PERSONAL ONTOLOGY

What are we? Are we, for example, souls, organisms, brains, or
something else? In this book, Andrew Brenner argues that there are
principled obstacles to our discovering the answer to this fundamental
metaphysical question. The main competing accounts of personal
ontology hold that we are either souls (or composites of soul and
body) or composite physical objects of some sort, but, as Brenner
shows, arguments for either of these options can be parodied and
transformed into their opposites. Brenner also examines arguments
for and against the existence of the self, offers a detailed discussion
of the metaphysics of several afterlife scenarios – resurrection, rein-
carnation, and mind uploading – and considers whether agnosticism
with respect to personal ontology should lead us to agnosticism with
respect to the possibility of life after death.

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PERSONAL ONTOLOGY

Mystery and Its Consequences

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