Introduction
The Communist Party in Leninist Theory, Soviet Practice and Historical Scholarship

The Soviet Union claimed to be a state founded on a class alliance of workers and peasants engaged in the world-historical task of building a communist society.[1] Workers were explicitly recognised as the senior members of this partnership, leading the way in historical progress by means of their political hegemony over the state, exercised through the monopoly in power of the Communist Party. The Party, as the 'highest form of [the proletariat's] class organisation', united in its ranks the most advanced elements of the working class in the struggle for the 'victory of socialism'.[2] It was, in Lenin's expression, the vanguard of the proletariat.[3] Ever prone to literary references, Stalin once likened the Communist Party to Antaeus, the giant of Greek mythology who was invincible as long as he remained in contact with his mother, the earth.[4] By this metaphor, the general secretary suggested that the Soviet Communist Party was not only a leader of the Soviet people, but also born of them and reliant on them for its strength. The premise of this monograph is that such claims reflected strong ideological commitments on the part of the Bolshevik leadership, which ultimately made their way to the institutional architecture of the

[1] The first article of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR stated: 'The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants.' A similar idea was expressed by the lengthier introduction to the 1924 Constitution, which declared that the formation of the USSR had divided the world into socialist and capitalist camps. Iu. S. Kukushkin and O. I. Chistiakov, *Ocherk istorii Sovetskoi Konstitutsii* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), pp. 264, 285.

[2] Thus stated the preamble to the 1934 Party Rules (*Ustav*) of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks). All subsequent references to the *Ustav* shall be given in the form *Ustav* (*date*): (*section*). (*article*). These will refer to the text as it appears in the documentary collection *Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza v rezoliutsiakh i resheniakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK, 1898–1988*, vols. 1–16 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literaturi, 1983–90). Hereafter, the terms Party, Communist Party and the acronym VKP (b) will be used interchangeably.

[3] V. I. Lenin, 'Tezisy ko II-mu kongressu kommunisticheskogo internatsionala', in V. I. Lenin (ed.), *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 5th ed., vol. 41 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1974): 160–212, p. 166.

[4] *Pravda,* 1 April 1937.

USSR and the way it was governed. The chapters that follow will provide an account of the implications of the institutional reflection of these claims for social and political life in the interwar Soviet Union. It will seek, in short, to answer the question: what did the vanguard party actually do?

This book is the first to place the party grassroots at the centre of its account of the formative first two decades of the Soviet system. Though leading Bolsheviks are the protagonists of most works of political history, this study focuses instead on the activities of the many thousands of ordinary communists who acted as the Party's concrete presence throughout Soviet society. Assembled in a large network of primary party organisations (PPO), the Bolshevik rank-and-file was an army of activists made up of ordinary people. While far-removed from the levers of power, they were nevertheless charged with promoting the Party's programme of revolutionary social transformation in their workplaces, neighbourhoods and households. Their incessant meetings, conferences and campaigns have generated a voluminous source base offering a unique view into the practical manifestation of the Party's vanguard mission. The chapters that follow draw on this rich material to craft a new account of how the Soviet republic functioned in the period from the end of the Russian Civil War in 1921 to its invasion by Nazi Germany in 1941.

One of the most influential social historians of the Soviet Union described party activism as a paradox, pointing out that communist rank-and-filers were representatives of political authority but their activities brought them to conflict with functionaries of the state everywhere.[5] This dual nature of the grassroots party membership as the promoter of state policy and supervisor of its implementation is the main theme of the following pages, where it will be argued that, instead of a paradox, communist activism is best viewed as a central feature of state–society relations in the Soviet Union. Rank-and-file activism was inseparable from the policy implementation process, with the party leadership and government unleashing successive waves of political campaigns to generate support for their policy initiatives.

There is much in this that is similar to what sociological literature terms political mobilisation.[6] What differentiates the Leninist concept of the vanguard from agents of political mobilisation more broadly is that the

[5] Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[6] An extensive sociological discussion of the concept of mobilisation is Birgitta Nedelmann, 'Individuals and Parties – Changes in Processes of Political Mobilization', *European Sociological Review* 3, no. 3 (1987): 181–202. For examples of the use of the concept in historical research, see

activity of the Party was intended to achieve more than a mere enhancement of the state's instrumental capacity of policy implementation. The vanguard party was conceived of as the means by which the communist content of policy would be safeguarded, ensuring the successful transition of the USSR to communism at some future point. For this, the active involvement of the rank-and-file in the everyday running of industry, agriculture, the military and everything else was as important as the leadership's control of government and the formulation of policy. This was despite the fact that the existence of a purely technical dimension of administration was recognised by Lenin and the acquisition of technical competence by the state apparatus would regularly emerge as a desideratum in policy pronouncements throughout the interwar period.[7] Getting the state to do what it was told to do was not enough for the Bolsheviks. It had to do things the right way and in the right direction. The very process of policy implementation thus acquired an ideological dimension.

This is crucial for the account offered in this book, because the vanguard principle transformed the party rank-and-file into an ineluctable aspect of the system of government in the USSR. For as long as the leadership remained committed to Marxism–Leninism, it was compelled by its worldview to insist that its policies were implemented by means of activism as well as administration. As will be shown in the chapters that follow, this was so even when it became clear that activism was getting in the way of policy implementation. Significantly, because ideology was more ambiguous than policy, the involvement of the party rank-and-file with the implementation process almost invariably took the form of party activists taking advantage of their status to address their myriad concerns as workers and non-elite members of Soviet society more broadly. This should not be viewed as a cynical attempt to manipulate public discourse. Rank-and-file influence over the implementation process was implied in the vanguard party concept. These people were doing what they were expected to do, even if particular outcomes left much to be desired from the perspective of the leadership.

The paradox in this, if any, is that the party grassroots moved politically closer to the leadership the more they disorganised policy implementation

Stefano Bartolini, *The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860–1980: The Class Cleavage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Gregory M. Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Susan Whitney, *Mobilizing Youth: Communists and Catholics in Interwar France* (Chapel Hill: Duke University Press, 2009).

[7] V. I. Lenin, 'Luchshe men'she, da luchshe', *PSS*, vol. 45: 389–406.

by getting involved in it. Reliant as it was on the input of non-professional activists, this mode of governance gave the latter significant opportunities to pursue their own interests, thus also giving them a stake in the system. Before expanding further on the content of this monograph, it is necessary to clarify its motivation; why study the communist rank-and-file?

The central argument of this book is that the Soviet Union remained a revolutionary polity committed to deep social transformation throughout the interwar period. The vanguard party was the main agent of this revolutionary process, not only as the producer of policy that sought social change, but also as the main instrument by which elements of Soviet society were themselves involved in bringing about this change. The PPO was the organisational space where the policies conceived by the Party leadership who held state power were put into practice by those workers, technicians and administrators who held party cards. It thus acted as an institutional interface between the Soviet state and the society it governed. The account that follows is predicated on an understanding of revolution as a rapid transformation of the relationship between society and the state.[8] It shows that the turbulent fluidity of this relationship received institutional form in the way the vanguard party functioned at its grassroots. In that regard, this book contributes to a broader historiographical trend exploring how the class tensions, political strategies and cultural outlooks that animated revolutions were subsequently transcribed onto the practices and institutions they produced.[9]

The nature of Soviet state–society relations has also been the central question of historical scholarship on the USSR. Telling the story of the early years of Soviet power from the perspective of the party rank-and-file makes it possible to rethink this relationship by sidestepping the problem of primacy that fuelled much of the heated debate that dominated the field

[8] This classic definition is in Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 4.

[9] David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds.), *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760–1840* (New York: Palgrave, 2009); Gail Bossenga, 'The Nobility's Demise: Institutions, Status, and the Role of the State', *The American Historical Review* 124, no. 3 (2019): 942–49; Stephan Fender, *The Global Perspective of Urban Labor in Mexico City, 1910–1929: El Mundo al Revés* (New York: Routledge, 2020); Robert Gerwarth, *November 1918: The German Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020); Sebastian Heilmann et al., *Mao's Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Ralf Hoffrogge, *Working-Class Politics in the German Revolution: Richard Müller, the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the Origins of the Council Movement* (Leiden: Brill, 2014); Mark Jones, *Founding Weimar: Violence and the German Revolution of 1918–1919* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Julia C. Strauss, *State Formation in China and Taiwan: Bureaucracy, Campaign, and Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

in its pre-archival period and has remained implicit in much of its intellectual output to the present day. Virtually every student of Soviet history learns about the acrimonious controversy between scholars subscribing to the totalitarian model of the Soviet state and the younger generation of revisionist historians that sought to deconstruct it. Totalitarianists argued that the power of the state over society was for analytical purposes boundless and consequently framed their scholarship around the intentions of state actors. By contrast, revisionists sought to demonstrate that social realities constrained the power of the state and even forced policy changes, even if, ultimately, all initiative came from above. The debate was to a large extent one about primacy. The problem with this was pointed out by J. Arch Getty at the height of the controversy. Being the product of a revolution, the Soviet Union had no obvious boundaries between state and society. 'An internally divided, improvised, inexperienced, and constantly renovating officialdom shaded almost imperceptibly into a dynamic, mobile, dramatically changing society.'[10]

As the disintegration of the USSR and the decline of the world communist movement appeared to make Cold War categories redundant, the heat generated by these debates died down. A more synthetic picture emerged, where Party leaders for whom Marxist–Leninist ideas matter can and do employ ruthless state power but are constrained by several factors leaving their own mark on historical development. Combined with the vastly increased availability of archival sources after 1991, the fading of old demarcations has led to a reorientation of scholarly efforts to highly empirical research eschewing attempts at broader interpretative syntheses. Some two decades after the archival revolution, one reviewer of the state of the field suggested that the collapse of old intellectual certainties could produce better history, even though it made for duller headlines.[11] Though there is much to agree with in this assessment, this book begins from the premise that the old bottom-up versus top-down binary remains implicit in much of the contemporary literature.[12]

[10] J. Arch Getty, 'State, Society, and Superstition', *The Russian Review* 46, no. 4 (1987): 391–96, p. 394.

[11] Catriona Kelly, 'What Was Soviet Studies and What Came Next?', *The Journal of Modern History* 85, no. 1 (2013): 109–49, p. 149.

[12] A recent book-length historiographical examination of debates on Stalinism is for the most part structured around the totalitarian–revisionist divide and suggests that pre-archival arguments have remained remarkably resilient in the present era. Mark Edele, *Debates on Stalinism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020), pp. 4–6. Quaint accusations of Stalinist apologia also still appear in book reviews: Oleg Khlevniuk, 'Top Down vs. Bottom-up: Regarding the Potential of

This becomes apparent if we consider more recent attempts at developing interpretative frameworks for the Soviet interwar period. One fertile departure in the literature has sought to frame the Soviet project of socialist construction within the broader framework of modernisation. tracing the origins of Marxism–Leninism in the intellectual tradition of the Enlightenment as an attempt to use reason and technological progress in order to improve human life, both materially and culturally.[13] The specificity of the Soviet Union lay in the particular historical legacy of the Russian Empire, combined with the explicitly non-capitalist path of development prescribed by Marxism–Leninism. A quest to overcome the backwardness of old Russia by revolutionary means and at any cost was the essential element of what a prominent contributor to the modernisation literature termed 'Stalinism as a civilization'.[14] By contrast, other scholars took issue with the concept of modernity as a descriptor of Soviet realities, arguing that whatever the intellectual lineage of Marxism–Leninism, the Party's transformative project was thwarted by the weight of Russian history. On their views, the persistence or re-emergence of informal power networks, authoritarian rule and ethnic particularism, among other things, betrayed the nature of the USSR as a neo-traditional or neo-patrimonial state.[15]

Contemporary "Revisionism"'. trans. Aaron Hale-Dorrell and Angelina Lucento, *Cahiers du monde russe. Russie – Empire russe – Union soviétique et États indépendants* 56, no. 56/4 (2015): 837–57; Hiroaki Kuromiya, 'Stalin's World: Dictating the Soviet Order', *Revolutionary Russia* 28, no. 2 (2015): 199–201; E. A. Rees, 'On Stalin's Team: The Years of Living Dangerously in Soviet Politics', *Revolutionary Russia* 29, no. 1 (2016): 110–12.

[13] Michael David-Fox, *Crossing Borders: Modernity, Ideology, and Culture in Russia and the Soviet Union* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015); David L. Hoffmann, *Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); David L. Hoffmann, *Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917–1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Peter Holquist, '"Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work": Bolshevik Surveillance in Its Pan-European Context', *The Journal of Modern History* 69, no. 3 (1997): 415–50; Amir Weiner, ed., *Landscaping the Human Garden: Twentieth-Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003).

[14] Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism As a Civilization* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1997).

[15] J. Arch Getty, *Practicing Stalinism: Bolsheviks, Boyars, and the Persistence of Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013); Yoram Gorlizki, 'Ordinary Stalinism: The Council of Ministers and the Soviet Neopatrimonial State, 1946–1953', *The Journal of Modern History* 74, no. 4 (2002): 699–736; Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Yuri Slezkine, 'The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism', *Slavic Review* 53, no. 2 (1994): 414–52.

There has occurred a certain inversion of analytical focus, whereby scholars interested in the ideological motivations of state policy look for its effects on the granular everyday practices of social life, while those interested in the deeper structures of Russian society examine their manifestations in the political behaviour of the Soviet leadership. This tends to reproduce the analytical distinction between state and society and, implicitly, the search for first causes in their relationship. We seem to be left with much the same picture as before the archival revolution, whereby the state tried to shape society according to its revolutionary vision and society responded in ways that yielded unexpected outcomes, modern or neotraditional. We are still missing a way to put the insight gained by access to the archives into a clearer account of socio-political dynamics than was the case before.

It is not the purpose of this monograph to propose anything as ambitious as a new theory of state–society relations in Soviet history. Instead, it will show that studying a particular feature of the institutional structure of the USSR points the way to a better understanding of the concrete functioning of this relationship in the interwar period. That feature is the rank-and-file of the Communist Party, the mass membership whose party status did not translate into executive positions in the state apparatus. The dual status of party rank-and-filers as *ipso facto* supporters and functionaries of the Soviet system on the one hand and as regular citizens on the other renders the state–society distinction null in their case. The party grassroots were both functionally and by design the locus in the Soviet system (*stroi*) where state and society overlapped. This is because the primacy question emerged as problem of policy for the Bolsheviks well before it became a problem of research for historians. The Leninist concept of the vanguard party was an attempt to provide a solution to the problem of how the state apparatus would remain under the control of a specific part of society – the proletariat – while at the same time pursuing a consistent political project, the historical transition to communism. The chapters that follow will show that the ideological underpinnings of the Soviet system had a concrete institutional reflection in the Communist Party, with profound effects on the way the Soviet state was governed.

This book then speaks to a number of more specialised scholarly debates. First, it contributes to a long tradition of works examining the capacity of the state to implement its policy at different levels of the apparatus. Getty's major contribution to the original revisionist challenge was to show that the Party and state apparatuses had been in such a chaotic state during the interwar period as to make the complex political intrigues

posited by totalitarian scholars implausible.[16] Post-archival research added further layers of complexity to the question of administrative weakness, with James Harris demonstrating that regional power holders such as industrial managers and local party bosses had the ability to mislead the centre and avoid implementing directives they found impossible or simply inconvenient.[17] This centre–periphery power contest had important implications for the question of the origins of the mass repression campaigns of the mid–late 1930s. Political violence was a tool used to bring powerful barons to heel, but was also driven by the information provided by the very same local leaders. Threat inflation was a key tactic used by regional leaders to secure extra power and avoid accountability for policy failures.[18]

By focusing on the party rank-and-file, this study enhances our understanding of how the Soviet system functioned, highlighting a level of politics that has received scarce attention. As the following pages will show, PPO activities blurred the lines between the managers and the managed, by delegating aspects of policy implementation to the latter. This meant that the problem of administrative weakness, actual and perceived, was exacerbated the stronger the Party's presence became on the ground. For the leadership, this was both a source of frustration and a resource in its tussles with regional power centres.

The party rank-and-file emerges here as an additional factor that further complicates known power dynamics. With regard to mass repression, the PPO provided a distinct channel through which existing social tensions could become entangled with state security concerns and thus contribute to the proliferation of violence. This book thus contributes to the literature on the social dynamics of Soviet political violence, but its focus remains broader.[19] Through their membership in the PPO, grassroots communists

[16] John Arch Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933–1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

[17] James R. Harris, *The Great Urals: Regionalism and the Evolution of the Soviet System* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

[18] J. Arch Getty, '"Excesses Are Not Permitted": Mass Terror and Stalinist Governance in the Late 1930s', *The Russian Review* 61, no. 1 (2002): 113–38; J. Arch Getty, 'The Rise and Fall of a Party First Secretary: Vainov of Iaroslavl', in James Harris (ed.) *The Anatomy of Terror* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); James Harris, *The Great Fear: Stalin's Terror of the 1930s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[19] Archival studies of the social dynamics of repression include Wendy Z. Goldman, *Inventing the Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in Stalin's Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Wendy Z. Goldman, *Terror and Democracy in the Age of Stalin: The Social Dynamics of Repression* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Cynthia Hooper, 'Terror from within: Participation and Coercion in Soviet Power, 1924–1964'. Unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 2003; James Hughes, *Stalinism in a Russian Province: A Study of Collectivization and Dekulakization in Siberia* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996).

became involved in all of the cataclysmic transformations that defined the Soviet interwar period but also every little intermediary policy adjustment. Neither dissidents nor state executives, but both militantly communist and fiercely protective of their workplace interests, these people were the concrete manifestation of the twin ideals of activist governance and participatory citizenship that lay at the heart of Marxist–Leninist ideology.

Questions of citizenship and grassroots politics form a significant part of the research agenda on the evolution of the Soviet system after the Second World War. Soviet elections, party conferences and anticorruption campaigns are often framed as attempts to reinforce the system's legitimacy with the demanding public of citizen-soldiers, or as mechanisms of containing tensions within a much expanded and more assertive administrative apparatus.[20] This study shows that post-war political practices had a long pedigree in the institutional experimentation of the 1920s and 1930s, thus placing them in the long(er) durée of the Soviet state-building project.

Finally, this monograph speaks to the perennial question of the role of ideology in Soviet governance. Marxism–Leninism features prominently in the chapters that follow, both as a causal factor and, more importantly, as the boundary of possibility and desirability with respect to policy for all actors involved. What is more, the main object of this study, the party organisation, was itself a product of Marxist–Leninist ideology rather than a deep structure of Russian history. The account that follows contributes to a tradition of scholarship examining the tension in Soviet governance between the demands of technical competence and ideological purity. In a detailed account, David Priestland traced the origins of this tension to an uneasy balance between scientific and romantic elements that was already present in Marx's thought.[21] Other scholars have approached this problem with reference to competing factions of 'reds' and 'experts' or puritans and pragmatists in the leadership, with policy content reflecting the balance of power between them.[22]

[20] Edward Cohn, *The High Title of a Communist: Postwar Party Discipline and the Values of the Soviet Regime* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2015); Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg V. Khlevniuk, *Substate Dictatorship: Networks, Loyalty, and Institutional Change in the Soviet Union* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020); Serhy Yekelchyk, *Stalin's Citizens: Everyday Politics in the Wake of Total War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). See also Alexei B. Kojevnikov, *Stalin's Great Science: The Times and Adventures of Soviet Physicists* (London: Imperial College Press, 2004), chapter 8.

[21] David Priestland, *Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 21–34.

[22] Sheila Fitzpatrick, 'Ordzhonikidze's Takeover of Vesenkha: A Case Study in Soviet Bureaucratic Politics', *Soviet Studies* 37, no. 2 (1985): 153–72; J. Arch Getty, 'Pragmatists and Puritans: The Rise and Fall of the Party Control Commission', *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European*

This study shows that the PPO was an inherently 'red' institution. By its very function, it tended to amplify the radical aspects of party policy and make any technocratic retrenchment hard to implement in practice. At its most direct point of contact with society, the Soviet system was always ideologically charged, in a manner reflecting the views and preferences of grassroots party activists. This argument also has implications for our understanding of how Soviet citizens internalised and interpreted official ideology. A significant body of work has approached this as a process of linguistic adaptation – 'speaking Bolshevik' – reflecting various levels of psychological transformation.[23] In the pages that follow, the PPO emerges as the political space where Soviet citizens could both learn and effectively deploy Bolshevik rhetoric. The ability to act Bolshevik was both an incentive and a prerequisite for mastering this vernacular.

Communist rank-and-filers were as much Marxist–Leninist advocates and executors of government policy as they were workers and functionaries concerned with their immediate environment. Their activity was a fundamental element of the Soviet political system, one that renders the contours of the imperceptible shading of the state into society much more discernible to the historian. For the state, the party rank-and-file was a section of society that could be relied upon to promote its policies. For the large majority of people who had little influence over state power, it was a part of the Soviet system that could make sure these policies were implemented in a way consistent with their needs. This monograph will examine how communist activists mediated state–society relations in the Soviet interwar period. The remainder of this introduction will outline how.

I.1 Methodological Leninism: Studying the Communist Rank-and-File

Due in large part to the persistence of the state–society binary, the Communist Party as a distinct political institution with specific traits

Studies, no. 1208 (1997); Jonathan Harris, *The Split in Stalin's Secretariat, 1939–1948* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008); Daniel Stotland, *Purity and Compromise in the Soviet Party-State: The Struggle for the Soul of the Party, 1941–1952* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2017).

[23] Igal Halfin, *Red Autobiographies: Initiating the Bolshevik Self* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011); Igal Halfin, *Stalinist Confessions: Messianism and Terror at the Leningrad Communist University* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009); Igal Halfin and Jochen Hellbeck, 'Rethinking the Stalinist Subject: Stephen Kotkin's "Magnetic Mountain" and the State of Soviet Historical Studies', *Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas* 44, no. 3 (1996): 456–63; Jochen Hellbeck, *Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain*, p. 198.