



Introduction

This book has three interwoven theses: The first of these concerns the Anthropocene era and contends that a more accurate understanding of the history of natural law and its impact on the development of modern Europe, which, significantly, focuses and draws on previous transformations of the concept of nature, will facilitate the addressing of key current issues in respect of that era. The second concerns the metaphysics of human nature and nature more broadly and contends that the sceptical denial of the light of moral nature and of its epistemological freedom is related to the disappearance of nature as a sacred space. The third thesis concerns the modification of natural law in England during the seventeenth century and contends that the most important seventeenth-century scientists/natural lawyers buttressed their liberal politics by means of philosophical and ethical necessitarianism. The naturalism and scientificism of necessity and needs constituted the means by which they separated moral and theological issues from governmental matters, to advocate a threshold of necessities to which each human being and each citizen is entitled and to foster the inauguration of a monetary economy. Accordingly, the first three parts of this introduction deal with the new ‘Empire over nature’, the context of epistemological scepticism and the new political economy of necessity. This book therefore chiefly enquires into the relations between natural law and the evidence we find of competing metaphysics of the past.¹ It asks why, despite fundamental differences, the English liberal natural lawyers agreed on so much as to the new natural law. The first three parts of the introduction are roughly divided between utopian, materialist and realist metaphysics. The fourth and fifth parts deal respectively with methodological questions and provide an overview of the chapters.

¹ On the knowledge of the past through evidence, see Aviezer Tucker: ‘Historiography makes no observations of historical events, but presents descriptions or representations or constructions of such events in the presence of evidence’. Aviezer Tucker, ‘Historical Truth’, in Vittorio Hosle (ed.), *Forms of Truth and the Unity of Knowledge* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), p. 238.

I Altering the Perception of Nature

Humankind's dominance of nature was articulated as a new geological epoch starting in the latter part of the eighteenth century and termed the 'Anthropocene' by chemist Paul J. Crutzen and biologist Eugene F. Stoermer more than twenty years ago. The measure they applied in assigning dates to this era was the evidence of measurable global effects of human activities, such as the concentration of 'greenhouse gases', that started during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Envisaging that humankind would continue to be 'a major geological force' for thousands and even millions of years to come, their proposal was to think strategically about ways in which to develop sustainable ecosystems.² Dominance of nature was a common trope of scholastic theology, and theologians ranging from Thomas Aquinas to Francisco de Vitoria, the leader of the Salamancan School, held that it was founded in Scripture.³ Theologians accordingly took dominance over nature to be scriptural in origin and natural to human beings in respect of the use of nature. Further, they viewed the design of nature as being subject only to the power of God.⁴ The political dream of being Lords (as Anthony Pagden described them) of all the world in the Spanish, French and British Empires had little to do with a scientific 'empire over nature', however appealing that Lordship was felt to be in relation to extracting natural resources from the new territories.⁵ Instead, the ethical standpoint of reverence towards nature was dismissed among the ranks of natural scientists involved in the emerging Scientific Revolution. Consequently, the notion of nature had to be altered in such manner that its domination was permissible. Cruzen and Stoermer's chronology coincides with scholars' acknowledgment of a change in

² Paul J. Crutzen and Eugene F. Stoermer, "The "Anthropocene"", 41 *Global Change Newsletter* (Stockholm: Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences) (2000), pp. 17–18.

³ See Chapter 6.

⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* q. 66 a.1. co; de Vitoria Francisco, *Comentarios a la Secunda secundae de Santo Tomás*, Vicente Beltrán de Heredia (ed.) Vol. III *De Justitia*, qq. 57/66, (Salamanca: Apartado 17, 1934), q. 66 art. 1, 73; Jaime Brufau Prats, 'La noción analógica del dominium en Santo Tomás, Francisco de Vitoria y Domingo de Soto' 4 *Salmanticensis* (1957), pp. 96–136; Annabel Brett, *Liberty, Right and Nature. Individual Rights in Early Scholastic Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), ch. 4; Martti Koskenniemi, *To the Uttermost Parts of the Earth: Legal Imagination and International Power, 1300–1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021) p. 150.

⁵ Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c. 1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Manuel Jimenez Fonseca, 'Civilizing nature. Revisiting the Imperial History of International Law 1511–1972' (PhD, Finland: University of Helsinki, 2017).

attitude towards ‘nature’ and the argument that that transformation was one important factor in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.⁶

This book situates that change in the perception of nature in the previous century, when scientists set out to ‘range, anatomize, and ransack nature’.⁷ The novelty of this way of thinking lies in the way in which the faraway and exotic ‘Other’ was no longer the party candidly designated as a victim in the process of plundering and pillaging.⁸ Now ‘nature’, simply and universally, ought to be ransacked. The new trend was to demystify nature, multiply it and transmute it. For the most part, leaving behind old occult practices and alchemy, how to do that lay in new knowledge. ‘Man’s power over the creatures depends chiefly upon his knowledge’ wrote Robert Boyle (1627–1691).⁹ Boyle was the foremost natural scientist and philosopher of nature of the era, brilliant in the extreme, though also extremely pragmatic as to his goals. It is unsurprising to find that two centuries later Friedrich Nietzsche defined science in exactly that manner in his *Will to Power*: ‘the transformation of nature into concepts for the purpose of mastering nature.’¹⁰ Apparently he wrote that approvingly.¹¹ There is a fine line between mastering and ransacking nature that perhaps now we are starting to sense. Hence, new theories about ‘Earth Stewardship’

⁶ Margaret C. Jacobs points to a text of mechanics of 1744 by Newton’s assistant, John Teophilus Desaguliers (1683–1744) as the first with that ‘critical insight’. See Margaret C. Jacob, ‘The Cultural Origins of the First Industrial Revolution’, in Marcus Hellyer (ed.), *The Scientific Revolution: The Essential Readings*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), p. 212; Joel Mokyr, *A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2016).

⁷ Robert Boyle, ‘Of the Usefulness of Experimental Philosophy, The First Part, Principally as It Relates to the Mind of Man’ in *The Works of Robert Boyle*, vol. 3 (London Pickering and Chatto, 1999), p. 237.

⁸ On some of the ‘Others’, see for instance, Anne Orford (ed.), *International Law and Its Others* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 245–386; Anthony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

⁹ Robert Boyle, ‘Of the Usefulness of Experimental Philosophy’. The Second Part. Second Section, in *The Works of Robert Boyle*, vol. 6, p. 436.

¹⁰ ‘Science – the transformation of nature into concepts for the purpose of mastering nature – belongs under the rubric “means”. But the purpose and will of man must grow in the same way, the intention in regard to the whole.’ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (trans.), Walter Kaufmann (ed.) (New York: Vintage, 1967 (1901, 1906)), section 610.

¹¹ Eli I. Lichtenstein, ‘Revaluing Laws of Nature in Secularized Science’, in Y. Ben-Menahem (ed.), *Rethinking the Concept of Law of Nature: Natural Order in the Light of Contemporary Science* (Cham: Springer, 2022), pp. 347–377.

turn to older traditions to revive aesthetic and moral appreciations of nature, and even to spiritual and sacred conceptions of ecological knowledge.¹² There is something about nature, scholars appear to argue, that we cannot know by simply dissecting and anatomizing it.

And yet, nature was necessary. Nature embodied the epistemic necessity of the new mechanical world. This time it was not a potential source of precious metals but of laws of motion and regularities. Laws followed principles, including the principle of causal necessity. Without nature as a container or perhaps the very articulation of all those necessary laws, what would be there to study? Moreover, knowledge about that nature was the driving force of much of the intellectual movement of the period. Transformations in the concept of ‘law’ in science towards ‘law’ either fully ruling the universe or being incapable of ruling it at all also followed from changes in the notion of ‘nature’.¹³

II Nature and The Light of Nature

Utopian theology gave epistemological impetus to science. There was still so much to learn from a world created by an omnipotent God, but that was a theology without human beings. Its counterpart, the pragmatism of scientists, was the result of how they had decided to step in to replace the *designer of nature*. The idea of conceiving nature as something sacred had been in the Christian tradition that human and non-human nature alike had been created to give glory to God the Creator, each according to their specific nature. Therefore, there was a purpose to nature. By the mid-seventeenth century, on the grounds of its inviolability and the boundaries to human knowledge and dominion that it established, ‘the unnecessariness of such a nature’ deserving any kind of ‘veneration’ was declared.¹⁴ Further, the rational human being no longer seemed to be part of nature. In the new natural law, every human being appeared a mystery.

¹² See Shan Gao, ‘Aesthetic and Moral Appreciation of Nature in Philosophical Traditions of China’; Fausto O. Sarmiento, ‘The Antlers of a Trilemma: Rediscovering Andean Sacred Rites’; Vicenta Mamani-Bernabé, ‘Spirituality and the Pachamama in the Andean Aymara Worldview’, all in Ricardo Rozzi et al. *Earth Stewardship. Linking Ecology and Ethics in Theory and Practice* (Cham, Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London, New York: Springer, 2015).

¹³ See Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis (eds.) *Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe. Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy* (Surrey, Burlington: Ashgate 2008); John Dupré, *Metaphysical Foundations of the Disorder of Things* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995); Brett, *Liberty, Right and Nature*.

¹⁴ Boyle, *A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Receiv'd Notion of Nature*, in *The Works of Robert Boyle*, v. 10, p. 485.

If left to their own judgment, they were a threat to all humanity, and in spiritual terms they were called to respond to none but their God and conscience. What could be specifically natural about that? At the same time the human body became a central source of concern. An old Greek-Arabic tradition of household economics taking the physical needs of human nature as the foundation of politics resurged in Europe through new Latin translations. These ideas entered the philosophy of natural law quietly but firmly during the early modern period. Further, the moderation of living ‘to or neere the necessity of nature’, throwing off whatever threatened to interfere with a life of simplicity, was considered the model for the Reformed individual.¹⁵ Nature, clearly articulating human necessities, represented thus the ideal of a virtuous Protestant. Around the middle of the seventeenth century the bottom line was that nature was considered to be a stream of constant needs experienced by human beings, which determined much of what followed in terms of virtue and sociability.

This physicalist idea about human nature was central to many Christian natural lawyers in seventeenth-century England working within the new science. The book explores the mixed vocation of Thomas Hobbes, Robert Boyle and John Locke, being at once natural scientists, economists, medical doctors, (al)chemists, theologians and philosophers. In the history of international law they are usually dealt with in terms of their ‘philosophy of law’ understood in a lego-juristic sense – except for Boyle who is usually omitted. But as a phenomenon extending now much further than ‘treaties’ or ‘diplomatic endeavours’, and encompassing all kinds of global matters and questions, both of social and of natural sciences, international law can benefit greatly from the rich approach to law that natural lawyers themselves adopted.

By emphasizing the physical aspects of the body within the pervasive dualist ideas of the period, such as Neoplatonism or Cartesianism, the great natural lawyers of the seventeenth century put aside the more intellectual view of human nature. In a period in which human beings were becoming masters and lords of empirical knowledge the light of nature was obscured. The classic notion of the light of nature illuminated the mystery of how individuals from all places and eras have searched for the good life, the virtuous life. Since Aristotle the light of nature had a

¹⁵ In a letter from Sir Cheney Culpeper (1601–1663) to Samuel Hartlib (1600–1662), ‘7 November 1649’, in M. J. Braddick and M. Greengrass (eds.), and Introduction, *The Letters of Sir Cheney Culpeper (1641–1657)*, (Royal Historical Society Camden Series, Vol VII, 1999), p. 360.

divine connotation. In Christian theology it was either the image of God implanted in each human being, or a certain participation in the eternal law in the divine intellect.¹⁶ Christian natural lawyers of previous centuries had even conceived human nature, soul and body, as ‘reason’. That was true of the biologist-theologian Albert the Great.¹⁷ For his disciple, Thomas Aquinas, moral natural law was, famously, participation in eternal reason, in a great part by means of the light of nature.¹⁸ Despite the weakening consequences of the Fall, it was thought that a human being can think, decide and view things in the world as God had created them and wished them to be. This was a spiritual or indeed a divine conception of reason, of nature and of law, unconcerned with future burgeoning struggles among philosophers of history to explain the past in terms of necessity and contingency.¹⁹

As recovered by the first liberals in terms of necessities, human nature again became part of a cosmology, similarly to what had been before in the natural law period of theologians. It once more encompassed political thought, natural science, religion, natural law and the incipient science of political economy. However, natural law had undergone a complete transformation, as had nature. But, after all, nature was necessary. The needs of human beings imposed themselves in the articulations formulated by social sciences, leaving very little to the

¹⁶ See Chapters 1 and 5.

¹⁷ Alberti Magni, *De bono*, in *Alberti Magni opera omnia*, tomus XXVIII), Henricus Kühle, Carolus Feckes, Bernhardus Geyer (Proldgomena), Wilhemus Kübel, ediderunt, (Aschendorff: Monasterii westfalorum in aedibus, 1951), pp. 259–271; Albertus Magnus, *Ethica*, ed. Borgnet, vol. VII (Paris: Louis Vivès, 1891); Georg Wieland, *Zwischen Natur und Vernunft: Alberts des Grossen Begriff vom Menschen*, Lectio Albertina 2 (Münster 1999); Jörn Müller, *Natürliche Moral und Philosophische Ethik Bei Albertus Magnus* (Münster: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters: Neue Folge 59, 2001); Stanley B., Cunningham, *Reclaiming Moral Agency: The Moral Philosophy of Albert the Great* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008).

¹⁸ Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I-IIae, q. 94; Riccardo Saccenti, *Debating Medieval Natural Law: A Survey* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2017); Odon Lottin, *Le droit naturel chez Saint Thomas d’Aquin et ses prédécesseurs*, (Bruges: C. Beyaert, 1931); Martin Grabmann, ‘Das Naturrecht der Scholastik von Gratian bis Thomas von Aquin. Nach den gedruckten und ungedruckten Quellen dargestellt’, 16 *Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie* (1922/1923), pp. 12–53; Brett, *Liberty, Right and Nature*, pp. 88–97; on Aquinas and *ius gentium* but also illuminating for natural law see, Koskenniemi, *To the Uttermost Parts of the Earth*, pp. 78–83; see also how the light of nature appeared in the legists in Rudolf Weigand, *Die Naturrechtslehre der Legisten und Dekretisten von Irnerius bis Accursius und von Gratian bis Johannes Teutonicus* (Munich: Hueber, 1967).

¹⁹ Yemima Ben-Menahem, ‘Historical Necessity and Contingency’, in Aviezer Tucker (ed.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell).

imagination or poetic mind. Moreover, in this new cosmology, nature could be the problem, as Hobbes had stated, or the solution, as in Boyle's theory. All the goods of nature could be multiplied and offer food and occupation for human beings' needs and their multitude of desires. In a century when all authors proclaimed the obscurity and even the extinction of the divine light of nature, the death of sacred nature as described above was being planned.²⁰ It is impossible to take a scientific stand about a causal necessity between these two events. Instead, I suggest that since they were unable to understand themselves and the earth as part of a unified Creation, natural scientists opted to squander recklessly what was appraised as their inheritance.

III Needs, Politics and Money

The book contends that Hobbes and Locke developed their natural law and political theory revolving around a novel doctrine of necessity and of necessities. The utopian moment in the history of Europe described above is observed from the perspective of the doctrine of necessities and comprises the promise of unlimited knowledge and unlimited economic growth – significantly through nature – in circumstances of great freedom of thought. The standpoint of the philosophers of necessity is described in the book as a response to that utopian moment, tempering that enthusiasm for the sake of the safety and well-being of human beings.²¹ In making this argument, several key transformations in the conception of nature and of money are uncovered that have not thus far received attention in the histories of natural law, international law and political economy.

A neutral, scientific idea of money has been instrumental in shaping the global legal order. But it is an open question whether there are other possible explanations of what money is. Also, the debate about whether scientific money would be the best instrument for devising the public good is as old as the scientific money itself. History and theories of natural

²⁰ See also Carolyn Merchant, *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution* (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1990).

²¹ 'For seeing every man, not only by Right, but also by necessity of Nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation; He that shall oppose himself against it for things superfluous, is guilty of the warre that thereupon is to follow; and therefore doth that, which is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature, which commandeth to *seek Peace*. The observers of this Law, may be called *Sociale*'. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Noel Malcolm (ed.), ch. 15, p. 232.

law, political economy, sociology and economics teach that money may be described in the following ways: as debt, credit, a medium of exchange, a lasting ‘thing’ that is not really a thing, but a measure of value, a social instrument, a political weapon, a storage facility for power, willpower, speculators’ fantasy, an idol ... Money is a complex reality that is particularly political and moral (a) in its relative independence from underlying reality, (b) in the way it may be distributed and (c) in the way that it is pursued within and outside the commonwealth and aligned with its principles or detached from them.

Ethical, political and economic concerns about economic inequality, the depoliticization of money and the ensuing undemocratic practices heightened after the 2008 financial crisis have prompted the resurgence of the debate about what money constitutes.²² Despite important recent exceptions, for the most part public international law follows mainstream economics in keeping their distance from these debates.²³ Thus, international lawyers continue to reduce money to a formal medium and represent it as a ‘black box’ and as a function of other forces and institutions. This under-theorization veils the more theoretical and foundational thinking about what money is, undertaken within the old European tradition of theological and monetary thought, but also carried out by twentieth- and

²² Aristotle, *Politics*, Ernest Barker trans., revised with an Introduction and Notes by R. F. Stalley (Oxford University Press, 1995); John Locke and Patrick Hyde Kelly (eds.), *Locke on Money. Vol. I and II* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); John Smithin, *Controversies in Monetary Economics* (London: Elgar Publishing, 2003); Geoffrey Ingham, *The Nature of Money* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004); Christine A. Desan, *Making Money: Coin, Currency and the Coming of Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Samuel Bowles, *The Moral Economy: Why Good Incentives Are No Substitute for Good Citizens* (London, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016); Joseph Huber, *Sovereign Money: Beyond Reserve Banking* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Diane Coyle, *Cogs and Monsters: What Economics Is and What It Should Be* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021); Stefan Eich, *The Currency of Politics: The Political Theory of Money from Aristotle to Keynes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022).

²³ Rosa M. Lastra and others, ‘Central Bank Money: Liability, Asset, or Equity of the Nation?’ *Rebuilding Macroeconomics Working Paper Series, Working Paper No 20*, 25.11.2020; Rosa M. Lastra and Marcelo J. Sheppard, ‘Ethical Foundations of Financial Law’, in Costanza A. Russo, Rosa M. Lastra and William Blair (eds.), *Research Handbook on Law and Ethics in Banking and Finance* (London: Elgar Publishing, 2019); Isabel Feichtner, ‘Law of Natural Resource Extraction and Money as Key to Understanding Global Political Economy and Potential for Its Transformation’, in Poul F. Kjaer (ed.), *The Law of Political Economy: Transformation in the Function of Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020); Isabel Feichtner, ‘The German Constitutional Court’s PSPP Judgment: Impediment and Impetus for the Democratization of Europe’ 21 *German Law Journal* (2020); see also the group of researchers in justmoney.org.

twenty-first-century economists and contemporary sociologists, political economists and anthropologists.²⁴

Phenomena such as that of financialization fundamentally defy the scientific and neutral explanation of money in ordering global monetary operations. Economists and political economists describe financialization as the increasing power of financial actors over the political world, society and the rest of the economy.²⁵ The term has ‘parasitical’ and negative connotations as money gradually acquires a fictitious nature, sovereign countries become heavily indebted to foreign private lenders and entrepreneurs become ‘liquidified’ by seeking profit for shareholders first and foremost.²⁶

Today Locke’s monetary ideas stand out in the context of historical monetary theory as one of the key languages that scholars employ to decode money in the contemporary global economic system.²⁷ One of the general concerns expressed in this literature pertains to the way in which money resists being considered a political issue in many spheres. My argument is that in his monetary writings Locke took money to be a representation of need and necessities, not of the private individual, as Aristotle had it, but of the necessities of the state, and in this manner

²⁴ John Maynard Keynes, *A Treatise on Money*. Vol. I *The Pure Theory of Money*. Vol. II *The Applied Theory of Money* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1935; 1950 [1930]); Joseph A. Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis*, Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter (ed.) with an Introduction by Mark Perlman (New York: Routledge, 1987); Paul A. Samuelson, ‘Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Capital’ 51 *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* (1937); Ingham, *The Nature of Money*; Bill Maurer, *How Would You Like to Pay? How Technology Is Changing the Future of Money* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015); Stefano Sgambati, ‘The Significance of Money: Beyond Ingham’s Sociology of Money’, 56 *European Journal of Sociology* (2014).

²⁵ Engelbert Stockhammer, Stefano Sgambati and Anastasia Nesvetailova, ‘Financialisation: Continuity and Change – Introduction to the Special Issue’ 2 *Review of Evolutionary Political Economy* (2021).

²⁶ Cédric Durand, *Fictitious Capital: How Finance Is Appropriating Our Future*, trans. by David Broder (Brooklyn, London: Verso, 2017); Tristan Auvray, Thomas Dallery and Sandra Rigot, *L’entreprise liquidée. La finance contre l’investissement* (Paris: Michalon, 2016); Stockhammer, Sgambati and Nesvetailova, ‘Financialisation: Continuity and Change’.

²⁷ Joyce Oldham Appleby, ‘Locke, Liberalism and the Natural Law of Money’, 71 *Past and Present* (1976); Patrick Hyde Kelly, ‘General Introduction: Locke on Money’, in Patrick Hyde Kelly (ed.), *Locke on Money* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Daniel Carey and Christopher J. Finlay (eds.), *The Financial Revolution in the British Atlantic World, 1688–1815* (Dublin, Portland: Irish Academic Press, 2011); Daniel Carey, ‘Locke’s Species: Money and Philosophy in the 1690s’ 70 *Annals of Science* (2013); Daniel Carey (ed.), *Money and the Political Economy of Enlightenment*, Oxford University Studies in the Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford Voltaire Foundation 2014); Christine A. Desan, *Making Money*; Katarina Pistor, ‘From Territorial to Monetary Sovereignty’ 18 *Theoretical Inquiries in Law* 2017; Stefan Eich, ‘John Locke and the Politics of Monetary Depoliticization’ 17 *Modern Intellectual History* (2020); Eich, *The Currency of Politics*.

began the scientification of money.²⁸ On the one hand, Locke was interested in promoting the monetary interests that he considered fundamental for the commonwealth to thrive. But he also foresaw the dangers posed by money, which he thought could be tempered by robust construction of the public good.²⁹ By integrating Locke's theory of money into the interpretative prism provided by the Scientific Revolution, the aim of *The Necessity of Nature* is also to contribute to current debate in Lockean interpretations, between Locke as the 'Evangelical political theorist'³⁰ and Locke as 'the inaugurator of radical capitalism'.³¹ Furthermore, it analyses his ideas of the public good, which, it is argued, are also founded on the doctrine of necessities, alongside more traditional interpretations.

IV Necessity and Liberalism

Thomas Aquinas is for the most part a sort of silent discussing partner in the context of this book – providing arguments but remaining in the background. Thomas Hobbes's proposal for a political philosophy sustained by a new and robust metaphysics represented a decisive change in the seventeenth century. Aquinas's metaphysical question, 'what is good?'

²⁸ A contemporary account of 'the scientification of politics' in the knowledge society, in Peter Weingart, 'From "Finalization" to "Mode 2": Old Wine in New Bottles?' 36 *Social Science Information*, (1997), p. 605.

²⁹ John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. with an Introduction by Peter Laslett (Cambridge University Press, 1988 [1967]). See on Aristotle, money and needs, chapter 9.2.2. below.

³⁰ John Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the 'Two Treatises of Government'* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); James Tully, *A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Ian Harris, *The Mind of John Locke: A Study of Political Theory in Its Intellectual Setting* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Timothy Stanton, 'John Locke and the Fable of Liberalism' 61 *Historical Journal* (2018); Paul Bou-Habib, 'Locke, Natural Law and Civil Peace: Reply to Tate' 16 *European Journal of Political Theory* (2017); Mark Goldie, in 2021, *The Carlyle Lectures: John Locke and Empire*. www.history.ox.ac.uk/event/the-carlyle-lectures-2021-john-locke-and-empire

³¹ C. B. MacPherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962); Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); John William Tate, 'Locke, God and Civil Society: Response to Stanton' 40 *Political Theory* (2012); Neal Wood, *John Locke and Agrarian Capitalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). See also Helga Varden commenting on Hannah Arendt's critique of the confusion between work and labour, Helga Varden, 'Locke on Property', in Jessica Gordon-Roth and Shelley Weinberg (eds.), *The Lockean Mind* (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2022), ch. 44.