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Introduction

Legal systems enforce morality. No one really denies it. “It cannot be seriously disputed,” H. L. A. Hart observes, “that the development of law, at all times and places, has in fact been profoundly influenced both by the conventional morality and ideals of particular social groups, and also by forms of enlightened moral criticism urged by individuals, whose moral horizon has transcended the morality currently accepted.”¹ From the fact that all legal systems enforce morality, it does not follow that they ought to do so. But no one really denies this either.² The legitimacy of legal prohibitions on a host of moral wrongs such as murder, rape and burglary is widely taken for granted and not subject to serious dispute. Since legal systems do and ought to enforce morality, the interesting question is not whether the law should enforce morality. The interesting questions concern what parts of morality the law ought to enforce, the considerations that justify its enforcement, how the law ought to enforce morality, the relationship between the legal and social enforcement of morality and whether there are moral limits that constrain the enforcement of morality – and, if so, the nature and justifications for these limits. These are the central questions explored in this book.

1.1 ENFORCING AND PROMOTING

The legal enforcement of morality is often taken to be an issue about the moral limits of the criminal law. This is understandable. Legal systems characteristically, even if not essentially, rely on the threat of punishment. In the world in which we live, legal efforts to regulate conduct and to guide it in morally desirable directions must impose criminal punishments to be effective. Still, the criminal law is but one

¹ Hart, *The Concept of Law*, 3rd ed., p. 185.

² Anarchists – more precisely, political (as opposed to merely philosophical) anarchists – may deny it. To the extent that they reject the legitimacy of legal systems, they will reject the legitimacy of enforcing morality through law. But for those who accept the legitimacy of legal systems, there is no serious dispute about the legitimacy of these systems enforcing morality. For the distinction between political anarchism and merely philosophical anarchism, see Simmons, “Philosophical Anarchism.”

instrument for enforcing morality, albeit a particularly salient one. So, we do well to consider other ways by which the law can enforce morality.

The term “enforcement” connotes the use of force. The law enforces morality when it imposes sanctions on its subjects to increase their compliance with its norms. Classical writers in jurisprudence defined sanctions in terms of unpleasant consequences. Sanctions refer to “the evil which will probably be incurred in case a command be disobeyed.”³ Punishments, accordingly, were viewed as the paradigm case of sanctions. Nevertheless, as most writers have allowed, sanctions include more than punishments. For example, it is common to distinguish punishments from mere penalties. The former express the law’s condemnation of the targeted conduct, whereas the latter may simply raise the costs of engaging in it.⁴ If mere penalties count as sanctions, and if the law enforces morality whenever it imposes sanctions to do so, then the legal enforcement of morality extends beyond the criminal law.

The term “sanctions” can be understood even more broadly to include the withholding of benefits as well as the imposition of costs. Consider a mundane example. Suppose that I have been paying the rent for my friend’s apartment while she looks for work. Over time I become concerned about her lack of effort in finding employment and announce that I will discontinue this support if she does not shape up soon. The expression of my intention to cease providing a benefit that I have been providing to my friend may function as a powerful incentive for her to do what I want her to do. Its influence on her conduct may be just as effective as a threat to harm her would be. Modern states provide their members with a wide range of benefits including retirement pensions, education, employment opportunities and health care. Modern states also extend tax credits and tax deductions to favored activities, such as a tax deduction for charitable giving or for making environmentally friendly renovations to one’s home. These tax breaks too can be viewed as benefits, which can be extended or withheld. The state might withhold public money for art that was deemed to be offensive, thereby seeking to enforce community standards of decency, for example. By withholding this benefit, it would, in effect, sanction the artists who were producing the offensive art. If the withholding of a previously provided benefit qualifies as a sanction, then the difference between enforcing morality and promoting it is muted. Normatively speaking, it will not matter too much whether state action is classified as enforcement in virtue of the fact that a benefit is withheld or promotion in virtue of the fact that a benefit is extended.⁵

For this reason, in this book we will understand the enforcement of morality to include the use of carrots as well as sticks. It may be objected that when states

³ Austin, *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined*, Lecture 1.

⁴ Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment.”

⁵ While the classification of state action does not have normative significance in itself, how it is perceived can make a difference. It often matters whether something is viewed as a gain or a loss. Perceived losses tend to produce greater pain or disutility than the pleasure or utility produced by equivalently sized gains. See Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, pp. 292–297 (discussing “the endowment effect”).

promote morality, they always do so coercively, and so even when the state extends or withholds benefits to its members, it is exercising force over them. On this view, when the state is involved, there are no carrots without sticks. In reply, it can be said that coercion is not simply a function of the power of the coercing agent but also of how the use of this power affects the decision making of those subjected to it.⁶ Some measures may be noncoercive, even though they are fully backed by the power of the state. These measures include extending recognition to certain institutions or practices (monogamous marriage) while denying it to others (polygamous marriage), providing subsidies for some activities (opera) while denying it to others (amusement parks), and using the law to express official support for some ideals or practices (religious toleration) while expressing official condemnation of others (recreational drug use).⁷ Whether these noncoercive legal measures are themselves indirectly coercive need not detain us. We can include them with criminal law prohibitions under the general rubric of legal efforts to enforce morality.

1.2 MAIN ISSUES

Since nearly everyone agrees that harm prevention is an appropriate aim of the law, this idea is a natural place to begin our investigation. We can distinguish cases in which people harm others from cases in which they harm only themselves. A society, it is sometimes said, should concern itself only with preventing harm to others. Famously, John Stuart Mill expressed this view in his essay *On Liberty* by propounding what he described as “one simple principle” for governing the relations between society and the individual:

[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, for interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right . . . The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.⁸

This principle, which has come to be termed the “harm principle,” is not as simple as Mill advertised, as nearly every commentator on his essay has

⁶ Schauer, *The Force of Law*, p. 129.

⁷ Even in countries with a strong commitment to freedom of speech, such as the USA, the courts have generally held that there is no requirement that the government’s own speech must be neutral with respect to different viewpoints. For critical assessment of this issue, see Alexander, *Is There a Right of Freedom of Expression?* pp. 82–102.

⁸ Mill, *On Liberty*, pp. 223–224.

observed.⁹ We will consider some of the complexities and puzzles it presents in Chapter 2. But whether we ultimately accept it or not, we should recognize that the harm principle is a moral principle. When society interferes with the liberty of some of its members so as to prevent them from harming others, it enforces (a part of) morality.

Mill's principle not only provides a justification for the enforcement of morality (prevention of harm to others) but it also identifies the limits to its enforcement. No enforcement of morality is justified beyond that which concerns preventing harm to others. Consider the following legal enactments.

- A legislative body passes a statute that fines anyone within its jurisdiction who is caught riding a motorcycle without wearing a protective helmet.
- A court refuses to uphold a contract between two adults on the grounds that the terms of the contract, while entered into freely, are grossly unfair.
- A judge sentences someone to prison for assisting another in their suicide.

The first of these enactments is an instance of *legal paternalism*. The legislative body interferes with the conduct of some people by imposing and by threatening to impose a fine on them, and it does so for their own good. The aim of the statute is to dissuade people from exposing themselves to the increased risk of serious injury that accompanies riding a motorcycle without protective headgear. The second of these enactments can be viewed as an instance of *legal moralism*. The court refuses to uphold the contract because its terms are grossly unfair. It is, in the language of the law, “an unconscionable contract.” Does the upholding of contracts of this kind cause harm to others? Not necessarily, since if the contract is freely and voluntarily entered into by both parties, then any harm that results from it is self-imposed. Friends of the harm principle often register this point by invoking the Latin phrase “*volenti non fit injuria*” (to a willing person injury is not done). The third enactment can be viewed as a mix of legal paternalism and legal moralism. In criminalizing assisted suicide, the society may seek to protect its members from harming themselves with the assistance of others. Perhaps it worries that those who desire to end their lives typically suffer from forms of depression that impair their capacity to make free and voluntary decisions to do so. Such people need protection against themselves, and from others who would help them to end their lives. But the society may also view suicide as immoral, even when it is the result of a free and voluntary decision and is in the interests of the person who engages in it.

I shall have much more to say about both legal paternalism and legal moralism in subsequent chapters. For now, it need only be noted that Mill's principle excludes them both.¹⁰ No legal enactment that involves either would be legitimate.

⁹ Some writers have denied that Mill was, in actuality, committed to the harm principle. See Jacobson, “Mill on Liberty, Speech, and the Free Society.” We will not take up this interpretive issue here.

¹⁰ Mill's principle should not be confused with Mill's own views on the legitimate enforcement of morality, since while he accepted the principle, he also appeared to accept enforcements of morality that are in tension with it. Compare his principle with the applications he discusses in chapter 5 of *On Liberty*.

I have been focusing on the law (or the state¹¹) as the agent of enforcement. But, at points, we will also consider societal, but nonlegal, instances of the enforcement of morality. This too was a pressing concern for Mill. His principle was intended to apply as much to “the moral coercion of public opinion” as to the physical force of legal sanctions. With this in mind, consider the case of controversial speech on college campuses and the efforts by some students to suppress it or interfere with it, not by legal means but by mobilizing resistance, including violent resistance, to it.¹² This too can be understood as an effort to enforce morality, even though the agent of enforcement in this case is not the state. To be sure, the state remains in the background. And those who wish to defend the rights to speak of those whose speech is targeted may try to enlist the power of the state to uphold these rights, thereby attempting to get the state to enforce that part of morality, as they see it, that concerns the protection of these rights.

The case of controversial speech reveals some of the complexity of our topic. For speech or expression may be wrongful, while being rightfully protected. Those who say false, dangerous or offensive things may not be in the right, even if they have a right to say it. We shall consider in Chapters 8 and 9 how to understand such purported rights to do wrong and how they bear on the enforcement of morality. Here we can simply note that if there are rights of this kind, then efforts to enforce one part of morality will block efforts, by the state and by others, to enforce other parts.

The idea that an important part of morality concerns the rights of individual people will be a familiar one to many readers of this book. Some think that individual rights exhaust the moral domain. This is not a plausible view. As the example of protected speech illustrates, if one has a right to do something, it remains a further question whether it is right for one to do it. But how exactly should the moral domain be characterized? Many have claimed that we need to distinguish a narrow from a broad conception of morality. The distinction has been drawn in various ways. Narrow morality, it has been claimed, refers to “a particular normative domain including primarily such duties to others as duties not to kill, harm, or deceive, and duties to keep one’s promises.”¹³ Of special importance (for our purposes), these duties include requirements of justice and fair treatment. This normative domain, it is often claimed, engages “the sentiments of guilt and resentment and their variants.”¹⁴ Broad morality, by contrast, includes narrow morality but much more as well. Most generally, it concerns the question of how to live, “the precepts instructing people on what makes for a successful, meaningful, and

¹¹ I will use the terms “legal enforcement” and “state enforcement” interchangeably.


¹² The recent controversy over the alt-right speaker Milo Yiannopoulos at the University of California, Berkeley provides a good example. The controversy, and its background, is described in Marantz, “How Social-Media Trolls turned U.C. Berkeley into a Free Speech Circus,” *New Yorker*, July 2, 2018.

¹³ Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other*, pp. 171–172.

¹⁴ Gibbard, *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings*, p. 6.

worthwhile life.”¹⁵ But, in addition, and more specifically, it includes self-regarding duties to develop one’s talents and respect one’s rational nature, ideals of character and duties to respect impersonal goods, such as perfectionist achievements and natural beauty, even when failure to do so would not contravene any duty to others.¹⁶

Drawing on the claims expressed in these statements, we can depict the distinction in the following rough-and-ready way.



The divisions depicted here are not meant to be sharp. They are intended to map out characteristic features of different domains or compartments of morality. Consider self-regarding duties, for example. Perhaps we can appropriately blame people for failing to live up to them. If so, then the moral sentiment of blame will not be confined to narrow morality.¹⁷ Or consider justice. A just or fair distribution of goods, I have emphasized, is a matter of narrow morality, but some have thought that justice has impersonal value. It is good for justice to be done, they say, even if it benefits no one.

There are, to be sure, other ways to mark a distinction between broad and narrow morality. Mill famously distinguished the morality of right and wrong from what he called “the art of life.” The latter refers to the broader question of how to live. The former is characterized in terms of the appropriateness of punishment: “We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.”¹⁸

On this proposal, narrow morality – the morality of right and wrong – just is the part of morality that is appropriately enforceable. The part of broad morality that extends beyond the narrow part should not be backed up by sanctions of any kind. In this way, Mill’s view makes the claim that we should only enforce narrow morality true by definition (although it does leave open what parts of morality are

¹⁵ Raz, “Right-Based Moralities,” p. 198.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Moral blame may have different senses. Blaming someone for failing to live up to a self-regarding duty may express a judgment of responsibility in one sense, while blaming someone for failing to honor their duty to another may express a judgment of responsibility in a different sense. If this were right, then the moral emotions that go with narrow morality could be understood as those that express the latter sense of responsibility. For discussion, see Watson, “Two Faces of Responsibility.”

¹⁸ Mill, *Utilitarianism*, p. 14. Mill’s position can be softened by replacing punishment with appropriate susceptibility to some non-punitive accountability-seeking reactive attitude. See Darwall, *The Second-Person Standpoint*, pp. 92–93.

appropriately subject to legal enforcement). But while Mill's characterization of narrow and broad morality could conflict with the characterization depicted earlier, it is not incompatible in substance with anything we need to say here. For we can investigate which parts of broad morality, as we have depicted it, are appropriately subject to enforcement and then, after concluding the investigation, characterize them as narrow or broad in Mill's terms.¹⁹

Nothing of substance, then, turns on the terminology we adopt to describe the different parts or domains of morality. The terminology depicted earlier, however, has the advantage of helping us to formulate clearly the questions that we want to ask. For example, some claim that legal officials should enforce only narrow morality. The part of broad morality that encompasses more than that encompassed by narrow morality should not be legally enforced. And, some hold in addition, that narrow morality is defined by the rights of individual people. Indeed, a proponent of Mill's principle could insist that each individual person has a fundamental right to live their life as they please, so long as they do not cause harm to others; and that the legal enforcement of morality should be confined to protecting this fundamental right for each person. Questions about the rightful exercise of this right could then be assigned to the broad conception of morality, which is not enforceable by law.

We shall be exploring the distinction between narrow and broad morality in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6. We will see that the distinction between these two conceptions or characterizations of morality is harder to sustain than it appears at first pass. If the distinction cannot be sustained, then it will no longer be credible to hold that only narrow morality should be legally enforced.

Whether morality is conceived narrowly or broadly, further questions about its nature invite consideration here. Should we speak of morality, as I have been doing so far, or should we speak instead of moralities? The latter course might seem to be more accurate, for there is, and has been, more than one morality practiced in the world. We speak of the morality of the ancient world or the morality of contemporary Christian culture, for example. At the same time, we often speak of morality as referring not to any moral code that is practiced by any particular society but instead as a set of critical principles or rules. As the opening quotation from Hart illustrated, morality can refer both to the conventional morality of a group and to the purportedly enlightened views of those who object to it (or endorse it). This ambiguity is important. If we are enjoined to enforce morality, then we need to clarify what kind of morality is in question.

Since the issue here is of central importance to our topic, a measure of clarification is in order. Let us stipulate that a social morality is a system of demands and aspirations that apply to and resonate with a particular group of people at a particular time. Let us add that this system of demands and aspirations is generally recognized

¹⁹ Plainly, if we were to do this, then we would need to keep track of the different kinds of sanctions – legal, social, internal reproaches of conscience – that are appropriate for breaches of different parts of morality.

by the members of the group as a source of obligations, in the case of demands, and justifying reasons in the case of aspirations. The general recognition that these demands and aspirations have this kind of authority attests to their perceived importance by those who are subject to them.²⁰ So understood, social moralities are plural. Different groups have different social moralities. Yet while there exists a plurality of social moralities, each social morality arguably contains within itself the seeds of its own criticism. In virtue of the fact that social moralities are systems of demands and aspirations that purport to be authoritative for their members, it becomes possible to ask, both by their members and by outsiders, whether the purportedly authoritative demands and aspirations are in fact genuinely authoritative. While this question is sometimes raised by those who doubt that any system of social demands and aspirations could be authoritative, it is more often raised by those who wonder whether the social morality to which they are subject could be improved in ways that would make it more authoritative. When this latter group raises the question of the authority of social morality, they are appealing to a critical standard or set of critical standards. These standards are the standards of critical morality.²¹

Unlike social morality, critical morality is not something that must be established by particular groups at particular times. Like the canons of logical reasoning, it can exist solely as abstract standards or principles. Does this mean that critical morality is singular – that one standard, or set of standards, applies to us all? Perhaps, but perhaps not. The issue here is enormously complicated. Much depends on the substance or the content of critical morality. Some utilitarian writers have held that there is one fundamental critical standard of morality, one that enjoins the maximization of utility (or happiness). This critical standard applies to all societies. But a pluralistic account of critical morality can also be advanced, one that maintains that there is a plurality of critical standards. Such a view can allow that these standards can be ranked in different ways by different social groups and that no single ranking is optimal from the standpoint of critical morality. We will consider a pluralistic view of this kind in Chapter 6 when we discuss the value of tradition. However, for present purposes, we do not need to determine whether critical morality is pluralistic or whether there is a single enlightened morality that applies to us all. We can sidestep this issue by distinguishing the social morality of a group from the critical morality that applies to it, thereby leaving open the possibility that different critical standards apply to different groups.

With this distinction in hand, we can return to the enforcement of morality and take proper account of the ambiguity in the injunction to “enforce morality.”

²⁰ This account of social morality draws on both Strawson’s “Social Morality and Individual Ideal” and Fuller’s “The Two Moralities” in his *The Morality of Law*.

²¹ For this term, see Hart, *The Concept of Law*. Hart’s distinction between positive and critical morality, which was influenced by Strawson’s discussion, tracks the distinction drawn here between social and critical morality.

On one proposal, to enforce morality is to enforce the social morality of the group in question. This has been the view taken by many writers who have been described as communitarians. The British judge Lord Patrick Devlin, whose arguments will be considered in Chapter 3, provides a classic example. For him, the social morality of a society is a necessary ingredient in the glue that holds it together, and if this morality is not adequately enforced, the society will fall apart: “For a society is not something that is held together physically; it is held by the invisible bonds of common thought. If the bonds were too far relaxed the members would drift apart. A common morality is part of the bondage.”²²

Applying this communitarian view of the enforcement of morality to the matter of sexual morality in particular, Devlin argued that whether the law should aim to discourage prostitution or homosexuality turns on whether doing so is necessary for, or conducive to, the preservation of the public morality (i.e. social morality) of the society to which it applies. Devlin was responding to the recommendations advanced by The Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, a report commonly referred to as the Wolfenden Report, that was commissioned by the British government and published in 1957. A chief recommendation of this Report was that homosexual sex between consenting adults in private should no longer be subject to criminal sanction.

To the readers of this book, many of whom will have grown up in modern liberal societies, Devlin’s focus on homosexuality may seem a little bizarre. Why would anyone want to criminalize conduct, such as homosexual conduct between consenting adults in private, if there is nothing inherently wrong with it? But this is precisely the point. For the society that Devlin was addressing – British society in the middle of the twentieth century – it was widely accepted that homosexuality was, in Devlin’s words, “a miserable way of life” – one that could, if unchecked, corrupt the young. That judgment, which reflected the settled and dispassionate assessment of the British people at that time, was an important part of the social morality of this society. And Devlin’s point is that it is proper and necessary for a society to support and uphold its social morality.²³

The proposal that we are now considering, that illustrated by Devlin’s response to the Wolfenden Report, is subject to a devastating objection. How could a society have an unqualified right to enforce its social morality? For suppose that the social morality of a given society sustains the institution of chattel slavery. If the proposal we are considering were accepted, then it would follow that this society would have a right to uphold this evil practice. But this cannot be right. The objection brings us back to the interdependence of social morality and critical morality that was noted earlier. The claim that a society has the right to enforce its social morality is not itself

²² Devlin, *The Enforcement of Morality*, p. 10.

²³ Devlin’s own position on the issue of the criminalization of homosexual sex was complex. On the one hand, he personally favored decriminalization. On the other hand, he insisted that his society had the right to criminalize it, if it judged that doing so was necessary to protect its social morality.

a claim of social morality. Devlin makes plain that he thinks that societies, not just his own society, have the right to uphold and enforce their social moralities. This right, then, must be a right of critical morality. But now it can be asked, how could a society have an unqualified critical moral right of this kind?

Devlin was sensitive to the interdependence of social and critical morality, and he struggled to account for it: “There are, have been, and will be bad laws, bad morals, and bad societies. Probably no law-maker believes that the morality he is enacting is false, but that does not make it true.”²⁴ Nonetheless, Devlin insisted that the lawmaker’s job is not to enforce the morality that they think is true but rather to enforce the social morality of their society. Their task is to ascertain not “the true belief, but the common belief” of their society. It is a good question why we should think that this is indeed the correct description of the lawmaker’s job.

Devlin hints at an answer. His refined view goes beyond the simple thought expressed by the metaphor of the glue holding a society together. The lawmaker must enforce the common moral beliefs of their society not only because doing so helps to hold the society together but also because they have a duty to defer to the views of those they serve. This refined view thus connects the right of a society to enforce its social morality to the value of popular self-rule. We shall examine the arguments for this view more fully in Chapter 3, but here a few preliminary remarks can be made about it.

On Devlin’s refined view, the lawmaker in a democratic society has a duty, a moral duty, to uphold the moral judgments of their constituents so long as they are consistent with democracy. This moral duty is a duty of critical morality but it directs the lawmaker to enforce not what they, the lawmaker, believe is right or wrong but rather what their society believes is right or wrong.²⁵ The duty in question is a democratic duty, since it is grounded in the claim that each citizen in a democracy has an equal claim to define the social morality of the society to which they belong. Admittedly, the democratic duty referenced here is a little obscure. Its content goes beyond the demand to extend formal political rights (to vote, to run for office, to organize in support of political causes, etc.) to the adult citizens in one’s society. The duty in question lies on the lawmaker and the judge, and it instructs them to recognize that their judgment of right and wrong has no greater authority than those over whom they govern. By granting that all citizens have an equal claim to discern right from wrong, the office-holder must honor the common morality, the established social morality of their society, rather than seek to replace it with their own understanding of what a more enlightened morality would require.

Several comments about this refined proposal can now be ventured. First, the appeal to democratic values obviously restricts the reach of the argument for the

²⁴ Devlin, *The Enforcement of Morality*, p. 94.

²⁵ Similar claims are sometimes made about the role of a constitutional judge in a democratic society. See Bickel, *The Morality of Consent* and Bork, *The Tempting of America*.