

## Immigration, Security, and the Liberal State

Contextualizing the regulation of human mobility in a new security framework, this book offers an original perspective on the dominant mode of politics and evolving norms shaping the immigration policies of contemporary liberal states. In doing so, the authors challenge existing paradigms that privilege economic and cultural factors over new security ones in explaining the critical institutional and normative changes in migration management, from the early post-WWII through the post-Cold War era. Drawing on evidence from multiple sources, including media and elite discourse, policy tracking, party manifesto data and public opinion across Europe and the US, the book exposes the restrictive nature of immigration politics and policies when immigration is framed as a security threat, and considers its implications for civil liberties. Informed by a rich breadth of scholarly sub-disciplines, the findings contribute both empirically and theoretically to the literatures on international migration, security and public opinion.

Gallya Lahav is Professor of Political Science at Stony Brook University, SUNY. Professor Lahav was recipient of the MacArthur Foundation award for this project's early development. She is the author of *Immigration and Politics in the New Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), and co-editor of several expert compendia on migration. Her work has also appeared in numerous books, handbooks, and journals including *Comparative Political Studies, the American Journal of Political Research, Political Behavior*, and *International Migration Review*.

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# Immigration, Security, and the Liberal State

The Politics of Migration Regulation in Europe and the United States

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Gallya Lahav

For Millie, an irresistible force of nature and a radiant light in my life.

- Anthony M. Messina



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## Preface and Acknowledgements

This book is the product of many years of conversations and investigations. It has experienced several incarnations, all of which involved much sober reflection about the nature and political well-being of contemporary liberal democratic states as they are reflected in the politics associated with the movement of people across national borders. What began as a solo project for Gallya Lahav eventually led to a renewed collaboration between the two authors whose scholarly agendas have periodically and productively intersected, culminating in several co-authored publications during the past two decades.

The seeds of the project for Lahav were sown at Charles de Gaulle Airport, Paris in December 1995, where she joined a group of her globally dispersed childhood friends and their spouses to celebrate the coming New Year. Their high-spirited reunion unfortunately ended with an unforeseen disruption at the departure gates, where an airline representative barred one of the American foreign residents in the group from boarding his flight to the US, claiming that he lacked the proper travel documentation. As a consequence of the US federal government shutdown which dragged on for eleven days between 16 December 1995 and 6 January 1996, her friend's departure to the US was derailed by an airline check-in agent, who acted as a proxy of the American state in France, scrutinizing the visas and travel documents of all US bound passengers that day.

Without recourse and lacking due process, this seemingly arbitrary and unanticipated interruption in her mate's travel schedule prompted Lahav to ponder the disturbing implications of the burgeoning role of private sector gatekeepers like airlines, and eventually other non-state actors such as university officials, employers, and hospital administrators, in sorting citizens from migrants at the various stages of human mobility, including those of migrant entry, stay, and exit. Located at the intersection between human mobility and human rights, the engagement of these non-state actors in the migration process and, particularly, their increasing authority to regulate the flow of persons across national

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borders seriously undermined, in her mind, many of the key norms, policies, and practices of the liberal immigration and human mobility regime that had hitherto prevailed during the post-WWII period. Despite the personal inconveniences imposed by such impediments to travel, Lahav is eternally grateful to the Helmers and Darvasis (especially to Amit, and the late Ariel) for their practical professional insights and so much more.

From that point forward, the liberal state's adoption of exceptional and even draconian practices in managing human mobility only accelerated. Its formal operationalization of security norms regarding human mobility regulation precipitated the proliferation of gatekeepers at all points of entry and stay. It spurred an exponential growth in the number of new actors enlisted by the state in the service of an ever-expanding migration policy playing field. The business of sorting the vast universe of people on the move has exponentially grown since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, the infamous shoe bomber episode two months later, and the terrorist incidents which followed at other transportation hubs like Brussels, London, Madrid, and Paris. In this 'new security' era, human mobility regulations have been increasingly linked to national security concerns which have severely compromised rights and even market priorities.

With the generous financial support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Lahav applied her normative concerns about securitization to her scholarly investigations of the changing migration gatekeepers and shifting liabilities across Europe and the US. Transcending the analytical framework that she had developed on the state previously, she set out to identify the central causes and consequences of the liberal state's devolution of many of its responsibilities for managing immigration to non-central state actors. Her objective was to explain the role of the security driver in influencing the trajectory of political party competition on immigration-related issues and, more importantly, immigration policy outcomes across the liberal states.

Along the way she became indebted to many accommodating academic hosts who facilitated the project's development. The scholars affiliated with the Robert Schuman Center at the European University Institute in Fiesole, Florence provided her with a lifetime of treasured inspiration and insights. She is especially grateful to Luciano Bardi, Helen Wallace, Philippe Fargues, Philippe Schmitter, Adrienne Héritier, Martin Rhodes, Rachel Epstein, Elena Jileva, Filipa de Sousa, and the late Peter Mair for their friendship and fellowship. She is also indebted to Virginie Guiraudon whose close collaboration on earlier projects inspired her to inquire more deeply into the mechanisms driving the new migration policy playing field and the values and norms underpinning it.

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