

Making Democracy Safe for Business

Businesses in the Middle East and North Africa have failed to bring sustainable development despite decades of investment from the private and public sectors. Yet we still know little about why the Arab Uprisings failed to usher in more transparent government that could break this enduring cycle of corruption and mismanagement. Examining post-transition politics in Egypt and Tunisia, Kubinec employs interviews and quantitative surveys to map out the corrupting influence of businesses on politics. He argues that businesses must respond to changes in how perks and privileges are distributed after political transitions, either by forming political coalitions or creating new informal connections to emerging politicians. Employing detailed case studies and original experiments, *Making Democracy Safe for Business* advances our empirical understanding of the study of the durability of corruption in general and the dismal results of the Arab Uprisings in particular.

Robert Kubinec is an assistant professor of political science at New York University Abu Dhabi. He was formerly a postdoctoral fellow at Princeton University and a diplomat with the US Consulate in Saudi Arabia. His writing has appeared in *The Washington Post*, *The Brookings Institution*, and *The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*.

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Corporate Politics During the Arab Uprisings
Robert Kubinec
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ROBERT KUBINEC

New York University Abu Dhabi



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For Elyse

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Data Availability Statement

R code and de-identified data to reproduce results in this book are available from this public Github repository website: www.github.com/saudiwin/crony_book.