

Introduction

Galen, the Unsuspected Moralist

This study is devoted to the ancient medical theorist and practising physician Galen of Pergamum (129–ca. 216 AD), whose fundamental contributions to specialised branches of the medical art (e.g. anatomy, physiology) made him an authoritative model in the field of medicine up to the seventeenth century. Taking his cue from his idealised master Hippocrates, the father of medicine in classical antiquity, Galen married medicine with philosophy, thereby establishing a robustly scientific system for researching, teaching and writing about the workings of the human body and the origins and treatment of disease.¹ In this way Galen seems to have actualised what he fervently proclaimed in his short essay *The Best Doctor is Also a Philosopher*, namely that the ideal physician should be armed with logic, physics and ethics, the three structural pillars of philosophical discourse in antiquity.²

Yet Galen is exceptional in other respects too. He is antiquity's most voluminous author, with his output surviving in Greek (there is more in Latin, Arabic, Syriac and Hebrew) filling twenty-two massive volumes³ in Karl Gottlob Kühn's nineteenth-century edition, an extraordinary number by any standard, whether ancient or modern.⁴ Such sheer quantity is

¹ We are fortunate to have three dedicated biographies of Galen by Nutton (2020), Mattern (2013) and Boudon-Millot (2012). Cf. Schlange-Schöningen (2003). For a concise overview of his life and career, see Hankinson (2008). Moraux (1985) provides a representative collection of passages from the Galenic corpus that help build a picture of Galen's experiences and opinions. On the interconnection between medicine and philosophy in Galen, see succinctly Boudon-Millot (2019).

² Ierodiakonou (1993), Trapp (2017: 31–32).

³ This amounts to around 20,000 pages of printed text.

⁴ Galen's exceptional productivity was well known in antiquity, e.g. Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* (early third c. AD) 1.1e states that Galen of Pergamum has 'published more works on philosophy and medicine as to surpass all his predecessors'. See Nutton (1984: 317–318) and especially Nutton (2008: 358–359). On Galen's early reception, see Pietrobelli (2019). Boudon-Millot (2017) mentions 500 treatises attributed to Galen, and Nutton (2013: 391, n. 21) estimates that Galen's 'writings in Greek amount to approximately 10 per cent of all surviving Greek literature before AD 350'.

already reflected in the (also rare) autobiographical inventories that he composed to authenticate his writings, in an attempt to stop what we would term intellectual property theft. Galen's productivity comes with notable diversity in subject matter, form and orientation, from didactic manuals on anatomical, therapeutic and prognostic theory at varying levels, to Hippocratic commentaries, polemical tracts against individuals and medical sects (e.g. the Methodists), (exegetical) works on Platonic or Aristotelian philosophy, as well as texts on demonstration, lexicography and philology.

Interestingly, his oeuvre includes a distinct body of works on moral philosophy (περὶ τῶν τῆς ἠθικῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐζητημένων), which comprises twenty-three titles of ethical tracts, catalogued in his *On My Own Books*.⁵ Of these works, three have come down to us: *Affections and Errors of the Soul* (περὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐκάστῳ παθῶν καὶ ἀμαρτημάτων τῆς διαγνώσεως, in Greek)⁶, *Character Traits* (περὶ ἡθῶν, in Arabic summary) and the long-lost *Avoiding Distress* (περὶ ἀλυσπίας, in Greek). The majority of the other book titles taken together point to these texts' affinity with essays on applied or practical ethics, a fashionable philosophical product by Galen's time, though the genre goes back to the Hellenistic period.⁷ As the name suggests, practical ethics sought to offer handy tips on how to think about the world and conduct oneself in it, so as to cope effectively with the hardships of everyday life. It also furnished advice on how to take care of one's body and soul, face the challenges arising from politics and other professional activities, and handle potential frictions and tensions while connecting with peers, friends and family. In doing so, it transcended scholarship and special interests, extending into the realm of human relationships in an accessible manner that moral learners could easily make sense of, regardless of their professional expertise. Practical ethics is also known as popular philosophy,⁸ not because it is addressed to the masses or

⁵ *Lib. Prop.* 15, 169.13 Boudon-Millot = XIX.45.10-11 K. ⁶ See also n.1, Chapter 6.

⁷ Gill (2003: 40–44).

⁸ *Popularphilosophie* ('popular philosophy') or *Die popularphilosophisch-ethischen Schriften* (the 'popular philosophical-ethical writings') are terms coined by Ziegler (1951: 637, 702) with reference to Plutarch's works on practical ethics. For *Popularphilosophie* specifically, Ziegler was most probably inspired by the application of the same term to works of the German *Aufklärung* in the second half of the eighteenth century; see Holzhey (1989). The term *praktische Seelenheilungsschriften* ('practical psychotherapeutic writings') was also deployed by Ingenkamp (1971) for his analysis of Plutarch's *On the Control of Anger*, *On Talkativeness*, *On Curiosity*, *On Compliance* and *On Praising Oneself Inoffensively*; while 'broadcasting ethics' has been recently devised by Roskam and van der Stockt (2011) for the same purposes.

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because it involves a lower level of sophistication,⁹ but because of its appeal to a broader category of readers/listeners, who were nevertheless educated enough to be attentive to their character development and self-management.¹⁰ Though theoretical moral philosophy emanated from and spoke to a restricted group of philosophical specialists, practical ethics reached out to a much larger audience as ‘a life-project to which any thinking person ought to feel obliged to subscribe’.¹¹

Galen’s moral works fall squarely within this generic tradition. As can be surmised from their titles, they concern three interrelated areas: first, the regulation of conduct in daily cultural practices, such as rhetorical demonstrations in the forum or private discussions in aristocratic villas.¹² Second, the mitigation of negative emotions especially germane to elite life in the High Roman Empire, for example, slander, flattery, love of honour or desire for fame.¹³ And third, the cultivation of

⁹ Thus, ‘popular’ meaning ‘less- or non-doctrinaire’, ‘commonsensical’, and not ‘folk’, ‘demotic’, ‘populist’ or ‘vulgar’. On the meaning of ‘popular’ in popular philosophy and ethics in the Imperial period, see Morgan (2007: 1–5) and van Hoof (2010: 6–7). Cf. Goulet-Cazé (2007) and Thom (2012). For a definition and description of the independent discipline of practical ethics, see van Hoof (2014); cf. Schofield (2003: 253–256) and van der Stockt (2011: 19–21).

¹⁰ Hence, Pelling (2011: 55–58) appositely suggested the alternative label ‘educated ethics’, which includes ‘material for the cultured, educated, sensible person to work on and exploit’ (p. 57).

¹¹ Trapp (2014: 45). See also the similar emphasis on the practical appeal of moral philosophy in the pseudo-Galenic work *History of Philosophy* 1–2, 597.1–598.16 DG = XIX.223.1–224.17 K.; [*Hist. Phil.*] 4, 602.12–603.6 DG = XIX.231.1–16 K.; [*Hist. Phil.*] 6, 603.14–20 DG = 232.10–18 K.

¹² *The Interaction Between Someone Making Public Demonstrations and Their Audience* (περί τῆς τῶν ἐπιδεικνυμένων <πρὸς> τοὺς ἀκούοντας συνουσίας), *To Orators in the Forum* (πρὸς τοὺς ἀγοραίους ῥήτορας), *The Interaction Between the Parties to a Dialogue* (περί τῆς ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις συνουσίας), *The Discourse with Bacchides and Cyrus in the Villa of Menarchus* (περί τῆς ἐν αὐλῇ Μενάρχου διατριβῆς πρὸς Βακχίδην καὶ Κύρον). In the light of a close parallel from *Avoiding Distress* (ὥσπερ τῆς ἐν αὐλῇ μοναρχικῇ διατριβῆς, 11, 76.12 PX), some scholars argue that ἐν αὐλῇ Μενάρχου in the above title should be emended to ἐν αὐλῇ μονάρχου, e.g. Kotzia and Sotiroudis (2016: 125). In that case we would be talking about private discussions on ethics taking place ‘at the imperial court’. As is clear, the emphasis in all these titles is on how a relationship or an interaction actually works or should, ideally, work. Galen’s *Kroniskoi* may also belong to this first group of writings on practical ethics. Although we know nothing about this work, it is most likely a literary description of erudite conversations that took place at banquets celebrating the Roman festival of Saturnalia (pace Nutton 2021: 123). The Saturnalia were held in honour of the god Saturn, the Roman equivalent of Greek Kronos, which helps explain why the work is given the Greek title *Kroniskoi*. In that sense, Galen’s *Kroniskoi* resembles Plutarch’s *Table Talk* or Athenaeus’s *The Sophists at Dinner*, which further validates Galen’s understanding of practical ethics as being deeply entrenched in social practice. The assumption of the generic affiliation of Galen’s *Kroniskoi* with the Imperial literary symposium chimes with the structure of the work itself, namely its sub-division into seven sections, in line with the division of Plutarch’s *Table Talk* and Athenaeus’s *The Sophists at Dinner*, each consisting of nine sections.

¹³ *On Slander* (περί τῆς διαβολῆς), *Things Said in Public Against Flatterers* (περί τῶν δημοσῶς ῥηθέντων κατὰ κολάκων), *To What Extent the Esteem and Opinion of the Public is to be Taken into Account* (μέχρι πόσου τῆς παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμῆς καὶ δόξης φροντιστέον ἐστίν). Love of riches (*philopoulia*), another standard passion in Imperial-period disquisitions on *moralia* (e.g.

moral uprightness, rooted in modesty and affability, widely¹⁴ (even if not universally) considered defining features of cultured individuals (*pepaideumenoí*) throughout the Mediterranean world in this period.¹⁵ All three strands attest to Galen's heightened alertness to practical philosophy and its social embedding, and help substantiate what is otherwise only evident from passing references in other parts of his corpus regarding the role of the ethical discipline, namely that it is beneficial in promoting purity, justice, friendship and happiness, as well as being open to anyone who shows an interest in it.¹⁶

In keeping with the spirit of the age, Galen seems deeply sensitised to the importance of practical philosophy both as a book topic and a way of life. Alongside his dedicated collection of moral treatises, which we have

Plutarch's *On Love of Money* or Aelius Aristides's *Oration of Rome*), is also explored by Galen: at the very end of his *Avoiding Distress*, he refers to a work he had produced entitled *On Rich People Infatuated with Money* (περί τῶν φιλοχρημάτων πλουσίων, 18, 92.6 PX), now lost.

¹⁴ I say 'widely' because the essence of *paideia* for a *pepaideumenos* in this period was itself a contested question, especially in view of the tendency of professional sophists to lay greater stress on technical literary and oratorical accomplishment rather than on moral uprightness. Adrian of Tyre in Philostratus's *Lives of the Sophists* or Lexiphanes in Lucian's eponymous dialogue are representative examples of this.

¹⁵ *Agreement* (περί ὁμονοίας), *Modesty* (περί αἰδοῦς), *Consolation* (περί παραμυθίας). The work *The Best Men Profit from Their Enemies* (of which only two fragments survive in Arabic; see Meyerhof 1929: 84, Lamoreaux 2016: 122, §131) is very much reminiscent of Plutarch's moral essay *On How to Benefit from your Enemies* and also fits the thematology of Galen's popular philosophical works. Here the emphasis is on Galen's disinterestedness and philanthropy: he does not charge his students or patients any money, nor does he yield to bribery. Rather, he ministers to the sick by supplying material goods (medicines, food) and services (nurses), and promotes the medical careers of other doctors.

The rest of the titles of Galen's ethical works bear out their inclination towards politics (*Public Pronouncements in the Presence of Pertinax*, <περί> τῶν ἐπὶ Περτίνακος δημοσίᾳ ῥηθέντων) and philosophical theory: *The Purpose of Life According to Philosophy* (περί τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν τέλους), *Pleasure and Pain* (περί ἡδονῆς καὶ πόνου), *The Consequences of Each Chosen Purpose in Life* (περί τῶν ἀκολουθῶν ἐκαστῷ τέλει βίων), *Against Favorinus's Attack on Socrates* (πρὸς τὸν Φαβωρίνον κατὰ Σωκράτους). The content of the works *To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime* (περί ἀμαρτημάτων καὶ κολάσεως ἰσότητος), *The Making of Wills* (περί διαθηκῶν ποιήσεως) and *On Idleness* (a title restored from the Arabic tradition, Boudon-Millot 2007: 170, n. 2) is less easy to define. The content of the work *περί τῶν ἀναγινωσκόντων λάθρα* has been much debated. Whether we take it to mean *People who Read in Secret*, *On Those who Plagiarise*, *On Those who Teach/Lecture Surreptitiously* (see Boudon-Millot 2007: 226–228) or even *Solitary Readers* (Nutton 2020: 77, with n. 15), *λάθρα* adds an ethical dimension to the activity of the verb's subject, which explains the inclusion of this text among Galen's moral writings. There are more ethically-inclined works under other book categories, e.g. *Whether Physiology is Useful for Moral Philosophy* (εἰ ἡ φυσιολογία χρήσιμος εἰς τὴν ἠθικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, *Lib. Prop.* 19, 172.17–173.1 Boudon-Millot = XIX.48.4–5 K.) or *The Happy, Blessed Life According to Epicurus* (περί τῆς κατ' Ἐπικούρου εὐδαιμόνου καὶ μακαρίου βίου, *Lib. Prop.* 19, 172.14–15 Boudon-Millot = XIX.48.1–2 K.). The latter is related to the work *On the Epicureans*, another title restored from the Arabic tradition and belonging to the works on moral philosophy (Boudon-Millot 2007: 170, n. 2).

¹⁶ *Prop. Plac.* 14, 136.21–22 PX; *PHP* 9.7, 588.7–27 DL = V.779.16–781.8 K.

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just surveyed, he also produced a good number of other texts that are steeped in moral(ising) influences and associations, despite the fact that they are not recorded among his ethical works in the autobibliographical lists. As a matter of fact, the heading and content of some of these works might at first sight point to their affiliation with other domains of Galen's oeuvre, e.g. prognostic theory (*Prognosis*, Chapter 8) or empiricism (*Exhortation to the Study of Medicine*, Chapter 5), but what unites them all is their ethical-psychotherapeutic value and the way they help reconstruct Galen's programme of emotional wellbeing.

And that is not all. Galen also imbued his technical tracts – both medical and philosophical – with moral reflections or overtones. The passages in question are sometimes concerned with representing Galen's high moral character (*ēthos*) as opposed to the villainy of his medical rivals. On other occasions, they delve into the gloomy ethical realities of present-day society or what Galen describes as the debased status of medicine compared to its morally flawless classical past. At other times, the teaching and learning of medicine itself is infused with moral lessons, and scientific accounts acquire a moral component often in the form of sermonising digressions or asides, which demonstrate the social importance of ethics in Galen's thought-world. Quotations from moral authorities or other material with a moral-didactic message reflecting popular morality are also utilised in non-ethical contexts, thus sharing widely held principles of the second/third-century Imperial state and foregrounding its solid ethical foundations.

In their totality, these scattered passages exploring ethics, together with the essays overtly designated as ethical and the individual works of a moral-psychotherapeutic nature form a relatively small proportion of Galen's overall production. But they still constitute an integral part of the author's mental mapping. The aim of this study is to piece them together, assess them for the first time in a holistic manner, and offer a new and robust framework in which we can comprehend Galen's role as a practical ethicist. This is an aspect of his intellectual profile that has been little studied and poorly understood up to now.¹⁷ As I plan to show, the cornerstone of his contribution to this area that makes him influential, if not original, in

¹⁷ The desideratum has been noted by some critics: e.g. Petit (2018: 134–135): 'Mais il manque une étude du Galien moraliste, spectateur impuissant et indigné des turpitudes de la société romaine.'; Lee (2014: 55): 'With few exceptions, little attention has been paid to Galen's own account of moral transformation . . .'; Linden (1999: 11, n. 5): 'It is unfortunate that Galen's contribution to ethics, not only with regard to medicine, but also to ethical methodology, has found so little attention among scholars . . .'. Others have vaunted the pervading presence of ethics in Galen's vast

ancient terms is his creative intermingling of medicine and practical ethics. Giving prominence to this dynamic interdisciplinarity in its social, philosophical and cultural context will transform our current understanding of Imperial-period literature on *moralia* as known from other thinkers. It will also give us new insights into popularised forms of ancient medical literature, refine our sense of ‘medical philosophy’ or ‘philosophical medicine’ through an emphasis on its ethical dimension that has previously been left out of relevant discussions, and provide a fresh vantage point from which to observe the social role of medicine. Last but not least, this more comprehensive reading of Galen’s moralising discourse will advance our understanding of the range of possibilities as regards representing key areas of the study of Imperial culture more generally, and notably athletics or the symposium.

Contribution and methodology

Galen’s relationship with ethics is not a foregone conclusion or a straightforward matter. For, unlike key moralists such as Plutarch or Musonius Rufus, who were mainly philosophers who participated to some extent in political affairs, Galen’s primary occupation was that of a doctor and medical writer. True, he espoused a kind of medicine that was intimately bound up with philosophy and tended to accentuate his self-perception as a physician-cum-philosopher.¹⁸ Yet technically he is the only medical expert we know of to have systematically engaged with ethics. Rufus of Ephesus (first century AD), the Anonymous of Paris (first century AD), Aretaeus of Cappadocia (second century AD) or Celsus (second century AD) discussed psychopathology and psychotherapy, but hardly touched on philosophical training or moral topics in general.¹⁹ Other doctors who straddled the boundaries between medicine and philosophy, such as

corpus and its importance, e.g. Asmis (2014: 136–138), Hankinson (1993: 185), but have not gone into it in any detail.

¹⁸ Galen himself tells us that the Roman emperor referred to him as ‘the first among doctors and unique among philosophers’, *Praen.* 11, 128.27–28 N. = XIV.660.11–12 K. Elsewhere he goes so far as to say that his teacher, the Peripatetic philosopher Eudemus, knew him for his philosophical standing and considered his practice of medicine a sideline, *Praen.* 2, 76.27–78.2 N. = XIV.608.13–18 K. On the model of the *medicus philosophus* that Galen embodies, see Romano (2000: 35–48). On Galen specifically, see Tieleman (2020).

¹⁹ It is interesting that Caelius Aurelianus (fl. 400 AD, traditionally labelled a compiler of Soranus’s works) draws a clear distinction between mental disorders and moral passions (greed, fear, sadness, anger), demarcating them as subjects belonging to two different areas of study, e.g. Caelius Aurelianus, *Acut. Morb.* 3.13.109–111 (356.21–358.17 Bendz); see also Polito (2016). The rhetorical and emotive style of Aretaeus’s *On Acute and Chronic Diseases* led him to

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Asclepiades of Bithynia (ca. 120 – 90 BC), Athenaeus of Attalia (fl. end of the first century BC), Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160 – ca. 210 AD) or Soranus of Ephesus (second century AD), might have been good candidates for surveying moral traits,²⁰ yet they too were not strongly attracted to them except for what they could contribute to pathology. For when moral traits feature in their nosological accounts, they are limited to their impact on the patient's corporeal health or behaviour.²¹ The same emphasis on the primacy of the body over the soul features in Athenaeus and Soranus, who, as has recently been shown, were keen to explore the role of early education proper, habituation and intellectual study, but only in as far as they related to shaping a healthy body.²² For the above-mentioned authors, then, matters of the soul are subordinate to somatic wellbeing, and are therefore a means to an end, that of the recovery of the body's strength and the alleviation of its sickness.

This attitude on the part of medical authors is taken to extremes in a contemporary declamation, which stages a dispute between a doctor, a philosopher and an orator regarding which of their disciplines is the more useful to the community.²³ The doctor makes a strong case for medicine, of course, reducing philosophy's role to moral philosophy in particular,²⁴ which he debunks. His main argument against it is that moral philosophy concerns few people (*ad paucos pertinent*), clearly having *theoretical* moral philosophy in mind, and that character is inborn (*mores nasci*), hence

circumstantially discuss social shame arising from physical disfigurement or (uncontrollable) behaviour as part of the symptomatology of the patient's disease. However, no practical ethical components are attached to such discussions other than those serving the author's rhetorical aims, e.g. *Acut. Morb.* 2.2.17–18 (21.16–26 Hude). Similarly, Rufus of Ephesus does not explore practical ethics, despite his cursory interest in the effect of a disease (e.g. melancholy) on someone's moral state. Cf. Swain (2008). Elsewhere, for example in his *Medical Questions*, the patient's character traits play a role in the diagnosis of the disease, e.g. *Quaest. Med.* 1, 24.8–12 Gärtner; 8, 38.21–22 Gärtner; 13, 46.15–17 Gärtner; cf. Letts (2016). And in other works, he refers in passing to vice and virtue in the context of his medical narratives, e.g. *Sat. et Gon.* 83.11–84.2 Daremberg-Ruelle.

²⁰ Nutton (2020: 91–92).

²¹ E.g. Celsus, *De Med.* 1.3.15–16 (34.19–25 M.), 1.5.2 (39.25–26 M.), 3.6.6–7 (111.32–112.7 M.), 3.18.18–24 (126.5–127.15 M.). The same goes for Soranus (despite the fact that he wrote a work entitled *On the Soul*, now lost): *Gyn.* 1.16 (46.95–96 Burguière, Gourevitch, and Malinas), 2.19 (31.80–96 Burguière, Gourevitch, and Malinas), 4.2 (4.59–65 Burguière, Gourevitch, and Malinas). At other times, moral qualities referred to in these authors are connected with professional conduct, e.g. Soranus, *Gyn.* 1.3 (6.1–8.45 Burguière, Gourevitch, and Malinas), Celsus, *De Med.* 7.pr.4 (301.24–302.5 M.); also in Aretaeus, *Chr. Morb.* 1.1.2 (36.11–13 Hude). Caelius Aurelianus, on whose theory of emotions see Horstmanshoff (1999), can also be added to this category.

²² Coughlin (2018). ²³ Pseudo-Quintilian, *The Lesser Declamations* 268.

²⁴ This is also supported by the fact that the doctor acknowledges the admirability of philosophy on the grounds that it promotes contentment with modest means (*modicis contenta est*) and the lack of desire for greater wealth (*ampliores opes non desiderat*). He must thus be referring to moral philosophy in particular.

moral philosophy is rendered useless, having failed to ‘cut out vice’ (*amputant vitia*). At the end of the declamation, the doctor exalts medicine’s utility by focusing only on the way it preserves the body’s wellness, in line with Athenaeus and Soranus above. Though a doctor himself, Galen not only did not subscribe to such notions, but also constructively opposed them through his pragmatic promotion of life-long moral development,²⁵ something that does not seem to have found an equal articulation in (near)contemporary medical discourse (more on this issue in Chapter 2).

Some scholars have briefly considered Galen’s medical ethics vis-à-vis Hippocratic deontology.²⁶ Others have dwelled on his indebtedness (or lack thereof) to earlier psychological and moral traditions by looking at relevant texts as sources of philosophical concepts and arguments. The burgeoning work on Galen’s philosophy of mind since the 1990s especially has provided us with a considerable body of theorisation on the ancient doctrines concerning the structure and function of the soul/mind and its relation to the body, mostly discussing the physical causation (humoral imbalance) and the pathologies of psychological disturbances. Examples include *melancholia*, *phrenitis*, *mania*, epilepsy, hallucinations and the like,²⁷ all nosological conditions which we would today place within the realm of psychiatry.²⁸ The focus in this book will be on moral passions and not mental malfunctions, which are not ‘diseases of the soul’ (νοσήματα τῆς ψυχῆς) in the way that Galen and others understood harmful passions to be,²⁹ albeit he sometimes mingled the two

²⁵ E.g. *De Mor.* 40 Kr.

²⁶ See Jouanna (1997), Linden (1999: 5–9) and Nutton (1972: 57–58); cf. Petit (2019: 51–55). There is still no comprehensive account of Galen’s medical deontology in its own right or its connection with practical philosophy. Research into the connection between medical ethics and practical philosophies in Graeco-Roman antiquity was noted as a desideratum by Kudlien (1970b) as early as 1970, but it has never been fully addressed since then. For Greek medical ethics Carrick (2001) is the most authoritative study.

²⁷ The major work in this area is Gill (1998), (2007), (2010: 243–329); also Hankinson (1991) and (1993), Tieleman (2003b), Donini (2008), Schiefky (2012). See also the relevant chapters in the volume by Manuli and Vegetti (1988).

²⁸ Siegel (1973) considered them neurological conditions and categorised them into syndromes involving the nervous system and syndromes involving mental changes. See also Thumiger and Singer (2018: 1–24).

²⁹ In *Affected Places* Galen claims that the lesions of the rational or hegemonic/regent part of the soul provoke mental illnesses (e.g. phrenitis, lethargy, melancholic delirium), whereas the affections that strike the lower parts of the soul (i.e. the spirited and the desiderative/appetitive) cause moral aberrations, e.g. cowardice. Despite the fact that Galen occasionally argued for a natural aetiology for both mental illnesses and passions of the soul, he compartmentalised the two groups: ‘For clarity of exposition, let the functions of the rational mind (αἱ μὲν τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαι) be

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groupings.³⁰ The same emphasis on theorising obtains in the more recent scholarship on ethics *per se*, which again privileges descriptive models and typologies (for example, in relation to emotions or proposed psychotherapeutic practices),³¹ glossing over Galen's moral agenda and its pragmatic impact on various spheres of the life of the contemporary upper classes as depicted in his works.³²

While taking into account the conceptual underpinnings of Galen's practical ethics, this study seeks to investigate the sophisticated ways – literary, rhetorical, argumentative or other – in which this doctrinal material is deployed by Galen so as to make his moralising more accessible to the reader. To put it another way, when it comes to Galen's voicing of moral ideas it is not the 'what' but the 'how' that interests me. This study highlights the fact that Galen's ethical instruction is tailored to suit various contexts, genres and target audiences, and it foregrounds in particular the social dynamics of his didacticism, which is aimed at enhancing his

called "directive" (ἡγεμονικὰ), and those of non-rational minds (αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων) "moral" (ἠθικὰ); about the latter I do not intend to speak, or about the affections of the liver or the heart.' (*Loc. Aff.* 3.6, VIII.163.2–5 K.). Just like Galen, Plutarch too in *On Superstition* 165C refers to *pathē* specifically as illnesses (*nosēmata*) of the soul (also in *De Garr.* 502E, 504E–F, *De Cohib. Ira* 457B–C, *De Curios.* 515C–D, *De Inv. et Od.* 536E). On Galen's passions as *nosēmata psychēs*, see Gill (1985: 317), Devinant (2018: 201–204) and Singer (2021: 156, with n. 3), who uses the term 'medical psychic impairments' to better distinguish them from emotions. Note Maximus of Tyre's oration entitled *Which Diseases (nosēmata) are Harsher, Those of the Body or Those of the Soul?* (*Oration* 7, ed. Trapp 1994) and Plutarch's (incomplete) essay *Whether the Passions (pathē) of the Soul are Worse than Those of the Body* (*Mor.* 500B–502A), with both works exploring moral passions such as anger, grief, pleasure, hatred, envy etc. (rather than mental dysfunctions) as sicknesses of the soul.

The well-known analogy between body and soul and thus medical and philosophical therapy, which is pervasive in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, also theorises passions as diseases of the soul: 'Philosophy heals human diseases, diseases produced by false beliefs. Its arguments are to the soul as the doctor's remedies are to the body. They can heal, and they are to be evaluated in terms of their power to heal. As the medical art makes progress on behalf of the suffering body, so philosophy for the soul in distress', Nussbaum (1994: 14). See also Edelstein (1967: 362–366), Pigeaud (1981), García Ballester (1988), Luchner (2004: 99–170) and succinctly Gill (2013: 343–348). Edelstein's (1967: 350) view is also worth quoting: 'The true contribution of medicine to philosophy, I venture to suggest, lies in the fact that philosophers found in medical treatment and in the physician's task a simile of their own endeavor. The healing of diseases, as well as the preservation of health, provided an analogy which served to emphasize the validity of certain significant ethical concepts and thus helped to establish the truth of philosophy; therein consisted the most fruitful relationship between ancient medicine and ancient philosophy'.

³⁰ Harris (2013: 9); cf. van der Eijk (2013). One such example of mingling is, for instance, when Galen refers, as he often does, to the emotional manifestations of specific clinical conditions, e.g. fear and despondency (*phobos* and *dysthymia*), accompanying the melancholic condition.

³¹ E.g. Becchi (2012), Singer (2013: 4–41), Kaufman (2017), Singer (2018), Singer (2019b), Lee (2020: 49–102). See also the beginning of Chapter 6.

³² The first few paragraphs of Chapters 4–8 explain in more detail how this book advances previous research and plugs gaps in scholarly literature for each text under examination.

audience's morals not in any abstract or absolute terms, but bearing in mind the special conditions of the community they live in, against a backdrop of situational variability. Galen's moral tracts and passages are examined in their own right and for their own interpretative, communicative or performative merits, not as repositories of philosophical tenets, but as lively textual entities, which convey moral concepts to an informed audience and actively reform their moral positions, while elucidating and debating their contemporary social and cultural ambience, in line with a new-historicist perspective.³³ For instance, the claims of the elite to social mobility and promotion, the power struggles they were often caught up in and the expectation that they should be highly educated and morally upright (*kaloi kagathoi*) are some of the factors that Galen as ethicist had to address, if he wanted to come across as practical and useful to the consumers of his moral advice.

Our knowledge of the moral climate of the Graeco-Roman period in the light of Greek testimonies has significantly improved thanks to recent work on Plutarch's practical ethics (van Hoof 2010, Xenophontos 2016a), Epictetus's pedagogical approach (Long 2002), and Imperial-period popular (not high) morality (Morgan 2007). So the present book seeks to add to this trend by illuminating a hitherto unappreciated and idiosyncratic exponent of philosophical writing on how to lead the good life in this era. Thus the core question that this book addresses is: What is Galen's contribution to the popularisation of moral philosophy in relation to and beyond his proficiency in medicine? Other key questions tackled are: How does Galen adjust his moral guidelines to fit the needs and requirements of contemporary life at the top? What techniques does he employ in assigning himself moral authority on different occasions? And, at the end of the day, to what extent could the exercise of reading Galen's works on medicine and practical ethics in tandem rather than in isolation reshape our image of Galen and his times?

This study ultimately aims to amend the scholarly view that sees Galen's ethical writing as an opportunistic by-product, intended for professional self-advertisement amidst the agonistic structures of the Imperial world.³⁴ It is true that medicine was at the time a notoriously contentious

³³ E.g. Schmitz (2007: 172–175) with further reading.

³⁴ This view refers to Galen's attachment to philosophy in general, though as the scholarly citations below show, ethics in particular is also involved: Nutton (1985: 28–29): 'Galen's own justification of medicine is a desperate attempt to raise it to the level and status of philosophy, an art fully worthy of the truly free man. His convoluted argument links a doctor's detailed knowledge of the internal organs of the body with the possession of all the moral virtues, and turns the doctor into a super-