



Introduction

I begin with a letter, sent to Kant from Tübingen on the first of February 1774 and signed by an unidentified author, “C.F.R.”:

Noble, Learned, Esteemed Herr Professor,

Allow me to thank you for the great pleasure that I have received in particular from your *Observations on the Beautiful and Sublime*. For quite a while now, I have made aesthetics my main activity and to this end I read not only Longinus, but also in particular the excellent essays of Mendelssohn, Home, Meiners, and others.¹ But none pleases me as much as yours. Whenever I compare these or other aestheticians with each other, I find that your opinions are fundamentally different from them regarding how to study the main sources of our cognitions in aesthetics or the way aesthetic concepts are formed in general: whether the kinds of ideas this science encompasses belong to those definite powers that have been discovered up this point or to other capacities not yet perceived by the ancient philosophers; whether the correct taste for the beautiful and sublime is inborn, or whether the sensation of the beautiful comes from the structure of the human being, or whether it depends on education or climate or age, in short whether everything beautiful is relative: and finally if there are different kinds of beauty, which of these should one take to be the most beautiful in general?

A few lines later, C.F.R. offers some answers and defends a distinction between sensible and intellectual beauty.

In what concerns the question, whether all beauty is absolute or relative, I always think one must make a distinction between sensible beauty and intellectual beauty. With sensible beauty there can be different opinions; one can claim to take many different things, or even the opposite, to be beautiful; one might not notice certain beautiful qualities because one has not yet been raised to the required enlightenment and cultivation of the understanding; often what is missing is either the agreeable ideas

¹ C.F.R. is referring to Moses Mendelssohn, Henry Home (Lord Kames), and Christoph Meiners. The full title of Kant's 1764 treatise is *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*.

themselves or at least a strong association of them; in that case, everything is only relatively beautiful. Only with the intellectually beautiful, I think, can the judgment of human beings lacking any erroneous concepts not be varied. For, if it is certain that everything intellectual is something absolute and necessary in and of itself – and who should deny this? – then I think my proposition can be rightly said to follow. The same object cannot be understood differently by me and someone else, provided that neither one of us errs. In contrast, with sensible beauty, the matter looks quite different. With this kind, the senses alone are activated, and the senses depend on the various tissues of the fibers and other similar conditions. . . . But the intellectually beautiful must be equally beautiful to all possible nations, and if this is not the case, they err. When it is judged correctly, the object that is intellectually beautiful cannot be judged otherwise. Here only *errors* can sneak in – not different opinions that are grounded in the matter itself.

(Br 10:146–8; my trans.)²

Despite C.F.R.'s pleas to hear from him at the end of the letter, it is unclear that Kant ever responded. If he replied, there is no record of it.³

C.F.R. is touching on the distinction that Kant would later formulate, sixteen years later, in §16 of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*: the distinction between adherent beauty and free beauty, or between (partly) conceptual and the sensible beauty. It would be a stretch to say that C.F.R. is the hidden source of Kant's view in §16, since Kant had already been thinking of something like the distinction between sensible and intellectual beauty. In addition, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Johann Georg Sulzer had already presented similar ideas. It may well be a coincidence that C.F.R.'s position reflects Kant's own thinking at this time. At the same time, the letter could have encouraged or prompted Kant to develop or make further use of the contrast. In any case, in the 1770s Kant not only made such a distinction, he agreed that the *intellectual* kind was the more “self-standing” or self-sufficient of the two kinds. This is the exact reverse of his position in the third *Critique* (i.e., *Critique of the Power of Judgment*), where Kant holds that it is *free* beauty that is self-sufficient. In this study, I explore such continuities and discontinuities in Kant's thinking.

² The collection, Immanuel Kant, *Correspondence*, trans. Arnulf Zweig (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), does not contain a translation of this letter (Letter 80).

³ The selection of Kant's letters, Otto Schöndörffer, *Kant's Briefwechsel*, ed. Rudolf Malter and Joachim Kopper (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1986), does not include this letter. Nor does the thorough study, Werner Stark, *Nachforschungen zu Briefen und Handschriften Immanuel Kants* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1993), identify the letter's author. Thanks to Werner Stark and Steve Naragon for discussion of this letter (and many other points).

“The Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment” in Kant’s third *Critique* is widely recognized as being one of the most important contributions to aesthetic theory in the history of the discipline. As one scholar put it, “If the single most influential text in the history of philosophical aesthetics were to be chosen, Immanuel Kant’s . . . *Critique of Judgment* of 1790 might well turn out to be the one that a majority of philosophers would point to.”⁴ By paying attention to Kant’s early publications, marginalia, correspondence, and university lectures, I explore the development and sources of Kant’s aesthetic theory.⁵ Each of this book’s eight chapters is devoted to how Kant handles a theme that should be of interest to readers in aesthetics and allied fields. The themes are aesthetic normativity, free (sensible) beauty, adherent (intellectual) beauty, creativity or genius, the fine arts, sublimity, ugliness and disgust, and humor.

For some decades now in anglophone Kant research, scholars have been investigating the genesis of Kant’s third *Critique*.⁶ Such studies, though

⁴ Kai Hammermeister, *The German Aesthetic Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 21.

⁵ For details about the lectures and Kant’s teaching activity, see Steve Naragon’s remarkable, continuously updated site, “Kant in the Classroom.” <https://users.manchester.edu/Facstaff/SSNaragon/Kant/Home/index.htm> [accessed September 7, 2021]. Given the website’s extraordinary breadth and depth, I will not here go over the details of Kant’s teaching activities. See also the Introductions to the “Critical Guide” volumes on Kant’s lectures on anthropology, metaphysics, and ethics. Alix Cohen, ed., *Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Courtney D. Fugate, ed., *Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). Lara Denis and Oliver Sensen, eds., *Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). See also the Introduction to Robert R. Clewis, ed., *Reading Kant’s Lectures* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015), 1–29.

⁶ Howard Caygill, “Kant’s Apology for Sensibility,” in *Essays on Kant’s Anthropology*, ed. Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 164–93. John Zammito, *Kant, Herder and the Birth of Anthropology* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002). John Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 12–28. Paul Guyer, “Play and Society in the Lectures on Anthropology,” in Clewis, *Reading Kant’s Lectures*, 223–41. Paul Guyer, “Beauty, Freedom, and Morality: Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology and the Development of His Aesthetic Theory,” in *Essays*, ed. Jacobs and Kain, 135–64. For studies in languages other than English, see, for instance, Daniel Dumouchel, *Kant et la genèse de la subjectivité esthétique: Esthétique et philosophie avant la Critique de la faculté de juger* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1999). Serena Feloj, *Il sublime nel pensiero di Kant* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2013). Paul Menzer, *Kants Ästhetik in ihrer Entwicklung* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1952). Alfred Baeumler, *Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft. Bd I. Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der Ästhetik und Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1923). Hans-Georg Juchem, *Die Entwicklung des Begriffs des Schönen bei Kant unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Begriffs der verworrenen Erkenntnis* (Bonn: H. Bouvier, 1970). In this Introduction, I explain how the present book builds on yet goes beyond such studies,

significant, have not been organized around specific topics that are of interest to contemporary aesthetic theorists and readers from kindred disciplines. Nor have they all paid sufficient attention to the claims Kant made in his university lectures and handwritten notes or marginalia (i.e., the *Reflexionen* or Reflections). And while some studies have examined Kant's views of aesthetic normativity,⁷ beauty, or the sublime, much less scrutiny has been given to topics of increased interest across the humanities and social sciences today, such as ugliness, disgust, and humor. And when ugliness, disgust, and humor have been investigated, it has usually been without much attention to the evolution of Kant's views.

How did Kant arrive at the position published in 1790? How might his early views clarify what he was trying to say in the third *Critique*? I will tackle such questions by focusing on Kant's early materials, charting the development of his aesthetic theory as Kant was responding to ideas from authors such as Charles Batteux, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Edmund Burke, Henry Home, Hume, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Moses Mendelssohn, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Lord Shaftesbury, Voltaire, and Christian Wolff.⁸ As C.F.R. implies ("Longinus, Mendelssohn, Home, and Meiners"), to understand the origin of Kant's aesthetics, one must examine Kant's predecessors. Kant's ideas in aesthetics drew heavily from the German philosophical tradition that stems from Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten,⁹ and Meier and extends to Mendelssohn and Sulzer.¹⁰ At the same time, Kant also appropriated ideas from British authors as well as (to a lesser extent) writers in French (Batteux, Rousseau) and Italian (Pietro Verri). Since Kant's early

which tend to be contributions to Kant scholarship without being organized around core themes in aesthetics, or which are working with older editions and translations of Kant's work.

⁷ For instance: Konstantin Pollok, *Kant's Theory of Normativity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). Karl Ameriks, "Ginsborg, Nature, and Normativity," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 56, no. 4 (2016): 389–95. David Berger, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory: the Beautiful and Agreeable* (London: Bloomsbury, 2011).

⁸ Given limitations of space, I cannot examine all of the relevant thinkers who deserve to be covered, and writers I discuss are often covered all too briefly. In particular, more attention would be given to Johann Jakob Bodmer, Johann Jakob Breitinger, Johann Georg Hamann, Johann Gottfried Herder, Georg Friedrich Meier, Karl Philipp Moritz, and Sulzer. Entire books could be (and sometimes have been) written about their aesthetic theories.

⁹ When Kant started teaching an anthropology course in 1772/73, he used the "Empirical Psychology" section from Alexander Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* (Halle: Carl Hemmerde, 1739). Since that section included topics from Baumgarten's aesthetics, Kant's anthropology course is an indispensable source for understanding the development of his aesthetics.

¹⁰ On Mendelssohn and Kant, including an examination of their respective aesthetic theories, see Paul Guyer, *Reason and Experience in Mendelssohn and Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

aesthetics synthesizes mainly the German and British aesthetic traditions, I focus on writers from these two traditions.

I examine the early materials in order to discern and comment on the continuities and discontinuities in his views, to gain possible insights into the meaning and wider context of the claims in the “Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment.” (For reasons that will become evident in this Introduction, I do not examine the book’s second part, the “Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment.”) By considering the positions Kant once adopted, one can contextualize and better discern the meaning of some of the claims defended in the “Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment.” For instance, Kant’s early grounding of taste in harmony and symmetry can explain (if not justify) why the third *Critique* contains a version of formalism – endorsed by theorists such as Clement Greenberg yet widely disputed by critics who emphasize the cultural, materialist, economic, or political contexts of art production and consumption.¹¹

My intended audience naturally includes Kant scholars, historians of philosophy, and historians of ideas. Given the themes covered in this book, I also write for students and scholars in philosophical aesthetics, art history, German studies, literary theory, media and film studies, and readers working in fields where Kant’s ideas about aesthetics are widely discussed (whether in a positive or negative light). Here Kant may be a widely cited source for the current debate (as in the case of the sublime, ugliness, and humor), while at other times he may be less directly associated with the topic today (as in the fine arts).

Each chapter addresses one of the core aesthetic themes in conjunction with selected views of some of his contemporaries or recent predecessors, whose positions will bring into relief the specific features of Kant’s thought.¹² To be sure, just as one could write monographs about the historical figures who influenced Kant, one could devote a book to each of my eight topics.

Given my aims, I do not assign entire chapters to Kant’s “principle of purposiveness” or to his view of “vital forces.” Few (if any) contemporary authors appeal to such concepts in proposing aesthetic theories today. For similar reasons, I do not devote chapters to Kantian notions of the common

¹¹ Influential examples of such critical perspectives are Terry Eagleton, *Ideology of the Aesthetic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), and Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). Similar interpretations continue to be offered today.

¹² For a consonant method, see Pauline Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3. Menzer likewise gives a brief overview of Kant’s sources before going into Kant’s views on a given theme (e.g., genius). Menzer, *Entwicklung*, 84–6.

sense (*sensus communis*),¹³ the supersensible substrate underlying inner and outer nature, the reflective power of judgment as such, a transcendental deduction of the a priori principle of the power of judgment, the finality of nature, or nature as a system.¹⁴ Kant's views of physiognomy, including its relation to the ideas of Johann Caspar Lavater and Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, may be of considerable historical interest, but given my aims I consider Kant's account of physiognomy only in passing. Many topics relevant to the "Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment" (organisms, hylozoism, Spinozism, arguments for God's existence, the ends of history, the systematic nature of philosophy) could not be discussed in this book.

Thus, a criterion for selecting the eight themes is influence or import within aesthetics. Kant's account of each theme, moreover, had to be of sufficient philosophical interest, or (ideally) even guide the contemporary debate (as in the sublime or the form of aesthetic judgment). A related criterion is that Kant himself investigated the topic with sustained attention. I thus leave aside tragedy and comedy as well as the notion of novelty, for Kant did not address these topics at any length in the third *Critique* (though he touches on them here and there in Reflections and lectures).

The centrality of most of the eight topics should be clear. The normativity of *aesthetic judgment* is widely debated in contemporary philosophical aesthetics, and it seems to be increasingly discussed in the wider humanities and studies of the arts.¹⁵ Studies and theories of *beauty*, whether more conceptual (genre-based, stylistic, institutional) or more formalistic, continue to be carried out or proposed, even if few contemporary critics would view appraisals of art in terms of beauty alone. The notion of *genius* is present, even if in modified

¹³ Kant's understanding of the common sense or *sensus communis* surely belongs to his wider aesthetic and epistemological theory, and it connects Kant to predecessors such as Shaftesbury. Given my aim of reaching contemporary audiences, however, I do not explore the notion of the *sensus communis*. In any case, the notion of the common sense (as a sense for judging in common or with universal/general [*allgemeingültig*] validity) appears to emerge only around 1781/82 (V-Anth/Mensch 25:1095–6), or 1777–80 (V-Met/L1 28:250–1), or 1776–78, here in a sense tied to sociality rather than in the third *Critique* sense: "Aesthetic judgment (in accordance with common sense) is taste. . . . Taste is the judgment of society or social judgment" (1776–78; R 1860; 16:139; cf. R 1850; 1776–78; 16:137). See also the note in Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 372 no. 48.

¹⁴ Guyer, *Taste*, 44, claims that the principle of systematicity is "actually irrelevant" to Kant's theory of taste. He adds (59): "Kant's explanation of aesthetic response is at odds with his characterization of the principle of reflective judgment, and the principle of taste has nothing to do with the latter."

¹⁵ Although Kant does not use the phrase "aesthetic normativity" per se, I hope readers will permit me to use it to refer to the bindingness or demand for agreement associated with aesthetic judgments of beauty and sublimity.

form, in theories of artistic creation and creativity generally, and is relevant to the interdisciplinary field of creativity studies that has been growing since the 1950s. The centrality of the *fine arts* to aesthetics hardly requires comment. The *sublime* came to particular prominence in European aesthetic debates by the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. For a while, especially in the wake of G.W.F. Hegel, the sublime perhaps drifted away to some extent, but now it continues to be widely discussed. The third *Critique's* account of *ugliness*, despite the brevity of Kant's remarks, has been well studied by scholars such as Karl Rosenkranz since the first half of the nineteenth century, if not earlier. Examined by writers from Aristotle to Lessing, not only is ugliness analyzed in aesthetics today, the concept also seems especially suited for interpreting many contemporary artworks.

The inclusion of the chapter on humor perhaps requires more explanation. While humor research is a growing interdisciplinary field, the study of humor within contemporary philosophy can be characterized as a subdiscipline of philosophical *aesthetics*. There are Kantian reasons, too. First, Kant's thoughts on humor can be seen as part of his more general aesthetic theory – not just as part of his anthropology, psychology, or ethics. Laughter at humor, Kant thinks, involves a play with aesthetic ideas (or rich representations of the imagination) – similar to how he describes aesthetic play in response to *beauty*. While the aesthetic play in humor and the one in beauty are not identical, they are analogous.¹⁶ Second, Kant considers the ability to create humor via wit to be one of the “agreeable” aesthetic arts. If so, examining humor as an agreeable art can clarify Kant's view of the arts in general. Finally, in a section on the imagination, Kant himself examines ridicule and laughter after discussing genius or the artist (Anth 7:174). Throughout the anthropology lectures, Kant pursues similar connections between the arts (above all, music) and laughter at humor, both conceived as kinds of play (e.g., V-Anth/Collins 25:184–7).

In each chapter, the investigation is typically guided by an interpretive question. What, according to Kant's early aesthetics, is the role played by rules? Does he think an artistic genius can produce original nonsense or must it be tamed by taste? How does he classify the fine arts? Guided by the question, each chapter usually includes a version of the following five components:

1. Summarize the general account of the topic Kant defends in the third *Critique*.
2. Characterize the (modern) intellectual debate or context that shaped Kant's view of the topic in question.

¹⁶ See Robert R. Clewis, *Kant's Humorous Writings: An Illustrated Guide* (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), 54–8.

3. State the development of Kant's views by examining the pre-Critical materials (publications, marginalia, correspondence, and lecture transcriptions).
4. Revisit the third *Critique*, revealing what views are retained, omitted, or modified.
5. Explain any discontinuities or continuities in his views.¹⁷

On (1): Entire articles and monographs can be (and have been) devoted to each of the topics summarized toward the beginning of each chapter. The study of Kant's aesthetics in the third *Critique* in anglophone Kant studies has grown considerably since the 1970s. Nevertheless, at the beginning of each chapter, I offer as conventional or accurate a reading as possible, while at the same time acknowledging interpretive difficulties and questions.

I start each chapter with an overview of Kant's position in the third *Critique*, for it is due to his published account, I gather, that readers today would be interested in studying his intellectual development in the first place. With such an overview of Kant's more familiar position in place, readers can see what claims were retained, rejected, or modified, and in what ways (though without necessarily seeing his development as a steady and inevitable "march" toward the published version of 1790).

Another reason (besides the light it might shed on the third *Critique*) to consider the relevant historical–philosophical developments (2) is to see if Kant's views relate to his intellectual predecessors in "philosophically interesting ways."¹⁸ To provide focus, I typically limit my analysis to authors Kant mentioned, cited, or directly engaged with. For my purposes, it is typically not enough for a writer to have put forward claims or arguments *similar* to, or that resonate with, Kant's, or to have proposed ideas that overlapped with his (or ideas that Kant opposed for that matter). While recognizing the limits of this procedure, I instead seek documentable influences on Kant's aesthetics, verified by his invoking the writer in a text or source material, that is, in Kant's allusions and references to, or citations of, the author or person in question.¹⁹ This means: yes to Lessing and Rousseau, and no to Diderot.

In engaging in (2), the notion of a "text" is construed broadly so as to include a "constellation" of sources (somewhat in the sense of Dieter Henrich's *Konstellationsforschung*), including intellectual papers or magazines such as

¹⁷ For a similar method, see Huaping Lu-Adler, "Constructing a Demonstration of Logical Rules, or How to Use Kant's Logic Corpus," in Clewis, ed., *Reading Kant's Lectures*, 137–58. Thanks also to Marcus Willaschek for discussing this methodological point.

¹⁸ Lu-Adler, "Constructing," 157.

¹⁹ Herder, whom I discuss in the chapter on genius, is an exception. In neither his *Reflections* on aesthetics nor in the third *Critique* does Kant name Herder, but I think Kant's philosophical concerns with Herder lead Kant to consider the view that a genius can produce original nonsense, and thus that "genius" needs to be tamed by taste and judgment (see Chapter 4). See also Zammito, *Genesis*, esp. 8–10, 142–3.

the English journal, *The Spectator*.²⁰ But I naturally draw from the more philosophical. Major political events (treaties, edicts), reports on natural disasters (such as the 1755 Lisbon earthquake), and various kinds of visual materials or written documents (printed or not) surely informed Kant's thinking, and they make up part of the relevant intellectual context. But to limit my scope and provide focus, I analyze mainly philosophical texts.

One might also worry if a study focuses too much on (2), the thread of Kant's main argument or position will be lost. This could pose a risk, admittedly. But, as noted, toward the beginning of each chapter, I summarize (as much as feasible) the respective account in the third *Critique*. In addition, each chapter shows how Kant's views developed (3). The focus remains squarely on Kant.

With the lecture transcriptions, dating can be uncertain. Moreover, the lecture notes were written by student transcribers, and these note-takers could garble Kant's message. Since none of the lecture transcriptions is a verbatim transcript of Kant's lectures, the transcriptions must be used with caution.²¹ If they are to provide authentic insight into Kant's views, they should be read in light of his published works (keeping in mind the publication's genre, style, and audiences) as well as other sets of lecture notes, his marginalia, and correspondence. Günter Zöller observes: "The philosophical interest that resides in Kant the lecturer chiefly consists in the further evidence the lectures provide for the extended emergence of Kant's original and novel views out of the critical reception of received positions and established doctrines."²² Accordingly, one needs to understand the eighteenth-century background of Kant's views. Zöller continues: "typically then, analyzing and assessing Kant's lectures will involve both a close consideration of the doctrinal traditions and traditional doctrines involved in the lectures' subject matter and a consideration of Kant's own pertinent philosophical views, as documented in his contemporaneous works, above all the published works, but also the hand-written remains (*Nachlaß*) and correspondence."²³ In the case of Kant's aesthetics or views of taste, however, there are not any "published works" after the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* of 1764 (a work that itself concerns, after all, much more besides aesthetic theory). Thus, in

²⁰ Dieter Henrich, *Konstellationen. Probleme und Debatten am Ursprung der idealistischen Philosophie (1789–1795)* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1991).

²¹ For guidelines on using the transcriptions, see the Introduction to Fugate, *Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics*, 11; Naragon, "Kant in the Classroom"; and the Introduction to Clewis, ed., *Reading Kant's Lectures*, 8–14.

²² Günter Zöller, "'Without Hope and Fear': Kant's *Naturrecht Feyerabend* on Bindingness and Obligation," in Clewis, ed., *Reading Kant's Lectures*, 346–61, 346.

²³ *Ibid.*

writing about the development of Kant's aesthetics, I look closely at the marginal notes, lecture transcriptions, and correspondence.

The marginal notes enjoy a certain advantage: they were written by Kant. One can be sure a Reflection expresses what was (at least at one point) a thought he had, even if he later changed his mind or was just working through his thoughts (or summarizing or commenting on another author) rather than stating a considered position. At the same time, the fragments can be difficult to date (often more so than the lecture transcriptions), having at best a merely general date range. Like most Kant scholars, then, I follow Academy editor Erich Adickes's meticulous efforts to order these literary remains chronologically. I realize that some scholars (Elfriede Conrad) have questioned the method used by Adickes or Benno Erdmann before him,²⁴ but I do not attempt to offer any major revisions of Reflection dates.

Let me also clarify in what sense this book is *not* an examination of the origins of Kant's aesthetics. I do not dive into disputes about the order of composition of Kant's third *Critique* or attempt to revise previous archeological investigations and genetic reconstructions. Following previous scholarship, I am content to claim that Kant wrote the bulk of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* between summer 1787 and late 1789, and that in all likelihood he did so in relative haste.²⁵

Finally, when I discuss which views are retained or modified in the third *Critique* (4), I propose to understand the trajectory of Kant's aesthetics in terms of five main arcs (more below). In this way, I explain the discontinuities or continuities in his views (5).

²⁴ Lu-Adler, "Constructing," 139 no. 1, which cites Elfriede Conrad, *Kants Logikvorlesungen als neuer Schlüssel zur Architektonik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1994), 46–51, 65–73. On methodological issues concerning Kant's views of logic, see also Huaping Lu-Adler, *Kant and the Science of Logic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 9–30.

²⁵ See Guyer, *Taste*, 390 no. 122; and Guyer's Introduction to Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Zammito, *Genesis*, makes useful comments on the earlier efforts by James Meredith, Michel Souriau, and, most recently, Giorgio Tonelli, "La formazione del testo della *Kritik der Urteilskraft*," *Revue internationale de philosophie* 8, no. 4 (1954): 423–48. Zammito divides up the writing of the third *Critique* into three phases: a transcendental grounding of aesthetics (summer 1787 to 1788); a cognitive phase, incorporating a new theory of reflective judgment (late 1788 to May 1789); and an ethical turn (late summer to fall 1789). Zammito, *Genesis*, 5–6, 45. Henry Allison writes: "A good indication of the haste with which Kant composed the *Critique of Judgment* and of his changing views during the period of its composition (roughly from September 1787 through 1789) is provided by the fact that he wrote two distinct introductions to the work." Henry Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 347 no. 17. Kant wrote two different versions of the introduction to the third *Critique*. He appears to have chosen not to publish the draft of the First Introduction because he considered it to be too long.