

Ukraine and Russia

In this fully revised and updated in-depth analysis of the war in Ukraine, Paul D'Anieri explores the dynamics within Ukraine, between Ukraine and Russia, and between Russia and the West that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union and eventually resulted in Russia's invasion in 2022. Proceeding chronologically, this book shows how Ukraine's separation from Russia in 1991, at the time called a "civilized divorce," led to Europe's most violent conflict since World War II. It argues the conflict came about because of three underlying factors – the security dilemma, the impact of democratization on geopolitics, and the incompatible goals of a post-Cold War Europe. Rather than a peaceful situation that was squandered, D'Anieri argues that these were deep-seated, preexisting disagreements that could not be bridged, with concerning implications for the prospects of resolution of the Ukraine conflict.

Paul D'Anieri is a Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of California, Riverside. He is author of *Understanding Ukrainian Politics* (2007) and *Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian–Russian Relations* (1999), as well as a widely-used textbook on international politics.

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From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War

Second Edition

Paul D'Anieri

University of California, Riverside



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Preface

The first edition of this book, published in 2019, aimed to explain Russia's annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014. When Russia massively escalated its invasion in February 2022, readers turned to the book to understand the background for the conflict. I have been very gratified by the response. However, that narrative stopped in early 2015, and the question on everyone's mind was why did Russia launch the much larger invasion of 2022. The need for a new edition, updated to cover the developments leading up to this new invasion, was self-evident.

Two practical problems arose in writing this revised edition. The first comes with writing about a war that is still raging. The narrative stops roughly in August 2022, when a great deal remained to be determined. While this is not satisfying, the goal of the book is primarily to account for how Ukraine and Russia came to all-out war, not to predict how it might end. The new Chapter 8 covers the period from 2015 to 2021, which sets the stage for the attack of 2022. It asks why Russia decided that maintaining the status quo was not a better strategy than going to war.

The new Chapter 9 begins in 2021 with the crisis that began when western intelligence agencies began reporting Russia's preparations for war and continues through the first six months of the war. While I cannot foresee the future, there is plenty to discuss about the decision to launch the war, the initial course of it, and the reaction in Russia, Ukraine, the West, and around the world. Why did Putin choose war? Why did Ukraine prove so resilient?

The new conclusion (Chapter 10) reconsiders themes from the first edition concerning the long-term sources of the war, while also addressing of the implications of the escalation of 2022. While much will be determined by events on the battlefield, some consequences of the invasion are already clear and in need of analysis.

The second challenge in writing this edition is deciding how the invasions of 2014 and 2022 relate to one another. In many respects, they are part of the same war, but they represent two distinct invasions. Do they

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fit a single historical arc such that a single explanation captures both events, or do they require distinct explanations? This comes up particularly in Chapter 9, when I consider the argument that the 2022 invasion was driven primarily by factors at the individual level, in the psychology of Vladimir Putin, or at the level of his closest advisors. This sort of explanation did not feature in the first edition.

The question of the locus and the rationality of Russia's decision to enlarge the war in 2022 relates to another theme. In contrast to 2014, where there were identifiable events that triggered Russia's invasion (which is not to say that it was justifiable), the war in 2022 was more clearly a war of choice. There was neither a clear opportunity nor an impending loss to explain the decision to go to war. That is why it surprised so many observers. Moreover, the scale of the aggression, the brutality of war crimes, and the viciousness of the rhetoric makes it much easier to attribute the war in 2022 simply to primordial Russian aggression, in contrast to the multi-causal account the first edition provided regarding 2014.

This leads to the question of whether one should read the current assessment of Russia's aggression backward into the analysis of the preceding 30 years or read the earlier assessment, which focuses on multiple sources of the conflict, forward into 2022. I have chosen to do neither. While I have edited the first seven chapters of the book, largely for clarity and to make room for added material, I have not rewritten my analysis of the long-term dynamics of the relationship. Nor have I avoided attributing the war of 2022 to a clear decision by Russia to attack Ukraine with the goal of subjugating it. That means that the invasion of 2022 is explained slightly differently than that of 2014. Both were the results of long-term incompatibilities of goals and norms, exacerbated by the nature of international politics. But if Russia's invasion of 2014 was based on a mixture of fear and opportunism, that of 2022 seems more based on a straightforward calculation, rational or not, that Russia could attain its goals by force and only by force. Thanks to the suggestions of reviewers, I have added a bibliography, while retaining page-by-page footnotes, which I believe are most useful to the reader. I have also added a list of major leaders, which should aid the non-specialist reader with the many names in the book. I am grateful to Raymond Finch III and to Emily Channel-Justice and her students at the Harvard Ukrainian Summer Institute, who provided valuable feedback on the new chapters.

Acknowledgments

I could not have written this book without the support of generous institutions, colleagues, and friends.

In the fall of 2017, I was fortunate to hold the Eugene and Daymel Shklar Research Fellowship in Ukrainian Studies at Harvard University. I am grateful to the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and its director, Serhii Plokyh, for providing an ideal environment in which to develop the project. Oleh Kotsyuba and George Grabowicz encouraged me to concentrate my thoughts in an article for *Krytyka*.

Early versions of the overall argument were presented at seminars at Harvard University, Syracuse University, Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, George Washington University, and at the Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt, Oslo. The discussions in these meetings were valuable as I refined my analysis. I thank Kristina Conroy, Audie Klotz, Pavlo Kutuev and Volodymyr Ishchenko, Peter Rollberg and Henry Hale, and Tor Bukvoll for arranging these visits.

For many years, Taras Kuzio has been generous in sharing his views and helping me make contacts in Kyiv. Eugene Fishel, Serhiy Kudelia, Henry Hale, and Volodymyr Ischenko, as well as two anonymous reviewers, read drafts of the first edition manuscript and provided insightful comments. Their detailed suggestions have helped me sharpen the argument in some places, to add nuance in others, and to avoid some factual errors. Perhaps unwisely, I have not taken all of their advice, and I am solely to blame for the shortcomings that remain.

The University of California, Riverside, provided research funding as well as a release from administrative and teaching duties.

I am especially grateful to a great group of friends who supported me through a difficult time. Over many sets of tennis, countless meals, and adventures in Europe, they have brought me immeasurable joy and wisdom, and I dedicate this book to them. Grateful Eight, this is for you!

xii Acknowledgments

Above all, I have to recognize the inspiration I receive from my wife, Laura. She cannot have imagined when we met that twenty-five years later, I would still be writing and talking about Ukraine and Russia. If she is tired of it, she hides it well. Her encouragement has sustained me at every stage of this project.



Map 0.1 Ukraine, showing areas occupied by Russia as of January 2022

Key People

- Akhmetov, Rinat – Ukrainian oligarch identified with the Party of Regions.
- Aksyonov, Sergei – separatist leader of Crimea.
- Azarov, Nikolai – Prime Minister of Ukraine, 2010–2014; Minister of Finance 2002–2005.
- Chernomyrdin, Viktor – Prime Minister of Russia, 1992–1998; Ambassador to Ukraine, 2001–2008.
- Glazyev, Sergei – Head of Russia's Customs Union Commission; advisor to Putin on Ukraine.
- Gorbachev, Mikhail – General Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1985–1991.
- Karaganov, Sergei – Russian political scientist, Head of Council on Foreign and Defense Policy.
- Klitschko, Vitaliy – Ukrainian opposition party leader, Mayor of Kyiv, former boxing champion.
- Kolomoisky, Ihor – Ukrainian oligarch; governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, 2014–2016.
- Kozyrev, Andrei – Foreign Minister of Russia, 1992–1996.
- Kravchuk, Leonid – President of Ukraine, 1991–1994.
- Kuchma, Leonid – President of Ukraine, 1994–2004; Prime Minister of Ukraine, 1992–1993.
- Kwaśniewski, Aleksander – President of Poland, 1995–2005; EU envoy on Ukraine, 2012–2013.
- Lavrov, Sergei – Foreign Minister of Russia, 2004–; Russian Ambassador to the UN, 1994–2004.
- Lukyanov, Fyodor – Chairman, Russian Council for Foreign and Defense Policy.
- Macron, Emmanuel – President of France, 2017–.
- Medvedchuk, Viktor – Ukrainian pro-Russian oligarch; confidant of Vladimir Putin.
- Medvedev, Dmitry – President of Russia 2008–2012; Prime Minister of Russia, 2012–2020.

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Merkel, Angela – Chancellor of Germany, 2005–2021.

Migranyan, Andranik – advisor to Boris Yeltsin.

Moroz, Oleksandr – leader of the Socialist Party of Ukraine; Chair, Verkhovna Rada, 2006–2007.

Navalny, Alexei – Russian anti-corruption activist; imprisoned since 2021.

Poroshenko, Petro – President of Ukraine, 2014–2019.

Primakov, Yevgeniy – Prime Minister of Russia, 1998–1999; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1996–1998.

Putin, Vladimir – President of Russia, 2000–2008; 2012–; Prime Minister 1999, 2008–2012.

Scholz, Olaf – Chancellor of Germany, 2021–.

Schröder, Gerhard – Chancellor of Germany, 1998–2005; Head of Nord Stream Board, 2006–.

Tarasiuk, Borys – Ukrainian Foreign Minister, 1998–2000; 2005–2007.

Tihipko, Serhiy – Ukrainian politician, Vice Prime Minister, 2010–2012.

Turchynov, Oleksandr – Acting President of Ukraine, 2014.

Tymoshenko, Yuliya – Prime Minister of Ukraine, 2005, 2007–2010.

Yanukovych, Viktor – President of Ukraine 2010–2014; Prime Minister 2002–2005, 2006–2007.

Yatseniuk, Arseniy – Prime Minister of Ukraine, 2014–2016.

Yeltsin, Boris – President of Russia, 1990–1999.

Yushchenko, Viktor – President of Ukraine, 2005–2010; Prime Minister, 1999–2001.

Zakharchenko, Alexander – separatist leader of Donetsk People's Republic, 2014–2018.

Zelenskyy, Volodymyr – President of Ukraine, 2019–.

Zhirinovskiy, Vladimir – Head of Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

Zlenko, Anatoliy – Foreign Minister of Ukraine, 1991–1994, 2000–2003.