

## THE ATTITUDE OF AGNOSTICISM

We often describe ourselves as agnostic on a wide range of topics, such as does God exist, is string theory true, or will the president win re-election? But what, precisely, does it mean to be agnostic? This monograph employs the tools and techniques of analytic philosophy to offer a broad account of what it means to be agnostic in both theological and non-theological contexts, and offers a critical discussion of the major descriptive accounts of agnosticism in the contemporary analytic philosophical literature. Unlike most other volumes on the subject, which approach the question from a theological point of view, this is the first book-length discussion of agnosticism from a purely philosophical point of view. It serves as a natural starting point for students and specialists in philosophy and anyone who is interested in the topic of agnosticism through the lens of analytic philosophy.

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# THE ATTITUDE OF AGNOSTICISM

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<sup>1</sup> Archer (2023).    <sup>2</sup> Archer (2022).    <sup>3</sup> Archer (2019).



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