

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	<i>page x</i>
1 Introduction	I
1.1 Overview	I
1.2 Chapter Descriptions	2
1.3 A Unique Perspective	4
2 Criteria for a Satisfactory Account of Agnosticism	6
2.1 Introduction	6
2.2 Non-Belief and Friedman’s Criteria	7
2.3 The Possibility of Doxastic Inconsistency	12
2.4 Examples of Doxastic Inconsistency	16
2.5 Alternatives to the Inconsistent Attitudes Explanation	18
2.6 Agnosticism-Involving Doxastic Inconsistency	21
2.7 The Impossibility of Agnosticism-Involving Inconsistency	23
2.8 Attitudinal Accounts and Wagner’s Criteria	32
2.9 Conclusion	39
3 Competing Attitudinal Accounts of Agnosticism	41
3.1 Introduction	41
3.2 Russell’s Metacognitive Account	41
3.3 Crawford’s Metacognitive Account	43
3.4 Masny’s Metacognitive Account	48
3.5 Raleigh’s Metacognitive Account	50
3.6 Wagner’s Endorsed-Indecision Account	52
3.7 Friedman’s Sui Generis Account	54
3.8 Conclusion	57
4 The Questioning-Attitude Account of Agnosticism	59
4.1 Introduction	59
4.2 Defining Key Terms	59
4.3 Agnosticism as Question-Directed	61
4.4 Agnosticism as Proposition-Directed	66
4.5 Agnosticism Attitude-Ascriptions	71

4.6	Agnosticism as Sui Generis	74
4.7	Applying the Seven Criteria	79
4.8	Conclusion	81
5	Agnosticism and the Inquiring State of Mind	83
5.1	Introduction	83
5.2	Defining Inquiry	84
5.3	The Inquiry-Entails-Agnosticism Thesis	86
5.4	The Agnosticism-Entails-Inquiry Thesis	91
5.5	The Unanswerable Questions Objection	92
5.6	My Argument against the Descriptive Thesis	95
5.7	My Argument against the Normative Thesis	101
5.8	Conclusion	105
6	The Act-Attitude Account of Doxastic Neutrality	107
6.1	Introduction	107
6.2	McGrath's Tripartite Account of Neutrality	108
6.3	The Mongrel Concept Objection	112
6.4	Negative versus Positive Neutrality	118
6.5	Interrogative and Anti-interrogative Attitudes	126
6.6	Conclusion	131
7	On the Non-existence of Practical Agnosticism	132
7.1	Introduction	132
7.2	The Appropriateness Norms for Belief	133
7.3	The Appropriateness Norms for Intention	134
7.4	Agnosticism, Picking, and Buridan's Ass	138
7.5	Is Indifference Practical Agnosticism?	142
7.6	Agnosticism, Acceptance, and the Truth-Aim	145
7.7	Conclusion	149
8	Agnosticism and Pragmatic Reasons	151
8.1	Introduction	151
8.2	Agnosticism and Transparency	151
8.3	Agnosticism and Pragmatic Considerations	155
8.4	Schroeder's Belief Sufficiency Principle	158
8.5	Agnosticism and Evidentialism	164
8.6	Conclusion	169
9	Agnosticism, Permissivism, and Peer Disagreement	171
9.1	Introduction	171
9.2	Agnosticism-Involving Permissivism	172
9.3	Nickel's Argument for Permissivism	175
9.4	Objections to Permissivism	180
9.5	The Requirements for Epistemic Peerhood	188
9.6	An Argument for the Agnostic Response	196

	<i>Contents</i>	ix
9.7	Palmira’s Objection to the Agnostic Response	197
9.8	Conclusion	201
10	Conclusion	203
10.1	Agnosticism as Sui Generis Attitude	204
10.2	Agnosticism’s Rational Appropriateness	205
10.3	Giving Agnosticism Its Due	207
	<i>References</i>	209
	<i>Index</i>	214