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## Drone Programs Reconfiguring War, Law, and Societies around Threat Anticipation

This is a story about how war, drone technologies, and the law interact and reshape one another in the counterterrorism context.<sup>1</sup> This interaction between war, drone technologies, and the law constitutes what is called here a program. By conceptualizing this interaction as forming a program, this book shows how the elements surrounding and constituting these programs form a network of interrelated factors. The book draws together the technological, the military, and the legal, without centering on one of these elements as being isolated<sup>2</sup> or singular.<sup>3</sup> This attempt to explore drone uses as a program entails compiling their textual, bureaucratic, and material traces and thus avoids reducing the phenomena surrounding drone uses to drone strikes. The book is accordingly an act of making visible the multiple textures of the socio-techno-legal phenomena related to drone technologies, from surveillance to targeting. Ultimately, this book lays bare the ways in

<sup>1</sup> This study focuses on aerial drones that are used for military purposes, also called “combat drones,” “military drones,” Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV), or Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (R.P.A.S). *Oxford Essential Dictionary of the US military*: A drone is “a vehicle designed to be remotely controlled during operations on land or sea or in the air.” Human intervention is still at play. In this sense, drones have to be distinguished from autonomous weapons systems. Drone pilots, and not the drone itself, make the decision to kill. The case studies are mostly related to drones that are not only equipped with surveillance capabilities but also capable of conducting lethal strikes. This does not mean that the findings are only applicable to this type of drones. In fact, many findings apply to surveillance drones, especially when they are used in the same contexts as combat drones.

<sup>2</sup> John Law, *Aircraft Stories: Decentering the Object in Technoscience* (Duke University Press, 2002), 2: Law talks about fractional coherence as the way of “drawing things together without centering them”; “Knowing subjects, or so we’ve learned since the 1960s, are not coherent wholes. Instead they are multiple, assemblages. This has been said about subjects of action, of emotion, and of desire in many ways, and is often, to be sure, a poststructuralist claim. But I argue in this book that the same holds for objects too.”

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 3–4. Considering these elements or factors as singular, would entail assuming that they hold together coherently.

which drone programs extend warfare in time and space, while exacerbating state power.

How can and should one write a story about such multi-textured phenomena?<sup>4</sup> This book embraces and cultivates the idea that the purpose of (socio-)legal scholarship is not to clarify or simplify social phenomena, in our case, socio-techno-legal phenomena.<sup>5</sup> The book identifies as many textures and elements composing such phenomena as possible – a potentially endless exercise if not delineated by time, space, and subjectivity, as it is here. In doing so, the book intends to make some of drone programs' textures visible in a meticulous way. Simultaneously, by telling this story of drone programs, the book cannot avoid performing and producing them.

Interest in drone wars is unlikely to fade for many reasons. Drone wars that reached a peak in the United States (US) in the early 2010s<sup>6</sup> are now spreading. While most literature on drone wars has focused on the US drone wars, this study intends to grapple with the role that the technology plays in reshaping warfare and pushing gray legal areas to breaking points beyond the confines of US drone wars of the Obama era. It explores the UK and French case studies alongside the US drone wars under Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump. Following the UK, which started using combat drones in 2014,<sup>7</sup> France started using its first armed Reapers from its Niamey base in Niger against jihadist groups in the Sahel region in late 2019<sup>8</sup> and is still involved in the Sahel region.<sup>9</sup> In addition, in February 2019, Australia announced the development of a locally designed combat drone, capable of both surveillance and

<sup>4</sup> This exercise in self-reflexivity about positionality when trying to make visible the different facets and elements of textured phenomena is encouraged by John Law, both in his *Aircraft Stories*, *ibid.* and in John Law, *After Method: Mess in Social Science Research* (Routledge, 2004).

<sup>5</sup> Law, *After Method*.

<sup>6</sup> See Database of The Bureau of Investigative Journalism on Drone Warfare, [www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war](http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war).

<sup>7</sup> See statistics of Drone Wars UK, <https://dronewars.net/uk-drone-strike-list-2/>.

<sup>8</sup> Madame Florence Parly, Ministre des armées, Université d'été de la défense 2017, "Discours de clôture," Toulon, September 5, 2017, [www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/discours/discours-de-florence-parly/discours-de-cloture-de-florence-parly-universite-d-ete-de-la-defense-2017](http://www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/discours/discours-de-florence-parly/discours-de-cloture-de-florence-parly-universite-d-ete-de-la-defense-2017); Loi de programmation militaire 2019–2025, July 2018, see also the Annexed report; Nathalie Guibert, "La France entre dans l'ère des drones armés," *Le Monde*, March 21, 2019, [www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/03/21/la-france-entre-dans-l-ere-des-drones-armes\\_5439209\\_3210.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/03/21/la-france-entre-dans-l-ere-des-drones-armes_5439209_3210.html).

<sup>9</sup> French Ministry of Armed Forces, Opération Barkhane, [www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/bande-sahelo-saharienne/operation-barkhane](http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/bande-sahelo-saharienne/operation-barkhane).

targeting,<sup>10</sup> and the manufacturing by Boeing is being finalized at the time of writing in March 2022.

Even if this book focuses on the use of combat drones by states against non-state actors, it is interesting to note that non-state armed groups increasingly use commercial drone technology to manufacture their own home-made explosive systems of varying degrees of sophistication.<sup>11</sup> Still today, however, drones used by non-state armed groups do not share the technical capacities of state-used drones, not only in terms of strength and precision of the strikes they are capable to conduct, but also with regard to the surveillance apparatus that characterize state-used drones on which this study focuses.

The preoccupations of the book are organized around a series of questions. How do drone technologies (from surveillance to targeting capacities), legal narratives, and military strategy interact with and reshape one another? What reality does this interplay bring about? Is there anything specific to counterterrorism uses of drones and drone technologies that explains the intensification of the pressures put on the international norms regulating the use of force in the counterterrorism context?

### 1.1 Drone Programs as a Network of Interacting Factors: Law × Technology × Military Strategy × Enemy

Describing drone programs as a network of interacting and interdependent factors including the contemporary technological capacities of drones, law, and military strategy is one of the main aspects of this study. All chapters identify where and how these factors converge or diverge and examine the result of this interaction. This description shows that combat drone technologies facilitate anticipatory warfare – the scope of which is indefinite in time and space – and that the law is rearranged around anticipation.

<sup>10</sup> Minister for Defense, the Rt. Hon. Christopher Pyne MP, Joint Media Release, “Australian-Designed Unmanned ‘Loyal Wingman’ Aircraft to Be Developed with Industry,” February 27, 2019, [www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/steven-ciobo/media-releases/australian-designed-unmanned-loyal-wingman-aircraft-be](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/steven-ciobo/media-releases/australian-designed-unmanned-loyal-wingman-aircraft-be).

<sup>11</sup> Ash Rossiter, “Drone Usage by Militant Groups: Exploring Variation in Adoption” (2018) 34 *Defense and Security Analysis* 2, 113–26; Linda Schlegel, “Interview: Rising Drone Capabilities of Non-state Actors,” *Global Risk Insights*, April 17, 2018, <https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/04/interview-risk-non-state-actor-drone-capabilities/>.

Anticipation in a war paradigm means that the decision to use force is based not on material circumstances of armed attack or participation in hostilities, depending on the framework we are interested in. Instead, the decision to use force is triggered by the behavior of the target and elements of context, taken to reveal that the individual belongs to a transnational terrorist group. The objective to anticipate threats dictates that if there is a capacity to kill an individual who has a hostile intent and belongs to a militant group before they conduct an attack, action is taken based on available behavioral and contextual elements. The military strategy and practice of anticipation at war in the counterterrorism context can be broken down and conceptualized in two ways: first, through what the book calls individualized warfare, and second, through its corollary, the dematerialized decision to use force. Drone surveillance and strikes consist in identifying dangerous figures (*individualized warfare*) rather than responding to witnessed acts of hostilities (*material warfare*).

The studied states have crafted legal narratives to justify this individualized and dematerialized kind of warfare facilitated by drones. These states have put the laws regulating the use of force against non-state armed groups at the heart of their justification and interpreted them to accommodate anticipatory warfare. These narratives have stepped up the pressure put on the norms, by exploiting legal uncertainties such as that regarding the temporal scope of conflicts, and by offering novel legal interpretations, such as direct participation in hostilities in the form of continuous combat function, or the right of self-defense as a paradigm to tackle threats posed by individuals with hostile intent rather than by armed attacks.

Further examining the socio-techno-legal phenomena produced by drone programs, the book explores the long-term effects of drone programs over populations living under drones in particular, and over the international legal order in general. While the literature provides a thorough discussion of the different legal interpretations suggested by the US and the UK to regulate drone operations, scholarly reflections have not focused on the broader socio-legal implications of drone programs as a whole. Because it was initially ruled out that drones might play a specific role in reshaping the military strategy and practice against non-state actors and in making new legal rationales emerge, the extra step of investigating the potential long-term effects of drone programs was not made. I give a concrete account of US power rituals through the analysis of the US drone program as it is the most stable and the one that has been the object of socio-legal investigations. In a granular manner, the book

shows that once drone programs are institutionalized, they have a serious impact on state power, with an operating state that conducts rituals of sovereignty over the populations living under drones.

The book proposes an explanation for how and why states active in the war on terror use the law in more or less malleable ways depending on the actor concerned. On the one hand, third states, affected by this expansion of state power, are tamed through notions such as unwilling/unable. While such concepts derive from extensive legal interpretations, the norms so interpreted are still recognizable. On the other hand, jihadist groups – which in the last instance are the *raison d'être* of this expansion of a surveillance and targeting apparatus extraterritorially – are the object of legal rationales that push legal gray zones to breaking points to such an extent that some norms' contents and meanings are difficult to recognize, and the possibility of infinite warfare emerges.

Different theories about the law have emerged from the debate on the proposed legal rationales for drone programs. On the one hand, the US legal rationales articulated for the development of the US drone program – used to certain extents by France and the UK – have never consisted in pseudo-scientific discourses or truth claims about the law. They do not claim that there is only one possible interpretation (the one they support) of international legal norms. On the contrary, they rest on the idea that a norm can be interpreted in multiple ways as norms and their open texture provide possibilities for struggles and reasonable disagreements about the interpretation of norms. Furthermore, these legal rationales consider that such struggles and reasonable disagreements are necessarily embedded in specific contexts and depend on contemporary goals and tactics. Following this understanding of the law, the studied states propose norm interpretations in accordance with a specific context – the war against transnational jihadist groups – in accordance with a certain mode of warfare – data warfare, and precise targeted killings, through drones – and adapted to a related military strategy – anticipation of threats and individualization of war.

On the other hand, most legal scholarship against the use of drones tends to deny that the content(s) of norms have a historical trajectory and often frames absolute truth discourses about the content of the norms. They tend to neglect the room for reasonable disagreements and sound unrooted in front of states' legal rationales. This book suggests that states' legal rationales reflect a more powerful and refined theory about the law than the theory embraced by many scholars and NGOs who have argued against drone programs. As a result of weak counterarguments, the book

shows that states active in the war on terror have exploited the semantic possibilities of the norms and their uncertainties in such a way that their rationales have reset some of the limits and reshaped the contents of key conceptual differentiations and oppositions (combatant/civilian, criminal/enemy, status/conduct, battlefield/non-battlefield).

Another flaw in existing debates, exceptions aside,<sup>12</sup> is that most of the literature on drone uses treats drones just like any other (discriminate) weapon.<sup>13</sup> Many studies on post-9/11 drone strikes against terrorists revolve around two points: first, that drones are not inherently problematic and should be treated like any other weapon; and second, for some (underexplored) reason, the way drones are used has posed an unprecedented challenge to the legal frameworks applicable to the use of force. In other words, these studies assume that there is nothing specific, or special, about drones. The report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions Agnes Callamard of June 29, 2020 encapsulates this lasting hybridity, if not paradox, in how drones are studied:

A reasonable argument can be made that to single out drones is misplaced, given that many targeted killings are carried out by conventional means – e.g. Special Operations Forces. Indeed, these also raise serious concerns. The present report thus contains findings applicable to all forms

<sup>12</sup> See, on the contrary, studies or at least references to the potential consequences of drones' technological capacities: Mary Ellen O'Connell, "Seductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of Lethal Operations" (2011) *Journal of Law, Information & Science*, Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 11–35; Laurie R. Blank, "After Top Gun: How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War" (2012) 33 *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law* 3, 675; Grégoire Chamayou, *Drone Theory* (Broché, 2015); Eyal Benvenisti, "The Legal Battle to Define the Law on Transnational Asymmetric Warfare" (2010) 20 *Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law* 339–59.

<sup>13</sup> Rosa Brooks, "Drones and the International Rule of Law" (2014) 28 *Ethics & International Affairs* 1, 83–103; Michael N. Schmitt, "Drone Attacks under the *Jus ad Bellum* and *Jus in Bello*: Clearing the 'Fog of Law'," in M. N. Schmitt, Mike N. Schmitt, Louise Arimatsu, and Tim McCormack (eds.), *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law*, Vol. 12 (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010), 313: "The article concludes that there is little reason to treat drones as distinct from other weapons systems with regard to the legal consequences of their employment." Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, "Légalité et légitimité des drones armés" (2013) 3 *Politique étrangère* 199–32; Stuart Casey-Malsen, "Pandora's Box? Drone Strikes under *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello* and International Human Rights Law" (2012) 94 *International Review of the Red Cross* 886, 597–625; Christian Tams and James G. Devaney, "Jus ad Bellum: Crossing Borders to Wage War against Individuals," in Steven J. Barela (ed.), *Legitimacy and Drones* (Taylor & Francis, 2016), 46; Hugh Gusterson, *Drone: Remote Control Warfare* (The MIT Press, 2016); Sarah Kreps and John Kaag, *Drone Warfare* (Polity Press, 2014).

## 1.1 A NETWORK OF INTERACTING FACTORS

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of targeted killings, no matter their method. Nonetheless, understanding the particularities of armed drone technologies is crucial if we are to keep pace with current and expected developments impacting on the protection of the right to life.<sup>14</sup>

The intuition and persistence in considering, after nearly two decades of US drone program, that drones are not in themselves vectors of meaningful developments correspond to a vision of state actors as agents in full autonomy and control of the course of action. Yet, the perspective that only the decisions of state agents matter in understanding practice and legal change is misleading as it overlooks the power of other actors, including that of technology. State representatives, their decisions, and the legal evolutions they instigate, do not exist in a vacuum. While it is true that the legal and political discourses used to justify the way that drones are employed challenge the law, they are only some out of many components of the natural and manufactured world. State agents' choices are generated by an evolving environment within which they generate new habits and practices. The essence of a technology lies in how it encourages actors to re-perceive the world and their own practice within it.

When this book holds that the strategy of drone programs and individualized warfare would not exist as such were it not for their technological capacities, it does not mean that military drones are a brand-new tool or that their current capabilities were not sought after and progressively achieved. On the contrary, the idea of arming drones was contemplated from the onset of their development.<sup>15</sup> The Digital Revolution, from the late 1950s to the late 1970s, fostered the development of drones for surveillance purposes. Moving from technological development to practice, the US started to use military drones to collect intelligence during the Vietnam War.<sup>16</sup> They were followed by Russia, which

<sup>14</sup> Human Rights Council, "Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions," U.N. Special Rapporteur Agnes Callamard, June 29, 2020, A/HRC/44/3, para. 3.

<sup>15</sup> William Arkin, *Unmanned: Drones, Data, and the Illusion of Perfect Warfare* (Little, Brown, 2015), chapter 5; Barry D. Watts, "The Evolution of Precision Strike" (2013) Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, <https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Evolution-of-Precision-Strike-final-v15.pdf>, 17–18.

<sup>16</sup> David Cenciotti, "The Dawn of the Robot Age: US Air Force Testing Air-Launched UCAVs Capable to Fire Maverick and Shrike Missiles in 1972," *The Aviationist*, March 14, 2012, <http://theaviationist.com/2012/03/14/the-dawn-of-the-robot-age/>; Ian G. R. Shaw, *Predator Empire: Drone Warfare and Full Spectrum Dominance* (University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 71.

deployed surveillance drones for military intelligence purposes in Ukraine, Belarus, and Latvia.<sup>17</sup> In 1973, Israel used surveillance drones during the Yom Kippur War, and again in 1982 when invading Lebanon.<sup>18</sup> During the first Gulf War and during the Kosovo War, military drones were used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance purposes.<sup>19</sup> Yet it was between the Kosovo War and military intervention in Afghanistan that their use morphed from surveillance to surveillance *and* combat drones.<sup>20</sup> In February 2001, the US Air Force carried out the first successful experimental strike in the Nellis Air Force Base where a Predator drone successfully deployed a Hellfire missile against its target.<sup>21</sup> From a fictional situation with a fictional target, combat drones were first used in real situations against real targets later the same year. US drone operators stationed in the Nevada Desert started to conduct drone strikes extraterritorially in several zones across the globe. The US was followed by the UK and Israel,<sup>22</sup> and more recently by France.<sup>23</sup> From 2001 onward, drone strikes were officially conducted in Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

While drones are not new, contemporary drones possess unprecedented capabilities. Aerial military drones are used to kill but they also have surveillance capacities. Recent technological advances have multiplied drones' operational efficiency by refining and accelerating each step of the decision-making process: orientation, observation, selection,

<sup>17</sup> Yefim Gordon, *Soviet/Russian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles* (Midland Publishing, 2005); Océane Zubeldia, *Histoire des drones* (Perrin Editions, 2012), chapter 1.

<sup>18</sup> Ben Hartman, "Ya'alon: IDF Cuts Revolutionary, Will Recreate Army," *The Jerusalem Post*, July 11, 2013, [www.jpost.com/defense/yaalon-idf-cuts-revolutionary-will-produce-new-army-319510](http://www.jpost.com/defense/yaalon-idf-cuts-revolutionary-will-produce-new-army-319510).

<sup>19</sup> "Predator Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)," *The New York Times*, updated March 5, 2012, [http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned\\_aerial\\_vehicles/index.html](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_aerial_vehicles/index.html).

<sup>20</sup> Arkin, *Unmanned: Drones, Data*, chapter 9: "The Machine Builds."

<sup>21</sup> Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (Penguin Books, 2004).

<sup>22</sup> UK Drone Strikes List, Drone Wars UK, <https://dronewars.net/uk-drone-strike-list-2/>.

<sup>23</sup> Speech of the French Minister of the Armed Forces, Madame Florence Parly, "Discours de clôture"; Statute, LOI no. 2018-607 du 13 juillet 2018 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2019 à 2025 et portant diverses dispositions intéressant la défense, [www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2018/7/13/ARMX1800503L/jo/texte](http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2018/7/13/ARMX1800503L/jo/texte), and Annexed report; Guibert, "La France entre dans l'ère des drones armés."



surveillance, engagement, and targeting.<sup>24</sup> In other words, armed drones are equipped to “find, fix, and finish” targets.<sup>25</sup> The enhancement of the military operational process is achieved because drone’s current technological capabilities have two core objectives: precision and ubiquity. The objective of precision (and related technological tools) concerns not only surveillance and intelligence collection but also the selection of the target and the lethal strike. The objective of ubiquity requires the capacity to be permanently everywhere in order to control, select, and terminate a target.

## 1.2 Compiling the Textual, Bureaucratic, and Material Traces of Drone Programs as Techno-Legal Machineries

As mentioned, this book can be thought of as an act of compiling the textual, bureaucratic, and material traces of these programs in order to lay bare the infrastructure that is extending warfare in time and space and exacerbating state power. The extraterritorial use of combat drones against non-state actors is not easy to study because of the lack of available information as, among other factors, much of it is classified. For this reason, when drones are used to target people on the territory of failing states, as in the case of Somalia, the affected state, and others, can remain unaware of the use of drones for a long time, or even forever. Besides, by the time suspicions arise that drones have been used, the evidence may well have disappeared. Therefore, it is difficult to obtain exact data on the number of drone strikes and the number of casualties of the strikes.

Some of the best aggregate databases on drone strikes currently available to the public has been put together by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) and Drone Wars UK, independent journalist organizations, which report on US and UK drone strikes, respectively, and their related civilian casualties.<sup>26</sup> Some major think tanks, such as New America, have also reported on drone strikes.<sup>27</sup> These databases are also

<sup>24</sup> Arkin, *Unmanned: Drones, Data*; Charlie Savage, *Power Wars: The Relentless Rise of Presidential Authority and Secrecy* (Little, Brown, 2015), 240, 273.

<sup>25</sup> The Intercept, *The Drone Papers*, September 2015, <https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/the-assassination-complex/>.

<sup>26</sup> The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), [www.thebureauinvestigates.com/](http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/); Drone Wars UK, <https://dronewars.net/>.

<sup>27</sup> New America, [www.newamerica.org/](http://www.newamerica.org/).

used and fed by law clinics in order to build their own reports.<sup>28</sup> Another precious investigative and research project has been led by Forensic Architecture in collaboration with TBIJ. They set up a colossal project with an interactive cartographic web platform that presents the distribution of drone strikes, the context and composition of the area where they took place, the number of people reported killed, and the types of targets reported hit was instrumental in identifying patterns and connections between drone strikes scenarios.<sup>29</sup> Other reports, such as “The Uncounted” conducted by Azmat Khan and Anand Gopal published by *the New York Times* provide a detailed account of a drone strike in Iraq that was very helpful in tracking and confirming these patterns and connections.<sup>30</sup> Some investigations and reports also come from international organizations, such as organs of the United Nations, especially in the aftermath of a strike contested for having caused civilian casualties.<sup>31</sup> Information can also be found in reports and resolutions issued by the Human Rights Council that are thematic or country-specific.<sup>32</sup> In 2015, confidential documents of the US government and military were

<sup>28</sup> See, for example, International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (Stanford Law School) and Global Justice Clinic (NYU School of Law), “Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan,” September 2012, [www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Stanford-NYU-Living-Under-Drones.pdf](http://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Stanford-NYU-Living-Under-Drones.pdf), vi.

<sup>29</sup> Forensic Architecture, The Drone Strikes Platform, <https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-drone-strikes-platform>.

<sup>30</sup> Azmat Khan and Anand Gopal, “The Uncounted,” *The New York Times*, November 16, 2017, [www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/16/magazine/uncounted-civilian-casualties-iraq-airstrikes.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/16/magazine/uncounted-civilian-casualties-iraq-airstrikes.html?_r=0).

<sup>31</sup> United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), “Rapport sur l’incident de Bounty du 3 janvier 2021,” March 2021, [https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/rapport\\_final\\_bounty\\_bounty9.pdf](https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/rapport_final_bounty_bounty9.pdf). This report followed the strike conducted by the French Barkhane forces in the village of Bounty, in Mali, in January 2021, on people who were attending a wedding at the time of the strike.

<sup>32</sup> For a thematic report, see Philip Alston, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,” May 28, 2010, Human Rights Council, A/HRC/14/24/Add6; see also Human Rights Council, “Ensuring Use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft or Armed Drones in Counter-Terrorism and Military Operations in Accordance with International Law, Including International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law,” Resolution A/HRC/25/L.32, March 24, 2014; Christof Heyns, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,” April 24, 2015, Human Rights Council, A/HRC/29/37; for a country report, see “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan and on the Achievements of Technical Assistance in the Field of Human Rights in 2013,” January 10, 2014, A/HRC/25/41, §21.