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A SAFETY VALVE MODEL OF EQUITY AS ANTI-OPPORTUNISM

Kenneth Ayotte
UC Berkeley School of Law

Ezra Friedman
Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law

Henry E. Smith Harvard Law School







Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,
New Delhi – 110025, India

103 Penang Road, #05-06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467

Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment, a department of the University of Cambridge.

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www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781009217941

DOI: 10.1017/9781009217965

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First published 2023

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-1-009-21794-1 Paperback ISSN 2732-4931 (online) ISSN 2732-4923 (print)

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A Safety Valve Model of Equity as Anti-opportunism

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DOI: 10.1017/9781009217965 First published online: August 2023

The co-editor in charge of this submission was Carmine Guerriero.

Kenneth Ayotte
UC Berkeley School of Law

Ezra Friedman Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law

> Henry E. Smith Harvard Law School

Author for correspondence: Kenneth Ayotte, kayotte@law.berkeley.edu

Abstract: Equity can be defined as the use of a more flexible, morally judgmental, and subjective mode of legal decision-making that roughly corresponds with historical equity. This Element presents a simple contracting model that captures the role of equity as a safety valve and shows how it can solve problems posed by opportunists – agents with an unusual willingness and ability to take advantage of necessary imperfections in the law. In this model, a simple but imperfect formal legal regime is able to achieve first-best in the absence of opportunists. But when opportunists are added, a more flexible regime (equity) can be preferred. However, equity is also vulnerable to being used opportunistically by the parties it intends to protect. Hence, the Element shows that it is often preferable to limit equity, reserving it for use only against those who appear sufficiently likely to be opportunists.

Keywords: equity, formalism, contextualism, opportunism, contracts

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ISBNs: 9781009217941 (PB), 9781009217965 (OC) ISSNs: 2732-4931 (online), 2732-4923 (print)



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