

INTRODUCTION: THE ORIGINS AND CHANGING AGENDAS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Richard Devetak

Introduction

This Introduction begins by outlining what is meant by international relations. It then tells the story of how and why the academic study of international relations emerged in the early twentieth century. Knowing something about the origins of the **discipline** tells us little about international relations today, but it does help us to understand the legacy left by the discipline's original purpose and by older traditions of thought. Following this, we consider the need to 'globalise' the study of international relations – to make it an academic discipline that is more open to non-Western perspectives. The chapter then sketches the changing agenda of international relations – a shift that some scholars describe as a transition from international relations to world politics, or from the 'traditional' to the 'new' agenda. Although there can be little doubt that as political reality has changed new theoretical tools have become necessary to grasp its new form, we should not assume that the myriad changes to our world have rendered the 'traditional' agenda obsolete. As we shall see, the 'new' agenda supplements but does not supplant the 'traditional' agenda. It is now more important than ever to consider the relationships between 'traditional' and 'new' agendas, and to globalise International Relations.

Discipline: A branch of learning focused on a relatively distinct subject matter, including a distinctive focus, set of institutions and traditions of thought.

What are international relations?

Every day the global news media carry stories of events involving foreign governments and their populations. Usually featured under the heading of 'international affairs' or 'world news', these stories all too frequently tell of political violence, lives and livelihoods lost, human rights violated, countries invaded and occupied, cities turned to rubble and hopes for **peace** and prosperity dashed. **War**, terrorism and political upheaval, rather than peace, make the news headlines. 'If it bleeds, it leads', as the cynical media adage goes.

Peace: Most simply, it is the absence of war. This definition has been found wanting because it says nothing about the positive requirements of peace, which are usually thought to include justice and basic human needs, among other things.

War: Organised political violence or armed conflict – the opposite of peace. As it is conventionally understood, war involves two armed forces, but the term is also used to cover asymmetrical wars where an official armed force confronts an unofficial force of insurgents, guerrillas or terrorists.

However, human societies are harmed by so much more than war. Chronic under-development, poverty, health pandemics, political repression, racism and other human rights violations, environmental degradation and climate change are no less harmful, even if they are sometimes less visible. Occasionally, however, the plight of the world's impoverished populations becomes headline news when famines occur or natural disasters such as droughts, earthquakes, floods, tsunamis or avalanches strike, compounding already fragile or disadvantaged societies. Sympathies will be aroused in faraway places, and celebrities, humanitarian organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the United Nations (UN) and canny politicians will talk the talk of collective grief, human community and global responsibility. Excitement will die down after a flurry of activity and the poor souls who have been impacted will inevitably be cast back to the margins of international attention. So goes the daily round of international relations: war and peace, poverty and under-development, global attention and global neglect.

This commonsense understanding of international relations only scratches the surface of all that the discipline of International Relations (IR) covers (see Box 0.1). So what precisely do we mean by 'international relations'? To answer this question, let us first say a few things about what it is not, before turning to an account of what it is.

First, the study of international relations is not to be equated with 'current affairs'. It is important not to reduce international relations to the lead stories of the global news media. News, by its nature, is ephemeral: each day brings a new story. Moreover, news agencies

TERMINOLOGY BOX 0.1

What are the differences between International Relations and international relations, and international politics and world politics?

It is conventional to differentiate the discipline of International Relations from the subject matter of international relations by the use of upper- and lower-case letters. As Chris Brown (1997: 3) puts it, '"International Relations" (upper case) is the study of "international relations" (lower case)'.

The term *international politics* is used here as a synonym of international relations. It does, however, have the advantage of highlighting the political dimension of relations and systems that are international.

Insofar as new actors, issues, structures and processes are thought to have emerged in recent decades as a result of globalisation, rendering the traditional state-focused agenda incomplete, some scholars prefer the terms *world politics* or *global politics* to 'international relations'. This has prompted some scholars to talk of a historic shift from 'international relations' to 'world politics' or 'global society' (Barnett and Sikkink 2008; Walker 1995).

make no attempt at drawing connections between stories. Their concern is not with showing how the stories relate to each other, so each news item is reported independently of others. International Relations (the academic study of international relations), by contrast, seeks to go beyond the ephemeral and common sense to reflect more deeply on events, structures, processes and actors, and to offer explanations, interpretations and **normative** analyses. Second, the study of international relations is not reducible to what happens in particular countries, even though it may include this. Political machinations in other countries – especially powerful ones – always hold particular interest; politics in Washington is never far from the headlines. In IR, though, any interest in the politics of other countries will be determined by how these impact on or play out in the international sphere or how they are shaped by international forces. Third, IR is not reducible to foreign policy analysis, although once again it includes this within its scope (see Waltz 1979: 121–2 for one explanation).

Normative: An adjective referring to the moral quality of something. For example, normative theories of international relations are concerned primarily with posing moral questions of actors or assessing the moral justification and evaluation of structures and processes.

Turning to a more positive definition of international relations, we can start by saying that it refers to *external relations among nations, states, empires and peoples* – although, as we explain below, this statement will need to be considerably qualified. The adjective 'international' was coined by the English political philosopher Jeremy Bentham in 1780. The neologism's purpose was to capture the concept of *relations among nations* in a single word (Suganami 1978). Although 'international' literally means relations among nations, it has for most of its existence referred to relations among states, and has been counterposed to *domestic* politics (see Devetak and Dunne 2024). Ian Clark (1999) calls this the 'Great Divide' (see Table 0.1).

For decades, leading scholars have defined international relations by opposing the international and domestic realms as if they represented a 'Great Divide'. The most influential realist IR theorist of the late twentieth century, Kenneth Waltz (1979: 103), remarked that the 'difference between national and international politics lies not in the use of force but in the different modes of organization for doing something about it'. What, then, are the

Table 0.1 The 'Great Divide'

Domestic	International
Inside	Outside
Hierarchy	Anarchy
Monopoly over instruments of violence	Decentralised instruments of violence
Lawful authority	Self-help
Security	Insecurity/security dilemma
Justice	Power
Community	Friends and enemies
Peace and order	War

possible modes of organisation? Waltz offered two – and only two – organising principles: **hierarchy** and **anarchy**. Relations between units (or actors) are either *hierarchical*, involving clear lines of authority and obedience, or *anarchical*, involving no such lines of authority and obedience (Waltz 1979: 88). There would appear to be no other possibilities. The key, according to Waltz, is governance. Is there a supreme authority, with the right to lay down and enforce the law? If the answer is 'yes', then we must be in the hierarchical realm of domestic politics – politics *within* the state. If the answer is 'no', then we must be in the anarchical realm of international relations – politics *between* states. In any case, the presumed differences between domestic and international politics seem to vindicate Martin Wight's (1966: 21) observation that it 'has become natural to think of international politics as the untidy fringe of domestic politics'. I shall suggest below that while it has indeed become natural to think in these terms, there may be good reasons to cast doubt over the 'Great Divide' as the point of departure for IR today.

Hierarchy: The structured differentiation of rank and authority. In the study of international relations, hierarchy is often opposed to anarchy.

Anarchy: The absence of rule or government. In international relations, it does not mean disorder and chaos.

According to the 'Great Divide', domestic politics take place on the *inside* of states, whereas international relations take place on the *outside*, as if they were two mutually exclusive realms. Domestic politics are premised on the presence of a central authority or government that has monopoly control over the instruments of violence, that can lay down and enforce the law, that establishes and maintains **order** and security, and that permits justice and peace to be delivered to the community of citizens. International relations are the negative image of domestic politics. In contrast to the domestic realm, the international realm is premised on the absence of an overarching authority or government that can lay down and enforce the law because the instruments of violence are decentralised. Injustice and war are thus permanent potentials and regular actualities for states, where states cannot afford to put their trust in others. States are trapped in a 'security dilemma', whereby measures taken to enhance their security lead others to take similar countermeasures and in the process generate further mistrust and insecurity.

Order: A sustained pattern of social arrangements. Order should not be confused with peace or stability. Peace is a particular order whereby the pattern of social arrangements excludes war. But, unlike peace and war, order and war are not mutually exclusive conditions. Order is also distinguishable from stability because stability and instability are properties of order. That is, orders may be more or less stable or unstable.

Perhaps the term that distinguishes international relations more than any other is *anarchy*. Meaning the absence of rule – but not necessarily disorder and chaos – anarchy has been the core presumption and constitutive principle for much of the discipline's history (Onuf 1989: 166; Schmidt 1998). Richard Ashley (1989) calls IR the 'anarchy problematique' – a field of knowledge revolving around the organising principle of anarchy.

International Relations as a discipline: Traditions, origins and evolution

Universities have long divided knowledge into different disciplines, a division meant to facilitate learning. A discipline comprises a distinctive focus, a set of institutions and traditions of thought. All three are crucial to the development and growth of a field or body of knowledge. 'Discipline' also has another, not altogether unrelated, meaning: to bring under control, train to obedience, maintain order. Disciplines thus maintain intellectual order by holding certain subjects in focus.

First, a discipline carves out a branch of learning focused on a relatively distinct subject matter, although these often can appear arbitrary. For example, where do we draw the boundaries between international politics, international ethics, international law and international economics? Nevertheless, if a discipline implies a subject matter relatively distinguishable from others, it must have questions and topics it calls its own. Some disagreement about the scope of a discipline is to be expected, but there will always be dominant tendencies – questions and topics that occupy the thought and research of most students and scholars. These will define the discipline at any given moment, but there will always be other questions and topics that are neglected or ignored by the mainstream.

Second, disciplines grow within institutions and grow their own institutions. Universities are the most obvious sites for the institutionalisation of the research and teaching of particular subjects, but they are not alone, as we shall see. Departments, schools or centres have been established in universities around the world to study international relations. The first was established in 1919 at the University of Wales, in the seaside town of Aberystwyth, when Welsh industrialist and philanthropist David Davies established the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics. The London School of Economics and the University of Oxford followed shortly afterwards, with the establishment of chairs in 1924 and 1930 respectively. The institutionalised study of IR in the United States began with the establishment of Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service in 1919, followed by the University of Southern California's School of International Relations in 1924. In Switzerland, the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva was established in 1927, becoming the first university dedicated to the study of international relations.

In the United States, the study of international relations generally remained a sub-field of Political Science (Schmidt 2002: 6). Brian Schmidt (1998) has shown that much of the discipline's early formation in America grew out of late nineteenth century inquiries into colonial administration and national imperialism. In his path-breaking *White World Order, Black Power Politics*, Robert Vitalis (2015) shows how race and race subjection were major preoccupations of the early twentieth-century discipline of American IR. This entailed the exclusion of African American scholars like Ralph Bunche, head of what Vitalis (2015) calls the 'Howard School' of IR (see Figure 0.1). Pioneering historical research has also been conducted to reveal the extensive writing and activism of women in the emerging discipline of IR (Hutchings and Owens 2021; Tickner and True 2018). Much of this work was marginalised, ignored or considered extraneous to the main concerns of the emergent discipline, resulting in a highly gendered construction of International Relations. Intellectual historians are now recovering formative works by Black and female intellectuals that were hitherto neglected. Disciplines, it should be noted, are not without their politics; nor are they without their exclusions and amnesia.



Figure 0.1 The 'Howard School's' Ralph Bunche, Head of the Department of Political Science, Howard University

The institutionalisation of academic areas of study provides housing for teaching and research, both of which are crucial. Teaching passes on knowledge and modes of analysis from one generation to the next in the classroom. Research, of course, needs to be published, so findings and analyses can be widely disseminated and tested – not only from one generation to the next but with contemporary teachers and students as well. Research practices and publishing reproduce and refine a discipline's body of knowledge.

Third, a discipline draws upon traditions of thought that have developed and evolved around the subject matter. The study of international relations did not begin in 1919. When departments were being established, scholars and students were not inventing a discipline out of thin air; they had over two millennia of recorded words, thoughts and actions to draw upon. Thucydides (c. 460–406 BCE), Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) and Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), for example, may not have taught in universities but they wrote about the actors and events that shaped the 'international relations' – as we now call it – of their day.

Care must be taken here because the actors and events they analysed are vastly different to those that now animate international relations. Moreover, none of these canonical thinkers limited themselves to the external relations of actors, whether city-states, empires or sovereign states. Indeed, it is closer to the truth to say that they discussed what we would call international relations either indirectly or only in occasional passages of their canonical texts. We need to be careful when discussing the past not to commit the historical sin of *anachronism* – discussing one historical epoch in terms of language, concepts and understandings borrowed from another. In other words, we risk anachronism when we speak of these great thinkers as contributors to IR or as adhering to one of our modern traditions of thought because, in fact, they did not neatly distinguish international relations from domestic politics, or international law or ethics, in the way the discipline of IR has done since its inception. Their thinking was not underpinned by the 'Great Divide', the 'anarchy problematique' or the categories of realism and liberalism.

Idealism: A theory of international relations whose chief purpose is to eradicate war. Flourishing after World War I, it embraced the Enlightenment and liberal values of peace and progress, believing that peace could be achieved through collective security arrangements, respect for the rule of law and greater interdependence.

Traditions of thought

What are the traditions of thought that have influenced the study of international relations? How one answers this question depends on which classificatory scheme one uses, and there are several such schemes. After World War II, the dominant classificatory scheme was of **idealism** or liberalism on the one hand and realism on the other (see Table 0.2); this was how

E.H. Carr (2016) presented the field of study. Arguably this scheme still dominates the discipline today in the United States. It is vital to come to grips with these two dominant IR theories, as they have largely set the parameters of the discipline, shaping its core assumptions and key questions.

Table 0.2 Realism and liberalism compared

Characteristic	Realism	Liberalism
Main actor	States	Individuals
Contextual focus	Anarchy	Institutions
Fundamental value	Security/power	Liberty
Elemental behaviour	Conflict	Cooperation
Outlook	Pessimism	Optimism
View of history	Recurrence and repetition	Progressive change

Realists argue that states exist in a condition of anarchy that compels them to seek and to balance **power** to ensure their survival and security (see Chapter 3). They paint international relations as a tragic realm of **power politics**, where national interests clash and moral claims hold little sway. For realists, the fundamental character of international relations remains unchanged through history. Marked by what Kenneth Waltz (1979: 66) calls 'a dismaying persistence' of war, international relations is, in Wight's (1966: 26) words, 'the realm of recurrence and repetition'. Thucydides, the great Athenian historian of *The Peloponnesian War*, Niccolò Machiavelli, the brilliant Florentine civil servant, diplomat and writer, and Thomas Hobbes, the towering English political philosopher, are canonical names in realism's hall of fame. They not only provided insight into their own times, but also offered wisdom and insight that realists believe transcend time. In the realist view, if Thucydides or Hobbes were transported to our own time, they would observe nothing different other than the names of the actors (Waltz 1979: 66; Wight 1966: 26).

Liberals take a more optimistic view. If realists see history as static or cyclical, liberals see it as progressive. They tend to emphasise humanity's capacity to improve: they are committed to ideals of technological and economic as well as moral, legal and political progress (see Chapter 2). That the world is anarchical and war-prone is as true for liberals as it is for realists, but the former believe it is possible and necessary for humankind to escape the **Hobbesian** 'state of war' – a condition in which states are insecure and constantly preparing for war. Strategies of 'peace through law' and 'peace through commerce' are the dominant liberal approaches. In international relations they see the gradual development and strengthening of international trade, international law and international organisations as the key to world order (Suganami 1989). Names in the liberal pantheon include great English political philosophers John Locke and John Stuart Mill, and the German philosopher Immanuel Kant.

Others have posited a tripartite scheme. One of the most common is the tripartite scheme of realism, liberalism and Marxism, or variations thereof (Doyle 1997; Holsti 1985;

Power: Classically defined as the ability to get an actor to do what they would otherwise not do. This is power in the sense of domination or power over others. But power can also be thought of in terms of capability or power to do or act. Realist theories hold the belief that international relations are a constant struggle for power, usually defined in materials terms.

Power politics: A nickname given to hard-nosed realist policies because of the great emphasis realists place on the struggle for power.

Hobbesian: An adjective describing a perspective on international relations influenced by the work of political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). He emphasised the political importance of state sovereignty and the need for states to be prepared to use threats and force to achieve security. He is thought to have likened international relations to a 'state of war', a lawless, insecure and conflict-ridden condition that he described as a 'war of all against all'.

Walt 1998). This extends and complicates the realism/liberalism debate by adding a Marxist tradition of thought. This tradition shifted emphasis away from states to the historical development of the capitalist system and the class conflict it generated (see Kubálková and Cruickshank 1985; Linklater 1990). It redirected the focus to an examination of how the twin logics of capitalist development and geopolitical rivalry interacted. It is worth noting here that Marxism played a vital role in stimulating the Critical Theory pioneered by Robert Cox (1981) and Andrew Linklater (1990) because Marx critically analysed the tensions between hopes of universal freedom and concrete realities of inequality and oppression (see Chapter 4).

In his famous lectures at the London School of Economics (LSE) in the 1950s, Martin Wight (1991) also distinguished three traditions of thought, but rather eccentrically called them realism, **rationalism** and **revolutionism** (also see Bull 1976). If realism was the tradition associated with power politics and 'the blood and iron and immorality men', as Wight called them (Bull 1976: 104), revolutionism was associated with the perpetual peace of liberal internationalism *and* the revolutionary internationalism of Marxism – 'the subversion and liberation and missionary men'. Rationalism was a 'middle way' that sought to avoid the extremes of realism and revolutionism. It is a tradition of thought most closely associated with seventeenth-century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius and eighteenth-century Swiss lawyer Emer de Vattel – 'the law and order and keep your word men', to use Wight's (1991) description (Bull 1976: 104). Rationalists accept the realist premise that states exist in a condition of anarchy (where no state has the authority to lay down and enforce the law), but deny that this condition is bereft of rules and **norms**. Rather, they argue that, to use the felicitous phrase of Wight's foremost protégé, Hedley Bull (1977), states exist in an 'anarchical society'. States tend to form international societies where order is maintained through mechanisms such as international law, diplomacy, balances of power, **great power** management and occasionally war (Bull 1977; see also Chapter 17). This 'middle way' continues today under the name of the English School (see Linklater and Suganami 2006) and has some affinities with neoliberal **institutionalism** (Hurrell 1995).

Rationalism: In the United States, this term is most commonly used to refer to theories employing positivist methods, in contrast to reflectivism. Elsewhere, rationalism is sometimes used – by Martin Wight (1977), for example – to refer to Grotianism.

Revolutionism: A tradition of thought committed to the cosmopolitan ideal of realising the moral and political community of humankind. It often possesses a missionary character and is committed to the revolutionary transformation of international order.

Norms: Moral standards or expectations.

Great power: A state possessing, and seen to possess, multiple dimensions of power and its sources, including military, political, economic, ideological, territorial, natural resources and people.

Institutionalism: The view that institutions (both formal and informal sets of rules and norms) matter in international relations by setting standards, shaping expectations, constraining behaviour and establishing patterns of interaction.

Needless to say, there are various classificatory schemes. What matters is not so much the historical veracity of the scheme as the analytical tools it serves up. We have to depart from somewhere, so we start with what the competing traditions leave to us. But traditions are not given and homogeneous. They are 'invented', which is not to say that traditions are false or arbitrarily fabricated, only that the inheritance must be selected and interpreted before it can be received.

Traditions are also heterogeneous, comprising multiple strands and legacies. What we believe they leave to us depends on how we sift through, select and interpret the tradition's inheritance (see Box 0.2). As Jim George (1994: 196) rightly points out, 'the "great texts" of International Relations can be read in ways entirely contrary to their ritualized disciplinary treatment'. Which is why IR has in recent years witnessed an 'historiographical turn' (Armitage 2013; Ashworth 1999, Bell 2001) – reflecting on the aims and methods of writing history, particularly intellectual history or the history of ideas. In keeping with the historiographical turn, this Introduction – as well as the book as a whole – aims to encourage and cultivate what Herbert Butterfield (1955: 17) calls 'historical-mindedness'. To summarise, traditions of thought are never as internally coherent or self-enclosed as they appear.

DISCUSSION POINTS BOX 0.2

Was Thucydides a realist?

As an illustration of how traditions depend on interpretation, consider the tendency of realists and others to assign Thucydides uncritically to the realist tradition. Behind this assignation lies the supposition that the realist tradition is centred around the concept of material or military power and that Thucydides is a realist *par excellence*. The one episode in his account of the Peloponnesian War that is always invoked is 'The Melian Dialogue'. According to Thucydides' (1972: 402) narrative, the Athenian envoy says to his Melian counterpart, 'The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.' Captured in this remark is one of the most powerful expressions of realism's emphasis on material power determining international outcomes – which is why Thucydides is viewed as the first great realist. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that Thucydides subscribes to this realist view, since he is simply retelling the story. In fact, much else in his narrative suggests that Thucydides would be out of place in the realist tradition, not least because he places a good deal of emphasis on normative standards for assessing conduct and moral responsibility. We can conclude, therefore, that how traditions are understood and who is included in them are indeed matters of selection and interpretation.

Origins and evolution of the discipline

The origins of the discipline cannot be reduced to a single source, but there can be little doubt that one historical moment precipitated its institutional establishment: World War I (1914–18), also known as the Great War. It was the most intense and mechanised war yet experienced, with new technologies allowing for new depths of destruction to be reached. The scale of suffering and carnage prompted calls for the eradication of war; it was often referred to as the 'War to End All Wars'. The traumatic experience of the Great War for Europeans was perhaps compounded by the fact that the years preceding it were relatively peaceful and stable, although not for the colonised peoples of Africa and Asia (see Du Bois 1925). In particular, significant strides were taken regarding the laws of war with the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, as well as the growth of peace movements, both of which seemed to vindicate liberal optimism for international reform (see Addams 1907; Angell 1912).

After the war, an understandable tide of anti-war sentiment surged through Europe. As an instrument of foreign policy, war appeared to many to be ineffective and counterproductive (see Addams 1915). We might think such sentiments are a natural reaction to war, but until the eighteenth century, while war had always been lamented, it was rarely viewed as eradicable. This is why English jurist Sir Henry Maine (cited in Howard 2001: 1) observed in the middle of the nineteenth century, 'War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention'. It was only with the initiation of 'plans for perpetual peace' in the eighteenth century, drafted most famously by the Abbé Saint Pierre and Immanuel Kant, that thinkers put their minds to determining how peace might permanently prevail over war in a system of states.

To this sentiment were added practical, institutional measures in the immediate post-war period, including the establishment of the League of Nations at Geneva in 1920 and, in accordance with the League's Covenant, the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague in 1922 (originally the Permanent Court of Arbitration, as established under the 1899 Hague Conference). According to Chris Reus-Smit (1999), a new *legislative* principle of procedural justice emerged at this time, which found concrete expression in these new institutions. Two precepts informed this new legislative justice: 'first, that only those subject to the rules have the right to define them and, second, that the rules of society must apply equally to all' (1999: 129). It was only in the aftermath of the Great War that a new diplomatic and legal order took shape based on contractual international law and multilateralism. The war not only marked a break with the previous peace; it brought about a different kind of peace, one where permanent international institutions were designed 'to promote international co-operation and to achieve peace and security', as expressed in the League of Nations Covenant (in Claude 1964: 409).

This is the general international context in which the academic discipline of International Relations was established (see Chapter 10). It was a period of progressive institutionalisation of liberal-constitutional principles as a reaction to war. This 'desire … to prevent future wars', says William Olson (1972: 12), 'must never be forgotten' when assessing the discipline's origins. More than just the study of the causes and conditions of war and peace, from the outset the study of international relations was guided by a purpose: to develop intellectual tools aimed at preventing or eliminating war. Liberals such as Sir Norman Angell and US President Woodrow Wilson believed that a lasting peace could only be achieved by overcoming the balance of power and secret diplomacy; they argued for the development of a new diplomatic and legal order around international organisations based on practices of collective security and open diplomacy (see Ashworth 1999; Woodrow Wilson 1918). 'The distinctive characteristic of these writers', says Hedley Bull (1972: 34), was their belief in progress,

> the belief, in particular that the system of international relations that had given rise to the First World War was capable of being transformed into a fundamentally more peaceful and just world order; that under the impact of the awakening of democracy, the growth of 'the international mind', the development of the League of Nations, the good works of men of peace or the enlightenment spread by their own teachings, it was in fact being transformed.

Liberal-constitutional values and global ideals thus set the agenda for the discipline in the middle decades of the twentieth century (Rosenboim 2017), the agenda against which E.H. Carr and other realists aimed their withering criticism (Guilhot 2017; Specter 2022).

Carr's (2016) *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939* has had a massive influence on the discipline of International Relations. Carr's book is a brilliant polemical attack on the liberal thinking associated with Angell, Wilson, Alfred Zimmern and others, which he characterised as a hollow sham (2016: 84). Carr believed utopianism (for which liberalism can be substituted) utterly failed to take account of power in its analysis of international relations; it ignored Machiavelli's injunction to deal with what *is* the case, rather than what *ought to be* the case (2016: 62). The structure of Carr's masterpiece revolves around the dichotomy between realism and liberalism. In fact, he helped to create the impression that the newly established discipline was dominated by a debate between realism and liberalism. This subsequently became known