

Introduction *Humanising Hegel*

As concerns the individual, each is in any case a *child of its time*; so too is philosophy *its time comprehended in thought*.

G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*

Just over two hundred years ago, in the autumn of 1820, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel published what subsequently became one of the most contentious books in the history of political thought. This recent anniversary of the *Philosophy of Right*, together with Hegel's 250th birthday, is an especially opportune moment to reflect anew on the book and its author. With his name invoked ubiquitously and incessantly, Hegel is more often treated as our own contemporary, or indeed as a kind of philosophical spirit hovering above the tides of time, than an actual human being who lived around the turn of the nineteenth century. My suggestion, in brief, is that we might do well to humanise this towering figure in the history of philosophy in greater measure than tends to happen and to remember that both form and content of the notorious *Philosophy of Right* were subject to an indispensable measure of contingency. This study aims to demonstrate how a situated analysis of Hegel's political thought, drawing on a wide variety of contemporary sources, enables a better understanding of his arguments and what he was trying to do in relation to the issues of his age.

Hegel, who was born in 1770 and died in 1831, lived in tumultuous times, overshadowed by the French Revolution and all its multifarious repercussions, and to think of his life as uneventful is positively misleading. Whenever he is treated as an obscure intellectual, Hegel's own experience of war, the crumbling of empire and the establishment of new states, which all deeply impacted his thinking, is too easily forgotten. Time and again, his writings and speeches reflect an acute awareness of the radical nature of ongoing changes. As he remarked in early 1807, just after Napoleon's troops had occupied his Jena home, 'it is not difficult to see

that our time is a time of birth and transition to a new era'.¹ Apart from all other ambitions, Hegel especially wanted to comprehend and render comprehensible his own time, and the central premise underlying my work is that we can hardly begin to make sense of Hegel's thinking without some knowledge of its historical context.

In particular, this book makes the case for reading G. W. F. Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* from 1820 as a pertinent contribution to the public debate on the constitutional question in post-Napoleonic Germany. It shows how Hegel's work addressed contemporary political concerns, engaging with both a German and broader European debate about how best to ensure government addressed the common good of society in the changed social and political climate brought about by the French Revolution and the development of commercial society. In the process, I hope to humanise a thinker with a notorious reputation for obscurity and to unearth the ideas of a number of lesser-known contemporaries, thereby drawing attention to previously overlooked connections and parallels as well as alternatives. Hegel constitutes the biographical centre of gravity, a kind of prism through which I approach early nineteenth-century discussions about government and representation. In providing a new interpretation of Hegel's vision of politics in the light of his intervention in contemporary debate, my work thus contributes to a history of thinking about the state and its organisation in early nineteenth-century Germany and beyond.

This book's title is inspired by a term used by contemporaries and Hegel himself, *repräsentative Verfassung* or *Repräsentativverfassung*.² While attempts at precise definition were undertaken, these constituted no more than bids for the prerogative of interpretation, and the exploration of that struggle lies at the heart of this work. At the most basic level, 'representative constitution' expresses the demand for some form of popular participation in government. In this sense, it corresponds to 'representative government' or 'representative system', a term that is more common and intuitive nowadays, in English as in German (*Repräsentativsystem*). Yet these expressions leave the concomitant claim unstated – the very need for a constitution, which warranted explicit emphasis at a time that saw the first wave of constitutionalisation in Central Europe. Both components of

¹ *GW*9, 14; preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Cf. 'Rede vom 30. August 1815' in *GW*10, 1.

² Hegel embraces the term without hesitation in his 1817 article on the Württemberg Estates (*LW*, 30, 33). In the later (and textually less secure) *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, his mention of it is more ambivalent (*VPG*, 67).

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the title-giving term are thus equally important in capturing the single greatest political demand of the age. In the general sense given here, Hegel undoubtedly embraced this demand and, in distinctive fashion, accommodated it in the *Philosophy of Right*. It is the exploration of Hegel's characteristic contribution to the discourse on the representative constitution that occupies the following pages.

As such, this book presents the first comprehensive historical discussion of the institutional dimension of Hegel's political thought. Sceptical of the arrangements favoured by Hegel (which include monarchy, an unusual separation of powers and an idiosyncratic system of representation, to name a few), most commentators have preferred to skip these specifics and to focus instead on what has been described as 'the *broadly Hegelian state*'.³ Even if we ultimately reject Hegel's institutional choices, however, we will benefit from understanding them more closely in the historical context of his own time. By recovering the actual constitutional debates in which Hegel participated, the specificity of his commitments will be clarified and his concrete institutional choices become more transparent. Such increased scrutiny and consideration of the original context of Hegel's book will provide the necessary groundwork for the renewed appreciation of the force of his ideas as well as their continued relevance, or otherwise. It is thus of genuine philosophical as well as historical interest, encouraging critical reflection on ideas and ideals of government and representation today.

Metaphysics, Polemics and Debate

There is broad consensus that Hegel's thought is still highly relevant. While it was long common to admit that his logic, the cornerstone of his speculative philosophy, was obsolete, its importance has recently been vindicated.⁴ But even those who consider the logic an irrelevant appendage

³ Patten 1999, 166. Cf. Hardimon 1994, 254.

⁴ Most recently and authoritatively by Pippin 2019. For some earlier reconstructions and critical discussion of Hegel's logic in English, see Taylor 1975; Burbidge 1981; Rosen 1982; Inwood 1983. Hegel's *Science of Logic* was published in three parts (1812, 1813, 1816) and partly revised during his lifetime (1832); see *GW2I*, *GW1I*, *GW12*. The terms logic and metaphysics are often used complementarily in discussions of Hegel's philosophy because 'his objective logic takes the place of what previously had been called metaphysics' (Burbidge 2006, 35). E.g., in §24 of the 1830 *Encyclopedia*, Hegel claims that 'logic coincides with metaphysics' (*GW20*, 67). Pippin's entire 2019 book, subtitled *Logic as Metaphysics*, is dedicated to the 'interrogation' of this claim (37). For references to the 'interesting historical story to Hegel's coming to this position' (which he held from 1806), see Pippin 2019, 3–4, n. 2. For more, see Houlgate 2006 and the references in n. 12 below.

find that his diagnosis of the ills of modern society retains much currency. Living in an age at once different from and similar to our own, Hegel is perceived as having supplied not the solutions but many of the basic questions about life in modern society. Atomism and alienation may be mentioned as representative keywords here, and the view that Hegel's 'penetrating analysis of the human predicament in modern society is perhaps unsurpassed among social observers of the past two centuries' is not unusual.⁵ Even when putting Marx aside as Hegel's most influential successor, his thought has without a doubt proven a crucial influence on more than 'just' various philosophical movements.⁶ Hegel's practical philosophy continues to inspire today, and explicit attempts are being made at 'a re-actualisation of the Hegelian philosophy of right'.⁷ Understanding Hegel's thought is thus still a pursuit of much relevance. This makes it simultaneously more difficult to resist retrospective evaluation and more important to adopt a historically informed approach. While theoretical engagement with Hegel's philosophy has flourished, however, intellectual history is neglected in the plethora of literature.

Interest in Hegel is alive and kicking, as testified by a proliferation of monographs, handbooks and new translations of Hegel's major works in the last few years.⁸ In the literature, it is commonly remarked that a veritable 'Hegel renaissance' has materialised over the last few decades, attracting attention to his works from far beyond the so-called Continental tradition of philosophy.⁹ Notwithstanding a turbulent history of reception, no one could reasonably deny the *Philosophy of Right* its place in the canon of Western philosophy, and disputes about the importance

⁵ Wood 1991, xxvii. Cf., for instance, Taylor 1979 or the more recent claim that 'the present epoch, can be best and fully grasped through the Hegelian system' in Hamza and Ruda 2017, 9. See further Welsch and Vieweg 2003.

⁶ On Hegel's influence in the nineteenth century, see most recently Stewart 2021: *Hegel's Century*. On *The Impact of Idealism* more broadly, see the extensive four-volume work edited by Boyle and Disley 2013.

⁷ Honneth 2001, subtitle. Honneth 2011, 2014 pursues this enterprise further; for another attempt, see Menke 2018. The broadest and most influential engagement with Hegel's practical philosophy in recent years remains Pippin 2008. On Hegel's legacy, see, for instance, Halbig, Quante and Siep 2004 and Herzog 2013b.

⁸ The latest companions are Beiser 1993a, 2008a; Houlgate and Baur 2011; Laurentiis and Edwards 2013; Moya 2017; Bykova and Westphal 2020. New translations of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* have recently appeared, by M. Inwood for Oxford and T. Pinkard for Cambridge; Hegel 2018a, 2018b. Recent works on Hegel's political philosophy include; Brudner 2017; James 2017; Comay and Zantvoort 2018 and works listed in n. 7. An annual bibliography is compiled by the editors of *Hegel-Studien* at www.pe.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophie/i/forschung_kdp/hegel_studien.html.de.

⁹ For example, by Beiser 1993b, 2 and Beiser 2008b, title, dating its start to the 1960s.

or otherwise of its metaphysical grounding are abiding. In Anglophone scholarship, the third successive ‘wave’ of reception has been identified.¹⁰ Following the appearance of influential works in the non-metaphysical vein, renewed emphasis has recently been placed on the systematic dimension of Hegel’s thought again and there has been a revival of metaphysical readings of the *Philosophy of Right*.¹¹ The historically minded analysis of Hegel’s thinking provided in this book is intended to engage scholars on both sides of the divide.

Hegel is frequently regarded as the systematic philosopher par excellence and, irrespective of divergent strategies of dealing with it, most interpreters agree that he considered himself a metaphysician.¹² His systematic aspirations are evident throughout his works and aptly symbolised by his image of ‘the circle of philosophy’.¹³ As far as the *Philosophy of Right* is concerned, Hegel relates it explicitly to his previous work in the book’s preface. There, he introduces it as an expansion of the subjects covered briefly under the heading of ‘objective spirit’ in his 1817 *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, offering ‘a broader, in particular more systematic exposition of the same basic concepts’.¹⁴ In the same way, the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* would present an extension of the final section (on world history) in the *Philosophy of Right*. What sets the book apart from ‘an ordinary compendium’, Hegel explains, is ‘the method which constitutes its guiding principle’, namely the ‘speculative mode of cognition’ as developed in the *Science of Logic* from 1812 and 1816.¹⁵ As Raymond Plant has pointed out,

¹⁰ For a recent survey of different phases in the reception of Hegel, see Goodfield 2017. A more detailed account of developments up to the 1970s is provided by Ottmann 1977. For a comparison of developments in Germanophone vis-à-vis Anglophone scholarship, see Pippin 2004.

¹¹ Prominent interpretations in the non-metaphysical vein include Findlay 1958; Avineri 1972; Pelczynski 1972, 1984; Wood 1990; Tunick 1992; Hardimon 1994; Patten 1999; and Neuhauser 2000. Robert Pippin’s influential work is often added to this group, or seen as offering a third way. Early and more recent champions of metaphysical readings include Plant 1973; Taylor 1975; Steinberger 1988; Beiser 2005; Brooks 2007a; Kervégan [2008] 2018; Stern 2009; Goodfield 2014; Brooks and Stein 2017; and Thompson 2018. See also the *Hegel Bulletin*’s virtual special issue on ‘Hegel and Politics’ at www.cambridge.org/core/journals/hegel-bulletin.

¹² See Leopold 2007, 45–47 and Beiser 1993b for succinct discussions of Hegel’s own assertions about the importance of metaphysics and his defence of it; Houlgate 1986; Longuenesse 2007; and Schülein 2016 on Hegel’s broader critique of metaphysics (Hegel both accepted and went beyond Kant’s critique of metaphysics); Stern 2009; Bowman 2013; and Kreines 2015 on *Hegel’s Metaphysics and Its Philosophical Appeal* (Kreines). Pippin 2019 argues that ‘Hegel is no metaphysician in th[e] rationalist sense, but he is most certainly a metaphysician in the Aristotelian sense’ (35; cf. 94).

¹³ *E*, 34. ¹⁴ *PR*, preface, 5.

¹⁵ *PR*, preface, 5: ‘speculative Erkenntnißweise’. Although the second part of *Wissenschaft der Logik* was dated to 1813, it still appeared in December 1812, seven to eight months after the first (Jaeschke 2010, 221).

if the Idea is to be traced ‘in all modes of experience’, then indeed ‘philosophy has to be a systematic activity’.¹⁶ Hegel’s injunction that readers should understand and judge the *Philosophy of Right* according to ‘the logical spirit’ clearly expresses his metaphysical ambition.¹⁷ A historical approach seems to demand that we take his claim seriously. Not least, Hegel’s larger philosophical commitments may sometimes have acted as a constraint on the positions he was willing to accept from contemporary debate. Yet the presentation of the *Philosophy of Right* as one part of a larger philosophical system also constitutes part of Hegel’s ‘game’, if you will, and there is now evidence that he did not consider his lectures on the philosophy of right the place to delve into ‘the metaphysical proper’.¹⁸

Convinced that we need to explore not just the ontological and epistemic dimensions of Hegel’s philosophy, but especially his strategy of argumentation, I want to focus on the polemics involved in his writing. In other words, I suggest that we not take Hegel’s text as a given but see him as engaged in a common discourse and scrutinise the rationales that led him to exclude some arguments to the benefit of others.¹⁹ In doing so, I both acknowledge the importance of metaphysical justifications for the historical Hegel and try not to accept them at face value without exploring other possible (that is to say, contextual) motivations for his choices. If a justification was needed for shifting the emphasis from the question about the importance of Hegel’s metaphysics to his interaction with other writers of his time (which I would call the discursive dimension of his writings), the fact that Hegel was a participant in the debates reconstructed here, but that his contribution was not their focal point, surely provides it.

That many aspects featured in Hegel’s theory of the state were to some extent determined by contemporary discourse should not come as a surprise. The polemical dimension of his writing is readily discernible to anyone upon reading merely the notorious preface to the *Philosophy of Right*. On the very first page, Hegel declares that the remarks on the book’s paragraphs are intended ‘to clarify occasionally the more abstract content of the text and to take fuller account of related ideas commonplace at the present time’.²⁰ An anonymous, and by no means uncritical,

¹⁶ Plant 1973, 139, 138. ¹⁷ *PR*, preface, 6.

¹⁸ *VPR*24, 1071. In the context of the relation between thinking and the will, the following is recorded here: ‘Das eigentlich Metaphysische ist eine Seite, die uns hier nichts angeht.’

¹⁹ As Knowles 1992, 405 has observed, ‘the major difficulty of studying Hegel lies ... in unearthing what he conceals – and what he conceals, too often, is the process of argumentation’.

²⁰ *PR*, preface, 5.

contemporary reviewer judged several of Hegel's remarks to be 'extremely noteworthy, especially in relation to the present'.²¹ It seems highly unlikely that someone with such an acute sense for the importance of history and socio-cultural context as Hegel really should have thought of himself as fabricating a purely abstract and, indeed, timeless theory.²² Even if he wanted to project the image of a producer of purely objective science, this constitutes a situational act in itself.²³ At the same time, the famous line about being a child of one's time in the preface to the *Philosophy of Right* conveys deep-rooted scepticism about the very notion of theory detached from actual human experience.²⁴ This is corroborated by an earlier comment on the reception of Machiavelli, where Hegel notes that it is 'quite senseless' to abstract the message of *Il Principe* from its contemporary Italian context and to read it as 'a compendium of moral and political principles applicable indiscriminately to all situations – i.e. to none at all'.²⁵ Yet that seems to be exactly the fate which has befallen Hegel's own book.

Books on Hegel are legion, yet conscientious attention to historical context is regularly missing, as, indeed, is detailed engagement with Hegel's concrete politics. Much scholarship has tended to provide interpretations of Hegel 'in the context of his own work' or, at best, in relation to other representatives of German idealism, mostly Kant.²⁶ While Kant and Fichte undoubtedly do provide important reference points for Hegel's constitutional ideas, and feature in this study as well, such analysis does

²¹ [Wendt?] 1821, 75.

²² Friedrich Engels claimed that 'what distinguished Hegel's mode of thinking from that of all other philosophers was the exceptional historical sense underlying it' (Engels [1859] 1980, 474). Forbes 1975 still provides a powerful account of Hegel's historical consciousness.

²³ In this context, see especially Hegel's introduction to the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*; Hegel 1986, 1–137. On Hegel's historicism and approach to the history of philosophy, see Beiser 1993c, 1995. Hegelian opposition to contextualism has recently been explored by Hunter 2019.

²⁴ *PR*, preface, 15. I have taken the liberty to slightly adapt the quotation in the epigraph above, rendering Hegel's 'son' as 'child', as have Knox in Hegel 2008, 15 and Nisbet in Hegel 1991, 21.

²⁵ Cited from Hegel 1999, 80–81 ('The German Constitution'). Hegel makes a very similar point about Plato's *Republic*, which is usually 'regarded as the proverb of an empty ideal'; *PR*, preface, 14. Cf. *PR* §185A.

²⁶ This is the primary aim declared by Henrich [1971, 1988] 2010, 7. For a recent example invoking contextualism without delivering quite what is promised, see Boyd 2019. Dieter Henrich also launched a research programme into the collaborative origins of early German idealism known as *Konstellationsforschung*; see Henrich 1991, 2004; and Mulsow and Stamm 2005. Henrich and Pinkard 2000 in particular argue that Hegel was strongly influenced by his friend Hölderlin. Further examples of the (very understandable) focus on the idealist context and especially the Kant-Hegel nexus include Kelly 1969; Priest 1987; Pippin 1989, 1997; Pinkard 2002; Henrich 2003; Sedgwick 2012 and the *Hegel Bulletin*'s virtual special issue on 'Hegel and Kant' at www.cambridge.org/core/journals/hegel-bulletin.

not exhaust the wide range of Hegel's engagement. Apart from biographies, book-length studies of a contextualist bent have hitherto mostly concentrated on Hegel's life and thought up to 1806/7, ending with his move from Jena in the aftermath of Napoleon's triumph.²⁷ Significantly, this is before Hegel took on the offices of newspaper editor in Bamberg, headmaster of a *Gymnasium* in Nuremberg (not to mention his marriage there) and professor in Heidelberg and Berlin where, between 1818 and his death in 1831, he reached the peak of his career. Existing scholarship, therefore, does not satisfy the demand for insight into the immediate context in which the *Philosophy of Right* was produced and published. Although hotly debated, Hegel's theory of the state has received comparatively little examination in terms of its composition. In other words, the fact that a choice lies behind every paragraph Hegel wrote has too often been overlooked. That is where the contribution of this book is located, aiming to provide a (self-consciously partial) corrective by situating Hegel's political thought, and especially its institutional dimension, in its historical context.

The general premise informing my approach is that even the most systematic of thinkers do not conceive their ideas in a vacuum but develop their positions in interaction with the world around them. Accordingly, 'even the most abstract works of political theory are never above the battle'.²⁸ If this is true, then an adequate understanding of what any writer meant to express cannot be reached by the mere study of their own writings but must involve examination of the intellectual and political world they inhabited. If we accept the idea that 'to speak is to act too', expressed by Hegel himself in one of his lectures, the question arises as to what he was doing in the *Philosophy of Right*.²⁹ In order to find an answer, we must begin to consider his thinking in relation to others and to understand his writings as interventions in contemporary debates. Accordingly, I want to turn the spotlight on Hegel's rhetorical and polemical interventions and show him engaged in dialogue. The following may thus be seen as an exercise in 'eavesdropping on the conversations

²⁷ This is the case with Harris 1971, 1983; and Dickey 1987. Waszek 1988 forms an exception in this respect but, as his book's title (*The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's Account of 'Civil Society'*) truthfully indicates, its preoccupations are rather different from those pursued here. See also Toews 1980. The best biographies remain Rosenkranz 1844 and Pinkard 2000.

²⁸ Skinner 2008, xv. See also Skinner 2002, vol. 1: *Regarding Method* and Tully 1988, for a start.

²⁹ VPR24, 1467.

of the past'.³⁰ My emphasis is on the reconstruction of the contemporary political context and Hegel's intervention in it. Rather than offering a direct philosophical evaluation of Hegel's position on particular issues, I provide the groundwork for doing so by scrutinising the original context of the *Philosophy of Right*.

Hegel's interaction with broader public debate has been greatly neglected, yet his biography confirms the need to replace the image of the absent-minded professor of philosophy. To begin with, Hegel was an acute observer with a great appetite for news from near and far, describing the daily reading of newspapers as a 'realistic morning blessing' and himself as one who 'follow[ed] world events with curiosity'.³¹ He also was an active publicist himself, contributing reviews and articles as well as (co-)editing *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie* in 1802–3, the *Bamberger Zeitung* in 1807–8 and *Heidelbergerische Jahrbücher der Litteratur* in 1816–18. Long before the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* were founded in 1827, Hegel had entertained the wish to establish a literary organ of his own, as testified by his 'Maxims of the Journal of German Literature' from 1807 and his draft 'On the establishment of a critical journal of literature' from winter 1819/20.³² Accordingly, he must have closely surveyed the landscape of periodicals throughout his career.

This inclination towards publicist activity notwithstanding, Hegel's political thought has hitherto hardly been placed in the context of contemporary public discussion or the period's broader political context. By doing so, this study provides relief and contrast to Hegel's thinking, explores possible sources and suggests interlocutors, intellectual allegiances and targets. Insofar as practicable, I have endeavoured to render such links tangible, for instance, by recourse to Hegel's correspondence or the auction catalogue of his library. At the same time, it would frequently be justified to reverse the burden of proof and assume Hegel's familiarity with the work of contemporary writers,³³ given his intellectual occupations, his involvement with the broader publicist landscape and the dynamics of academia then as now.

³⁰ The image was coined by John W. Burrow; see Burrow 2006, 22–3 and Cuttica 2014. For more, see Thomson 2012 and Whatmore 2016 on *What Is Intellectual History?*.

³¹ *GW*5, 493; *BL*, 145: Hegel to I. Niethammer, 20 February 1807. Buck-Morss 2000 provides a memorable demonstration of that in the case of 'Hegel and Haiti'.

³² These drafts are contained in *GW*4, 507–14 and *GW*15, 147–203, respectively.

³³ As suggested by D'Aprile 2014, 141 or MacGregor's 2014 (chapter 4) claim that Hegel knew Tom Paine's writings. (Incidentally, I have found that Hegel personally knew the German translator of *The Rights of Man*, Meta Forkel/Liebesskind, whose house he frequented during his time in Bamberg.)

Although Hegel insisted that philosophy was not for everybody,³⁴ he had a clear sense of its practical importance. This is conveyed impressively in his essay on natural law from 1802, where he states that ‘nothing has to be so applicable to reality . . . as that which comes from philosophy’.³⁵ There can be little doubt that Hegel had something meaningful to say, and consequently it seems not unreasonable to infer that he wanted to make himself understood, despite the fact that his use of language is and was widely considered peculiar.³⁶ After all, Hegel spent his life as a teacher and was recognised as a fascinating one, his notorious lecturing style notwithstanding.³⁷ Already in his youth, he had envisioned himself as an ‘educator of the people’.³⁸ From the moment of his graduation, he pursued this path, be it as a private tutor, at grammar school or at university, and arguably even when he edited Bamberg’s local newspaper for a year. On the very first page of the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel explains that it was written as a ‘textbook’ for university students and with reception by ‘the wider public’ in mind.³⁹ Given how easily this has been overlooked, the following truism offered by one of his contemporaries bears repeating: ‘Whoever lets a book be printed, dedicates it to the public. It is the entire people to whom he communicates his thoughts.’⁴⁰ This quotation is also an apt reminder that distinctions between literary genres may be largely artificial or, at least, historically variable and adherence to them not conducive to comprehensive analysis. Accordingly, I have tried to bridge the divide commonly established between what are considered philosophical works proper, on the one hand, and rather occasional writings, on the other. It is hoped that the result may convince readers of the connectedness and mutual relevance of these different kinds of text, whose differences may be gradual rather than categorical.

³⁴ Besides several statements to that effect in *PR*, he chose as epigraph for his 1812 *Science of Logic* Cicero’s ‘Est enim philosophia paucis contenta iudicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens, eique suspecta et invisā’; *GW*21, 4.

³⁵ *GW*4, 471. Cf. Hegel 1999, 164.

³⁶ As attested by the existence of ‘Hegel dictionaries’, such as Inwood 1992; Cobben et al. 2006; and Magee 2010. Virtually all contemporary reviewers of *PR* (collected in Riedel 1975) remarked upon the peculiarity of Hegel’s terminology and even the editor of the 1833 edition admits to Hegel’s ‘distinguishing artificial language’; Gans 1833, XVII.

³⁷ See, for instance, Heinrich Gustav Hotho’s classic account of Hegel at the lectern in *BZ*, 246–50.

³⁸ Pinkard 2000, 15–17. The concern with the education of mankind was especially nourished by the young Hegel’s engagement with the work of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. On ‘Hegel as Political Educator’, see Villa 2017, chapter 3.

³⁹ *PR*, preface, 5. ⁴⁰ Grävell 1816, III.