INTUITION IN KANT

In this book, Daniel Smyth offers a comprehensive overview of Immanuel Kant's conception of intuition in all its species – divine, receptive, sensible, and human. Kant considers sense perception a paradigm of intuition, yet claims that we can represent infinities in intuition, despite the finitude of sense perception. Smyth examines this heterodox combination of commitments and argues that the various features Kant ascribes to intuition are meant to remedy specific cognitive shortcomings that arise from the discursivity of our intellect, with intuition acting as the intellect's cognitive partner to make knowledge possible. He reconstructs Kant's conception of intuition and its role in his philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of mathematics, and shows that Kant's conception of sensibility is as innovative and revolutionary as his much-debated theory of the understanding.

DANIEL SMYTH is Assistant Professor of Letters, Philosophy, and German Studies at Wesleyan University, Connecticut. He publishes on Kant, philosophy of mathematics, and aesthetic theory and has translated numerous books and articles from German.

INTUITION IN KANT

The Boundlessness of Sense

DANIEL SMYTH

Wesleyan University, Connecticut





Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India

103 Penang Road, #05–06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467

Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment, a department of the University of Cambridge.

We share the University's mission to contribute to society through the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781009330312

DOI: 10.1017/9781009330305

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First published 2024

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

A Cataloging-in-Publication data record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

ISBN 978-1-009-33031-2 Hardback

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> It is too little to call *Man* a *little World*; Except *God*, Man is a *diminutive* to nothing. Man consists of more pieces, more parts, than the world; than the world doeth, nay than the world is. And if those pieces were extended, and stretched out in Man, as they are in the world, Man would be the *Gyant*, and the World the *Dwarfe*, the World but the *Map*, and the Man the *World*. —John Donne, *Devotions upon Emergent Occasions*, 1624, Meditation IV

> Various predicates of space that one would otherwise regard as objective can now be explained through this concept [sc. of space] in view of its origin. 1. Space is unitary [einig], because it is the form of representations of every possible outer object in a unitary subject. 2. Space is infinite. For the capacity to suffer [Fähigkeit zuzulassen] various impressions of outer things, or receptivity [Empfänglichkeit], has no limitations [Schranken] in itself. 3. Space is necessary; for it is that upon which the possibility of the senses is grounded. —Kant, R4673, 1774–1775, 17:641.14–21

> When a man summoned to animated observation begins to do battle with nature, he initially feels a prodigious drive to subjugate its objects to himself. Yet it does not take long for them to intrude so violently upon him that he well feels how much cause he has to acknowledge their power and to admire their efficacy. No sooner has he convinced himself of this reciprocal influence than he becomes aware of a double infinity, in the objects the manifoldness of being and becoming and their lively criss-crossing relations, in himself, however, the possibility of an infinite development, as he refines his receptivity as well as his judgment to ever new forms of up-take and reaction.

—Goethe, "Apology for the Undertaking," Ideas on Organic Formation, 1806–1807, FA 24:389

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Acknowledgments

This project began as a dissertation at the University of Chicago over a decade ago. No part of that dissertation survives in the present book, but the formative influence of my advisors and my fellow graduate students endures. Robert Pippin's breadth and savvy taught me the value of viewing issues against a wide historical horizon and of imaginatively inhabiting unfamiliar postures of thought. Jim Conant's capacity for slow, generous reading showed me the importance of attending closely to philosophical methodology. From Daniel Sutherland I learned to appreciate the fecundity of Kant's philosophy of mathematics and the acuity of its scholars. And Anat Schechtman introduced me to the profundity of Leibniz's and Descartes's views on infinity and helped me to see their relevance to Kant. I am forever discovering and re-discovering gems that they managed to slip into my pockets. I'm grateful to Nathan Bauer, Thomas Land, Justin Shaddock, and Clinton Tolley for discussing Kant with me before I knew what I was talking about. And I'm grateful to Simon Gurofsky, Joshua Mendelsohn, Andrew Pitel, Daniel Rodriguez-Navas, Jess Tizzard, and Andy Werner for continuing those discussions after I would not shut up.

I owe a great debt to the broader community of Kant scholars for cultivating an intellectual estuary for up-and-comers that is at once nurturing and rigorous. My views and habits of mind have improved immeasurably from being an active member of the North American Kant Society. For encouragement, intellectual camaraderie, and invaluable insights at various stages along the way, I am grateful to Matt Boyle, Emily Carson, Rosalind Chaplin, Andrew Chignell, Stephen Engstrom, Anil Gomes, Johannes Haag, Andrea Kern, Pat Kitcher, Michelle Kosch, Samantha Matherne, Colin McLear, Bennett McNulty, James Messina, Sasha Newton, Sebastian Rödl, Timothy Rosenkoetter, Ulrich Schlösser, Lisa Shabel, Nick Stang, and Rachel Zuckert. I have particularly benefitted from extended conversations with Ian Blecher, Thomas Land, and Tyke x

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Acknowledgments

Nunez. And I cannot begin to survey the debts I owe to my closest interlocutors about Kant (*auch allen Dingen überhaupt*), Till Hoeppner and Jess Tizzard. I shudder to think where I would be without their good sense and good humor.

I also benefitted from acute and constructive reports by two anonymous reviewers for Cambridge University Press. For finding such fantastic readers and for guiding me through the review and publication process with patience and practicality, I am grateful to Hilary Gaskin. Thanks are also due to Cameron Cook for creating the Index and to my department for paying for it.

The process of writing this book was no walk in the park, so I am especially grateful to my wonderful colleagues at Wesleyan University for advice, moral support, and walks in the park. My colleagues in the College of Letters, as well as my comrades in the Philosophy Department, worked to ensure that I felt valued and secure, actively protecting my time for research and family. For going above and beyond in different ways, I must single out Joe Fitzpatrick, Steve Horst, Tushar Irani, Katherine Kuenzli, Roger Matthew Grant, Uli Plass, Joe Rouse, Sanford Shieh, and Courtney Weiss Smith.

What writing this book has required more than anything else is time. I am grateful for Wesleyan's parental leave program, which enabled me to put research on hold during the precious early months of my children's lives. I am grateful to my mother-in-law, Kristin, for dropping everything when the pandemic hit in order to devote herself to her grandkids. I am grateful to the teachers at Neighborhood Preschool in Middletown for the care they practiced during the pandemic and for the love they practice always. I am grateful to my children, Fionn and Eva, for being relentlessly amazing. And I am grateful to my wife, Leigh Ann, for her resilience and forbearance when I have been absent or irritable, for the intensity and generosity of her attention, for her capacity for gentleness, and for her tenacity. It is to my family, not to Kant, that I owe my most vivid sense of the boundlessness of our human capacities.

Abbreviations, Citations, and Other Conventions

References to Kant

Translations of Kant are my own, but key terms accord with standard English editions. I underline text to signify my own emphasis, and note it parenthetically. I use bold typeface to express Kant's emphasis (where he would have used Sperrdruck), which I generally leave unremarked. I retain Kant's italics in quotations, though only to indicate foreign words, not to express emphasis.

References to Kant's writings follow standard practice with one refinement: the addition of line numbers. I provide volume, page, and line numbers from the Akademie Ausgabe of Kant's writings (Kant 1901–), except for the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where I cite the A (1781) and B (1787) pagination. The A/B page number is followed, after a period, by the line numbers of the Meiner Philosophische Bibliothek edition (Kant 1998). These line numbers track the pagination of the Meiner volume, not the pagination of the A, B, or Akademie editions. To locate cited passages, first find the A/B page in the Meiner edition and then look for cited line numbers within that A/B page.

Because an A/B page may extend across a page break in the Meiner edition, line numbers may sometimes appear to go backward. Thus, A53/ B77f.34–06 refers to the sentence, "Sie hat also [...] gemeinen Verstandes." This sentence begins on line 34 of page 131 of the Meiner edition and ends on line 6 of page 132. For the same reason, some early portions of B77 have higher line numbers than later ones, since they appear before the page break: B77.30–34 precedes B77.2–4.

When no line numbers are specified, I mean to refer to an extended discussion in that area of the text. I do this only when I take my interpretation to be uncontroversial.

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Abbreviations, Citations, and Other Conventions

I supply Adickes's estimated dating of all Reflections and of all unpublished writings that fall outside the penumbra of Kant's "critical period" (1777–1792). I do not provide dates for texts within this period or for published writings.

I abbreviate Kant's works as follows:

A–	Anthropology lectures, followed by full title (e.g.			
	A-Colli	ns; A-Menschenkunde)		
Anthropology	y Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798)			
Critique	Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781 = A / 1787 = B)			
Directions	Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden			
	im Rau	ume (1768)		
Discovery	Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der			
2	reinen	Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht		
	werden soll (1790)			
Dreams	Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der			
	Metapł	nysik (1766)		
Groundwork	Grundl	egung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785)		
<i>Inaugural</i> De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et				
	princip	iis (1770)		
Judgment	gment Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790)			
L–	Logic lectures, followed by abbreviated title:			
	Blom	Blomberg (early 1770s)		
	Bus	Busolt (c. 1789)		
	DW	Dohna-Wundlacken (1792)		
	Iäsche	Immanuel Kants Logik, ein Handbuch zu		
	2	Vorlesungen (1800)		
	Ph	Philippi (1772)		
	Pö	Pölitz (1780–1782)		
	Wien	Wiener Logic (1780–1782)		
M–	Metaphysics lectures, followed by abbreviated title:			
	DW	Dohna-Wundlacken (1792–1793)		
	Н	Herder (1762–1764)		
	Mr	Mrongovius (1782–1783)		
	Pö/L ₁	Pölitz / L ₁ (1777–1780)		
	Pö/L ₂	Pölitz / L ₂ (1790–1791?)		
	Schön	von Schön (1789–1791)		
	Vi/K ₃	Vigilantius / K ₃ (1794/95)		
	Vo	Volkmann (1784/85)		

Abbreviations, Citations, and Other Conventions

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Metanhysische Anfangsgründe der
Naturwissenschaft (1786)
Über Kästners Abhandlungen (1790)
Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren? (1786)
Metaphysicae cum geometria iunctae usus in philosophia
naturali, cuius specimen I. continet monadologiam
physicam (1756)
Opus postumum (c. 1796–1801)
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788)
Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als
Wissenschaft wird auftreten können (1783)
Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer
Demonstration des Daseins Gottes (1763)
Reflections, cited with Adickes's estimated dating
Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der
Philosophie (1788)
Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in
der Philosophie (1796)

References to Major Historical Figures

I generally cite critical editions with the standard abbreviations indicated in my bibliography. I provide line numbers when available and useful. I depart from this practice only when I think it will be easier for readers to find the passage by section numbers or in a widely available collection. Thus, citations of Aquinas, Wolff, Baumgarten, and Meier employ section numbers, as do many citations of Leibniz.

Other References

All other references, including citations of secondary literature, employ the Chicago-style, name-date format. When a piece has been republished or translated, I cite the version I think is easiest to access, providing the original date of publication in square brackets for historical context. Thus, "Parsons (1992 [1969])" refers to his classic essay "Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic" as it appears in Posy's invaluable collection, *Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics: Modern Essays*.

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Abbreviations, Citations, and Other Conventions

Other Conventions

I enclose words in angled brackets to mention the concepts they express. Thus <horse> and <*Pferd*> co-refer to the concept of the natural species *equus ferus*. I use these same angled brackets to refer to the judgment expressed by the sentence they enclose, which I also italicize. Thus <*horses are mammals*> is an analytic judgment.

I use single quotation marks to mention the words enclosed by them. Thus 'horse' has two vowels, but '*Pferd*' only one.

I use double quotation marks both to quote text and as "scare quotes", to call critical attention to a phrase or idea.