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Contents

List of Figures

	—··· -y8···	r 0
	List of Tables	viii
	Acknowledgements	ix
	List of Abbreviations	X
	Introduction	1
1	Churchill, Chamberlain and Historians	3
	1.1 Chamberlain: Guilty Man?	3
	1.2 Why Historians Differ on Appeasement	9
2	Personalities and Policymaking	15
	2.1 Two Contrasting Personalities	15
	2.2 Who Was Who in Whitehall	23
	2.3 The Intelligence Services	42
	2.4 Churchill and Whitehall in the 1930s	45
3	Britain and the Balance of Power	48
	3.1 Measuring Power	48
	3.2 Sea Power	53
	3.3 Air Power	59
	3.4 Land Power	64
	3.5 Defence Industries	68
	3.6 The Wider Economy	74
	3.7 Public Opinion and National Morale	77
	3.8 Collective Security	80
	3.9 Intelligence and Perceptions of Power	85
4	The Darkening Scene	88
	4.1 Dealing with the Great Depression	88
	4.2 The War Debts Controversy	92
	4.3 Manchuria and the End of the Ten Year Rule	98
	4.4 Disarmament and Defence Requirements, 1932–1934	100
	4.5 Reshaping Grand Strategy, 1934	107
	4.6 Anglo-Japanese Relations	113
5	The Ethiopian and Rhineland Crises	118
	5.1 The German Threat Increases	118

page vii



Cambridge University Press & Assessment 978-1-009-20198-8 — Churchill, Chamberlain and Appeasement G. C. Peden Table of Contents More Information

vi	Contents	
	5.2 The Ethiopian Crisis5.3 Drawing Up the Rearmament Programme5.4 The Rhineland Crisis and After	122 128 132
	5.5 Rearmament and the Role of the Army5.6 Financing Rearmament	139 144
6	Chamberlain Takes Charge 6.1 Relations with the United States and Japan 6.2 Seeking a General Settlement in Europe 6.3 The Inskip Defence Review 6.4 Eden's Resignation	148 148 157 166 173
7	From the Anschluss to Munich 7.1 First Reactions to the Threat to Czechoslovakia 7.2 From May 'Crisis' to September Crisis 7.3 Berchtesgaden and Godesberg 7.4 Munich	177 177 187 194 205
8	From Munich to Prague 8.1 The Aftermath of Munich 8.2 Towards a Continental Commitment 8.3 Still Hoping for the Best 8.4 The End of Czechoslovakia	215 215 228 235 238
9	Deterrence by Guarantee 9.1 The Guarantee to Poland 9.2 Negotiations with the Soviets 9.3 Secret Contacts with Germans 9.4 The Decision for War	242 242 255 267 272
10	The Test of War 10.1 The 'Phoney War' 10.2 Norway and the Fall of Chamberlain's Government 10.3 Finest Hour 10.4 The Limits of British Power	280 280 286 292 300
11	Counterfactuals and Conclusions 11.1 What Would Churchill Have Done? 11.2 Would It Have Been Better to Fight in 1938? 11.3 Concluding Reflections	305 305 308 315
	Notes Bibliography Index	320 375 399