

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	page vii
<i>List of Tables</i>	viii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	ix
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	x
 Introduction	 1
1 Churchill, Chamberlain and Historians	3
1.1 Chamberlain: Guilty Man?	3
1.2 Why Historians Differ on Appeasement	9
2 Personalities and Policymaking	15
2.1 Two Contrasting Personalities	15
2.2 Who Was Who in Whitehall	23
2.3 The Intelligence Services	42
2.4 Churchill and Whitehall in the 1930s	45
3 Britain and the Balance of Power	48
3.1 Measuring Power	48
3.2 Sea Power	53
3.3 Air Power	59
3.4 Land Power	64
3.5 Defence Industries	68
3.6 The Wider Economy	74
3.7 Public Opinion and National Morale	77
3.8 Collective Security	80
3.9 Intelligence and Perceptions of Power	85
4 The Darkening Scene	88
4.1 Dealing with the Great Depression	88
4.2 The War Debts Controversy	92
4.3 Manchuria and the End of the Ten Year Rule	98
4.4 Disarmament and Defence Requirements, 1932–1934	100
4.5 Reshaping Grand Strategy, 1934	107
4.6 Anglo-Japanese Relations	113
5 The Ethiopian and Rhineland Crises	118
5.1 The German Threat Increases	118
	v

vi	Contents	
	5.2 The Ethiopian Crisis	122
	5.3 Drawing Up the Rearmament Programme	128
	5.4 The Rhineland Crisis and After	132
	5.5 Rearmament and the Role of the Army	139
	5.6 Financing Rearmament	144
6	Chamberlain Takes Charge	148
	6.1 Relations with the United States and Japan	148
	6.2 Seeking a General Settlement in Europe	157
	6.3 The Inskip Defence Review	166
	6.4 Eden's Resignation	173
7	From the <i>Anschluss</i> to Munich	177
	7.1 First Reactions to the Threat to Czechoslovakia	177
	7.2 From May 'Crisis' to September Crisis	187
	7.3 Berchtesgaden and Godesberg	194
	7.4 Munich	205
8	From Munich to Prague	215
	8.1 The Aftermath of Munich	215
	8.2 Towards a Continental Commitment	228
	8.3 Still Hoping for the Best	235
	8.4 The End of Czechoslovakia	238
9	Deterrence by Guarantee	242
	9.1 The Guarantee to Poland	242
	9.2 Negotiations with the Soviets	255
	9.3 Secret Contacts with Germans	267
	9.4 The Decision for War	272
10	The Test of War	280
	10.1 The 'Phoney War'	280
	10.2 Norway and the Fall of Chamberlain's Government	286
	10.3 Finest Hour	292
	10.4 The Limits of British Power	300
11	Counterfactuals and Conclusions	305
	11.1 What Would Churchill Have Done?	305
	11.2 Would It Have Been Better to Fight in 1938?	308
	11.3 Concluding Reflections	315
	<i>Notes</i>	320
	<i>Bibliography</i>	375
	<i>Index</i>	399