and Political Refugees in France, 1808–1820," in Scott Eastman and Stephen Jacobson, eds., *Rethinking Atlantic Empire: Christopher Schmidt-Nowara's Histories of Nineteenth-Century Spain and the Antilles* (New York, 2021), 199–218.

[29] Vincent Brown, *Tacky's Revolt: The Story of an Atlantic Slave War* (Cambridge, MA, 2020), 4, building on remarks by Olaudah Equiano.