

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	<i>page</i> xiii
Introduction	1
PART I FOUNDATIONS	
1 Power	9
1.1 A Multifactorial, Multidimensional, Contextual, and Evolutive Notion	9
1.2 Concentration and Abuse	11
1.3 Separation of Powers	13
1.4 Antitrust	18
2 Economic Content of the Separation of Powers Theories?	25
2.1 Montesquieu	25
2.2 Hayek	27
2.3 Aron	29
3 Political Content of Antitrust from a Historical Perspective	31
3.1 United States	31
3.2 Germany	34
3.3 Japan	36
3.4 European Union	37
4 Political Content of Antitrust in the Digital and Artificial Intelligence Era	39
4.1 Concentration of Power	39
4.2 Political Power of Digital Platforms	46
4.3 Digital Infrastructure of Democracy	49

PART II INTERACTIONS

5	Separation of Powers in Antitrust	57
5.1	Various Sources Imposing Checks and Balances to a Firm	57
5.2	Search for an Analogy between Separation of Powers and Antitrust	59
5.2.1	Breaking Up or Unbundling Firms	59
5.2.2	Merger Control and Politico-Economic Power	63
5.2.3	Public or Private Regulation and Antitrust	66
5.3	Organizational Remedies or Commitments	74
5.3.1	Additional Checks and Balances	75
5.3.2	Platform Assemblies or Parliaments	78
5.4	Argument or Defense in Antitrust Matters	84
6	Antitrust in Separation of Powers	85
6.1	Data, Platform, and Politico-Economic Powers	85
6.2	Some Considerations on Market Definition	87
6.2.1	Zero Monetary Price Products or Services in Multisided Platforms	87
6.2.2	Competition for an Election or a Referendum	91
6.3	Data Access, Portability, Sharing, and Interoperability	93
6.4	Abusive Discrimination	96
6.4.1	Discrimination between Trading Parties	97
6.4.2	Fundamental Rights, Principles, or Values	100
6.4.3	Exclusionary or Exploitative Conducts	106
6.4.4	Consumer Harm and Absence of Major Anticompetitive Concerns or Administrative Hurdles	108
6.4.5	Antitrust's Potential Contribution to Separation of Powers	111

PART III TOWARD A NEW SEPARATION OF POWERS

7	General Issues	117
7.1	State-Centered and Power-Centered Approaches	117
7.2	Internal, External, Multilevel, Interinstitutional, and Transversal Checks and Balances	118
8	Promises and Shortcomings of Recent or Proposed Legislation	122
8.1	Australia	122
8.2	European Union	123
8.3	Germany	128
8.4	India	130
8.5	Japan	132
8.6	South Korea	132

Contents

xi

8.7	United Kingdom	133
8.8	United States	135
8.9	Critical Assessment	138
9	New Politico-Economic Axes of the Separation of Powers	140
9.1	Control of the Digital Infrastructure of Democracy	140
9.2	Prohibition of Distortions of the Electoral and Democratic Process	144
9.3	Governmental Contracts	147
9.4	Regulation and Deconcentration or Decentralization of Artificial Intelligence	149
9.4.1	Concentration Tendency and Need for Regulation	149
9.4.2	Deconcentration or Decentralization	153
9.4.3	Limits to Substantial Autonomous Powers	158
9.5	Regulation and Deconcentration or Decentralization of the Metaverse	160
9.5.1	The Metaverse between Centralization and Decentralization	160
9.5.2	Antitrust on the Metaverse	164
9.5.3	Antitrust in the Metaverse and Separation of Powers	166
10	New Institutional and Individual Axes of the Separation of Powers	169
10.1	Institutional and Procedural Settings	169
10.2	Personnel	173
10.3	Campaign Finance, Lobbying, and Anti-corruption Laws and Regulations	176
	Conclusion	182
	<i>Bibliography</i>	185
	<i>Index</i>	219