Introduction
Tripoli, Secondary City of Lebanon

'This is no capital of culture: it's a wrestling ring'

'The Volcano of Beirut'
El-Rass, Tripolitanian rapper

Tripoli, October 2019: young people from various religious backgrounds and all walks of life sang and danced together in the city's central al-Nour Square. The sight shattered the myth that Tripoli was a 'cradle of terrorism' or a 'citadel of Muslims'. The Islamists who had often dominated Tripoli's urban space retreated, and instead, youths, families and the educated middle-class filled al-Nour Square during Lebanon's revolutionary moment. The socio-economic demands of protestors throughout Lebanon found strong resonance in northern Lebanon, one of the country's poorest and most unequal regions. As Tripolitanians came together in a wave of protests, Tripoli became known as the 'bride of the revolution'.

This was a complete turnaround for Tripoli's image. Since the 2000s, Tripoli had been seen by outsiders as an Islamist city, a sort of 'Lebanese Kandahar'. Ever since I arrived in Tripoli in spring 2008 for the first time in a series of visits that would last more than a decade, most Tripolitanians I spoke to expressed resentment of portrayals of their city 'as a city of terrorism, a city of jihad'.[1] A senior official in Dar al-Fatwa complained in 2013 that: 'journalists never come to Tripoli to write about sports or cultural events, even though they do not hesitate to put themselves literally under the bombs to cover rocket attacks in Bab al-Tibbeneh and Jabal Mohsen'.[2] He alluded to the many NGO workers and journalists based in Beirut or abroad who would visit conflict-prone

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[1] Informal discussion with Tripolitanians, August 2009.
[2] Interview, Dar al-Fatwa official, Tripoli, March 2013. Dar al-Fatwa is the highest religious office in Sunni Lebanon. It houses the Mufti of the Republic, the highest religious authority in the country, as well as the Directory of (Sunni) Religious Endowments. The offices in Tripoli and other Lebanese provinces are subordinated to those in Beirut.

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areas to assess the humanitarian situation or interview the fighters, but who would not take the time to see anything else in Tripoli.

Al-Nour Square is one of the main spaces of political protest in Tripoli. It is the first place visitors encounter when they enter Tripoli from the Beirut road. In its roundabout stands a statue with the words of 'Allah', erected by the Islamic Tawhid Movement in the 1980s to replace a statue of a prominent political family. The square thus projects and embodies Tripoli's Islamist identity. During the first years of war in neighbouring Syria, the square was the site of weekly Islamist demonstrations of solidarity with the Syrian opposition, and of protests demanding 'Sunni rights' in Lebanon against the Shiʿa Hizbullah movement. During the anti-sectarian anti-corruption protests of 2019–2020, however, the square was filled with youths, students and families from all walks of life and all religions. A myriad of different anti-sectarian groups were present, from communists to human rights activists and students, forcing the city's Islamists to retreat.

Both Tripoli's Salafi leaders and its anti-sectarian youth movements have attempted to claim the public space to project a specific identity of Tripoli. While Tripoli's Islamists want the city to remain conservative, other forces wish to project a more inclusive image. This struggle, central to Tripoli's history, is visible in al-Nour Square.

In this book, I analyse political violence and urban identity in Tripoli and its crises, in light of the city's history of political protests. The city has in recent years faced multiple concurrent crises in the political, economic, financial and health sectors, made more challenging by the needs of over 233,000 Syrians who, having fled the war in their home country since 2011, settled in northern Lebanon.[3,4]

This book constructs an argument about Tripoli as a secondary city, informed both by rich descriptions of the city and a review of the theoretical literature and regional comparisons. It is one of the first monographs in English, French or Arabic on urban politics in Tripoli since 1967, and it builds on extensive primary material and more than 300 interviews. My book contributes to three fields of literature: the study of Lebanon and the Levant; the literature on sectarianization and identity politics in the Middle East; and debates about the causes of jihadi violence.

[3] UNHCR, 'Operational portal refugee situations', December 2020, https://data2.unhcr .org/en/situations/syria/location/71. Real numbers are probably higher, because many Syrians are not registered with UNHCR. UN-Habitat Beirut, *Tripoli City Profile*, 2016, p. 33.

[4] With the recent Lebanese economic and financial crisis starting in 2019, livelihood is a matter of concerns for all Lebanese citizens, and especially Tripolitanians. This book was written before this crisis and should be read as such.

In this chapter, I first describe the present-day physical setting of Tripoli. Next, I review ways in which Tripoli is a microcosm of the ideological movements of the Middle East as a whole, introducing the concepts of dethronement of secondary cities, politics of autochthony, and erosion of city corporatism in Tripoli. I then discuss broader lessons of the Tripoli case. After outlining my methods, the chapter concludes with a brief overview explaining how the rest of the book is structured.

The Geography of Modern-Day Tripoli[5]

Tripoli is Lebanon's second-largest city and the capital of Sunni north Lebanon. Its middle-class lived in modern and comfortable quarters in the city's West End (see maps of Tripoli in the first pages of the book), near the incomplete futuristic fairground designed by the Brazilian architect Oscar Niemeyer in 1963. In this part of Tripoli, tall luxury buildings on concrete pavements have mostly replaced the more traditional two-storey houses that were surrounded by orange groves and gardens. In the southern extension of this area, close to the road south toward Beirut, lies Tripoli's newest quarter, al-Damm wa-l-Farz, created since 2000. It is evidence of the dynamism of the city's real estate sector,[6] one of few sources of wealth generation in contemporary Tripoli. Al-Damm wa-l-Farz has wide boulevards busy with Western-style cafes and restaurants.

In stark contrast is Tripoli's poverty-stricken old city and the poor quarters in the northeast. Tripoli's old city is of Mamluk origin and its historic Mamluk architecture, dating back centuries, is second only to that found in Cairo.[7] However, security concerns often deter tourists who might visit the old city. After a flood damaged much of the old city in 1957, Tripoli's notable families moved out to newer and more modern quarters, snubbing old traditions. The old city was then inhabited by immigrants from the countryside.[8] It became neglected by the local bourgeoisie, whose focus was on profits to be made in newer quarters.

Between these two urban universes, the old and the new, is the commercial area of Al-Tall, with its Ottoman clocktower donated by the last Sultan, Abdulhamid II (1876–1909). Despite his despotism,

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[5] This section describes the situation prior to the 2019 economic and financial crisis. Tripoli's and Lebanon's social structure have since been severely affected by this crisis.

[6] See Bruno Dewailly, *Pouvoir et production urbaine à Tripoli Al-Fayha'a (Liban): quand l'illusio de la rente foncière et immobilière se mue en imperium*, Université de Tours: PhD thesis, 2015.

[7] The Mamluk dynasty, centred in Cairo, ruled Greater Syria from 1289 until 1517.

[8] Khaled Ziadé, *Vendredi, dimanche*, Paris: Sinbad/Actes Sud, 1996, p. 85.

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Abdulhamid II was popular in Tripoli and other Arab cities because he represented the traditional Islamic values of the old order.

South of Al-Tall on a hill is the residential quarter of Abi Samra, which has come since the 1970s to house the headquarters of most of Tripoli's Islamist movements. The area was favoured by the wealthy classes before the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) because of its pure air and olive trees, but has since become more urbanized and populous. Down the hill from Abi Samra, towards the old city in the north, is the citadel of Saint-Gilles created by the Franks during the European invasions of Crusades (1109–1289).

Abu Ali River divides Tripoli. The river is today covered in concrete, making space for the booths of itinerant vendors and a vegetable market.[9] Across the river to the east of Abi Samra is Tripoli's poorest quarter, Bab al-Tibbeneh. The area was described by the French scholar Michel Seurat in the 1980s as twice marginalized: Tripoli, marginalized from the rest of Lebanon, and Bab al-Tibbeneh from the rest of Tripoli. Its economic and political situation has since deteriorated further.[10]

In Bab al-Tibbeneh and other poor areas in Tripoli's outskirts, unemployment and school dropout rates create a 'poverty culture'.[11] Abuse of tobacco, alcohol, solvents and paint thinners is widespread, as is the use of *habb* (a light narcotic bean). Some young men try to make themselves look tough, with tattoos and scars from self-inflicted cuts.[12]

Many unemployed young adults have dark views of the future, and suffer from low self-esteem and depression.[13] Many are neglected by their parents, or have broken families, as the sons and daughters of widows or divorcees, or with fathers who are addicts or behind bars.[14] These are youth 'who face problems with everything in their daily life, with water, with electricity, and who have no ambitions for their future, who see no future and who have nothing.'[15]

To the north of Bab al-Tibbeneh lies the road leading to Lebanon's northernmost governorate of Akkar and beyond to the Syrian border. To the east of the road is Syria Street, and across Syria Street is the ʿAlawite-dominated ghetto of Jabal Mohsen. Surrounded by Sunni quarters, Jabal Mohsen lies on a hill. Further up the hill is the quarter of al-Qibbeh,

⁹ Catherine Le Thomas and Bruno Dewailly, *Pauvreté et conditions socio-économiques à Al-Fayhâ'a: diagnostic et éléments de stratégie*, report, Institut Européen de Coopération et de Développement (IECD) and l'Agence française de développement, December 2009, p. 39.
¹⁰ UN-Habitat and UNICEF Lebanon, *Tebbaneh Neighbourhood Profile*, 2018, August 2018; UN-Habitat Beirut, *Tripoli city profile*, p. 43.
¹¹ Le Thomas and Dewailly, *Pauvreté et conditions socio-économiques à Al*-Fayhâ'a, pp. 57, 176.
¹² 'Boy prostitution in Tripoli', *Now Lebanon*, 17 March 2009.
¹³ Interview, Katia Kartenian, in charge of the civil society organization al-Haraka al-Ijtimaʿiyya (the Social Movement) in Tripoli, Tripoli, April 2009.
¹⁴ Interview, Tripoli municipality worker, Tripoli, September 2009.   ¹⁵ Ibid.

where the barracks of the Lebanese army are located, along with a branch of the Lebanese University in Beirut created in the 1980s. Jabal Mohsen was until recently (2014) dominated by the ʿId family, a political dynasty closely tied to Damascus; the ʿId protected Tripoli's ʿAlawite minority but also subordinated them to its political goals, which ran contrary to those of most of Tripoli's Sunnis.

Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tibbeneh fought each other frequently during the civil war (1975–1990). The conflict re-erupted with Lebanon's political crisis in 2006. Since 2011, the conflict in Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tibbeneh has begun to mirror the war in neighbouring Syria. Internal violence has created new militant identities in both quarters, endangering Tripoli's city corporatism and social cohesion.[16] The deprivation in the quarters reflects the broader urban and political crisis in Tripoli and throughout Lebanon.[17]

Tripoli as a Microcosm of Ideological Movements

Why did so many episodes of Lebanon's contentious politics in the last century have their centre in Tripoli? What explains Tripoli's propensity for ideological-political activism? Why is Tripoli's political identity so fluid, so frequently transformed? What can Tripoli tell us about broader dynamics in Middle East cities? I argue that the answers to these questions are central to understanding the future shape of democracy, mass participation, and regime stability in the Middle East.

Lebanese history has usually been viewed from the perspective of Beirut, Christian Mount Lebanon, or the Shiʿa south.[18] Lebanese history is rarely told from the perspective of Sunni northern Lebanon or Tripoli. The last book in English about Tripoli dates back to 1967;[19] in Arabic, the most respected one only covers the period up until 1950.[20] More

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[16] For an operationalization of social cohesion, see Michal Bauer, Christopher Blattman, Julie Chytilová, Joseph Henrich, Edward Miguel, and Tamar Mitts. 'Can War Foster Cooperation?', *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 30: 3 (Summer 2016), pp. 249–274.

[17] Umayma Jadaʿ, *Mashrūʿ dirāsāt al-faqr al-ḥaḍarī fī al-buldān al-ʿarabiyya: al-faqr fī madīnat ṭarāblus* (Urban Poverty Study Project in Arab Countries: Poverty in the City of Tripoli), Vol. 2. 'al-Tadakhkhulāt al-waṭaniyya wa-l-maḥalliyya' (National and Local Interventions), Beirut: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), 2010, p. 20.

[18] One example of this is that little mention is given to Tripoli in studies of Lebanese history, which generally begin with the history of Mount Lebanon. See, for example, Kamal Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2005, 1988, p. 3.

[19] John Gulick, *Tripoli. A Modern Arab City*, Boston: Harvard University Press, 1967.

[20] Nur al-Din al-Miqati, *Ṭarāblus fī al-niṣf al-awwal min al-qarn al-ʿishrīn: awḍāʿuha al-ijtimāʿiyya wa-l-ʿilmiyya wa-l-iqtiṣādiyya wa-l-siyāsiyya* (Tripoli in the First Half of the

recent books focus on Tripoli's Salafis, but do not explain why Tripoli has so many protest movements and so much ideological-political activism.[21]

This book contributes to the debate about urban identity, contentious politics, and violence in Lebanon and beyond. It examines Tripoli's ideological-political activism from 1920 until 2020: the city has a particularly militant history of resisting the Lebanese state that goes back to its establishment in 1920 under the French mandate. Militancy in Tripoli transcends specific ideological expressions.

In Tripoli, various political Sunni and non-sectarian movements have demarcated sectors of the city by displaying political posters, flags and religious symbols in the built environment. A wealth of various and contradictory political Sunni movements are present at the same time on a particularly fragmented and hybrid Islamist scene. Since 1920, Tripolitanians have associated themselves with most of the powerful ideological currents running through the wider Middle East. Many of Tripoli's Sunnis considered the Lebanese state illegitimate, since it was devised by the French to allow dominance by the Maronite Christian sect. Many Tripolitanians resisted the state until its independence in 1943. Thereafter, they reluctantly accepted the state of Lebanon, but their primary cultural identity continued to be with the regional trends of Arab Sunnism beyond Lebanon's borders. Tripolitanians have, ever since, had a significant historical propensity for such nationalist protest movements as pan-Arab nationalism, Nasserism, Baʿthism, and Palestinian nationalism.

During Lebanon's civil war, the primary political identity for militant youth in Tripoli transformed: once Arab nationalists, they began to see themselves as Islamists. An Islamist militia ruled the city militarily for three years, which resulted in the flight of much of the city's Christian population. Tripoli's reputation has, since that time, been linked to Islamist movements and Islamist radicalism. However, this ignores the many other layers of Tripoli's identity. Moreover, most of Tripoli's Islamists are moderate, non-violent, and accept the state.

Twentieth Century: Its Social, Scientific, Economic and Political Situation), Tripoli: Dar al-Inshaʾ, 1978.

21 Bernard Rougier, *The Sunni Tragedy in the Middle East: Northern Lebanon from al-Qaeda to ISIS*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014; Zoltan Pall, *Salafism in Lebanon: Local and Transnational Movements*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018; Robert Rabil, *Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism*, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015.

Domestic and regional upheavals often pit Lebanon's confessional-political camps against each other.[22] This became worse after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in the heart of Beirut in 2005. Tripoli then became the electoral stronghold of the Sunni-dominated Future Movement, and a Sunni counter to Shiʿa-dominated southern Lebanon. The spread of sectarianism, in the sense of opposition to Shiʿism, added a new layer to Tripoli's hybrid political identity.

Regional Arab Gulf states considered Tripoli, Lebanon's primary Sunni city, as their main entry-point for exporting Salafism into Lebanon. Their aim was to contain Hizbullah and what they saw as Iran's expansion in the Mediterranean. Thus, in the years between 2005 and 2014, many of Tripoli's religious clerics developed direct links, often monetary ones, with governments or embassies of Arab Gulf states. A mixture of regional and domestic support empowered Tripoli's Islamist movements.

Despite its small size, Tripoli developed one of the most diverse Islamist scenes in the entire Middle East. It became a microcosm of all the Islamist movements present elsewhere in the Arab Middle East, including the Muslim Brotherhood; the ultra-orthodox Salafi trends, the pro-Iranian and pro-Syrian Sunni Islamist movements, the trans-national Hizb al-Tahrir movement, the puritanical Tabligh movement, and jihadi underground networks. Yet, anti-sectarian and non-Islamist movements and groups were also strong in Tripoli, as the city's contribution to Lebanon's October 2019 uprising showed.

Tripoli as a Secondary City

Since 1920, Tripolitanians have tended to side with all ideological movements that opposed the Lebanese state: Arab nationalism, Nasserism, Palestinian nationalism (a nation without a state), and Islamism. Writing in the midst of the Lebanese civil war, the French scholar Michel Seurat pointed out that Tripoli is a city where the majority of the population was Sunni Muslim. He wrote that Tripoli's urban poor rejected the Lebanese state for several reasons: the state had been created by the French; the presidency was reserved for a Maronite Christian; its economy was based on a ruthless type of capitalism and structural inequalities; and it did not

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[22] See, for example, Ohannes Geukjian, *Lebanon after the Syrian Withdrawal: External Intervention, Power-Sharing and Political Instability*, London: Routledge, 2016, p. 275.

provide adequate state services to poor quarters like those in Tripoli and Lebanon's other secondary and tertiary cities.[23]

Seurat argued that the historical propensity of Tripoli's residents to resist the Lebanese state went back to the city's 'dethronement' in 1920: large territories had been detached from Syria and attached to the area of Mount Lebanon to form a new state dominated by the Maronites, and Beirut became its capital.[24]

At the symbolic level, Tripoli's Sunni Muslim population associated Beirut with the minority sect in power, the Maronites. In opposition, they saw northern Lebanon as a fortress of Arab Sunnism. They brandished the flag of conservative Sunnism and used traditional myths and values to defend themselves against dominance by the capital and the central government.

These narratives revealed a city patriotism rooted in the Ottoman and Fatimid era, when Tripoli had been a larger and more prosperous city than Beirut, and a centre of religious Sunnism. Tripoli was, between the 16th and 19th centuries, the capital of an Ottoman province (*wilāya*).[25] Sunni Muslims had ruled the land of Greater Syria, as co-religionists of the Ottomans.

Tripoli is one in a broader universe of 'secondary cities' in the Arab Middle East, in which certain populations perceive themselves as 'dethroned' from power over the affairs of the state.[26] A 'secondary city' is a large city with a recent history of significant decline in its power and prestige. Some of the most radical general transformations in the Middle East in recent years have taken place in secondary cities that exist under the shadow of the capitals from which the regimes rule. Most Sunni secondary cities in the Levant and Iraq, including Tripoli as well as Aleppo and Mosul, are former Ottoman provincial capitals that lost their status with the creation of the modern state in the 1920s.[27] They often

23 Michel Seurat, 'Le quartier de Bâb-Tebbâné à Tripoli (Liban). Étude d'une '*asabiyya* urbaine', in *Syrie, l'État de barbarie*, Paris: Seuil, 2012, 1989, pp. 235–284, pp. 240–241. First published in Mona Zakaria and Bachchâr Chbarou (ed.), *Mouvements communautaires et espace urbain au Machreq*, Beirut: CERMOC, 1986. Seurat died in Beirut in 1986, while held in captivity by the Islamic Jihad group.

24 Ibid., pp. 138–139. Michel Seurat, 'La ville arabe orientale', in *Syrie, l'État de barbarie*, pp. 229–234, p. 232. First published in *Esprit*, February 1986.

25 Antoine Abdel Nour, *Introduction à l'histoire urbaine de la Syrie ottomane XVIe-XVIIIe siècle*, Beirut: Librairie Orientale, 1982, pp. 310–312.

26 Seurat, 'La ville arabe orientale', pp. 231–232.

27 Ibid. For regionalism in Syria, see: Thomas Pierret, *Baas et islam en Syrie. La dynastie al-Assad face aux oulémas*, Paris: PUF, 2012, p. 25. For Mosul's loss of status, see: Shields, Sarah. *Mosul before Iraq: Like Bees Making Five-Sided Cells*, Albany, NY: Sony Press, 2000, p. 190. For tribalism in state governance, see: Ghassan Salamé, *al-Dawla wa-l-mujtamaʿ fī al-mashriq al-ʿarabī* (Society and State in the Arab Levant), Beirut: Arab

have disputed identities and also often suffer the economic and political consequences of urban unrest.[28]

Seurat argued that the dethronement of Aleppo, Tripoli, and Mosul at the creation of the modern state planted seeds of rebellion in the 'personality' of the Levantine secondary cities.[29] Their economies suffered from the creation of new borders and the resulting isolation from their former trading partners in Greater Syria and Iraq.[30] They tended to develop ambivalent relationships with the modern state, because of their historical rivalry with the capital. Thus, they emerged as hubs of resistance to the modern and colonial order. Secondary cities tended to develop an exceptional 'city patriotism' and were also more conservative than the cosmopolitan state capitals.[31] However, as I argue in subsequent chapters, successive and competing mobilizations since the 1960s gradually eroded urban cohesion in Tripoli.

Secondary cities are central to much of the current political crisis in the Middle East. Such secondary cities have a higher propensity than capital cities for unrest. Urban Sunni protest movements in the Levant and Iraq are more likely to emerge in secondary cities than in the capitals. As I explain in Chapter 1, since Tripoli's 'dethronement' in 1920 when it became a neglected periphery in the Lebanese state, Tripoli has opposed the government in Beirut for regional and sectarian reasons.

City Corporatism in Divided Cities

Tripoli's role within Lebanon's conflict economy was as an electoral and demographic stronghold for Lebanese Sunnis and Arab nationalists.[32] Because of this historical role, Tripoli has long been more cohesive than other divided cities such as Karachi, Jerusalem, Nairobi, Belfast, or Beirut. As will be seen throughout this book, a stable, common

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Unity Press, 1987, pp. 218–227; Amatzia Baram, 'Neo-Tribalism in Iraq (1991–96)', in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 29:1 (February 1997), pp. 1–31, p. 5.

[28] For Mosul's disputed identities, see: Sarah Shields, 'Mosul Questions: Economy, Identity and Annexation', in Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor H. Teijirian (eds.), *The Creation of Iraq. (1914–1921)*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, pp. 50–60, pp. 54–56.

[29] Seurat, 'La ville arabe orientale', p. 233; Seurat, 'Le quartier de Bâb-Tebbâné à Tripoli (Liban)', p. 240.

[30] Sarah D. Shields, 'Take-off into Self-sustained Peripheralization: Foreign Trade, Regional Trade and Middle East Historians', *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, 17: 1 (April 1993), pp. 1–23, p. 21.

[31] Seurat, 'La ville arabe orientale', pp. 232, 234; Seurat, 'Le quartier de Bâb-Tebbâné à Tripoli (Liban)', pp. 238, 241, 249–251.

[32] Ibid., p. 238.

understanding of Tripoli's identity was shared by most residents over long periods of time.

City corporatism is an elite mechanism for organizing and integrating the political, economic and social realms of the city or other polity.[33] In the corporatist idea, the city is conceptualized as a harmonious organism, and differences are minimized. Class differences, for example, are downplayed, and internal conflict within the group is not perceived as legitimate.[34] The aim of this model of organization and narrative is not only power projection, but also to defend common interests and a 'common social conscience'.[35]

Urban protests in Tripoli as far back as 1920 produced a city corporatism that united the city's Sunnis in collective action. The concept of city corporatism sheds light on how Tripoli united politically in certain periods against outsiders to the city. In the 1920s, most of Tripoli's population united into a cross-class political front, around common norms, against the French mandate. The political front created in the 1920s outlasted the mandate period. The legacy of the anti-French struggle united the city's Sunnis and many non-Maronite Christians from various social classes until the late 1960s, if not longer. All actors within Tripoli's field of Sunnism opposed the political centre in Lebanon and resisted 'political Maronitism'.

This strong internal cross-class solidarity was possible because of Tripoli's small size, but also because of the strength and entrepreneurship of the dominant Karami family. This political family created cohesion in Tripoli around a common political and identity project, working from the dominant sentiment of the city's population, Arab nationalism. Said differently, Tripoli's cohesion did not follow inevitably from being a secondary city, from being Sunni, or from dethronement; it required political entrepreneurship. In Tripoli's case, Sunni leaders took an active role in defining insiders and outsiders; they defined the city's economic, political and symbolic interests, often based on their own interests. Such boundary work sometimes used violent means, involving feuding rivals.

[33] Erbatur Çavuşoğlu and Julia Strutz, 'Producing Force and Consent: Urban Transformation and Corporatism in Turkey', *City*, 18:2 (2014), pp. 134–148, p. 137. See also: Giulia Annalinda Neglia, 'Some Historiographical Notes on the Islamic City with Particular Reference to the Visual Representation of the Built City', in Salma K. Jayyusi, Renata Holod, Attilio Petruccioli and André Raymond (eds.), *The City in the Islamic World*, Leiden: Brill, 2008, pp. 3–46, p. 11.

[34] For factional balancing under the Ottomans in another case, see: Nora Lafi, 'Violence factieuse, enjeux internationaux et régulation ottomane de la conflictualité urbaine à Tripoli d'Occident entre XVIIIe et XIXe siècles, *Hypothèses*, 16:1 (2013), pp. 395–403, p. 399.

[35] Çavuşoğlu and Julia Strutz, 'Producing Force and Consent', loc. cit.